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THESIS ABSTRACT
This thesis deals with the struggles of two groups of skilled workers in
late 19th century Britain, engineers and compositors, to defend their position
in the division of labour in the face of pressures towards technical and
organisational change. Its principal concern is to trace and explain the
divergent long-run experiences of these two occupational groups, focusing
particularly on the period 1890-1914.
The thesis opens with a critical review of the dominant theoretical
approaches to the division of labour. Their tendency to deduce the evolution
of the division of labour from a unilinear model of capitalist development, it
is argued, renders them incapable of providing an adequate account of such
central phenomena as the ongoing complexity of the distribution of skills in
the labour force and the impact of industrial conflict on the division of labour
itself. Elements of an alternative approach offering a more satisfactory
relationship between theory and empirical cases are sketched out; their practical
fecundity is explored in the body of the thesis.
The body of the thesis is divided into three parts. Part I focuses on the
relations between skilled workers and employers in engineering and printing
before major waves of mechanisation in the l890s, highlighting those structural
features which conditioned both the forms and outcomes of conflicts over
technical change in each case. Accordingly, the characteristics of market
structure, the division of labour, and trade union and employer organisation
are analysed for both industries. The principal conclusion of this section is
that craft regulation had been eroded to a considerable extent in both industries
by employers' attempts to cheapen and intensify skilled labour within the
framework of the existing division of labour.
Part II presents a primarily narrative account of the conflicts sparked off
by a major wave of technical and organisational change in the two industries
during the 1890s, together with the extent of their resolution up to 1914. The
early success of compositors in capturing control of mechanical typesetting is
contrasted with the employers' victory over similar issues in the 1897-8
engineering lockout. These variations in craftsmen's ability to capture new
technology placed the two trades on divergent paths in relation to their future
position in the division of labour. The remainder of this section examines
engineering employers' failure fully to transform the division of labour before
1914, together with the progressive consolidation of craft regulation by the
typographical unions.
Part III explores the long-term outcomes for the position of skilled workers
in the division of labour, taking account of developments in the inter-war years,
which it is argued confirm the divergent fates of the two groups. The concluding
chapter attempts to identify the central structural forces conditioning the
differences in the outcomes in the two cases, and to balance their importance
against that of the strategic choices of the historical actors. The thesis as a
whole highlights the role of conflict between skilled workers and employers in
determining the consequences of technical and organisational change for the
position of craftsmen in the division of labour within the limits set by market
forces and technology. The outcomes of industrial conflict are in turn traced
back to Variations in the balance of forces between skilled workers and employers,
emphasising the impact of market structure and the preexisting division of labour
for the bargaining power and solidarity of each group. At the same time, it is
argued that structural factors conditioned but did not determine the actual
pattern of alliances formed by workers and employers, which depended in large
measure on an essentially political process influenced by specific historical
conjunctures, past experiences of conflict and cooperation, and the strategic
choices of each group of actors.
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Introduction
The Division of Labour in History
This thesis deals with the struggles of two groups of skilled workers
in late 19th century Britain - engineers and compositors - to defend their
position in the division of labour in the face of pressures towards technical
and organisational change. The choice of this subject flows from a desire to
bring together a prominent theme in recent writing on the social history of
the working class - skilled workers' resistance to the extension of managerial
control over the organisation of production - with current debates on the
development of the division of labour in advanced industrial societies.
As historians in Britain, the United States, and France began in the
1960s to turn away from the study of labour institutions and organisations in
search of the authentic experience of the rank and file worker, their attention
was increasingly drawn to the pervasive conflicts between skilled workers and
their employers over whose values should govern the division of labour. Drawing
1on prior contributions by Thompson and Hobsbawm, historians such as Montgomery
Hinton, and Scott have rediscovered the struggles of 19th and early 20th century
skilled workers to impose on industrial production a comprehensive framework of
regulation rooted in their conception of themselves as craftsmen. This
alternative 'moral economy' of the workshop, reinforced by custom, ritual,
and perception of market interest, contained claims to autonomy and control on
Place of publication is London unless otherwise indicated.
1 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (Revised edition,
Harmondsworth, 1968), especially Ch.8; ibid., 'Time, Work Discipline and
Industrial Capitalism', Past and Present 38 (1967); and ~., 'The Moral
Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century', Past and Present
50 (1971); these last two articles are concerned with the transition to a
capitalist market economy and are only applied by analogy to struggles over
the division of labour within machine production. E.J. Hobsbawm, Labouring
Men, (1964), especially the essay, 'Custom, Wages and Workload'.
xthe job and to a distinctive place in the division of labour which skilled
workers defended tenaciously against encroachments, whether by their employers
2or by other groups of workers.
In all three countries at the turn of the century, as these historians
have shown, managerial efforts to reorganise production by promoting labourers
onto machines, by forcing craftsmen to work more than one machine at a time,
and by introducing new systems of incentive payment and scientific management
were opposed by a battery of weapons including slowdowns, refusal to instruct
labourers, boycotts, sympathetic action, short stoppages, and prolonged strikes.
Historians have seen a deep significance in these struggles for the
development of labour politics at the turn of the 20th century, and in some
cases have discerned a movement for a new mode of production based on workers'
control emerging from these efforts to defend craft prerogatives within the
3framework of industrial capitalism. Yet by contrast comparatively little
2 D. Montgomery, Workers' Control in America, (Cambridge, 1979); J. Hinton,
The First Shop Stewards' Movement, (1973); and J. Scott, The Glassworkers
of Carmaux, (Cambridge, Mass., 1974). Other works in a similar tradition
include Britian, I. Prothero, Artisans and Politics in Early 19th Century
London, (Folkestone, 1979); for the US, A. Dawley, Class and Community:
The Industrial Revolution in Lynn, Massachusetts, (Cambridge, Mass., 1976);
for France, B. Moss, The Origins of the French Labour Movement: The Socialism
of Skilled Workers, (Berkeley, 1976); W. Sewell, 'Property, Labour and the
Emergence of Socialism in France, 1789-1848', (unpublished paper, Institute
for Advanced Study, Princeton, 1978); and ibid., 'Corporations republicaines:
The Revolutionary Idiom of Parisian Workers in 1848', Comparative Studies in
Society and History, 21 (2) (1979); P. Fridenson, 'France, Etats-unis:
genese de l'usine nowvelle', Recherches 32-33 (1978) is a comparison of the
French and American experiences.
3 See especially Montgomery, Workers' Control; Moss, Origins; and Hinton,
Stewards, who gives a larger independent role to politics and ideology.
an exchange on the relationship between workplace struggles and labour
politics see J. Monds, 'Workers' Control and the Historians: The New
Economism' and the reply by Hinton in New Left Review 97 (1976).
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attention has been paid to the consequences of such struggles for the longer-
range development of the division of labour in particular industries or
national economies. This lacuna stems in large measure from historians' implicit
reliance on a theoretical framework which, whether drawn from Marxism or
modernisation theory, held that craft organisation was bound up with archaic
forms of production destined to be swept away by the inexorable march of industrial
development, at least so long as such development remained within the confines
of a capitalist economy.
The tacit adherence to a teleological model of the evolution of the
division of labour can be found among historians with widely divergent method-
ological approaches and ideological orientations. Thus for example in the labour
aristocracy debate which has dominated much of recent British social history,
Marxist and anti-Marxist historians have largely been agreed that at some paint
between 1850 and 1914 technical and organisational change undermined the
objective foundations of skilled workers' privileged position in the workplace,
thereby reducing the sectional diversity of the working class. The main difference
have arisen over the periodisation of this development and, of course, over its
social and political implications. Thus both Foster and Pelling have argued for
the homogeneously proletarian character of the British working class during
the third quarter of the 19th century, while Hobsbawm and Gray date the erosion
of skilled workers' position from the 1890s.4 From another quarter, the single
4 J. Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution, (1974), ch.7 and
especially pp.223-38; H. Pelling, 'The Concept of the Labour Aristocracy' in
popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain, (1968); G. Stedman
Jones, 'Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution', New Left Review 90
(1975), pp.63-65, accepts a modified version of Foster's position. E.J.
Hobsbawm 'The Labour Aristocracy in 19th Century Britain' in ~., Labouring
Men, pp.289, 300-301; and R.Q. Gray, The Labour Aristocracy in Victorian Edinburg
(Oxford, 1976), ch.9. The whole notion of a 'homogenisation' of the working
class in 19th century Britain is criticised effectively by A. Reid in 'The
Labour Aristocracy in British Social History', Our History 5(1979) and ibid.,
The Division of Labour in the British Shipbuilding Industry, 1880-1920 ~th
Special Reference to Clydeside, (Cambridge Ph.D. Thesis, 1980), ch.7.
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attempt we possess at a general interpretation of working class life in the major
industrial nations of Western Europe at the end of the 19th century, Peter Stearns
Lives of Labour, (1975) while paying tribute to the diversity of experience among
various trades, nonetheless adopts as its central focus the adaptation of workers
to the inevitable loss of autonomy and control at work consequent on the intro-
duction of new technology and on changes in business organisation.
If social historians have often been content to rely upon an unexamined
evolutionary model of the development of the division of labour as a backdrop
to their own empirical studies, contemporary social theorists and researchers
have in turn increasingly come to question such models, inspired in part by
the work of social historians themselves. In the English-speaking world the
problems of conceptualising the development of the division of labour have been
raised most sharply by the debate touched off by Braverman's Labour and Monopoly
capitalS and by the emerging literature on labour market segmentation. In
choosing to focus on these discussions, our contention is not that they permit an
exhaustive review of theoretical approaches to the division of labour - a task tha
would carry us well beyond the confines of this thesis - but rather that they high
light some of the ways in which developments in the realm of theory have opened uF
a space within which empirical and historical research can offer a distinctive
contribution. While Braverman's work is devoted to the exposition of a deskilling
model, the strictures raised against it in the discussion which follows apply with
equal force to those evolutionary theories which arrive at opposite conclusions,
namely that the development of the division of labour results in a steady increase
in the skills and education of the labour force, as for example in human
6capital theory. A more sophisticated version of this second view can
5 (New York, 1974).
6 G. Becker, Human Capital, (New York, 1964).
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be found in the work of the so-called 'new working class' theorists, who
argue that advanced technology, rarticularly automation, generates new
skills and forms of work organisation which progressively supersede older
7ones based on craft and assembly line methods. The evolutionary assumptions
shared by 'deskilling' and 'upgrading' theorists lead both groups to agree
that technical progress tends to eliminate craft skills and methods of
production; the two groups differ principally on the skill content of the
new jobs which replace them.
Labour and Monopoly Capital represents the most powerful contemporary
restatement of the view that the development of the division of labour
capitalism tends, in the long run, to create a relatively deskilled and
homogenous proletariat. In attempting to extend Marx lS analysis of the
labour process into the 20th century, Braverman set out to delineate both
the transformation of the division of labour within particular occupations
and that between occupations in the economy as a whole (what Marx calls the
social division of labour). We will confine our present discussion of
Braverman's work to his account of the transformation of blue-collar work,
at the risk of obscuring his more original contributions to the analysis of
changes in office work and of long-term shifts in the occupational structure
itself
Braverman, like Marx, sees the development of the division of labour
as a series of stages in the separation of conception and execution, whereby
7 S. Mallet, The New Working Class, (trans. A. and B. Shepherd, !~ttingham,
1975); A. Touraine, La conscience ouvriere, (Paris, 1966). Good critical
reviews of the literature appear in ~. Mann, Consciousness and Action Among
the Western Working Class, (1973); D. Gallie, In Search of the clew Working
Class, (Crullibridge,1978), ch.l; ana C. Sabel, Industrial Conflict and the
Sociology of the Labour Market, (unpublished manuscript forthcoming from
Cambr idge University Press, based on a Harvard Ph.D. Thesis 1978), chs. 2-4.
xiv
knowledge of and control over the labour process is eXpropriated from the
direct producers by managers and technicians in the service of capital.8
Stripped of their particular skills and confined within a fragmented and
hierarchical division of labour, industrial workers come to approximate ever
more closely to the ideal of abstract labour power. This analysis takes as
its point of departure Marx's schema in volume one of Capital in which simple
cooperation gives way to manufacture and then to machine production, as the
worker loses control first of the productive process as a whole and the
appropriation of the product, and then over the particular task in which he
9is engaged. Within modern machine production, Braverman sees the deskilling
8
In this exposition we have focused on the central continuities between Marx
and Braverman's analyses. Other commentators have drawn attention to signifi-
cant areas of divergence, such as the absence in Braverman's account of a
theory of crisis tendencies based on a falling rate of profit caused by a
rising organic composition of capital. See D. Stark, 'Class Structure, Class
Struggle, and the Labour Process: A Critique of Braverman', (unpublished
paper, Harvard University, 1978), pp.18-43; and M. Burawoy, 'Towards a Marxist
Theory of the Labour Process: Braverman and Beyond', Politics and Society,
8(4) (1978). These divergences are, however, of minor importance for the
issues discussed here.
9
Marx, Capital, vol.I (trans. B. Fowkes, Harmondsworth, 1976), chs.13-15. In
the unpublished sixth chapter entitled 'Results of the Immediate Process of
Production', Marx draws a distinction between 'formal subordination' and 'real
subordination' of the worker to the capitalist organisation of production.
This distinction is related to that between 'manufacture' and 'modern industry'
or 'machine production', but not identical with it, since real subordination
may not yet prevail in all areas of the factory despite the transition to
machine production; this chapter is included as an appendix in the Penguin
Marx Library edition of Capital vol.I, OPe cit .• Several writers have sought
to develop the distinction between 'real' and 'formal' subordination as a
basis for analysing struggles between managers and workers over the reorgani-
sation of production within modern industry. See Brighton Labour Process Group,
The Capitalist Labour Process', Capital and Class 1 (1977); and T. Elger,
'Valorisation and "Oeskilling": A Critique of Braverman', Capital and Class 7
(1979), pp.63-67. For the suggestion that these categories provide an
appropriate point of departure for analyses of industrial conflict in 19th
century Britain, see Stedman Jones, 'Class Struggle', pp.49-50.
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of the worker as the result of two complementary developments: the systematic
reorganisation of the division of labour according to the principles of
'scientific management' and the continuous application of science and
technology to industrial production.
In order to eliminate those vestiges of craft control which had survived
the transition to machine production, management embarked on a self-conscious
programme of reorganising the division of labour. Following principles first
enunciated by Taylor at the turn of the century, management has continuously
reduced the knowledge and discretion of the individual worker, has centralised
the planning and direction of production in its own hands, and has imposed on
the shop floor a fragmented and tightly supervised distribution of tasks.
This process has gone hand in hand with the application of scientific
knowledge to production and the consequent development of ever more advanced
forms of mechanisation. The capacity to control production is thus increas-
ingly polarised between managers and technicians on the one hand and shop
floor workers on the other:lO
The more science is incorporated into the labour process, the less
the worker understands of the process; the more sophisticated an
intellectual product the machine becomes, the less control and
comprehension of the machine the worker has.
By removing the last remaining elements of skill and initiative from the
labour process, automation - of which Braverman treats numerically-controlled
machine-tools as the most advanced representative - reduces the worker to a
passive attendant of the machine. In a similar vein, the French Marxist
industrial sociologist Michel Freyssenet, who developed a model analogous to
Braverman's independently, treats automation as a fourth distinct stage in
10 Braverman, Lal::o.Jrand Monopo ly Capi tal, p. 425.
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the capitalist division of labour, in which the worker is separated from
11physical contact with the product.
Braverman is well aware of the uneven pattern of development across
particular industries; indeed, this phenomenon plays a central role in his
analysis of shifts in the occupational structure, as labour tends to pile
up in relatively unmechanised sectors which are then transformed in turn:12
This displacement of labour as the subjective element of the process,
and its subordination as an objective element in a productive process
now conducted by management, is an ideal realised by capital only within
definite limits, and unevenly among industries. The principle is
itself restrained in its application by the nature of the various specific
and determinate processes of production. Moreover, its very application
brings into being new crafts and technical specialities which are at
first the province of labour rather than management. Thus in industry
all forms of labour coexist: the craft, the hand or machine detail
worker, the automatic machine or flow process.
The survival of older forms of production does not, however, imply the existence
of counter-tendencies to the basic deskilling model, but it is rather the
product of temporary local obstacles to the application of the principles at
work in the rest of the economy, which will ultimately be extended to a
greater or lesser extent to these sectors as well. Thus as his recent
defenders have been at pains to reiterate,13 Braverman offers us a classic
evolutionary model, which explains away present diversity by reference to
a postulated unitary future, itself the product of a unilinear pattern of
development.
As an indictment of the 'degradation of work in the 20th century',
Labour and Monopoly Capital stands as a document of undoubted moral force,
and serves as a valuable corrective to the over-sanguine pronouncements of
11 M. Freyssenet, La division capitaliste du travail, (Paris, 1977) especially
pp.53-69.
12 Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, p.172.
13 See A. Zimbalist, (ed.), Case Studies on the Labour Process, especially his
introduction, pp.xv-xvi.
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industrial sociologists in the 19S0s and 60s on the human consequences of
automation. But in the course of the lively debate inspired by Braverman's
work, a range of substantive and methodological criticisms have been raised
which taken together amount to a fundamental challenge to its global
, 14analyt1cal framework. Drawing on arguments advanced in this debate and on
results emerging from the related literature on labour market segmentation,
we hope to point the way towards an analytic framework which will be both
theoretically more compelling and empirically more fruitful.
The principal substantive objections raised by Braverman's critics
have centered on the adequacy of the deskilling model as an account of the
development of the division of labour under capitalism.1S Much of this
criticism has centered on the structural sources of diversity,within the
division of labour. First, attention has been drawn to the systematic
reproduction of highly skilled manual workers as a result of progress in the
division of labour. Braverman's model stresses the polarisation of knowledge
and control over production between managers and technicians on the one hand,
and the working class as a whole on the other. Considerable evidence exists
however, to suggest that this process must also be understood as one of
polarisation within the working class itself. As Sabel has persuasively argued,
each wave of technical innovation even as it reduces the skills of a large
14 The major reviews and critical responses to Braverman's work include:
Stark, 'Class Structure'; Burawoy, 'A Marxist Theory of the Labour Process';
Elger, 'Valorisation and "Deskilling"'; R. Jacoby, 'Review of Braverman',
Telos 27 (1976); G. Mackenzie, 'The Political Economy of the American Working
Class', British Journal of Sociology 28(2) (1977); A. Friedman, Industry
and Labour, (1977); R. Coombes, 'Labour and Monopoly Capital', New Left
Review 107 (1978); J. Rubery, 'Structured Labour Markets, Worker Organisation
and Low Pay', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2(1) (1978); and T. Cutler,
'The Romance of Labour',Economyand Society 7(1) (1978).
15 The most extensive critique of Braverman on this question is Elger,
'Valorisation and "Deskilling"'.
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body of workers at the same time creates a demand for a smaller number of
workers with enhanced skills to install, repair, and even design new
machinery, and to adapt new processes to shop floor conditions:16
•••As production becomes more mechanised, it becomes more prone to
(ever more costly) disturbances. It is thus impossible to dispense
with a core of skilled workers. Whether they are engaged in
repairing the existing equipment or installing the next generation
of technology, they must be capable of understanding each task as
part of a larger complex of tasks, as a case of the application of
the overarching principles of construction. They must, in other
words, grasp the principles of a given technology abstractly enough
so that they can repair defects which occur for the first time.
Such workers may tend to form a progressively smaller proportion of the
labour force as a whole, certain of their skills may be routinised and devalued
while others pass from one craft to another, but evidence from both large
integrated car plants and automated chemical process plants supports the
17view that they cannot be dispensed with as a social category.
A second significant line of demarcation separates those workers
with intermediate or plant-specific skills from ordinary unskilled workers.
16 Sabel, Industrial Conflict, ch.2, pp.33-34.
17 On car plants, see the studies by A. Touraine,L'evolutiort du travail
ouvrier aux usines Renault, (Paris, 1955) and P. Naville,J.-P. Bardou,
P. Brachet, and C. Levy,oL'etatentreprerteur: lecas dela regie Renault,
(Paris, 1969). These studies are extensively reanalysedby Freyssenet,
Division capitaliste du travail, ch.2, and by Sabel, Industrial Conflict,
ch.2, pp.47-60. On skilled craftsmen in chemical plants, see D. Wedderburn
and R. Crompton, Workers' Attitudes and Technology, (Cambridge, 1965);
Gallie, New Working Class; and the papers by Coriat, Dadoy, and Linhart in
the proceedings of the Colloque de Dourdan, La division du travail, (Paris,
1978). Freyssenet, like Sabel, puts forward a polarisation model in which
progress in the division of labour calls forth new groups of 'super-skilled'
(surqualifies) workers even as it deskills a larger number, and this
process is then applied in turn to the ranks of the super-skilled themselves.
But when he comes to analyse the transition to automation, Freyssenet tacitly
discards polarisation in favour of a straightforward deskilling model, so
that the upshot of his account converges strikingly with Braverman's. See
~., Division capitaliste du travail, pp.53-85.
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Studies of both the 'new working class' and of internal labour markets have
emphasised the strategic importance within technically advanced production
processes of workers with a body of particular skills generally obtained on
the job. such workers, of whom control panel operators in automated
chemical plants are the best-known example, are responsible for supervising
expensive capital equipment, and management must rely on their accumulated
experience of its operation if costly and dangerous breakdowns are to be
Od d 18aVOl e • In more conventional forms of mass production such as those found
in the car industry, large numbers of workers with intermediate skills such
as tool-setters are likewise required to maintain the flow of Taylorised and
interdependent production processes, though these may be recruited both from
the ranks of downwardly mobile craftsmen and upwardly mobile ex-unskilled
19workers. Despite their strategic importance, the plant-specific character.
of such workers' skills leaves them dependent on a single employer, by contrast
to the fully-skilled craftsman able to change jobs freely because his skills
are recognised on external labour market.20 At the same time, this
dependence, together with the privileges these workers enjoy in the plant,
their evident bargaining power, and their distinctive behaviour in industrial
conflicts, make it impossible to assimilate them to a model of abstract
labour power.
18 In addition to the studies cited note 7 above, see p. Doeringer and M.J.
Piore, Internal Labour Markets and Manpower Analysis, (Lexington, Mass.,
1971), and M. Mann, Workers on the Move, (Cambridge, 1973).
19 Naville et al., L'etat entrepreneur; L. Sayles, Industrial Work Groups:
Behaviour and Control, (New York, 1958); Sabel, Industrial Conflict, chs.2-3.
20 The dependence of these workers on the internal labour market is
particularly stressed by Mann, Workers on the Move, ch.3, and Sabel,
Industrial Conflict, chs.2-4.
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Finally, detailed empirical studies of the introduction of particular
innovations which have been presented as paradigmatic examples of deskilling
cast further doubt on the analytic value of this concept. The self-acting
mule appears in Capital ,as a crucial example of the use of machinery by capital.,..
ists to dislodge hand craftsmen from their position within the division
of labour. But Lazonick's study of the introduction of the self-acting mule
in the British cotton textile industry shows that hand spinners were effectively
able to capture control over the new machines, both because their employers were
divided amongst themselves by competition and because the skilled workers
themselves came to assume supervisory functions over their female and
juvenile subordinates.2l Similarly, Jones' contemporary investigation of the
impact on British engineering of the numerically-controlled machine tools
which figure so prominently in Labour and Monopoly Capital reveals a wide
range of outcomes - including in some cases the enhancement of craftsmen's
skills - depending on market structures, managerial strategies, and union
. . 22organ1.sat1.on.
If empirical studies of the division of labour in advanced sectors cast
doubt on the deskilling model as an image of the future, the literature on
labour market segmentation suggests that its predictions of the disappearance
of backward sectors are founded on a failure to analyse the economic context
of innovation at the level of the individual firm. Braverman, like many
contemporary Marxists, derives his analysis of the labour process directly
from general pressures towards capital accumulation operating at the level
of the economy as a whole. But as Friedman, Rubery, and others have suggested,
21 W. Lazonick, 'Industrial Relations and Technical Change: The Case of the
Self-Acting Mule', Cambridge Journal of Economics 3 (.3), (1979).
22 B. Jones, 'Destruction or Re-Distribution of Engineering Skills?: The
Case of Numerical Control', in S. Wood (ed.), Labour and Deskilling,
(forthcoming 1981).
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this analysis takes place at too high a level of abstraction to explain why
individual firms in particular sectors of the economy introduce new techniques,
23and obscures the link between advanced and backward sectors. Studies of
labour market segmentation have demonstrated that there are systematic diverg-
ences between those firms which invest in capital-intensive technology and
those which rely on archaic methods of production: large firms will even create
divisions between their main plants producing for stable demand with advanced
technology and subsidiaries producing for unstable demand with outdated
techniques characteristic of the secondary sector. In many industries such
as automobiles or electronics, the small firms which comprise the secondary
sector are systematically linked to the large firms of the primary sector
by sub-contracting arrangements which enable the uncertainties associated
with seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in demand to be passeq on to
24the former. There can therefore be said to exist structural tendencies
23 Friedman, Industry and Labour, passim.; Rubery, 'Structured Labour Markets';
Cutler, 'Romance of Labour'. It should be evident that we are out of sympathy
with those of Braverman's critics who have suggested that his analysis of the
labour process needs to be more tightly bound up with global analyses of
valorisation and accumulation, e.g., Brighton Labour Process Group, 'Capitalist
Labour Process'; Coombes, 'Labour and Monopoly Capital'; and EIger, 'Valor-
isation and "Deskilling"'. While French scholars pursuing an analogous project
have produced certain interesting results, their willingness to deduce
developments in the labour process from general tendencies of capitalist
development leads them on the whole to reproduce most of the weaknesses of
Braverman's analysis, including an uncritical acceptance of the deskilling
thesis. See M. Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, (1979), part I,
and B. Coriat, L'Atelier et le chronometre: une etude sur le taylorisme, le
fordisme, et la production de masse, (PariS, 1979).
24 See especially, Doeringer and Piore, Internal Labour Markets, M.J. Piore,
'Dualism as a Response to Flux and Uncertainty' and 'The Technological
Foundations of Dualism and Discontinuity' in S. Berger and M.J. Piore,
Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies, Cambridge, 1980, and
ibid., Birds of Passage, (Cambridge, 1979), ch.2. See also Sabel, Industrial
conflict, ch.2, and 'Marginal Work and Marginal Workers in Industrial Society',
Challenge, (March-April, 1979) for an elegant presentation of the theory.
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within the economy which continually reproduce rather than extinguish archaic
forms of production in the secondary sector.
Perhaps the most prominent among the methodological objections which
have been raised against Braverman's model is his exclusion of workers'
resistance from a causal role in the development of the division of labour.25
While acknowledging that workers' struggles may reduce the pace of work or
delay the introduction of new technology, Braverman explicitly argues that the
objective development of the division of labour under capitalism (in his
language the formation of 'class-in-itself') can be analysed without reference
to workers' consciousness and organisation ('class-for-itself,).26 Here he
broadly follows the line of argument in Capital in which workers' struggles
primarily affect the rate and mode of exploitation (e.g. the campaign for a
shorter working day produces a shift from absolute to relative surplus value)
27rather than modifying the division of labour in a sUbstantive way. Many
critics have contended in opposition to this view that workers' organisations
25 This objection has been raised by all of the reviewers cited in note 14
above, with the exception of Cutler, who is concerned to argue explicitly
against an 'anthropology of labour' underlying Braverman's analysiS.
Zirnbalist, Labour Process, pp.xii-xiv, seeks to defend Braverman against
these charges by reiterating the claim that the market renders workers'
resistance irrelevant in the long-run by eliminating high-cost production
methods and by permitting capitalists to shift their investments away from
areas of strong union organisation. See also Zirnbalist's essay on printing
in the same volume.
26 Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, pp.26-30.
27 See Marx's discussion of the economic consequences of the Factory Acts in
Capital Vol.I, ch.1S, and of the relation between absolute and relative
surplus value in chs.16-l7: the assumption is always that capital is able
to find an adequate solution to the pressures created by workers' resistancei
the crisis tendencies identified do not stem essentially from this source.
Freyssenet,Division capitaliste du travail, pp.106-ll4, argues in a parallel
but more sophisticated fashion that it is the effectiveness of workers'
resistance within the existing stage of the division of labour which
precipitates the transition to the next stage.
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and resistance may play an active role in determining the structure of the
division of labour itself, though they have found it more difficult to specify
the mechanisms whereby this occurs. Thus, for example, Friedman has suggested
that strategic groups of workers in the core of the economy are able, in the
context of the greater freedom from market constraint attendant on their
employers' oligopoly power, to force the latter to grant them substantial
autonomy and security on the job. Similarly, a number of writers have drawn
attention to the contribution of trade unions to labour market segmentation
through their role in the creation of seniority systems, restrictions On layoffs,
and craft demarcation lines.28
A final methodological difficulty raised by critics of Labour and Monopoly
Capital can be traced directly to its underlying evolutionary assumptions.· It
remains ambiguous throughout the work whether its true subject is capitalism
in general or 20th century America in particular: all the evidence is drawn
from American history but is used essentially to illustrate what are presented
as general tendencies of capitalist development. Not only does such an account
represent a partial and selective reading of American experience, as Palmer and
29others have suggested, but it also reflects a more basic confusion between
theoretical and historical modes of analysis. Braverman proceeds as if the
trajectory of American social and economic development can be read off from
general tendencies rooted in the logic of capitalism itself, so that the pattern
28 Friedman, Industry and Labour; Rubery, 'Structured Labour Markets', Piore,
'Dualism', and ibid., Birds of Passage, ch.2.
29 B. Palmer, 'Class, Conception, and Control: The Thrust for Efficiency,
Managerial Views of Labour and the Working Class Rebellion, 1903-22',
Review of Radical Political Economics, 7U) (1975); M. Davis, 'The Stop-Watch
and the Wooden Shoe: Scientific Management and the Industrial Workers of
the World', Radical America, (Jan-Feb 1975); Stark, 'Class Structure', pp.55-82.-
Montgomery's work has, of course, provided the principal source of objections
to Braverman's reading of late 19th and early 20th century American history.
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need only be illustrated rather than analysed in its own right. In a sense
this objection follows from the preceding ones: if there is no single
evolutionary tendency within the division of labour itself, and if particular
industrial and market structures, along with workers' struggles, fundamentally
condition the introduction of new techniques, then clearly analyses of the
development of the division of labour must be empirical and historical as much
as abstract and theoretical. And as we suggested at the outset, these
strictures apply not only to Marxist analyses, but to all theories which
postulate a unilinear evolutionary model for the division of labour.
A number of conclusions follow from our discussion of the deskilling
and labour market segmentation debates. The identification of broad
tendencies operating at the level of the economy as a whole leaves indeterminate
their impact on the division of labour within particular industries and the
position within them of individual occupational groups. Technical and
organisational innovation create a diverse and shifting set of positions within
the division of labour which do not cluster around a single tendential pole,
and the precise lines of demarcation between the different positions by nature
contain a significant arbitrary element. How the set of necessary tasks
created by technology are combined into jobs and allocated among competing
social groups is a problem that does not readily lend itself to ~ priori
theoretical analysis. We can identify in advance some of the forces which
will condition the outcome in particular cases - notably the structure of
product markets and of the pre-existing division of labour - but the way these
structures will combine in practice with the struggles of organised groups of
workers and employers is properly the subject of empirical and historical analyse~
It follows not only that theoretical analyses cannot substitute themselves for
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empirical and historical studies of particular cases, but more strongly
that the latter, when properly informed by theoretical considerations, may
shed fundamental light on the process whereby the structure of the division
of labour is determined. But before proceeding to outline the empirical
study of skilled workers and the division of labour which will occupy us in
the body of this thesis, it will be best to consider some problems raised
by the concept of skill itself.
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Skilled Workers and Craft Regulation
In the preceding discussion of the division of labour we have employed
the concept of skill as if it corresponded unproblematically to an identifiable
set of technical capacities. Yet its definition raises issues stemming directly
from the interpenetration of technology and social relations in the division of
labour itself. Skill can, of course, be loosely defined as that combination of
knowledge about production and manual dexterity sufficient to enable a worker
to perform a given task, and we have distinguished between workers possessing
general skills based on an abstract (if only implicit) understanding of the
principles of a given technology, and those who have instead accumulated a body
of particular expertise confined to the workings of a single factory or set of
machines. Such a technical definition of skill, however, specifies neither that
the workers who perform a task are the only ones who could do so, nor the relation
between those workers and others who actually or potentially could replace them.
This social dimension of skill, the fact that technical capabilities are
associated with socially defined groups whose exclusive claims to them are often
contested both by management and by other groups of workers, is equally central
to its significance for the division of labour.
The duality in the concept of skill, rooted in the dual character of the
division of labour itself, has given rise to two equally one-sided interpretations
The first is the technical definition in which skill is seen simply as the
intellectual and physical capacity to perform a particular task. Such a
definition underlies the whole body of literature which treats the history
of the division of labour as a function of the history of technology, so
that the rate and pattern of industrial development depends on the abilities
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of inventors and entrepreneurs to devise solutions to technical problems and
30to adapt these to the requirements of the market. This perspective, together
with the technical definition of skill which underlies it, is inadequate
because its failure to understand the embeddedness of technology in a set of
social relations affords it no means of explaining why a group of workers should
retain its position in the division of labour once there exist technical
31possibilities for their displacement.
The second definition, developed in reaction against the first, tends
to treat skill simply as an aspect of the social relations of the workplace.
In the more extreme expressions of this perspective, skill appears essentially
as a credential, a weapon used by a group of workers to defend its corporate
interests against management and against other workers. This 1S, for example
the position adopted by Turner in his analysis of trade unionism in the British
cotton textiles industry:32
From the viewpoint of trade union development, at least, workers
are thus equally 'skilied' or 'unskilled' according to whether
entry to their occupation is deliberately restricted, and not in
the first place according to the nature of the occupation itself.
More recently, Parkin has elevated the struggles of skilled workers to defend
their position in the division of labour against the encroachments of manage-
ment and other workers alike to the rank of a basic principle of stratification
30 Perhaps the most distinguished example of this strand of the historiography
is D.S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, (Cambridge, 1972).
31 A good critique of the technical conception of skill, focused on the
ergonomic and job evaluation literature, appears in p. Sadler, 'Sociological
Aspects of Skill', British Journal of Industrial Relations 8Gl (1970),
which treats the capture of mechanical typesetting by British compositors as
a central case in point.
32 H.A. Turner, Trade Union Growth, Structure andPolicZ, (1962), p.114 and
Section III for the overall argument.
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33under the name 'dual closure'. This second position, though more fruitful
than the first, has the evident disadvantage of failing to explain why any
group of workers cannot in principle claim a monopoly over any task, and
runs up against the objection, founded both on the theoretical and empirical
studies discussed in the previous section and on the experience of everyday
life, that the division of labour has a definite structure requiring real skills
and training for the performance of certain tasks even if the question of who
will have access to them remains open.
Some of the dangers implicit in the purely social definition of skill
can be illustrated by the divisions within the ranks of those who share this
basic assumption. While most commentators stressing the arbitrary character
of demarcation lines based on skill have called attention to the role of
workers' struggles and organisations in their creation, others have moved on
to the denial of real skill differences among workers, and thence to the claim
that observable differences between groups of workers are in fact the product
of employers' conscious strategies to divide the labour force. such an
assertion can be found in its baldest form in Foster's claim that the objective
skill content had been removed from most industrial jobs in Britain by the
middle of the 19th-century, so that skilled workers such as engineers should
properly be viewed as "pace-makers" whose privileged position in the workshop
flowed from their willingness "to implement technically phrased instructions
from above" and to supervise other workers.34 Similarly, in the work of radical
33
F. Parkin, 'Strategies of Social Closure in Class Formation' in ibid., (ed.),
The Social Analysis of Class Structure (1974), and ibid., Marxis~ass
Theory: A Bourgeois Critique (1979), especially ch.6.
34 Foster, Class Struggle, pp.224, 237-38.
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American economists such as Stone and Gordon, the job ladders within American
plants are seen as the result of management's efforts to create hierarchical
divisions among workers rather than a reflection either of real skill differences
35between jobs or of workers' own demands. Quite apart from their empirical
adequacy as an account of the position of skilled workers in mid-19th century
Britain or of their semi-skilled counterparts in 20th century America - both
of which have been effectively criticised - such conceptions of skill divisions
as arbitrary creations from above obscure the real bargaining power of these
workers and the persistent conflicts which arise between themselves and
management over the defence of their prerogatives.36 The value of an emphasis
on the social construction of skill lies precisely in the fact that it opens
up the question of what forces determine the position of different groups in·
the division of labour, but an over-rigid and dogmatic assertion of the
non-existence of real skills threatens to foreclose just this question.
Our own view is rather that the social and technical aspects of skill
are analytically distinct, without being empirically separable or reducible
to one another. This means that any statement about the division of labour
35 K. Stone, 'The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry' ,Review of
Radical Political Economics 6(2) (1974); D. Gordon, Theories of Poverty and
Unemployment, (Lexington, Mass., 1972); R. Edwards, M. Reich, and D. Gordon,
(eds.), Labour Market Segmentation, (Lexington, Mass., 1973); and R. Edwards,
Contested Terrain, (New York, 1979), especially chs.4, 7, and 8.
36 Foster's position has been criticised by J. Field, 'British Historians and
the Concept of the Labour Aristocracy', Radical History Review 19 (1978-79);
see also below pp.41-S0. The radical economists' account of the
transformation of the steel industry has been convincingly challenged by
B. Elbaum and F. Wilkinson, 'Industrial Relations and Uneven Development:
A Comparative Study of the British and American Steel Industries', Cambridge
Journal of Economics 3(3) (1979). Their general position is refuted in
Sabel, Industrial Conflict, ch.2, pp.38-46, and Piore, 'Dualism' and
'Technological Foundations' •
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is necessarily a statement about the relations between employers, workers, and
machines rather than between two of these terms alone. Thus a particular form
of the division of labour is not simply a combination of passive factors of
production by the entrepreneur to produce a given commodity, but also involves
a set of social relations among people whose subjective qualities and conception
of themselves are as integral to the operation of that form of production as
'Ii' 37are their technical capab1 t1es. To put the paint more simply, the
subjective attributes of the labour force have an objectivity for the employer,
and may figure explicitly in the latter's strategic calculations, as where
special efforts are made to recruit workers with distinct social orientations,
whether women, peasants, or indeed skilled craftsmen; these subjective
qualities of the labour force may equally become constraints on capital
accumulation.
At the same time, neither workers nor their employers are free to
reshape the division of labour in their own image. Technology and market
structures act as constraints which rule out certain ways of organising
production without determining the precise shape of the division of labour that
will be adopted. The compatibility of particular technologies with different
forms of the division of labour is born out most clearly by a recent study of
'twin' French and German factories making the same products with similar
technologies. To be sure, certain common principles of organisation emerged
37 For a recognition of this point by a sophisticated economic historian
concerned essentially with the relationship between market forces,
entrepreneurship, and technical change, see Landes, Unbound Prometheus,
p.3l7: "•••reorganisation of work entailed reorganisation of labour:
the relationship of the men to one another and to their employers were
implicit in the mode of production; technical and social patterns reinforced
each other ••• Labour is not a factor like others. It is active where
equipment and material are passive. It has a mind of its own: it resists as
well as responds."
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from these studies: both French and German firms found it necessary for
example to distinguish in some way between skilled and unskilled workers,
though they drew the line between the two differently. But the divergences
between the two countries in such matters as overall skill levels, lines of
promotion, intensity of supervision, layers of bureaucratic hierarchy, and
range of wage differentials were so substantial and systematic that the
authors of the study were led to postulate an effet societal to account for
38them.
This argument is not maant to deny the unquestionable fact that lower-
cost techniques of production will in the long-run tend to drive out higher-
cost techniques, at least where there is a stable demand for the product. But
competition of this kind acts in a relatively crude and undifferentiated
manner, eliminating certain firms or sectors (often very slowly) without
necessarily compelling all survivors to adopt a single method of production.
In many cases, moreover, inter-capitalist competition may impede collective
action and therefore undermine employers' ability to dislodge strategic groups
of workers from their position in the division of labour, rather than intensify
the pressures to introduce new techniques and raise productivity, as in the
standard Marxian and neo-classical models.39 We have already noted such
38 M. Maurice, and F. Sellier, lA Societal Analysis of Industrial Relations',
British Journal of Industrial Relations 17(3) (1979), which is an abridged
version of a longer article entitled 'Production de la hierarchie dans
l'entreprise: recherche d'un effet societal. Comparaison France - Allemagne',
Reuve Francaise de Sociologie, (1979). See also M. Brossard and M. Maurice
'Existe-t-il un modele universel des structures d'organisation?', Sociologie
du Travail 4/1974. This study is reanalysed by Sabel, Industrial Conflict,
ch.l, pp.48-53, and ibid., 'French and German Factories', (unpublished
paper, M.I.T., 1979).
39 For a more developed version of this argument, see W. Lazonick, F. Wilkinson,
and J. Zeitlin, 'The Labour Process, Market Structure and Marxian Theory',
Cambridge Journal of Economics 3(3) (1979).
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'perverse' effects of competition in the case of the British mule-spinners, and
we will have occasion to call attention to their importance in the struggle
over the introduction of composing machines in printing as well.
Thus while technology and market structures impose definite constraints
on the division of labour, their effect is deeply equivocal and leaves a
significant amount of indeterminacy as to the actual arrangements prevailing
on the shop floor. Hence the particular division of labour adopted will depend
in large measure on the outcome of conflicts between workers and employers.
These conflicts, together with those factors conditioning the relative balance
of forces between workers and employers, will form the central focus of this
thesis.
These theoretical considerations can best be amplified in relation to the
category of workers with which we will be centrally concerned in this theSis,
skilled craftsmen. As we argued above, the development of the division of
labour in the advanced sector of the economy creates a continual demand for a
diminishing number of workers with general skills even as it creates a larger
number of jobs which require a lesser amount of training. This process of
polarisation affects the existing ranks of craftsmen along with the rest of the
working class: among those workers possessing general skills within the existing
division of labour, some will obtain opportunities to upgrade and enhance their
skills in the new phase by adding the principles of the new technology to their
knowledge, while others will find their skills devalued and confined to a
particular body of machines for which they must compete with workers advancing
up a ladder of intermediate skills within the plant. As we shall see below, this
is precisely what happened in engineering at the end of the 19th century: the
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introduction of new machine tools and methods of workshop organisation, to
the extent that this occurred, tended to enhance the skills of some
engineering craftsmen, who became for example toolmakers, while the majority
of the fitters and turners who had dominated the industry in the second half
of the 19th century found themselves competing against non-apprenticed 'handymen'
for the right to work new machines which did not demand the full range of their
skills. In printing, by contrast, hand compositors were able to minimise the
devaluation of their skills by capturing exclusive rights to work the new
typesetting machinery and strictly regulating the terms of its competition
with hand work.
The willingness of employers to invest in the capital-intensive
technology necessary to restructure skill requirements in this way itself
depends on the nature of their product and of the demand for it. The product
itself must be amenable to standardisation, and investment in capital-intensive
technology will be further limited, as Piore and others have argued, by the
extent of a stable and predictable demand for the product. Where an unstable
demand for a variable product prevails, as in building, shipbuilding, and
newspaper printing, employers will seek to minimise the use of expensive
capital equipment tailored to a standardised process, and will therefore rely
to a greater extent on the adaptability of a skilled labour force to a wide
range of tasks. Even where a stable demand exists for a standardised product,
as in the case of motor cars and other engineering products, employers will
seek to separate out the stable from the unstable component of demand,
investing in advanced technology to produce for that segment of demand which
persists through the trough of the business cycle, and sub-contracting the
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remainder or producing it themselves with older techniques depending to a
larger extent on a combination of craft skills and unskilled labour.40
Beyond the nature of demand, the existing structure of the enterprise
may also constrain the ability of employers to transform the division of
labour. As we shall see in detail in the case of British engineering, the
small size of firms and their commitment to existing machinery and products
which remain profitable in the medium-term will discourage entrepreneurs
from risky investments in new capital equipment, despite the onset of foreign
competition. While their failure to adapt to the long-run requirements of the
world market by shifting to new products and processes would ultimately lead
to the decline of the older sectors of the British engineering industry, this
process was strikingly slow and gradual, leaving considerable space for firms
continuing to produce according to older and more labour-intensive methods.
If there are a range of objective technical and economic forces working
to sustain a demand for craft skills, these are powerfully reinforced by the
40 The relationship between the nature of the product and the organisation of
production is well set out in A.L. Stinchcombe, 'Bureaucratic and Craft
Administration of Production', Administrative Science Quarterly 4(2) U959)i
the basic argument on the relationship between stability of de~and and
segmentation appears in the works by Piore cited in note 24 above. The
precise relations between primary and secondary sectors and the strategies
employed by primary sector firms to unload the burden of adjustment to
fluctuations onto the secondary sector are explored in Sabel~ IndUstrial
Conflict, ch.2, Piore, 'Dualism', and Friedman, Industry and Labour, chs.8,
15-16. The connection between instability of demand and the persistance
of craft labour is examined for building by Stincombe, 'Craft and Bureaucratic
Administration', for shipbuilding by R.K. Brown, P. Brannen, J.M. Cousins,
and M.L. Samphier, 'The Contours of Solidarity: Social Stratification and
Industrial Relations in Shipbuilding', British Journal of Industrial Relations,
10(1) (1972), especially p.16, and S. Pollard and P. Robertson, The British
Shipbuilding Industry, 1870-1914, (Cambridge, Mass., 1979); for printing
see below, chs.1-2.
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efforts of skilled workers themselves. There is abundant evidence that
groups of skilled workers across a range of industrial economies conceive
of themselves as a community of men united by the possession of skills and
practical knowledge indispensible to production. "•••Because they define
themselves in this way," as Sabel argues, "they frequently succeed in
forcing their employers to organize work as if they did possess such knowledge
,,41
They use the collective strength afforded by their market position
to force the firm to institutionalise the existing relation between
craftsmen and the firm as a relation, not between productive agents,
but between social groups: the firm is obliged to concede to
craftsmen as a particular political entity the right to perpetuate
certain historically defined privileges with respect to both
management and fellow workers.
Two components of skilled workers' defence of their position in the
division of labour require special emphasis here: the centrality of their
self-conception as craftsmen and the importance of trade union organisation
in determining their strategies and alliances in relation both to their
employers and to other groups of workers. In referring to skilled workers
as 'craftsmen', we call attention to the importance of their conception of
themselves, their implicit world-view, for their behaviour in the workplace
and for the development of the division of labour, without endorsing
their claim to possess skills comparable to those of the handicraft artisan
capable of producing a piece of work from start to finish under his own
direction. The more successful skilled workers' struggles to capture a
privileged place for themselves in the division of labour as a corporate
41 C. Sabel, 'Industrial Conflict and the Sociology of the Labour Market',
(unpublished paper, Harvard University, 1976), pp.14-15; cf., also
D. Segrestin, 'Du syndicalisme de metier au syndicalisme de classe:
pour une sociologie de la CGT', Sociologie du Travail, 2j1975, especially
p.165.
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group, the more likely it is that they will spend some of their time on routine
tasks which could be done by other workers, and that certain of their number
will find themselves largely confined to work which does not require the full
range of their skills. There may thus emerge significant variations in the
actual skills of members of the same craft, as well as between crafts, and
the level of technical skill provides no secure index of an individual or
group's position in the division of labour.
But skilled workers' conception of themselves as craftsmen is not,
of course, immune to changes in their objective position. When a larger and
larger proportion of craftsmen's work consists of routine tasks, management
will become increasingly tempted to encroach on their prerogatives in the
workplace and to introduce cheaper and more tractable labour. Insofar as
these measures are successful, they will tend to undermine skilled workers'
craft identity and force them to reconsider their relation both to their
42employers and to other groups of workers.
This last point highlights a central ambiguity in skilled workers'
conception of themselves: the tension between the defence of their autonomy
against management and of their exclusive position against other groups of
42 The tenacity of skilled workers' craft identity in the face of changes in
their objective position is illustrated by a German study cited by Sabel,
Industrial Conflict, ch.3, pp.24-27, which found in certain plants that
craftsmen whose work no longer requires the full range of their skills
nonetheless continue to think of themselves as craftsmen and take special
pleasure in their occasional opportunities to perform (unremunerated)
extra work requiring greater skill as a reaffirmation of their craft identity.
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workers. As we have seen, the essential principle underlying craft organ-
isation is the attempt by a corporate group to secure for itself a timeless
place in the division of labour independent of the market value of their
skills. As a result, skilled workers' demands take the form of a defence
of an idealised model of the existing organisation of work against innovation,
and therefore of a defence of their prerogatives against encroachments by
other groups of workers: strikes over wage differentials or over demarcation
lines are typical examples of the claims which routinely pit craftsmen against
the less skilled and members of other crafts. At the same time, the true
foundation of craftsmen's defence of their sectional position lies in their
opposition to management, which they view as the principle source of threats
43to their autonomy and control at work. Hence while skilled workers in
certain circumstances may assume supervisory functions, as did British
mule-spinners in the second half of the 19th century, or even act as sub-
contractors, as did iron and steel craftsmen in both Britain and the US in
the same period, there is a continual tendency for conflict to erupt between
craftsmen and their employers over the organisation of production, as the
subsequent history of both these groups confirms.44 In certain cases, where
craftsmen feel themselves to be fighting a losing battle against their
employers, they may turn to an alliance, temporary or permanent, with other
43 A similar analysis of the contradictory structure of craft consciousness
can be found in Hinton, Shop Stewards, ch.2, and in Sabel, Industrial
Conflict, ch.4, pp.52-72.
44 On cotton-spinning, see Lazonick, 'Industrial Relations'; Turner, Trade
Union Growth; and J. White, The Limits of Trade Union Militancy, (Westport,
Conn., 1978); on iron and steel see Elbaum and Wilkinson, 'Industrial
Relations', and F. Wilkinson, 'Collective Bargaining in Steel in the 1920's,
in A. Briggs and J. Saville, (eds.), Essays in Labour History, 1918-39 (1977).
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grades of workers, in which their traditions of opposition to management and
the anti-capitalist implications of their commitment to autonomy and control
at work may lead them in extremely radical directions. Thus British cabinet
makers and boot and shoe workers in the late 19th century were converted to an
alliance with the less skilled, as were a section of skilled engineers during
the First World War, American electrical craftsmen during the 1930s, and more
recently northern Italian skilled workers during the strike wave of the late
1960s.45
In recent years, the central role of trade unions in skilled workers'
struggles to defend their position within the division of labour has tended
to become obscured by the reaction against the institutional biases of earlier
labour historians beginning with the Webbs. Thus more recent 'studies have
tended to stress the primacy, both analytical and chronological, of workplace
activity over trade union organisation, emphasising the opposition between
rank and file and trade union officials.46 While the tensions between rank
45 On cabinet makers, see D. Blankenhorn, Cabinet Makers in Victorian Britain,
(Warwick M.A. Thesis, 1978); on boot and shoe makers, G. Thorn, Statement
Aristocrats and Sweated Militants, (Warwick M.A. Thesis, 1974); on
engineers, Hinton, Shop Stewards; on American electrical workers, R. Schatz,
'Union Pioneers: The Founders of Local Unions at Westinghouse and General
Electric, 1933-37', Journal of American History 66(3) (1979); on Italy in
the 1960s, see the factory monographs edited by A. Pizzorno,Lotte operaie
e sindicato, 1968-72, (6 vols., Bologna, 1974-78), and Sabel, Industrial
Conflict, ch.4. The general problem of relations between skilled and unskillec
workers in unionisation is discussed in relation to the British car industry
in my 'The Emergence of Shop Steward Organisation and Job Control in the
British Car Industry', forthcoming in History Workshop Journal 10 (1980).
46 Among the major studies which mark the 'rank-and-filist' reaction against
institutional labour history, see Hinton, Shop Stewards; K. Burgess, ~
Origins of British Industrial Relations (1975); R. Samuel, (ed.), Miners,
Quarrymen and Saltworkers, (1977); G. Brown, Sabotage (Nottingham, 1977);
and R. Price, Masters, Unions and Men, (Cambridge, 1980). Montgomery's
'Workers' Control of Machine Production in 19th Century America' in ibid.,
Workers' Control, likewise sees trade union work rules as evolving out of
a prior tradition of autonomous workshop organisation, though he allots a
more positive role to wider union structures than do many rank-and-filist
historians. The reaction against the Webbs' evolutionary vision of trade
unionism and collective bargaining is discussed in greater detail in relation
to engineering and printing in ch.~I, ~ee pp.69-7l.
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and file workers and the various levels of union organisation form a basic
feature of industrial conflict, and receive close attention in this thesis, it
is a fundamental error to locate craftsmen's struggles to control their work
in a distinct tradition of 'autonomous regulation' separate from trade union
organisation.47 While workplace organisation may have preceded national
unionism in certain trades such as building or printing, in others such as
patternmaking, the very emergence of the occupation as a craft distinct from
engineering was the result of the formation of a trade union. The lines of
demarcation between different trades - which is to say the definitions of
which tasks are to constitute a particular craft - are likewise normally
48constituted by trade union organisation.
Skilled workers' defence of their autonomy and control at work has always,
moreover, been closely bound up with the regulation of the wider labour market.
Well before the onset of mechanisation, employers in many trades had developed
innumerable methods of subverting the control of craftsmen over their work:
as we shall see in chapter III, printing employers prior to the advent of
composing machines sought to cheapen and intensify hand compositors' labour
by introducing partially-trained men and women onto certain tasks, by multiplying
the number of apprentices, by manipulating methods of payment, and by taking
advantage of the underemployment created by seasonal and cyclical fluctuations
in demand. The efforts of the printing unions to regulate the labour market
by restricting the number of apprentices and by setting minimum conditions
47 See especially Price, Masters, Unions, and Men, for this view.
48 These points are made forcefully by Reid, Shipbuilding, especially pp.220-22l.
On patternmakers, see ibid., pp.75-82 and below, PP.43-44, 122-25.
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and rates of pay under which their members were permitted to work formed an
integral part of the compositors' struggles to maintain their position in
the workplace against encroachments by employers.
In characterising the methods used by skilled workers to defend their
position in the division of labour, we have generally chosen to use the term
'craft regulation' in order to stress both their origins in workers' self-
conception as craftsmen and the link between workplace organisation and wider
trade union structures. This not merely a question of terminological
conventions: the terms used by other students of the subject carry with them
implicit theoretical assumptions. 'Workers' control', for example, suggests
a direct passage from the limited and defensive aims of most craft struggles
to a movement for an alternative mode of production; 'work control' or 'job
control' obscures the specificity of the demands raised by workers who conceive
of themselves as craftsmen; even 'craft control', the closest alternative,
49tends to fix the focus to firmly on the workplace alone.
Perhaps the most important function performed by trade unions in struggles
over the division of labour lies in their role as articulators of alliances
between workgroups with divergent interests both inside and outside the union
. 501tself. No trade or occupation is internally homogenous, and conflicts of
49 For 'workers' control', see Montgomery, Workers' Control; for 'work control',
see Price, Masters, Unions, and Men; for 'craft contro~, see inter alia,
Hinton, Shop Stewards, ch.2, and an earlier version of the arguments in this
thesis, 'Craft Control and the Division of Labour: Engineers and Compositors
in Britain, 1890-1930', Cambridge Journal of Economics 3(3) (1979). I have
elsewhere used the term 'job control' to refer to those forms of control over
workplace conditions which are not specific to craftsmen: see Zeitlin,
'Shop Steward Organisation and Job Control'.
50 In developing this conception of the 'political' role of trade unions as
articulators of strategies and alliances, I have beon influenced by Reid,
especially chs.7 and 10, and by Sabel, 'The Internai Politics of Trade Unions',
in S. Berger, (ed.), Interest Groups in Western Europe, (forthcoming Cambridge
University Press).
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interest will always arise between different sections, whether based on the
division of labour itself, the differential impact of technical change, or
even the division between employed and unemployed. Trade unions and their
leaders must therefore necessarily playa 'political' role in seeking to balance
and satisfy the diverse interests of their members within the framework of
common goals and a given organisational structure. The external counterpart
of this internal political role arises in relation to other groups, whether
of employers or other workers. The policies of trade unions as organisations
will play an important role in determining which alliances prove possible
between trades as well as within them, and of course in negotiating compromises
between workers and employers. The extent of the discretion exercised by union
leaders in these matters is in turn a political question depending on their
relationship with the rank and file and local officials, and on the internal
structure of the union itself. As we shall see, in both engineering and printing,
the alliances between different groups of workers would play a central role in
determining the outcome of struggles over the division of labour, as would
the employers' own capacity for organised collective action.
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Comparative Method and Historical Explanation
In an essay on British gasworkers written some 25 years ago, Eric
Hobsbawm called attention to the successful capture of new technology by
skilled workers in late 19th century Britain, citing as examples the very
groups which are the subject of this thesis, engineers and compositors:
Labour-saving and labour-simplifying devices do not automatically
dislodge key groups of workers from their strongholds. They do
so only when such groups are unable to maintain their relative
indispensibility (i.e. their bargaining strength) during the
crucial transition period, and cannot therefore 'capture' the new
devices for recognised unionism, the standard rate, and standard
working conditions. Thus in the last decades of the 19th century
printers almost everywhere, and to a lesser extent skilled
engineers in Britain 'captured' mechanised typesetting and
automatic machine tools, assimilating the new semi-skilled work
to the old artisan status; American engineers failed to do so,
and remained virtually without unions for some 30 years.Sl
But as Hobsbawm recognised, this line of argument immediately raises new
questions: why are some groups of skilled workers more successful than
others in maintaining (or even enhancing) their position in the division
of labour in the face of pressures towards technical and organisational
change?
Such a question readily lends itself to comparative treatment, and a
systematic comparison of the experiences of several groups of skilled
workers with major waves to technical innovation offers a potentially
fruitful framework within which the forces determining the development of
the division of labour can be empirically examined. A focus on the
explanation of observed divergences in the experiences of different trades
51 Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, OPe cit., pp.170-71.
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should permit a more convincing relationship to be established between theory
and empirical evidence than that prevailing in most of the existing literature,
in which the use of empirical examples to illustrate conclusions deduced from
a priori principles alternates with isolated case studies conducted against
a backdrop of unexamined theoretical assumptions. At the same time, an
emphasis on the struggles between skilled workers and their employers over
the social consequences of technical change promises to shed particular light
on the impact of industrial conflict on the division of labour, and on those
forces which in turn condition the forms and outcome of such conflict itself.
The decision to focus the research on engineers and compositors in late
19th century Britain flowed from a combination of strategic choices and practical
considerations. The choice of late 19th century, Britain, like that of skilled
workers themselves, flowed from our concern with the relative success of workers'
struggles and their impact on the division of labour. Where employers were
more successful in sweeping aside constraints on their freedom of action in the
workplace, and often in destroying union organisation itself, it is much more
difficult both from a theoretical and empirical point of view to consider the
impact of workers' resistance: unions which disappear from the workplace leave
few sources on shopfloor conditions. Thus it is no accident that many of the
theories which discount the importance of workers' struggles and organisations
rely on evidence drawn primarily from the American experience.
It has long been evident, both to contemporaries and historians, that
workers in Victorian and Edwardian Britain, both skilled and unskilled,
exercised a greater influence on the organisation of production than their
counterparts elsewhere, and that technical change and the growth of
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productivity advanced less rapidly than in American and German industry
during the same period, though there is little agreement on the connection
52between these phenomena. This period, during which the predominance of
Britain in the world economy first came to be challenged by American and
European competition, was marked by intense conflict between workers and
employers across a wide range of industries, much of it centred on the division
of labour. New groups of workers and employers organised for the first time,
while already organised groups expanded and reformed their existing associations.
The attendent intensification of industrial conflict ultimately resulted in
significant shifts in the relation between organised labour, the law, and the
political system, drawing the state into the regulation of collective
bargaining for the first time. It is no wonder, therefore, that this period
has left abundant documentation from trade union, employer, government, and
independent sources, so that a study of conflicts between skilled workers
and employers over the division of labour in late 19th and early 20th century
Britain will encounter both ample food for theoretical reflection and a wealth
of empirical material.
As the quotation from Hobsbawm cited above indicates, the historiography
pointed to the experience of engineers and compositors in late 19th century
52 See for example H.J. Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the 19th
Century (Cambridge, 1962). Most of the recent debate on the performance
of the Victorian economy has been dominated by the clash between pessimists,
who generally argue that deteriorating entrepreneurship was responsible for
British decline, and optimists, most of whom use econometric techniques to
suggest that individual firms and industries performed about as well as could
have been expected given objective constraints. The pessimist case is
summarised in the essays collected in D.H. Aldcroft and H. Richardson, ~
British Economy, 1870-1939 (1968); the optimist position in D.N. McCloskey,
'Did Victorian Britain Fail?', Economic History ReView, 2nd ser., 23(3) (1970),
and ibid., and L. Sandberg, 'From Damnation to Redemption: Judgments on the
Late Victorian Entrepreneur',Explorations in Economic History 9(1) (1971-2).
For structural explanations of decline which stress the role of labour, see
E.H. Phelps Brown and M. Browne, A Century of Pay (1968). esp. pp.174-195~
and W.A. LewiS, Growth and Fluctuations, 1870-1913 (1978), especially chs.4-5.
xlv
Britain as a rich context within which to investigate the divergent abilities
of skilled workers to defend their position in the division of labour in the
face of technical change. At the same time, the secondary literature on each
group, when considered in a comparative context, proved to contain unresolved
puzzles that suggested the need for a closer analysis of their struggles over
the reorganisation of the division of labour.
The capture of composing machines by hand compositors furnishes one of the
clearest cases available of the successful defence of craft privilege despite
mechanisation, and so su~gested itself as a natural choice for a study of this
kind. While historians of the typographical unions had noted the relatively
unusual character of compositors' experience with mechanisation, they made little
attempt to explain it in terms other than those of the moderate and prudent
53policies adopted by union leaders. Here a comparative perspective raised
immediate difficulties. As we shall see in the body of the thesis, the demands
of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) which touched off the 1897-8 lockout
were far more moderate than those which printing employers accepted without a
struggle, and there were significant differences in both the policies towards
mechanisation pursued by the three regional typographical unions and in the
influence exercised by the rank and file in their formulation. Hence a more
structural account of the capture of composing machines by the typographical
unions seem~d very much in order.
53 The major works on the history of 19th century compositors include: E. Howe,
(ed.) The London Compositor (1947); Howe and H.E. Waite, The London Society
of Compositors: A Centennial History (1948); S.C. Gillespie, The Scottish
Typographical Association, 1853 to 1952 (Glasgow, 1953); A.E. Musson, The
Typographical Association, (Oxford, 1954); I.C. Cannon, The Social Situation
of the Skilled Worker, (London Ph.D. Thesis, 1961); and J. Child, Industrial
Relations in the British Printing Industry (1967), Musson most clearly
attributes the compositors' capture of mechanised typesetting to their leaders'
prudence and moderation, (T.A., p.249), but a similar emphasis can be discerned
in Gillespie, STA pp.115-1~and Child, Industrial Relations, p.182.
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The case of engineers and automatic machine tools proved in practice
rather more ambiguous than that of the compositors, and the divergences
between the experiences of the two groups forms a major theme of our treat-
ment. Here too the existing secondary literature left a number of major
questions unanswered. Skilled engineers had long figured in the historiography
as archetypal examples of the secure and affluent labour aristocrats who were
held to characterise the mid-Victorian labour movement, and whose prosperity
was tied to the international predominance of British industry. 54 With the
rise of American and German competition after 1890, British engineering employers
sought to repair their position in world markets by introducing automatic
machine tools and by reorganising the division of labour along more advanced
lines. The efforts by skilled engineers to defend their craft position
triggered off a major confrontation with the employers in 1897-8, in which
the unions were defeated and forced to accept a regime of untrammeled
managerial prerogative in the workshops.
While drawing attention to engineering as an important point of inter-
section between workers' struggles and the response of British industry to
foreign competition, this account raised a number of further questions.55
If the position of skilled engineers in the division of labour was so secure
during the mid-Victorian period, why were they so easily defeated in 1897-8?
54 See Hobsbawm, 'The Labour Aristocracy'; Foster, Class Struggle; Gray
Labour Aristocracy; and G. Crossick, An Artisan Elite in Victorian Britain
(1978). Stedman Jones refers to engineering as the locus classicus of
the labour aristocracy, 'Class Struggle', p.63.
55 This account is, of course, a radically foreshortened composite of the major
components of the historiography, which include: J.B. Jefferys, The Story
of the Engineers, 1800-1945 (1946); B.M. Weekes, The Amalgamated Society of
Engineers, 1880-1914, (Warwick Ph.D. Thesis, 19701; Burgess, Industrial
Relations; and Hinton, Shop Stewards. Of these Burgess's account most closely
conforms to the sketch given here.
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If the employers were so conclusively victorious in 1898, why did the share
of British engineering in world markets continue to decline? And why, by
the same token did studies of the industrial unrest of the First World War
suggest that skilled engineers still retained a central place in the division
of labour and continued to exercise a significant measure of control on the
56shop floor? These questions likewise pointed to the need for a re-examination
of struggles over the reorganisation of the division of labour in the industry.
As an exercise in systematic comparative analysis, the project undertaken
in this thesis has certain disadvantages. We had originally intended to compare
engineers and compositors with a third group of British workers from the same
period, boot and shoe makers, whose experience more closely a~proximated to .
the predictions of the deskilling model. Like their counterparts in engineering
British boot and shoe employers in the 1890s found themselves faced with serious
competition from more advanced American manufacturers, and responded by
introducing new machinery and attacking union restraints on their freedom of
action in the workplace. But in contrast to engineering, boot and shoe
employers appear to have been able to capitalise relatively rapidly on their
victory over the union in 1895 to develop integrated factories using
machinery manned by semi-skilled workers, and thereby not only to repel the
57American challenge in the home market but to regain lost ground abroad.
56 See especially Hinton, Shop Stewards, ch.2.
57 R.A. Church, 'The Effect of the American Export Invasion on the British
Boot and Shoe Industry, 1885-1914', Journal of Economic History 28(2)
(1969)7 p. Head, 'Boots and Shoes' in D.H. Aldcroit, (ed.) ,The Development
of British Industry and Foreign Competition, 1875-1914 (Glasgow, 1969);
A. Fox, A History of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Workers, 1874~1957,
(Oxford, 1957), pp.129-358.
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The inclusion o£ a third case offering a more polar contrast with printing
might conceivably have facilitated more confident generalisations about the
explanatory weight to be given to such factors as foreign competition or
divisions within the labour force, as well as a more balanced treatment of
the ambiguities of the outcome in engineering.
In the event, however, this research design was abandoned for a
combination of practical and methodological reasons. Despite the existence
of a rich secondary literature on printing and engineering, new questions
required new primary research, and important aspects of our problem, such as
the introduction of composing machines in London, had received only cursory
historical attention. Not only were boot and shoe workers the least well
studied of the three groups, but such was the diversity o£ experience in the
various regional centres that a comprehensive synthetic treatment would,
we felt, have to await the conclusion of a number of detailed local studies
1 . 58current y ~n progress. At the same time, the periodisation of developments
in boot and shoe making differed significantly from those in printing and
engineering: while in the latter cases the conflicts of the l890s marked a
challenge to the relatively well-established structure of the division of
labour (albeit of different vintages), in the former the pattern of change
could better be represented as a series of connected but discontinuous stages
in the displacement of hand labour between 1860 and 1900.
This last consideration highlights the active influence of the choice
of cases on the results of comparative analysis. Any comparison necessarily
58 Theses in progress by G. Thorn on London at Warwick and by K. Brooker on
Northampton at Hull.
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involves an arbitrary component, however carefully controlled, and the
introduction of an additional case into the analysis will normally cast a
new light on the importance of particular causal factors. If we had included
boot and shoe workers in the analysis, such factors as the periodisation of
technical development and regional variations in labour market structure might
have assumed a greater importance among our conclusions. Similarly, a
comparison of British engineers and compositors with their counterparts in
another country would have enabled us to control more fully for the effects
of industrial structure and to give greater weight to the role of external
cultural and political factors in the development of the division of labour.
But international comparisons are not without their own pitfalls, not
the least the tendency of even their most sophisticated practitioners to
place the main explanatory weight for observable divergences on global
59characteristics of the national contexts themselves. Moreover, even the
most rigorous exponents of systematic comparison as an analogue to mUlti-variate
analysis for testing causal hypotheses "where there are too many variables
and not enough case s''are compelled to acknowledge in practice that their
conclusions have a "suggestive'-'rather than a definitive character.60 This
is not, of course, to argue that any comparison is as useful and powerful as
the next, but rather to suggest that even the best constructed comparative
59 For examples of this tendency, see Maurice, et al., 'Societal Analysis';
Gallie, New Working Class; and R. Dore, British Factory, Japanese Factory:
The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations (1973).
60 T. Skocpol and H. Somers, 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial
Inquiry', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22(1) (1980).
Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge, 1979), is a rigorous
and exciting attempt to apply this version of comparative method to the
causes and outcomes of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions.
1framework does not allow us to eliminate those elements of contingency which
are integral to the analysis and interpretation of empirical cases.
By undertaking a comparison of two groups of workers with similar
world views against the background of a common political context, we hope
to explore the role of certain structural factors in the outcome of conflicts
over the reorganisation of the division of labour, without claiming that these
exhaust the causal forces at work. Our choice of a historical and in part
narrative mode of exposition reflects a recognition of this contingent and
provisional character of comparative analysis. At the same time, however,
it flows from our understanding of the division of labour as the product of
a dialectic between structures and struggles, in which the strategies and alli-
ances forged by organised groups of workers and employers play a fundamental
role. For it is above all in the context of a historical mode o£ presentation
that the roles o£ the conscious (and unconscious) choices of human actors can
be balanced against those of structural and conjunctural forces to provide an
account of historical processes which avoids the pitfalls o£ determinism
without eschewing the demands of explanation.
The body of the thesis is divided into three main parts. The first is
devoted to the relations between work~rs and employers in the two industries
during the period prior to mechanisation, and is intended to highlight the
structural features which conditioned both the forms and outcomes of the
conflicts over the introduction of new technology in each case. Accordingly,
li
the characteristics of industrial structure, the division of labour, and trade
union and employer organisation are analysed for both engineering and printing.
The section concludes with an account of the central areas of conflict between
skilled workers and their employers in the pre-mechanisation period, which
it is argued were of cardinal importance in determining the initial reactions
of both sides to the opportunities and dangers opened up by technical change.
The second section shifts from a primarily structural and synchronic mode of
analysis to a more narrative account of the conflicts over technical and
organisational change in the two industries during the 1890s, together with the
extent of their resolution in the years up to 1914. Part three returns to the
structural mode to examine the long-term outcomes of these struggles for the
position of skilled workers in the division of labour, taking account of develop-
ments during the interwar years. The concluding chapter attempts to identify
the central structural forces determining the differences in the outcomes in the
two cases, and to balance their importance against that of the strategic choices
of the historical actors.
PART I
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT, 1850-1890
2Chapter I
Industrial Structure and Market Position
The structure of the engineering and printing industries, together
with their patterns of development during the second half of the 19th century,
forms an indispensible point of departure for an understanding of the pressures
towards the reorganisation of the division of labour which would make themselves
felt so strongly in each industry during the l890s. The engineering industry
itself a cluster of related industries or sectors, united, in the words of
the Balfour Committee, "••.by the fact that the basic metal working processes
underlying them are fundamentally the same"l_ occupied a cent:r::alplace in the
Victorian economy in several respects. As a capital goods industry supplying
technology essential to the transformation of production in other sectors,
engineering played a critical role in the growth of the economy as a whole.
At the same time, employing nearly one million men in its various branches
in 1907 and responsible for 14.6% of industrial production in the same year,
2a larger proportion than any other sector apart from coal, the engineering
industry was of fundamental economic importance in its own right. (See table 1).
Finally, as a major 19th century export industry (along with coal, iron and
steel, textiles, and ships), engineering contributed to and benefitted from
that orientation towards foreign markets and international trade which
constituted the defining feature of the Victorian economy; in fact, machinery
1 Balfour Committee on Industry and Trade, Survey of the Metal Industries,
(1928), p.130.
2 Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, p.252.
3exports increased more than those of any principal commodity group between
31850 and 1890. Exports of machinery increased as a proportion of the
total value of British exports from 1% in 1850 to 6% in 1891; by 1907 they
comprised half of total engineering production.4
Printing, of course, was of much lesser weight in absolute terms -
Lewis estimates it at 4.7% of industrial production in 19075- but it occupied
a strategic place in the Victorian economy in other respects. Leaving aside
its cultural and political role (perhaps greater during the second half of
the 19th century than at any other time), printed matter, especially newspapers,
was at once one of the first mass consumption goods and an essential adjunct
to the sale of other products because of its role in advertising and puhlicity.6
Growth
. The second half of the 19th century was a period of exceptional growth
for the printing industry. As Alan Lee has shown, the repeal of the 'Taxes
on Knowledge' (advertisement duty, 1853; newspaper stamp 1855; paper duty 1861),
together with the extension of popular literacy led to a tremendous growth in
3 Burgess, Industrial Relations, p.25.
4 Jefferys, Engineers, pp.52, 118.
5 Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, p.252.
6 For an excellent account of the changing cultural and political role of the
newspaper press during this period, see A.J. Lee, The Origins of the Popular
Press, 1855-1914 (1976), and G. Boyce, J. Curran, and P. Wingate (eds.1,
Newspaper History: From the 17th Century to the Present Day (1978).
4the volume of printed material, particularly the periodical press and above all
7daily and weekly newspapers. In the absence of any full-scale economic history
of the industry and of reliable series on output, its growth is difficult to
measure, but various indirect indices are available. The most recent series
of industrial production, based on the domestic use of writing paper, shows
a sixfold expansion between 1852 and 1890, while Coleman's figures for the
total volume of paper production run from less than 100,000 tons in 1850 to
475,000 in 1890.8 Clearly, this expansion was concentrated in the newspaper
press, though this is difficult to prove in the absence o£ reliable figures
on circulations~ one indication, however, is the fact that employment among
bookbinders grew only half as fast as total male printing employment, which
tripled between 1851 and 1891. (See Table 2B).
Engineering, by contrast, had enjoyed its period o£ most rapid growth
between 1835 and 1850 under the in£luence o£ demand £rom the textile industry
and the railroads. After 1850, British dominance in world markets stabilised
production, leading to a pattern of steady export-dependent growth without
major shifts in the capital-intensiveness of investment.10 Lewis's indices,
based on the net use of iron and steel by domestic manufacturers (excluding
7 Lee, Popular Press; see also ibid., 'The Structure, Ownership, and Control
of the Press, 1855-1914', in Boyce et al. (eds.), Newspaper History; and
A.E. Musson, 'The Newspaper Industry in the Industrial Revolution', Economic
History Review, 2nd ser., 10(3) (1958).
8 Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, pp.248-49, 256; D.C. Coleman, 'Industrial
Growth and Industrial Revolutions', Economica (Feb. 1956), fig.2, p.8.
9 For various isolated figures, see Lee, Popular Press, p.292, and ibid.,
'Structure .•.of the Press', pp.122-23.
10Burgess, Industrial Relations, pp.1-4; see also his 'Technological Change and
the 1852 Lockout in the British Engineering Industry', International Review
of Social History l4(1) (1969).
5ships' plates and railsl, suggest that engineering output quadrupled between
111852 and 1890.
Fluctuations
The different positions of these two industries in the Victorian economy
naturally resulted in different experiences of fluctuations, both cyclical
and seasonal. As a capital goods industry, engineering experienced the effects
of the business cycle particularly sharply, since manufacturers in other
industries put off ordering new machines until the boom was well underway
while cutting back such expensive investments as soon as the economy turned
the corner into recession. This is the pattern identified by Floud for the
12machine tool sector, in many respects the core of engineering as a whole.
The intensity of fluctuations, of course, varied by sector: marine engineering
shared in the enormous fluctuations in output and employment of shipbuilding,
while textile engineering, linked to the smoother demand curve of the textile
13producers, was more insulated from such dramatic peaks and slumps.
These fluctuations in output, dictated by the short, sharp character of
the trade cycle in the industry, naturally had direct effects on employment
and thus on the nature of relations between workers and employers. In 1879,
for example, the trough of the mid-Victorian depression, 15% of engineering and
11 Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, pp.248-49, 254.
12 R. Floud, The British Machine Tool Industry, 1850-1914 (Cambridge, 1976),
pp.6l-67.
13 On fluctuations in shipbuilding, see Pollard and Robertson, Shipbuilding,
ch.2, and Reid, Shipbuilding, pt.I.
6shipbuilding trade unionists were unemployed, while unemployment among the
Boilermakers, the most important of the shipbuilding unions, fluctuated from
21.5% in 1887 to 2.5% in 1889.14 But while engineering's status as a capital
goods industry exposed it to sharp cyclical fluctuations in demand, it also
insulated the industry from the seasonal cycles that bedevilled the consumer
goods industries, furnishing the major source of casual labour.1S
The pattern of cyclical and seasonal fluctuations in printing was just
the reverse of that in engineering. While the output of printed matter
depended to a large extent on the overall level of economic activity, (especially
in relation to advertisements in newspapers and handbills in jobbing printing) ,
the overall trend was sharply upward. Employment therefore fluctuated much
less sharply over the trade cycle in printing than in engineering, ranging
from a low of 1.3% in 1873 to a high of 5.7% in 1894.16 In Edinburgh, for
example, where compositors were particularly badly organised, only 2.4% of
trade union printers (compositors plus machine managers) wer~emPIOyed in
December 1893, compared to 8.6% of iron and engineering unionists.17
14 Burgess, Industrial Relations, p.26; D.C. Cummings, A History of the
Boilermakers' and Iron and Steel Shipbuilders' Society (Newcastle, 1904),
p.120.
15 See A. Freeman and S. Webb (eds.), Seasonal Trades (1912); G. Stedman
Jones, Outcast London (Oxford, 1971), pt.I.
16 Board of Trade, Abstract of Labour Statistics, analysed by Musson, TA,
p.103. Overall levels of unemployment were almost certainly lower for
craftsmen than for printing workers as a whol.e,
17 Gray, Labour Aristocracy, p.SS.
7On the other hand, printing experienced a marked seasonal cycle of
demand. The demand f~r advertisements generally peaked just before Christmas,
and the London season and parliamentary timetable also contributed to shaping
the pattern. August was usually the slackest period, with employment picking
up steadily until just before Christmas, slumping again in January only to
recover just before Easter, with a further slump until a small recovery in
18July. Newspapers, of cou~, were subject to sudden, unpredictable changes
in the size of editions which often required them to engage extra hands at
short notice. Casual employment among trade union compositors might range
from one-eighth to one-fifth of total membership; when the seasonal and cyclical
troughs coincided it might reach as high as one_third.19
As we shall see in more detail in Chapter III these fluctuations,
strongly influenced the patterns of industrial conflict in the two industries,
making regulation of the labour market a prime objective of trade unionism
and determining major points of contention with employers. In engineering the
sharp demand for labour in the upswing tended to draw a permanent pool of
workers into the industry who were unable to find employment at other times:
thus between 1880 and 1890 unemployment in the metal industries was 26% higher
than the average of other industries. (This figure is of course somewhat
inflated by the inclusion of shipbuilding.)20 Similarly, in printing, seasonal
fluctuations produced a pool of underemployed workers, whose condition was
18 Webb and Freeman, Seasonal Trades, pp.28, 35; G. Arkell, 'Printers', in
C. Booth (ed.), The Life and Labour of the People of London (1903 edition),
2nd ser., vol. II, pt. III, ch.l.
19 These estimates are based on the provincial Typographical Association:
see Musson, ~, p.103.
20 Jefferys, Engineers, p.119.
8always a threat to trade union regulation of wages and working conditions;
overtime was likewise a major source of conflict in both industries. Given
the pattern of the trade cycle in engineering, manufacturers were pressed
to maximise and speed up their output in booms or lose customers to competitors
able to produce machines more rapidly; hence for engineering workers the
obverse of unemployment in the downswing was systematic overtime in the upswing.
This tendency was exacerbated if employers invested in new machinery to meet
expanded demand, as overtime was then necessary to amortise the capital
. 21invested as rapidly as possible. Similarly, in printing, employers anxious
to minimise their labour cost during slow periods might require extensive
overtime from their permanent employees, while still relying on a large
proportion of casual labour.
Sectoral Structure
Engineering
As we noted earlier, engineering was more a cluster of partially separate
sectors united by common metal working processes (and, one should add, over-
lapping labour markets) than a unified indust.ry, so that its boundaries are
unusually difficult to define. These sectoral differences, founded above all
on differences in product markets, resulted in variations in market position,
profitability, vulnerability to competition (foreign and domestic), experience
of the trade cycle, and in the capacity of employers for collective action, and
will therefore playa central role in our analysis of industrial conflict.
21 Burgess, Industrial Relations, pp.15-16.
9The initial growth of engineering during the first half of the 19th century
was fuelled by the demand from the textile industry for machines and from the
22railroads for locomotives and rolling stock. After mid-century, the growth
of iron and steel shipbuilding called forth an increasing output of ships'
engines, while the extension of mechanisation and steam power throughout the
economy led to an expanded demand for a wide range of general engineering
products. Beginning in the last two decades of the century, new products
electrical goods, consumer durables such as sewing machines, typewriters, cycles,
and motor cars - came to form an increasing proportion of engineering production.
With the stabilisation of the British economy after mid-century, together with
the growth of export demand and the emergence of new products, engineering
firms tended to specialise and the division between sectors became more
pronounced. As the President of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers
observed in 1874:23
Within the last few years, the business of mechanical engineering
has divided itself into distinct branches, so that a locomotive
builder is little more than a locomotive builder.
The boundaries between sectors were, of course, by no means watertight.
This was particularly true for machine tools; as Floud has shown through an
examination of commercial directories: "it was in fact normal for machine
tools to be made in conjunction with at least one other engineering product".24
22 See Burgess,'Technological Change',
23 Quoted in Jefferys, Engineers, p.S3.
24 Floud, Machine Tool Industry, p.42.
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The processes involved in making machine tools are cornman to most branches
of engineering, and firms in more specialised sectors appear to have moved
in and out of machine tool production as a means of adapting to the trade
cycle, as well as in response to the availability and cost of machine tools
25for their own purposes.
Unfortunately, the only breakdown of engineering production by sector
dates from the 1907 Census of Production, and therefore gives considerably
more weight to the newer sectors, especially vehicles, than these would have
possessed in 1890. Nevertheless, as a glance at table 2A reveals, the older
sectors of the industry, especially textile machinery, railway engineering,
and marine engineering continued to dominate output, though the production of
cycles, motor vehicles and electrical goods was already considerable.
As S.B. Saul has demonstrated, textile engineering, which was predictably
concentrated in Lancashire and Yorkshire, remained up to 1914 among the most
successful branches of the industry, dominating foreign markets as well as
those of home and empire, even surmounting the 45% ad valorem tariff to
penetrate the US market. This sector was dominated by half a dozen Lancashire
firms, employing three quarters of the total work force of 40,000; one firm,
Platt's, employed 12,000 men. Here concentration and the relative stability of
the export market (half of the sector's product was exported in 1907) encouraged
b 1 d f k d 1 . 26a su stantia egree 0 mar et control an emp oyer cooperat10n.
25 Ibid., pp.32-50.
26 S.B. Saul, 'Engineering', in D.H. Aldcroft (ed.), The Development of
British Industry and Foreign Competition, 1875-1914 (Glasgow, 1968),
pp.191-95; and his 'The Market and the Development of Mechanical Engineering',
Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 27 (1) (1967).
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Railway engineering, the largest sector of all, was in practice split
into two completely separate branches: the railways themselves whose chief
interests were not in engineering at all, and the private builders. The
works of the railway companies were huge - the largest, the Great Western
Works at Swindon, employed 14,000 men in 1914, while five owners employed between
4,000 and 7,000 - and generally quite isolated from the industry as a whole.
The companies refused to join employers' associations and, at least through
the l890s, also were unwilling to recognise trade unions or negotiate with
th . . 27e~r representat~ves. Private building was also quite concentrated:
"by 1870 there were some nine or ten important builders of large locomotives
and a similar number for smaller engines"; and in 1903 three of the four
largest makers based in Glasgow amalgamated to form the North British Company
employing 8,000 in 1907. In contrast to the railway companies, who were
legally confined to the home market, the private builders were heavily involved
in the export trade, became progressively more dependent on foreign markets
as the century wore on. Here, however, they became the first sector of British
engineering to encounter serious foreign competition, and German locomotives,
better suited for poorly constructed tracks, drove them out of European and
28Latin American markets into empire preserves from the 1870s.
27 Saul, 'Engineering', pp.195-96. On the reluctance of the railway companies
to join employers' associations, see the evidence of J. Whittaker CASE
Manchester ODD) to the Royal Commission on Labour, Third Report, ~
Minutes and Digest of Evidence, (C. 6894), Group A, P.P. 1893-4, XXXII, q.
22,665i on their refusal to recognise collective bargaining, J. Swift
(General Secretary, SEMS), ibid., q. 23,655; on Crewe and Derby, see the
evidence collected by F. Galton, Webb Collection EA XVI, f. 6, pp.54-61;
and on Swindon, see A. Williams, Life in a Railway Factory (1915).
28 Saul, 'Engineering', pp.196-205i ibid., 'Mechanical Engineering', pp.114-l7.
Private railway carriage making, though more successful in foreign markets
after 1870, had a similar structure comprising a small number of large
companies. See Saul, 'Engineering', pp.203-5.
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Marine engineering is difficult to disaggregate from the closely allied
shipbuilding industry, but together, the two sectors comprised 25% of the
29total employed in the metal trades in 1907. Most of the large shipbuilders,
whether involved primarily in commercial or military construction, tended to
have their own marine engine works, and therefore to employ large numbers of
skilled engineers, especially fitters: in the early 1890s, for example,
Armstrong's employed some 474 fitters out of a total of 5669 men in their
shipyards at Elswick, while Harland and Wolff's had 364 fitters and 120
turners out of 2,475 men in the engine department of their yard in Belfast.30
The growing capital requirements involved in large scale shipbuilding resulted
in the emergence of a cluster of giant firms in the main shipbuilding centres
of the Northeast Coast, Clydeside, and Northern Ireland; the ten largest firms'
share of output rose from 30% in 1883 to 40% in 1913. At the same time, this
tendency toward concentration should not be overstated: firms with fewer than
2,000 employees continued to produce nearly 60% of national output as late as
1901, while the number of firms able to launch over 20,000 gross tons per year
actually grew from 17 to 39 over the same period.31 Moreover, as in the car
industry today, a small number of large firms coexisted with a large number of
smaller ones involved in producing components (such as marine engines), often
on a sub-contracted basis.32
29 Jefferys, Engineers, pp.198-99.
30 Webb Call. EA XXI, f. 18, p.10, and XVI, f. 1, pp.11-12. On relations
between marine engineering and shipbuilding firms, see Reid, Shipbuilding,
pp.5, 156-57.
31 Ibid., pp.21-29.
32 Saul, 'Engineering', pp.205-7.
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Arms production constituted a sector closely allied with shipbuilding
and marine engineering, but clearly distinguishable on the basis of the
rather different market conditions created by government contracting. The
state itself maintained a set of extremely large engineering factories in
the shape of the Royal Ordnance Works: in June 1886, the three main departments
of the Woolwich Arsenal employed a total of 9,890 men, and the small arms
factory at Enfield another 2,172.33 At the same time, the state filled a large
proportion of its military requirements through private contracting. A
combination of government policy, the specialised and capital-intensive
character of arms production, and the defensive reactions of the contractors
themselves tended to restrict entry to a small number of firms primarily
engaged on military work. Big gun making in the l880s, for example, was
concentrated on three firms: Armstrong, Whitworth, and Vickers, with Maxim-
Nordenfeldt and Hotchkiss holding on to a smaller share of the market; Vickers
absorbed Maxim-Nordenfeldt in 1889 and Armstrong amalgamated with Whitworth in
1897. These firms numbered among the largest in the country: Armstrong's
Elswick works employing 13,000 to 15,000 men in the l880s and 90s was undoubtedly
the largest engineering establishment of the period, while defence contractors
comprised 10% of Payne's list of the largest British companies of 1905.34
33 Committee on the Organisation and Administration of the Manufacturin~
Departments of the Army (Morley Committee), Report with Minutes of Evidence,
(C. 5116), P.P. 1887, XVI, app. IV.
34 C. Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers (1977), ch.l, especially pp.8-9; P.L.
Payne, 'The Emergence of the Largescale Company in Great Britain, 1870-1914',
Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 20 (1967). On Armstrong's see the
testimony of Capt. A. Noble to the Morley Committee, qs. 8861-9069, especially
q. 9067; W. Boyd, 'Sir W. Armstrong, Mitchell, and Co., Ltd.' in British
Association, Handbook to the Industries of Newcastle and District (Newcastle,
1889); letters from Col. Dyer (Managing Director) to B. Potter, 1891-2, Webb
Call., EA XXI, f. 18; evidence of J. Ratcliffe ~SE ODD Northeast coast) to
Select Committee on Government Contracts (Fair Wages Resolution), Report
with Minutes of Evidence, P.P. 1897, X, Qs.2446-2577i the article on Armstrong'
in W.G. Gordon, Foundry, Forge, and Factory (18901; and A.J. Cochrane, The
Early History of Elswick (Newcastle, 1909). I am indebted to Keith McClelland
of Birmingham University for several of tnes~ xe!erences.
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Private arms construction amounted to 8% of total engineering and 23% of total
shipbuilding production in 1907.35 The pattern of demand in this sector
was governed by an entirely different cycle than the rest of the industry:
a military contracting cycle (supplemented by foreign arms sales) which
depended on the changing level of international tension, and often ran in
36an opposite direction to the commercial trade cycle. As Trebilcock has
shown, the response of the large arms manufacturers to the exigencies of
producing for a single unpredictable client was to evolve a form of simultaneous
competition and collusion attacked by contemporary radicals as the 'arms ring',
37especially with the intensification of the arms race after 1900. Unlike the
other sectors we have discussed so far, military production contained a large
component of standardisation, especially in areas such as shells and light
guns. The arms manufacturers, accordingly, figured among the pioneers of mass
production in Britain. Consequently, they found themselves in continual
conflict with engineering craftsmen over the division of labour. These conflicts,
coupled with their distinctive market position, encouraged them to take the
lead in employers' organisations and militancy.
The bulk of engineering production, however, was concentrated in the more
amorphous field of general engineering. (See Table 3A) Within this category
there were of course numerous firms catering for specialised markets, such as
35 Trebilcock, Vickers Brothers, p.25.
36 Ibid., ch.l, especially figure 1.
37 Ibid., passim; cf. his 'Radicalism and the Armaments Trust' in A.J.A. Morris
(ed.), Edwardian Radicalism (19741, and 'A "Special Relationship" - Government,
Rearmament and the Cordite Firms', Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 19(1)
(1966) •
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sugar machinery (concentrated in Glasgow) or printing machinery. But while
engineering manufacturers' turn towards overseas markets after 1850 led the
boundaries between certain sectors to become sharper, the variety of foreign
demand discouraged product standardisation. This was true even in such
38distinctive sectors as textile and railway engineering, as Saul has argued.
It was even more pronounced in machine tool making, the core of general
engineering: here a dominant firm like Greenwood and Batley of Leeds could
produce 793 products between 1856 and 1900, 457 of which were one-off jobs.39
Despite the existence of a nucleus of large firms such as Greenwood and Batley
or later Alfred Herbert of Coventry, firms moved in and out of this sector
with comparative ease, as F10ud has shown; this fluidity seems to have been
characteristic of general engineering as a whole.
Underlying the fluidity of production in general engineering was a
complex network of sub-contracting relations between the large, specialised
firms and the small general shops which supplied them with components. While
this pattern clearly existed in sectors such as marine and textile engineering,
it is best documented for armaments. One leading Newcastle employer noted
in 1908 the dominance achieved by Armstrong's over the engineering trade of
the city through these relationships: in 1915 they were found to have some
1,500 sub-contractors, some as far off as Scotland. Similarly, the Board of
Trade found at the onset of the First World War that "most firms of any standing
38 Saul, 'Mechanical Engineering' and 'Engineering'.
39 R. Floud, 'Changes in the Productivity of Labour in the British Machine
Tool Industry, 1856-1900' in D.N. McCloskey (ed.), Essays on a Mature Economy
(1970), p. 321.
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or capacity" were already involved in munitions production either directly or
40through sub-contracts for the arms firms or the Arsenal. These sub-
contracting relationships were themselves the product of a strategic choice
by the large firms to minimise the risks of the business cycle: in the context
of Britain's slow growth after 1870 and the emergence of foreign competition,
the larger firms often preferred to meet expanded demand in boom periods by
extending their network of sub-contractors rather than by investing in new
capacity themselves.
Thus it was above all general engineering, producing for a variety of
partially specialised markets at home and abroad, which fits the picture of
the engineering industry as a multiplicity of small, undercapitalised firms
41drawn by the Board of Trade as late as 1918. It was also in various sections
of general engineering and in what were to become the new mass production
sectors that German and American competition began to make itself felt during
the l890s: light machine tools, agricultural machinery, cycles, sewing machines,
42motor vehicles, and electrical goods.
40 Evidence of B.C. Browne (Hawthorn, Leslie, and Co.) to the Roval Commission
on the Poor Laws and the Relief of Distress, Appendix, vol. VIII (Minutes of
Evidence), (Cd. 5066), P.P. 1910, XLVIII, q. 86,241; Hinton, Shop Stewards,
pp.25-29.
41 Floud, Machine Tool Industry, pp.32-50; S.B. Saul, 'The Machine-Tool Industry
in Brit<,;into 1914', Business History 10(1) (1968); Board of Trade Depart-
mental Committee, Report on the Position of the Engineering Trades After the
War, (Cd. 9073), P.P. 1918, XIII.
42 S.B. Saul, 'The American Impact on British Industry, 1895-1914', Business
History 3(1) (1960); R. Floud, 'The Adolescence of American Engineering
Competition, 1870-1914', Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 27 Cl) (1974),
and ibid., Machine Tool Industry, ch.4; I.W. McLean, 'Anglo-American Engineerin
Competition, 1870-1914: Some Third Market Evidence', Economic History Review,
2nd ser., 29(3) (1976); and A.E. Harrison, 'The Competitiveness of the
British Cycle Industry, 1890-1914', Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 22(2)
(1969) •
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Printing
As in engineering, the printing industry was marked by pronounced
sectoral divisions: these were in fact simpler and the lines of demarcation
between them somewhat sharper than in engineering. Late 19th century printing
was divided into three main sectors: newspapers, books, and jobbing, with
government and periodical printing as further sub-divisions. These were
recognised by contemporaries as nearly distinct branches, though a 19th century
general printing firm might well produce books, a few weekly or monthly
. d . h b . 43per10 icals, and do some jobbing work 1nto t e arga1n. The only comprehensive
breakdown of output, that given by the 1907 Census of Product:i,.on,doubtless .
overstates newspaper production relative to 1890, as a result of that sector's
rapid growth in the intervening period. (See Tables 1.C and 2.B)
Employment is more difficult to estimate: the categories of the Census
of Production reveal that newspaper and periodical printing employed 45,303
people (including 3,287 women) in 1907, while the rest of the industry - books,
jobbing, bookbinding, lithographic, photographic and process engravers, etc. -
employed 172,677 (including 55,583 women).44 In a partial sample taken in the
43 J. Southward, Practical Printing (1882), ch.18; B.W.E. Alford, The London
Letterpress Printing Industry, 1850-1914 (London Ph.D. Thesis, 1962), ch.4.
44 Analysis of Census of Production in J.C. Smail, Training and Employment in
the Printing Trades (London County Council, 1917), pp.2-9. The Census of
Production divided printing employment into 'Group I - Printing and Bookbindins
Factories and Workshops (Printing Companies)' and 'Group II - Factories
Engaged in the Printing and Publishing of Newspapers and Other Periodicals'.
The overlap between the two groups was minimal, a £act which illustrates the
segmentation of the industry: the value of newspapers produced in Group I
workshops amounted to only 1,143,000 o£ a total output of 24,597,000, while
conversely jobbing work done in periodical £actories comprised 1,077,000 of thE
total of 13,237,000. As we shall see, however, many periodical printing
factories were in fact owned by book and jobbing printers, though this is
obscured by the census categories.
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last week of September 1906, the Board of Trade found that 1,757 male
compositors over 20 years old were in full or part-time employment on daily
newspapers, while some 10,527 were similarly occupied on book, jobbing, or
weekly news work. As Cannon has painted out, this survey (which made no claims
to completeness) most likely overstates the proportion of daily news compositors
45in the total because of their greater accessibility to the surveyors. In
London, the News Department accounted for roughly 10% of the total membership
of the London Society of Compositors (LSC), and the proportion of news
d h l' 46compositors was no doubt lower outsi e t e metropo 1S.
Both news and jobbing printers produced a succession of highly perishable
and unique products! news becomes worthless if dated, so that newspapers often
go through several editions in a single night, each of which is a qualitatively
different product~ jobbing firms catered to a temporally specific and therefore
equally perishable demand for publicity and advertising materials. Thus both
newspaper publishers and jobbing printers needed to be located close to their
markets and sources of information - particularly given the state of communi-
cations at the end of the 19th century - tending therefore to remain concentrated
in London and other major cities.47 Consequently, as the Managing Director of
45 Board of Trade, Report of an Enquiry into the Earnings and Hours of Workpeople
in the UK in 1906, pt. VIII, Printing and Paper Trades, (Cd. 6556), P.P. 1913,
CVIII; Cannon, Skilled Worker, pp.71-73.
46 Figures submitted by the LSC for the years 1891-99, in Notes of the Proceedings
of an Arbitration between the LSC and the Master Printers' Association, before
G.R. Askwith, Feb. 1901 (1901), p.109; and T.E. Naylor (LSC General Secretary)
to Industrial Council, Enquiry into Industrial Agreements, Minutes of Evidence,
(Cd. 6953), P.P. 1913, XXVIII, q. 8371.
47 P.G. Hall, The Industries of London Since 1861 (1961), ch.6.
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the Manchester Guardian noted in 1902:48
The nature of the work takes the printing industry out of the rank
of those industries in which foreign competition is possible to any
great extent. By far the greater part of printing, for instance all
newspapers, magazines, weekly papers, and the smaller kind of jobbing
work must be done by each country on the spot where it is wanted •••
At the same time, domestic competition was intense among both newspapers
and jobbing printers. In the context of the explosive growth of newspaper
readership in the late 19th century, new papers were able, despite the
considerable capital required to enter the market and to capture a considerable
share of circulation, especially in London: the first million circulation
daily, the Daily Mail was only founded in 1896. As Lee puts it, "•••the
situation was one of general and rapid expansion, so that it was not necessary
to lose circulation to fall relatively behind one's competitQrs, while it.was
t to tOO d k II 49necessary 0 con 1nue 0 ga1n 1n or er to eep up. Ownership of provincial
papers remained comparatively unconcentrated right up to 1914 though in each
town one or two papers might predominate. Despite the greater apparent con-
centration in London - in 1910, three companies controlled 66.9% of morning
circulation and 82.6% of evenings, while four companies controlled 80.7% of
Sunday circulation - the volatility of their readership still ensured a highly
tOtO 0 50compe 1 1ve env1ronment.
General or jobbing printing was the sector within the industry most
similar to general engineering in its variegated and fragmented structure. The
low capital requirements for a small printing shop led many journeymen to set
up as small masters: Naylor of the LSe estimated in 1912 that there were in
48 G.B. Diblee, 'The Printing Trades and the Crisis in British Industry',
Economic Journal (Mar. 1902), p.8.
49 Lee, 'Structure •••of the Press', p.124.
50 ~., pp.126-27; and ibid., Popular Press, p.293.
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London some 3-400 printers employing no labour but their own; the 1911
Census recorded 1,339 men in England and Wales as 'working on their own
account', while the TA recognised 703 offices employing 1-2 men and 669
employing 3-7; many more offices of this size were of course unrecognised. 51
Not all general printers, however, fit the model of a small shop, located in
a back alley or country town, employing antiquated techniques and boyar
female labour, which was so often excoriated as the source of compositors'
woes during the second half of the 19th century. Some firms were able to
develop a more viable position on the basis of large specialised contracts -
one firm, for example, was responsible for printing all pawn tickets in
London - and these firms, often organised as joint stock companies, were able
to purchase machinery and to operate on a larger scale. The gap between large
and small firms tended to widen as the century wore on because of the increased
capital requirements associated first with flat-bed and rotary presses and
then with composing machines, and many smaller specialised firms were devoured
by large commercial printers or book publishers such as Water low and Sons or
Hazell, Watson, and Viney.52
The ease of entry into the jobbing sector continually threatened to
unleash waves of competitive price cutting, as firms submitted tenders at or
below cost to secure contracts. As the London Master Printers' Association (MPA)
51 Naylor to Industrial Council, Minutes of Evidence, q. 8381; Alford,
Letterpress printing, pp.93-94; Musson, TA, pp.93-94.
52 Alford, Letterpress Printing, pp.97-l17, 148-49, 161-63; ibid., 'Business
Enterprise and the Rise of the Commercial Letterpress Printing Industry,
1850-1914', Business Historv 7(1) Q965); Musson, TA, pp.91-95. Alford
reckons the size of a large firm at 2-400 employees in 1850 and 200-1,000 in
1914; medium-sized firms employed 50-200 workers in 1914. 'Business Enterpris~
pp.1-2, 10-11. A daily newspaper might employ up to 2,000 workers while a
large jobbing firm like Clowes employed 1,600 men and 100 machine presses.
Child, Industrial Relations, p.160
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remarked in 1892:53
It is notorious that, under stress and unhealthy competition, houses
undertake work involving a large amount of composition at prices
which allow but a slight percentage on compositors' wages, with the
idea of merely covering the costs of composition, and of making a
profit in the other departments.
The reduction of such 'unhealthy competition' through the diffusion of systematic
cost analysis became one of the principal objects of the Federation of Master
54Printers (FMP) from its inception in 1901.
Book publishers, on the other hand, produced a less perishable commodity
than the other sectors of the industry, and one which was relatively unaffected
by seasonal fluctuations. Similarly, book production was more amenable to
standardisation, and one important class of book printing, reprint work,
could be substantially routinisedi in Edinburgh it became the mainstay of
the female compositor.55 Thus Diblee's remarks about the immobility of printing
work and its freedom from foreign competition apply only to a lesser extent to
book publishing. Though book publishers often complained of German and Dutch
competition, in reality such competition does not seem to have been particularly
acute: in 1896 the declared value of books, maps, and charts imported into the
UK was £283,748, compared to £1,309,036 in exports, and the balance became
more favourable to Britain during the succeeding decade.56 More important
53 London MPA Special Circular 9.11.1892, quoted in Child, Industrial Relations,
p.198.
54 M. Sessions, The Federation of Master Printers (1950), pp.40-52i see also
STC Feb. 1893, and Child Industrial Relations, pp.161-62.
55 Naylor to Fair Wages Committee, Minutes of Evidence, (Cd. 4423), P.P. 1908,
XXXIV, qs. 252-56.
56 When pictures and prints are taken into account, the balance of imports and
exports was more equal: £428,037 of the former as opposed tOJ£395,200 of the
latter in 1896. Smail, Printing Trades, p.9. For complaints about foreign
competition see BCPS 1894 passim, especially 12.1741894, and P.W. Wilson in
The Heart of the~ire (1912), quoted in Hall, Industries of London, p.103.
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than foreign competition was the possibility of reducing labour and overhead
costs by relocating production in country towns outside the control of the
metropolitan trade unions, a process which accelerated after 1890.57
The book firms also became heavily involved in the rapidly expanding
market for magazines, weekly newspapers, and other periodicals. In 1887,
the London-based firm of Hazell, Watson, and Viney published 42 magazines with
a combined circulation of 12,400,000; by 1895, their number had doubled to
95, and other firms such as Wyman's, the St. Clements Press, and Spottiswoode's
followed hard on their heels. The segmentation between the relatively stable
demand for books and the more erratic and variable demand for periodicals -
which paralleled the wider split between the news and book sectors - was
reflected in the internal structure of the book firms themselves: many London-
based firms built large modern plants in the country for the book trade, while
continuing to produce periodicals from their cramped and archaic London premises,
close to the sources of news and advertisement and free from the risks of major
. 58capital investments.
As in the newspaper sector, opportunities abounded for rapid growth and
high profits in the sharply expanding periodicals market. Imaginative new
firms like George Newnes, whose Tit-bits revolutionised popular journalism,
realised net profits of £43,000 in 1892, £65,000 in 1900, and £81,000 in 1914,
while Harmsworthpaid 15% dividends during the first years of the 1900s.
57 Alford, Letterpress Printing, pp.74-77, 87-89; Hall, Industries of London,
ch.6; and below PP·2]1~J2, 300.
58 Alford, Letterpress Printing, pp.144-48, 156-58.
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Competition for this market was, however, equally intense: Newnes and
Harmsworth found themselves involved in a circulation war which forced the
latter to suspend dividends between 1906 and 1909, while Hazell, Watson,
and Viney and Wyman's fought for control of the magazine trade by tendering
for contracts at cost price on the eve of the First World War. The expansion
of the market, the intensification of competition, and the high capital costs
attendant on mechanisation and investment in new plant took their toll on the
book sector as a whole: Alford's survey of the business records of some 20
London-based firms of varying sizes suggests that net profits as a proportion
of total turnover fell from 25-30% in 1870 to 10% in 1914.59
Government printing likewise became markedly more competitive after
mid-century. In this case, however, political forces rather than the emergence
of new markets were chiefly responsible: parliamentary pressure forced the
Stationery Office to offer contracts to a much wider circle of firms than had
been true before 1870, when Hansard and Eyre and Spottiswoode monopolised large
classes of government printing at inflated prices. Government printing was in
general more similar to news and periodical printing than to book work in its
sensitivity to time pressures and its consequent dependence on London, though
by the first decade of the 20th century trade unionists were complaining about
60the decentralisation of such work to the country as well.
59 Ibid., pp.95-98, 106, 135-44, 157-61, 169-70; ibid., 'Business Enterprise',
p.6.
60 Alford, 'Government Expenditure and the Growth of the Printing Industry in
the 19th Century', Economic History Review, 2nd. ser., 17(1) (1964-5); Hall,
Industries of London, p.lOO; Naylor to Fair Wages Committee, qs. 214 ff.
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Competition, Concentration, and Employers' Collective Action
These variations in the nature of the product and in market position
between the printing and engineering industries, as well as between sectors
in each industry, were of cardinal importance in determining the respective
capacities of employers for collective action in opposition to trade unions_
But industrial conflict is not merely an expression of the balance of market
forces, and the emergence of employers' organisations cannot be read off
directly from patterns of competition and concentration, any more than can
the development of trade unions. -Instead, market pressures will be mediated
through the unfolding struggles with organised workers which provide the
immediate spur to employers' militancy.
In printing, employers in the leading sector, newspapers, were deterred
from successful combination by the particular impact of competition on the
industry. The perishibility of the product made newspaper proprietors
extremely vulnerable to strikes and short interruptions of production: the
losses incurred could not easily be made up later. Similarly, the keen
competition between papers for circulation and advertising revenue, coupled
with the volatility of the reading public, increased the risks for any individual
proprietor in a confrontation with his workforce while rendering cooperation
among publishers difficult to achieve. At the same time, the rapid growth of
demand and of profits in this sector encouraged employers to seek compromises
with their workforce which could be financed by the steady expansion of output
rather than pursue a riskier but potentially more lucrative strategy of
confrontation. Hence as contemporaries observed, newspaper proprietors shied
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away from major collisions with the trade unions:6l
The only printing operatives who find it easy to force their
demands upon employers are the printers employed in the daily
newspaper trade. As may be readily imagined, the proprietors
of such papers cannot afford to cease publication even for an
edition; and this has had a considerable effect on the discipline
of daily newspaper offices, which discipline, from the point of
view of the Trade Union enthusiast, is the most perfect of any
branch of the trade. Indeed, so real is the dread among news-
paper proprietors of any stoppage in their works, that one
prominent London proprietor is said, on one occasion when certain
demands were put forward by one section of his employees, to have
stated that he would grant them even though it cost him £10,000
per year - a striking commentary on the power of Trade Unionism
to levy what is practically, in regard to the position in which
the employer finds himself, a form of blackmail.
Similarly, the Secretary of the London Master Printers' Associatio~ asked whether
his members did not possess "the force of capital in relation to no capital"
62as a lever in dealings with their employees could respond:
•••In the printing trade it is not always a question of capital.
I have in my mind a case recently where we unfortunately had to
fight against one of these unions. It was a question of a daily
publication, which had to be brought out at a fixed hour, and
the employer could not in any way delay his publication, other-
wise he was liable to heavy penalties. So you see it is not always
a question of capital against non-capital.
While such considerations applied with diminished force to the provincial
press, where the localisation of demand made cooperation between proprietors
in different towns more feasible than in London, the more pronounced contrast
was with the large book and jobbing firms. It was the large London book firms,
able to stockpile their relatively standardised and durable product, but faced
61 C. Watney and J.A. Little, Industrial Warfare (1912), pp.217-18; cf. LUA
MC Dec. 1900.
62 H. Vane Stow to Select Committee on Stationery Contracts, Report with
Minutes of Evidence, P.P. 1896, XIII, q. 1866.
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with declining profit margins and vulnerable to competition from provincial
plants unfettered by trade union wage rates and work rules, who played the
most active role in resisting the demands of the metropolitan printing unions.
The multiplicity of smaller jobbing firms were not themselves able to form
effective combinations or to withstand a major stoppage, but parallel difficultieE
in meeting union wages and working conditions often ranged certain of their
number on the side of the book firms in resisting the demands of the unions.
These variations can be discerned quite clearly in the reactions of each
group of employers to the LSC's memorial for a revision of the London Scale
of Prices in 1890. The London MPA had been dissolved in 1866, and the demand
for a revision of the Scale led the employers to call for its re-formation as
a negotiating body. The opening meeting of the new organisation known
alternatively as the Master Printers' Association or the Printing and Allied
Trades' Association was overwhelmingly dominated by the representatives of the
large book and jobbing firms, who called with a single voice for delay and
tough negotiation in dealing with demands which they asserted would undermine
their competitive position and accelerate the movement of work out o£ London.
The single spokesman for the newspaper press, the editor of Lloyds' Weekly
Newspaper observed that,
They had to be printed at a given moment, and he thought the matter
of the men's demands should at once be dealt with. In regard to
newspaper work, this matter should speedily be settled; first to
ascertain what was really wanted, and then to deal with it at once.
A representative of the smaller jobbing firms likewise complained that ".•.
those firms employing 60 or 70 hands had not had the same opportunity of
63expressing their views as the larger firms".
63 .Art1cle in BCPS 11.4.1890, reprinted in LSC Trade Reports 1890.
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It was these same large printing and jobbing firms who would offer the
most determined opposition to the coropositorst demand for a wage advance in
1901, and to the Federated movement for the 50 hour week in 1911; the daily
newspapers, for their part, split off from the London MFA in 1906 when faced
with the threat of a London-wide printing strike, forming their own
P . 'A . t· 64organisation, the Newspaper ropr1etors SSOC1a 1on. These structural
factors are not, of course, the entire story: to anticipate the events narrated
in subsequent chapters, had the LSe adopted a completely intransigent attitude
towards the introduction of composing machines, the London newspaper proprietors
might well have overcome their divisions and formed a more solid alliance
against the union's demands. Similarly, though the Provincial Newspaper
Society had atrophied with the expansion of the industry after 1855, provincial
newspaper employers were able to surmount the (admittedly weaker) barriers
among themselves to force the Typographical Association (TA) to engage in
national negotiations, and the convergence of conflicts with the union over
apprenticeship, work rules, and hours forged an alliance between master printers
throughout provincial Britain across sectors which nearly precipitated a national
strike in 1911.65
Engineering employers were far more successful at collective organisation
than their counterparts in printing. As capital goods producers they could in
principle (though not always in practice) stockpile their product during a
64 See below, pp.278-79.
65 Lee, 'Structure .••of the Press', pp.12S-26; Child, Industrial Relations,
pp.201-2; and see below pp.230, 304-5, 315-16.
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shutdown and so later recoup a proportion of their losses,66while the greater
size and capitalisation of the leading firms enabled them to withstand a
prolonged strike more easily. Unlike newspaper publishers as well, engineering
manufacturers sold an important proportion of their production abroad and so
were vulnerable to foreign competition, which Britain's commitment to free
trade would allow to penetrate even the home market, as certain American
products were to do to an alarming extent during the mid-l890s. Consequently,
whereas the newspapers were sheltered from foreign competition and could rely
on their buoyant domestic growth prospects to absorb the costs of compromise
with their workers, engineering employers faced the discipline of an inter-
national market which threatened to penalise them if they allowed labour costs
to get too far out of line with those of their competitors. And like the book
firms, engineering manufacturers found their resolve in dealings with their
labour force stiffened by declining profit margins and the gradual exhaustion
of the existing division of labour in the depressed decades after 1870.
While the high levels of concentration in important sectors such as
textile machinery, private locomotive construction, and armaments ultimately
facilitated the establishment of a cohesive employers' association, the leading
role in the formation of the Engineering Employers' Federation (EEF) was played
by firms in marine engineering, a less concentrated sector whose pattern of
competition and relation to the business cycle brought it into especially fierce
collision with its workforce. As Paul de Rousiers, an acute French observer of
66 For some of the obstacles to stockpiling in capital goods production due
to the custom-made character of the product, see Reid, Shipbuilding, pp.4S-47.
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the British industrial scene, commented at the time, the pattern of demand
gave skilled workers in shipbuilding and marine engineering a hold over their
employers similar to that of the newspaper printers:67
The shipbuilding industry •••is essentially migratory and irregular.
It moves alternatively from place to place and, occasionally within
a single centre, from yard to yard. The work presents, at the same
time, an urgent character which one does not find to the same extent
in other industries. A firm is most often obliged to deliver a ship
within a given time period, under penalty clauses, after which the order
is shifted to another yard. Note that an order for a ship is an important
event: the construction of a single liner represents a financial interest
which can assure or compromise the dividends of a whole year. As a
result, the worker can, at a given moment, to a great extent use methods
of intimidation against his employer, and by the threat of an interruption
of work which would be fatal to the yard and even to a whole region obtain
important concessions .••
The industrial situation, which explains the demands of the
shipbuilding workers, of the engineers in particular, is equally the
reason for the organisation of the employers. To keep a flourishing
industry in their region, to protect it against the dangers that
the attitude of their workers produces, the employers of the North-
East have been led to sacrifice their commercial rivalry to their
common interests.
Unlike the newspaper proprietors, however, marine engineering employers were
able to use their greater resources and their position as capital goods
producers to overcome the obstacles to successful combination; moreover, the
possibility of losing their hold on international markets to the nascent
continental constructors gave them an additional spur in the same direction.
It was, however, an intensification of local conflict between skilled
workers and their employers which gave the decisive impetus to the organisation
of the latter. Beginning with the upturn in trade of the late 80s and early
90s, the marine centres, particularly the Northeast Coast, were racked by a
67 P. de Rousiers, Le trade-unionisme en Angleterre (Paris, 1897), pp.285-86,
my translation.
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series of costly disputes over wages, demarcation, and overtime, as the unions
sought to recoup the losses of the preceding period of depression. Faced
with what de Rousiers referred to as "a state of almost perpetual warfare",
the marine employers began to seek wider structures of cooperation. In 1895-6,
employers in Belfast and on the Clyde staged a joint lockout against an ASE
wage demand, and their success provided the signal for the formation of the
EEF later that year; its original membership was confined to the major marine
districts of the Northeast, Clydeside, Belfast, Liverpool and Barrow.
A previous attempt to establish a national engineering employers'
association, the Iron Trades Employers' Association (ITEA), in the aftermath
of the union victory in the 1871 nine hours strikes, had foundered on the
diversity of the industry, and especially on the divergent interests of the
marine and inland producers. Though William Armstrong had drawn up the
original proposals for its formation, the Northeast Coast employers held aloof
from the ITEA after its inception, though a major strike in Sunderland in
1883 ultimately persuaded them to affiliate. It was the darkening storm clouds
over mechanisation and the eight hour day which led the inland producers
themselves to make common cause with the marine firms, and various employers'
association, including Manchester, Bolton, and London joined the EEF in 1897.
With the establishment of a federal structure, the EEF was able to turn the
sectoral differences among its members to its advantage, becoming a formidable
national organisation dominated by large firms exercising a significant degree
of market control in their own sectors, and concerned as much with foreign as
with domestic competition. But despite the strategic advantages of its
structure, which combined firm central direction with substantial autonomy
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for its district associations, the EEF's expansion from 180 firms at the
onset of the 1897-8 lockout to 702 at its close was in large measure a
product of coercion: the large firms initiated a boycott of all engineering
concerns not locking out their workers, which their sub-contracting networks
rendered widely effective. Even at its height, however, the EEF was only
able to lock out 25% of ASE members, a figure which testifies to the pre-
68ponderance of small and unspecialised firms in engineering employment.
Thus in both printing and engineering, the capacities and inclinations
of employers for collective action was strongly conditioned by variations in
the nature of the product, the structure of competition, and the level of
concentration. But the formation of militant and effective employers'
association depended at the same time on the evolution of industrial conflict
itself, and therefore on the outcomes of the strategic choices and initiatives
of employers and trade unions alike. "Commercial rivalries", in de Rousiers'
words, had always to be balanced against "common interests", and the precise
extent of the latter was by no means fixed in advance, but had rather to be
determined in the course of the unfolding struggle with the unions.
68 E. Wigham, The Power to Manage (1973): chs.2-3; EEF, List of the Federated
~ngineering and Shipbuilding Employers who Resisted the Demand for a 48
Hours Working Week, 1897-8 (1898); ASE, Notes on the Engineering Trades
Lock-out, p.14, and see below, PP.200-1.
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Chapter II
The Division of Labour, Craft Regulation,
and Trade Union Organisation
The broad economic structures examined in the previous chapter - patterns
of growth, fluctuation, competition, and concentration - generate those
pressures towards the transformation of the division of labour which are our
primary concern in this thesis. The outcome of conflicts between skilled workers
and their employers over the structure of the division of labour will naturally
depend to alarge extent on the position of craftsmen within the already existing
division of labour, and on the forms of regulation which they have been able
to establish through their workshop organisations and wider trade union
institutions. In this chapter, we will explore the position of skilled workers
in the division of labour, together with the forms of craft regulation which
they created, on the eve of a major wave of mechanisation in both printing
and engineering in the l890s. In offering a somewhat static account of these
structures and practices, our aim is above all to delineate the framework of
conflict between skilled workers and their employers, and in the case of
craft regulation, to draw out its underlying principles and rationale. In the
succeeding chapter, we will attempt to set these structures in motion by
examining the characteristic conflicts between skilled workers and their
employers during the period preceding mechanisation; there we will, of course,
be more centrally concerned with the specific features of each industry than
can be the case in this chapter.
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The Division of Labour
The most basic contrast between the division of labour in printing and
engineering lay in the relative technical immobility of the former and the
more recent emergence of the latter. In printing, despite the vast expansion
in the volume of printed material, particularly newspapers, during the second
half of the 19th century, and the attendent revolutions in the technology of
the printing press itself, typesetting remained the preserve of the hand
compositor using techniques that had changed little since the days of Caxton
and Gutenberg. Engineering, by contrast, was itself a product of the
industrial revolution, and the division of labour during the mid-Victorian
era was the product of a period of rapid economic and technical change between
the 1830s and 50s. More importantly, the division of labour in engineering
was the outcome of bitter struggles between skilled workers and their employers.
Thus while it is possible to offer a technical description of the hand compositor'
labour without making reference to trade unionism and industrial conflict, the
same cannot be done for that of the mid-Victorian engineer: the technical and
social aspects of the division of labour are inextricably intertwined. None-
theless, as we shall see in later sections, beneath its technical immobility
the division of labour in printing was governed by a complex web of craft
regulation and so cannot be fully understood in technical terms, though it may
be depicted as such.
Printing
By the middle of the 19th century, the expansion of printing enterprises
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had begun to create a division of labour between composition and press work
in most large and medium-sized offices, a division which became progressively
sharper as the century wore on. While many young men in the provinces were
still trained as 'printers', serving an apprenticeship to both branches of
the trade, and journeymen often shifted from case to printing machine in those
shops which could not provide sufficient work to keep the latter running full-
time, this practice of 'twicing' was strongly frowned upon by the unions and
prohibited entirely in London. By the end of the century it was becoming
attenuated as a result of the increasing dominance of the larger firms and the
improved organisation of the machine room, particularly in the provinces.l
Within the machine room itself, the technical dynamism of the printing
press, with the emergence of the flat-bed and rotary presses from the 1830s
onwards, gave rise to a complex division of labour between apprenticed machine
managers, specialised labourers who worked their way up a ladder of jobs to the
demanding task of 'pointing' and 'stroking' connected with the feeding of the
machines, and general labourers responsible for carrying type-filled for~ and
heavy rolls of paper. Once the printing labourers formed their own union in
1889 (which ultimately became NATSOPA), they began to demand access to
promotion to the most responsible jobs which the machine managers sought to
reserve for apprenticed craftsmen. The most serious conflicts emerged over
the management of rotary machines, whose operators had often been recruited
from the ranks of engineers or even labourers, and whose organisation had been
neglected at first by the craft unions. It was the persistent attempts by the
1 Musson, TA, pp.249-63; Child, Industrial Relations, p.2l7.
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various unions organising apprenticed machine managers to force those non-
craftsmen who became managers of rotary machines to join their ranks which
would precipitate the transformation of the former Printers' Labourers
Union into an organisation seeking to embrace all grades of printing workers.2
While the Times and certain large provincial papers such as the
Manchester Guardian, the Bradford Times, and the Sheffield Independent,
introduced Hattersley or Kastenbein composing machines beginning in the 1860s,
for reasons we will explore in chapter IV these did not prove satisfactory
and the vast bulk of all typesetting continued to be done by hand up until
the 1890s. The division of labour in the composing room accordingly remained
far simpler than in the machine room, and apprenticed compositors were able
to monopolise the key jobs in most society houses, and indeed 'in many outside
the ambit of union control. Hand composition was (and continues to be)
divided into three main operations: typesetting proper, making up, and
, , 3
ampo s ariq ,
In setting type by hand, the hand compositor, reading from the
manuscript copy, sets each line of type in a 'composing stick',
a device which holds type in place, letter by letter and line
by line. When this stick is full, he slides the completed lines
onto a shallow metal tray called a 'galley'.
The galleys, together with any headlines, engravings, or photographs are then
'made up' into pages and locked into 'formes', the type surfaces having been
2 On the development of the printing press, see Musson, 'Newspaper Printing' ,
pp.4l3-20; ibid., TA, pp.96-99; G.R. Isaacs, The Newspaper Printing Press
(1931); and Lee, Popular Press, pp.54-57. On the division of labour in the
machine room, the tasks performed by the specialised labourers, see Isaacs,
Printing Press, pp.59-60; J. Moran, .NATSOPA: Seventy-Five Years Later (1964),
ch. 1; on conflicts between the semi-skilled and craftsmen in the machine room,
see below,ch.V, note 73.
3 R. B1auner, Alienation and Freedom (Chicago, 1964), p.40.
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made as regular as possible. At this point, the formes are carried to the
'stone' to be 'imposed' or arranged into the correct numerical order for
printing.4 Given that a page of type might weigh over one hundred pounds,
making up and imposing were considered quite heavy work: where female
compositors were employed, their inability to perform these parts of a
5compositor's job was adduced to justify their lower wages. Even in society
houses, however, labourers might be employed to carry the type-filled formes
6to the press room. Finally, the used formes would be broken up and the
type distributed to its appropriate cases; generally all compositors took
turns 'dissing', as with the other tasks, though typesetting and making up
. 7were often specialised in news off~ces.
The process of hand composition required considerable intellectual
powers from the compositor beyond the manual dexterity necessary for speedy
typesetting. The hand 'comp' had to be able not only to read, but also to
decipher often illegible handwritten copy, to justify the lines and internal
spacing following complex rules specifying the proper spaces between letters,
to correct spelling and supply punctuation, and often to design the page ·layout
as well. As John Southward, the foremost technical journalist of the period,
put it in a lecture on the limits of mechanical composition in 1890:8
4 Southward, Practical Printing; H.W. Larkin, Compositors' Work in Printing (1961)
5 Naylor to Fair Wages Committee, q. 194; William Fraser (Managing Director,
Neill and Co., Edinburgh), to ibid., q. 4586.
6 See the rules of the Manchester Branch of the TA specifying labourers' work
in composing rooms, Printers' Register, Jan. 1907.
7 Southward, Practical Printing, ch.22.
8 'Type-Composing Machines of the Past, Present, and Future', paper read before
the Balloon Society of Great Britain, 3.10.1890, Southward Collection, St.
Bride's Library, London.
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Much more has to be known than is necessary for the typewriter
operator .••the manual compositor •.•is not a mere animated machine,
picking up type and arranging it in a tool. He is deciphering
his copy, spelling the words - for it is seldom that the hand-
writing is so good as to distinctly indicate the different letters
of a word, punctuating them, and probably just before arriving at
the end of each line considering how to make a proper division of
the word according to etymological rules and printing customs.
The sectoral divisions between newspaper, book, and jobbing printing
meant that each type of work required somewhat different skills. According
to Southward, "•••Book work requires the most education, news work the most
dexterity, and jobbing work the most ingenuity and taste".9 The book hand
might be called upon to set matter in foreign languages, or perhaps to
arrange tables, (though he would usually be paid extra for such tasks), while
the jobbing hand would often be expected to design the layout of a handbill or
. 10 . han advertisement. The newspaper compos1tor, on the at er hand, was primarily
occupied with setting 'ordinary matter' - solid copy - at as rapid a pace as
possible. Hence compositors trained in newspaper offices were considered less
versatile than ordinary compositors: as William Fraser explained to the Fair
Wages Committee in 1908:11
There are two classes of printers, one called newspaper hands, who
are trained on newspapers and set nothing but solid matter; and
properly trained compositors who have been taught to do jobbing,
tabular work, and everything.
In London, the stronghold of craft unionism, newspapers were therefore
prohibited from taking apprentices; in the provinces, the unions campaigned
9 Southward, Practical Printing, p.165.
10 C. Manby Smith, A Working Man's Way in the World (.l853,reprinted 1967),
pp.183-88; Fraser to Fair Wages Committee, qs. 4607,4641, 4653.
11
~., q. 4641.
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strenuously against the production of 'inefficient workmen' through apprentice-
h' d '1 12s ~ps on a~ y papers. As the former secretary of the LSC complained in
18S0: "what knowledge of his business can that man have who has served seven
13years apprenticeship on the Times paper?" A correspondent spelled out the
threat to the market position of other printers a newspaper apprentice
represented: if he secured work in a general printing office after serving
his time 14
•.•and happens to be given plain, straightforward setting, it will be
all right; but if, unfortunately, it should be other work - a fancy
card, a circular, a piece of rule work, the copy for a pamphlet to
set up, make up, impose, and dress the forme, or formes, or be told
to do a job on the press, make it ready, and work it off, or in fact
to do anything out of the ordinary range of 'compositorial' work, he
is then found to be as much at sea as the youngest apprentice. The
discovery being made, his services would be dispensed with at the
earliest possible moment, and become probably a continuous burden on
the funds.
Engineering
The engineering industry was called into being at the end of the 19th
century by the growing demand for machinery in other sectors of the economy,
most notably, of course, in cotton textiles. At the centre of the early
engineering labour force was a group of highly skilled all-round craftsmen, the
12 Howe and Waite, LSe, pp.128-43; LTJ Sept.-Oct. 1910.
13 The Times was a non-union house between 1816 and 1914. E. Edwards, 'The
Disease and the Remedy', LSe Prize Essay (18S0), reprinted in Howe, London
Compositor, p.304.
14 TC, Dec. 1887, pp.6-7.
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~illwrights, ~hose trade combinations were among the earliest and roost powerful
15in the country. According to Sir William Fairbairn, a leading early Victorian
civil engineer, himself apprenticed as a millwright but initially excluded by
the millwrights' society from practicing his trade in London:16
The millwright of former days was to a great extent the sole
representative of mechanical art •••he was an itinerant engineer and
mechanic of high reputation. He could handle the axe, the hammer
and the plane with equal skill and precision; he could turn, bore,
or forge with the despatch of one brought up to these trades and
he could set out and cut furrows of a millstone with an accuracy
equal or superior to that of the miller himself ••••Generally he was
a fair mathematician, knew something of geometry, levelling and
mensuration, and in some cases possessed a very competent knowledge
of"practical mathematics. He could draw in plan and section, and could
construct buildings, conduits, or water courses in all forms and under
all conditions required in his professional practice. He could build
bridges, cut canals and perform a variety of work now done by civil
engineers.
With the great increase in demand for engineering products beginning in
in the l820s, the position of the millwright, with his high wages, restrictive
trade practices, and laborious hand methods, became more and more of an obstacle
to the expansion of engineering production. Employers accordingly sought to
recruit workers from other metal working trades - who became known as 'engineers'
- and to introduce new labour-saving machinery - notably the slide-rest lathe
and planing, slotting, drilling, shaping, and boring machines - to displace the
15 Jefferys, Engineers, pp.9-l2; Burgess, 'Technological Change', pp.218-21;
I. Prothero, Artisans, especially pp.31, 43, and 57-9. On the emergence of
the millwright from the ranks of itinerant woodworkers constructing and
maintaining flour mills, see J. Tann, 'The Textile Millwright in the Early
Industrial Revolution', Textile History 5 (1974).
16 Treatise on Mills and Millwork (4th ed., 1878), quoted by Jefferys, Engineers,
pp.9-10.
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exigent millwrights. Already in 1824, a leading London employer could claim
that:17
Engineers have become millwrights, and we make our machines so much
better and cheaper, that the trade that used to scoff and spurn at
the name of engineer are obliged to take up the name and conduct
their business by the engineers' economy.
During the years that followed millwrights sought to defend their position
within the emerging 'engineers' economy' by opposing piecework, systematic
overtime, the introduction of non-apprenticed men into the trad~ and by
creating new trade societies, of which the most important was the Journeymen
Steam Engine Makers' Society (JSEM) founded in 1826. But with demand for
engineering products rising more rapidly between 1835 and 1850 than during
any period in the industry's subsequent history, these efforts were bound to
bring the millwrights into collision with their employers. A series of
conflicts during the late 1840s and early 50s culminated in a lockout of the
newly formed ASE by a coalition of London and Lancashire employers, sparked
by a demand by craftsmen at the Oldham works of Hibbert and Platt's for
the dismissal of 'illegal men' working machines. After a month, the engineering
craftsmen were defeated, largely as a result of the increased supply of labour
in the industry, and forced to sign the 'document' renouncing trade unionism;
employers such as James Nasmyth took advantage of the stoppage in the following
18manner:
17 A. Galloway to SC on Artisans and Machinery, quoted in ibid., p.21.
18 S. Smiles (ed.), James Nasmyth, Engineer: An Autobiography (1889), p.299,
quoted in K. Burgess, 'Trade Union Policy and the 1852 Lockout in the
British Engineering Industry', International Review of Social 'History 17
(1972), p.659. On the transformation of the engineering industry during
the first half of the 19th century and the 1852 lockout, see also ibid.,
'Technological Change' and Industrial Relations, pp.5-24; Jefferys-,---
Engineers, pp.12-42.
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We added .••to the number of intelligent labourers, advanced them
to the places our Unionist workmen had left ••.I largely increased
the number of self-acting machines, and gave a still greater amount
of employment to my unbound apprentices.
Summarising the transformation of the division of labour, Fairbairn
19argued that in the new engineering workshops,
•••the designing and direction of the work passed away from the
hands of the workmen into those of the master and his office
assistants. This led to a division of labour; men of general
knowledge were only exceptionally required as foremen or out-door
superintendants; and the artificers became, in process of time,
little more than attendants on the machine.
20Nasmyth went even further:
The machine tools when in action did not require a skilled workman
to guide or watch them; all that was necessary to superintend them
was a well-selected labourer. The self-acting machine tools already
possessed the requisite ability to plane, to turn, to polish, and
to execute the work, when firmly placed in situ. The work merely
required to be shifted from time to time, and carefully fixed for
another action of the machine •••
Some historians, notably John Foster, have taken these judgments,
together with fears expressed by skilled workers at the_time of the 1852 lockout,
at face value, arguing that after 1852, "independent craft autonomy in the
21engineering industry more or less came to an end". In the event, however,
the hopes of employers and fears of the craftsmen that the employers' victory
would lead to a low-paid, unskilled, and unorganised labour force supervised
19 W. Pole (ed.), The Life of Sir William Fairbairn (1877), p.47, quoted in
Burgess, Technological Change, pp.229-30.
20 Smiles, Nasmyth, p.210.
21 Foster, Class Struggle, p.227; cf. also Stedman Jones, 'Class Struggle'.
For apocalyptic predictions by skilled workers about the implications of
new machine tools in the early 1850s, see Burgess, 'Trade Union Policy'.
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by a small number of skilled men proved illusory. Though according to the
census classifications in 1861 skilled workers constituted only 40% of the
engineering labour force in Oldham, home of Platt's, the most advanced firm
of the period, Jefferys estimates on the basis of five representative company
paybooks that skilled workers comprised 75% of the engineering labour force
nationally. As late as 1914 the EEF classified 60% of the labour force in
Federated firms as skilled.22 In 1892, Andrew Noble reported to the Royal
Commission on Labour that skilled workers constituted 60% of the workers at
Armstrong's Elswick works, surely the largest and most highly rationalised
f h 'od 23engineering enterprise 0 t e per1 • At Platt's Oldham works, with 10,000
employees the largest textile engineering firm in the world, Paul de Rousiers
in the early 1890s noted the overwhelmingly skilled character of the labour
24force:
Every workman is a specialist ...not a single woman is employed
by the firm .... There is no room for occasional hands or casuals
who take up any kind of work today to drop it for something else
tomorrow ..•. Except the porters, who are superseded as far as
possible by lifts and locomotives, almost every individual
employed by the firm is a skilled workman.
Not only were the new machine tools technically incapable of dis-
placing the skilled craftsman on a significant range of engineering tasks, but
the demand for craft skills in the industry was further enhanced by the dis-
covery that more sophisticated products could be made with the machines than
with hand tools, and by the limited opportunities for standardised production
afforded by the market. As Jefferys, the official historian of the ASE arguec
22 Foster, Class Struggle, pp.327-28; M. and J.B. Jefferys, 'The Wages, Hours
and Trade Customs of the Skilled Engineer in 1861', Economic History Revie\
1st ser., 17 (1947), p.30; Jefferys, Engineers, p.146.
23 Noble to RC on Labour, Group A, qs. 25, 485-86.
24 P. de Rousiers, The Labour Question in Britain (1896), pp.254-55.
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It was true that the johs which had required a high degree of skill
and experience to produce on a hand lathe or with a chisel and file,
were usually comfortably within the ability of a youth or less skilled
man on a 'go-cart' or planer. And as long as the demands on the
engineering industry were similar, except in number, with those made
in the 'handicraft' period, there was some justification for the
employers' high hopes. But industry was not to remain satisfied for
long with the hand tool standards of quality and speed of production.
The new machines were capable of an entirely different range of work,
and with the demand for larger jobs, greater accuracy, intricacy and
speed, the operator, youth, or unskilled man, had to develop a range
of skill to match the capabilities of the machines or be replaced by
the man who was so able. Furthermore, these machines, revolutionary
as they were in comparison with earlier methods, still left the major
portion of the engineering work, from patternmaking to fitting and
erecting, in the hands of the skilled worker with hand tools.25
Similarly, Saul has claimed that even at the end of the 19th century, most
"textile machinery parts were not interchangeable without a moderate amount
of fitting.,,26
The new division of labour that emerged within these technical limits
after 1852 bore a complex relation to that which had prevailed before 1830.
We can best understand the millwright's craft as a hierarchy of skills, with
the intellectual components - planning, drafting, designing, and model
building - at the top; sophisticated lathe work (turning) and precise assembling
(fitting) somewhat lower; and simple operations such as rough turning, planing,
drilling, boring, slotting, and shaping at the bottom. The introduction of
the new tools - slide-rest lathes, planers, etc. - primarily affected the
lowest set of skills: these operations could now be performed by unapprenticed
workers under the supervision of more highly skilled foremen and tool setters.
The highest set of skills was affected only to a limited degree, insofar as
a certain measure of direction was appropriated by management and draughtsmen
25 Jefferys, Engineers, p.16.
26 Saul, 'Mechanical Engineering', p~l14.
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emerged as a separate category of technicians; workers able to build and
design models and prototypes known as patternmakers emerged as the most
highly skilled engineering manual workers of the period.27
As for the intermediary skills, those aspects of the millwright's
craft that could not be routinised by the new processes gave rise to new,
more specialised groups of craftsmen, the fitters and the turners. These
workers, many of whom had served a general apprenticeship, drew upon a modicum
of abstract knowledge of engineering technology to perform their particular
tasks. The turner used his abstract understanding to execute complex operations
on the lathe and to adapt general purpose tools to specific tasks: the fitter,
to make his skill with the file compensate for the inability of the other tools
to produce parts that fit together perfectly; both might be called upon to .
read drawings, to design special tools or fixtures, to grind their own tools,
28and to set their feeds and speeds. The fitters and turners emerged during
the second half of the 19th century the largest single category of engineering
labour - almost twice the size of the next largest category in 1891 - and formed
29a majority of the ASE right through the 1920s.
27 For a careful description of the work'of patternmakers and draftsmen with
special reference to shipbuilding, see Reid, Shipbuilding, pp.75-82; on the
former, cf. also W. Mosses, A History of the United Patternmakers' Association,
1872-1922 (1922). The.special interests and organisation of the pattern-
makers in relation to the ASE will be considered below, pp.122-25.
28 RC on Labour, Group A, Digest of Evidence, P.P. 1893-4, XXXII, p.107; J.W.F.
Rowe, Wages in Practice and Theory (1928), app.III.
29 Jefferys, Engineers, p.5l; Burgess, Industrial Relations. The 1911 Census
shows the following figures for the numbers of fitters and turners, though
changes in classification resulted in an artificial drop between 1901 and 1911
as 14,271 labourers were separated out.
1881
1891
1901
1911
64,663
87,510
159,173
154,167
Census of Population, 1911, P.P. 1913, LXXVIII, Table 26.
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The decomposition of the millwright's skills and the rise of the engineerin(
and shipbuilding industries also called into being a host of metal trades which
do not fall into the tripartite schema. These groups include blacksmiths, the
various shipbuilding crafts organised by the Boilermakers, foundry workers
or moulders, sheet metal workers, brass founders and finishers, coppersmiths,
and plumbers. In addition to fitters and turners, the ASE sought to organise
the pptternmakers and the smiths, who also formed their own craft unions, while
a second union, the Steam Engine Makers' Society (SEMS) catered for much the
same class of workmen as did the ASE itself. At the same time the ASE was
engaged in demarcation disputes with most of the other metal trades; these will
be considered in the next chapter. In this thesis, we will be essentially
concerned with the fitters and turners of the ASE and the SEMS, and with the
labourers and handymen occupying positions below them in the division of l~our;
other metal trades, including the smiths and the patternmakers will be considered
mainly insofar as they affected the fitters and turners.3D
The lowest grade of skills opened a path into the engineering workshops
for a new category of worker, the 'handyman' or 'machinist'. Originally a
labourer, often recruited from other industries or from agriculture, the
handyman might begin on a simple machine and work his way up to more complex
ones, much like his counterpart in the printing machine room. As John Price,
the General Manager of Palmer's Shipyards and Engineering Works in Jarrow noted
in 1886:
30 For an excellent account of the division of labour in shipbUilding, which
contains much useful material on the patternmakers and smiths in relation to
the ASE, see Reid, Shipbuilding, pp.88-92, 99-106, 156-72.
31 Price to Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade and Industry, Third Report
(C. 4797), PP 1886, XXIII, q. 10,971.
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Q. Is there much movement in bringing forward unskilled labour to
skilled labour?
A. Yes; a drill'ing machine man is occasionally moved up to a slotting
machine or a planing machine, and a planing machine man ultimately
in some cases, but not frequently, becomes a lathe man.
By 1908, after another major wave of technical innovation, this process had
become significant enough for Sir Benjamin Browne, a leading Northeast Coast
32engineering employer to observe:
In our trade a semi-skilled man is the man who was on the floor, that
is a shop labourer. If he is any good at all he is taken to a small
machine, say a drilling machine; then if he is good at that he goes to
a planing machine, and so onto a slotting machine and other things, but
not onto lathe work usually; planing, drilling, and slotting are generally
worked by semi-skilled men, who get higher and higher wages. They have
a trades union of their own, the same as the engineers have, and a very
good union it is; they get very good wages, not so good as the engineers,
but better than the labourer gets.
Employers and Trade Unionists were agreed that the principal difference
between the apprenticed craftsman and the handyman was the far greater versatility
of the former: on a given machine there might be little to choose between them,
except their wage rates. Thus during the negotiations between the ASE and the
33EEF on the machine question in 1897, Browne noted for the employers that,
•••The advantage of a skilled man is this: it is not perhaps a very
difficult thing to train a man who has not had a full training to do
one part of a process, but when you want to put him on another process,
then the man has to learn it allover again.
34The General Secretary of the ASE for his part admitted that,
32 RC on The Poor Laws, q. 86,334. It should be noted that Hawthorne, Leslie and
Co., was a marine and railway engineering firm employing the highest class of
skilled labour, so that Browne's comments would understate the extent of such
promotions. Cf. his remarks quoted below,p.201,fn.64, see also the description OJ
machinemen at Elswick in the letter from Col. Dyer to B. Potter, Webb.Coll. EA
XXI, f.18; and the chapter on 'the handyman' in Anon., Working Men and Women (187~
33 Verbatim Report of a Conference between the ASE and the EEF on the Machine
Question, Apr. 1897, p.14. See also his evidence to the RC on the Poor Laws
q. 86,333.
34
Machine Conference, 1897, p.4.
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We know very well that there are men who are attending to machines
and have been doing so for a long time; and although they have not
served an apprenticeship, we are prepared to admit that they are just
as skilled as we are on the particular machines that they are working.
But another ASE representative hastened to reassert the linchpin of the skilled
35men's case:
We contend that by serving five years in the trade, we are g1v1ng
you a man whom you can get more from than the unskilled man. He is
supposed to have a certain amount of intelligence to enable him to
learn the trade through his apprenticeship, and we contend that with
the skilled man during his apprenticeship, and by subsequent work
with these and other machines, we are supplying you with a man who is
more capable of development than an unskilled man.
As one might expect, therefore, the nature of the work was the chief
factor determining the extent of less skilled labour; where there was greatest
scope for repetition production, handymen and machinists were most in evidence:36
In places like the Elswick works where they make ammunition and so on,
they employ a very large number of unskilled men, and even a large
number of girls. If you come to the making of machinery for the
textile trades, and so on, like they do allover Lancashire ...there
you get great repetition, and you have then a very large proportion of
unskilled ••••
This point emerges quite clearly from a comparison of the relative proportion
of skilled to unskilled men in the various departments of the Woolwick Arsenal.
In June 1886, the Laboratory, which concentrated on the mass production of
shells, employed 2988 labourers and 1422 boys to 1119 'artificers'; the Gun
Factory, where the work was more varied, employed the same number of artificers,
37but only 534 labourers and 134 boys.
35 ~., p.l4.
36 Browne to RC on the Poor Laws, q. 86, 227; see also de Rousiers, Trade-
unionisme, p.258.
37 Morley Committee, app.IVi on the arsenal itself, see Crossick, Artisan Elite,
pp.81-87.
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In large works such as railway factories or shipyards, another class of
specialised labourer known as 'fitters' assistants' might be employed. The
Royal Commission on Labour defined 'fitters' helpers' as:38
•••skilled labourers who assist the mechanic fitter by performing
part of the manual, while the fitter does the technical, part of
the work. A fitter's helper must be a trained man and have a rough
practical knowledge of the work, otherwise two fitters would be
required to perform one piece of work.
Some idea of the proportions of craftsmen to skilled labourers in such cases
is given by the figures submitted by the Chairman of Harland and Wolff's
Belfast shipyards to the Webbs in 1892, which revealed that the firm employed
364 fitters and 72 apprentices to 448 fitters' assistants; in the machine
shop 120 turners worked alongside 129 machinemen and boys. In some enterprises,
these proportions might fluctuate with the business cycle, as ~t Palmer's
Jarrow works, where the ratio of fitters to machinemen stood at 121 to 164 in
1865, 219 to 101 in 1873, and 24S to 170 in 1882.39
While the new groups of engineering craftsmen expanded and prospered in
the decades of Britain's dominance in world markets after mid-century, they did
not escape the effects of the general processes of specialisation in major
sectors of the industry: As William Allan, General Secretary of the ASE noted
in 1867:40
Some 20 years ago when we had not so many machines introduced •••
men were considered to be better general workmen, and could do
different things where they are now confined to one or two branches.
38 R.C. Labour, Group A, Digest of Evidence, p.107.
39 E. Harland to Webbs, ColI. EA XV, f. 1; Price to RC on the Depression, Second
Report (C. 4715-1), P.P. 1886, XXII, app. IV, Table 1. On the use of fitters'
assistants in railway shops, see Webb Coll., EA XVI, f. 6, pp.54-6l.
40 Quoted in Jefferys, Engineers, p.S7.
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41Similarly, the more exclusive SEMS observed in its Annual Report for 1876:
There are members of our own trade who know little of the relative
parts of an engine, only what they read of or are told by others,
no matter how anxious they may be to know, for the rules of the
establishment in which they are employed are often of such a
stringent nature that they are not allowed to move from their bench
or lathe in working hours, whilst they put to one class of work when
they commence, and never remove from it so long as they remain at that
particular firm ..••
42By 1892, the Royal Commission on Labour could state categorically that,
Fitters are divided into two classes, 'engine-fitters' and 'machine-
fitters', the former being engaged exclusively on the work of fitting
engines, and the latter performing all other branches of fitting.
In particular sectors, skilled workers might even find themselves
dependent on the labour market of a particular plant, whether because
specialisation put their skills at a premium in that plant or because it
had stripped them of their more general skills. Paul de Rousiers in the
early 1890s noted the golden chains that bound skilled engineers to the textile
43machinery firm of Platt's in Oldham:
In 1851 at the end of an important strike the union was entirely
crushed, and since then Messrs. Platt have forbidden the formation
of any such union among their employees. When the men have any
suggestions to make, they send a deputation to their masters who always
hear it with attention •••• The absolute position of the masters, so
exceptional in the labour world is explained by the unique position
of the firm. Although it is not the only English house of the kind,
it is by far the most important. It has no rival in the neighbourhood
of Oldham, and has in fact, a monopoly of this branch of the industry,
which it has raised to its present importance. Workmen who left
would find great difficulty disposing of their special skills on equally
favourable terms. It is their highly-specialised character that makes
them so dependent on the great firm which directs and employs them.
41 SEMS AR 1876, quoted in Reid, Shipbuilding, p.171.
42 RC on Labour, Group A, Digest of Evidence, p.107.
43 P. de Rousiers, Labour Question, pp.2S5-56. My emphasis. de Rousiers was not
entirely correct about trade unionism at Platt's; by 1866 the firm was prepare(
to discuss reductions of hours with ASE representatives, though it is unclear -
whether its employees were union members during this period. See Jefferys,
Engineers, p.69.
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So extreme a dependence on the labour market of a single firm was confined on
the whole to large isolated works like those of the railway companies at Crewe,
Derby, and Swindon, or to the Woolwich Arsenal, which offered special benefits
to its workers; even in these cases, however, such dependence was more
characteristic of the handyman than of the craftsman, whatever the real state
of the latter's skills. Thus a local ASE official at Crewe explained the
f 01 f hO 0 h 1 44a~ ure 0 the numerous mac ~nemen to organ~se t emse ves:
It is quite impossible to get these men to form and maintain a trade
union. Many of them are men brought in from rural districts and the
wages they are receiving are far above anything they have become
accustomed to. Then also there is absolutely nothing else in the town
for them to do if they leave or get discharged from the Railway works,
and to such men the idea of going to another town to seek work is very
remote and fraught with many terrors.
As de Rousiers himself went on to point out, in most sectors of engineering
craftsmen moved about quite freely from employer to employer; the surviving
autobiographies of engineering craftsmen confirm that such mobility remained
45the norm well into the 20th century.
44 Webb Call. EA XVII, f. 3; for a similar point about Derby, see ibid., EA
XVI, f. 6, pp.58-61; on Swindon, Williams, Railway Factory, pp.275-86.
45 de ROllsiers, Labour Question, pp.266-67; W.F. Watson, Machines and Men:
The Autobiography of an Itinerant Mechanic (1935); P. Taylor, The
Autobiography of Peter Tayloro (Paisley, 1903); J.T. Murphy, New Horizons
(1932); G.N. Barnes, From Workshop to War Cabinet (1924); D. Kirkwood,
My Life of Revolt (1935); W.G. Riddell, The Thankless Years (1948).
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II. The Inner and Social Life of the Workshoe and the Framework of Craft Regulation
There are traditions, customs, and usages interwoven with, and indeed in
great measure constituting, the inner and social life of the work-
shops, a knowledge of which is as essential to the comfort of those
whose lot is cast among them, as technical proficiency is necessary to
obtaining or retaining employment.
The Rationale of Craft Regulation
.As Thomas Wright pointed out over a century ago, a technical description
of work captures only a fraction of the worker's experience in the organisation
of production. As we saw in the previous section, it is impossible to present
even a schematic description of the division of labour in a Victorian engine-
ering workshop without reference to conflicts between skilled workers and their
employers; even in the less technically dynamic printing industry the aspirations
of craftsmen to regulate the conditions of the trade inevitably played a
constitutive role in the division of labour itself. Nineteenth century engineers
and compositors - like all workers who consider themselves craftsmen - sought
to control the conditions under which they worked down to the most minute details,
on the basis of an elaborate moral code in which,as we noted in the introduction,
their conception of their collective identity and their definition of their
material interests were inextricably bound together. Skilled workers
characteristically define themselves as possessing practical knowledge indispens-
ible to production, and consequently seek to force their employers to organise
production as if this would always be the case, regardless of the intervention
of fluctuating market conditions or of technical change. Craftsmen then as now
demanded from their employers a recognised and autonomous place in the division
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of labour, with attendent material privileges, on the basis of their membership
of a social group, the craft community (ideally defined by the serving of an
apprenticeship), independent of the transitory market value of their skills.46
Craftsmen's conception of their proper place within the division of labour
gave rise to an acute sense of rights and entitlements, codified in trade customs
and regulations - the common law of the workshop - whose enforcement was the
primary task of their formal and informal organisations. The clearest formulation
47of these claims appears in an artisan newspaper of the l820s:
Most well regulated shops are governed internally by a particular code of
laws, for the maintenance of justice and good order among the men, and
also for the prevention of such persons exercising their employment who
have no just claim to it - a jealousy which equity allows; for •••every
artisan and operator who has been in bondage for seven years, and who
frequently for that time endures complete privation of his liberty, chiefly
in order that he may afterwards enjoy a superior right to a trade, is as
much entitled to stand forward for his prerogative, and to use every means
in his power for the support of the same, as the monarch has to the throne.
It is well known among mechanics, that there are men who have but an
indifferent knowledge of the practical part of the business, and who will
offer their services to the master-tradesman at reduced wages, to obtain
employment till they become more perfect in the art, often at the great
injury of the regular operator.
Now, as there are no constitutional laws to protect such encroachments
on their rights, they have established shop-laws among themselves, which
they attend to with all the deference that could be shown to any legis-
lative enactment.
When a mechanic who is a stranger in a shop is first engaged, his
fellow workmen endeavour to ascertain whether he has a proper claim to
the business he professes. If there is any doubt, an objection is made
to his footing, till it is satisfactorily explained; and if he fails to
do so, he is then considered as an invader of their rights, and immediately
(to use their own phrase) they send him to Coventry •••• He is likewise
never spoken to by his shopmates, but obliged to experience practical jokes
and vexatious insults, which generally terminate by the man being obliged
to leave the shop.
46 See the discussion in the Introduction.
47 Mechanics' Magazine, 20.12.1823, quoted by Prothero, Artisans, pp.34-35.
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A trial is generally proceeded in after the following manner: The
oldest workman in the establishment presides as the judge, and for this
purpose he is provided with a full-bottomed wig, when, with all the
earnestness and gravity imaginable, he fills his important office. A
jury is impanelled from among the men. After the plaintiff and defendent
have selected their counsel (for there is usually a Demosthenes and a
Cicero to be found even among Cyclops), they proceed after the form of a
King's Bench trial, and decide agreeably to the verdict, which is generally
for a trifling fine as damages ••••
While the development of the division of labour and the emergence of
trade unionism and collective bargaining on a large scale inevitably entailed
modifications in the institutional forms of craft regulation, in both the
engineering and printing industries there is a substantial continuity through-
out the 19th century and beyond, not only in the rhetorical expression of
craft aspirations but also to an important extent in their practical embodiment.
The well known preamble to the ASE rule book, adopted in 1864 but still in use
at the turn of the century, provides a striking illustration of the rhetorical
continuity, with appropriate shifts from a monarchical to a meritocratic idiom:48
If constrained to make restrictions against the admission into our trade
of those who have not earned a right by a probationary servitude, we do
so, knowing that such encroachments are productive of evil, and when
persevered in unchecked, result in reducing the condition of the artisan
to that of the unskilled labourer, and confer no permanent advantage on
those admitted. It is our duty, then, to exercise the same care and
watchfulness over that in which we have a vested interest, as the physician
does who holds a diploma, or the author who is protected by a copyright.
Similarly, during the 1897 conference on the machine question, the General
Secretary of the ASE observed that; "If the employers say they have a property
in the machines, we might just as well say we have a property in our skill and
49our labour."
48 S. and B. Webb, Industrial Democracy (1902 ed.), pp.469-70. A similar
formulation may be found in the rules of the ASE's predecessor, the
Journeymen Steam Engine Makers' Society, see ibid., pp.563-64.
49 Machine Conference 1897, p.53.
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Wright's account of the socialisation of apprentices in a mid-19th
century engineering workshop - the process whereby they discover that their
place in the social order of the workshop is inseparable from the technical
mastery of their craft - provides the best introduction to the complex
character of craft regulation.50
When an apprentice enters a shop, he will in all probability be taught to
'keep nix' before he is told the names of the tools, •••
The men of every trade speak of their trade among themselves as the
trade, and this he the apprentice learns in time to do, and he is taught
both by the precept and example of his mates, that he must respect the
trade and its written and unwritten laws, and that in any matter affecting
the trade generally he must sacrifice personal interest or private opinion,
to what the trade has rightly or wrongly ruled is for the general good •••
He will hear, with commendable trade horror, of the existence of a
proscribed and hated race of beings called nobsticks or black sheep, and
he will be taught, in effect, that whenever he meets one of these obnoxious
creatures - wretches in human form, who never having learnt the craft in
a legitimate manner, are guilty of trying to get a living by working at
it, or who duly having acquired their craftsmanship, presume to exercise
it under circumstances objectionable to the trade - it will be his duty
to 'strike the caitiff down' ••••
He will learn at what times and under what circumstances he will be
justified in demanding and holding out for 'walking money' - money claimed
in consideration of men being sent to work at such a distance from the
shop as necessitates their rising earlier in the morning and getting home
later in the evening than usual; or 'dirty money' - money demanded by men
who are put upon repairs, or other work that involves extra wear and tear
of clothes; and on what kinds of jobs it will be advisable to 'kick' the
master for 'allowance' - allowance being drink or money to get drink,
asked for by men who are employed upon work requiring an unusual degree
of physical exertibn, or that has to be carried on in very hot or very
cold places, or upon the successful completion of any unusually large or
difficult piece of work. He will learn exactly how far he may go in doing
any work that does not strictly fall within his own branch of trade; what
rate of payment to demand for overtime under various circumstances; with
whom he mayor may not work; in what jobs he may demand or object to the
assistance of a labourer, and a variety of other useful matters pertaining
to trade and workshop etiquette .•••
50 Wright, Working Classes, pp.84-5, 103-4. In this passage, the term 'keeping
nix' ,"consists in keeping a bright lookout for the approach of managers or
foremen, so as to be able to give prompt and timely notice to men who may
by skulking, or having a sly read or smoke, or who may be engaged on
"corporation work" - that is, work of their own." Ibid., p.S5.
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He will be taught to consider the intimation 'he's in the trade',
on all sufficient reason for extending the hand of friendship to all
fellow craftsmen, irrespective of position and appearance; and he will
find that the greatest kindness is extended to a brother of the craft
at the time that he stands most in need of it - namely, when he is out
of work; and he will see that whenever special misfortune overtakes a
man, his shopmates are always prepared to enter into a subscription to
relieve his wants, so far as a little money will do so.
As will be apparent from this description, the aims of craft regulation,
like craftsmen's conception of themselves, were at once economic and moral in
character. To a certain extent, as Carter Goodrich observed, the apparatus of
craft regulation can be seen as "control as a bulwark of wages", a means to
maintain an adequate level of remuneration. But, as Goodrich went on to observe,
much of this regulation sought to protect the craftman's dignity, autonomy, and
non-instrumental relation to his work, as ends in themselves, while reinforcing
the solidarity of the craft community from which his identity flowed. 51 Thus,
for example, the rejection of supervision involved in 'keeping nix' was both an
assertion of the skilled workers' dignity as independent and competent craftsmen,
and a defence of their market position by reserving to themselves information
about the production process and resisting any attempts to speed up their work.
Because skilled workers' claim for insulation from the vagaries of the labour
market and for differential treatment to that accorded other workers rested on
their prior claim to possess distinctive qualities of inventiveness, reliability,
and technical mastery, the defence of their material interests was inseparable
from their self-understanding as craftsmen. Nor should the affirmation of this
identity be understood simply as an instrumental strategy for the protection of
their market position, as there are numerous instances in which skilled workers
51 C. Goodrich, The Frontier of Control (1920, reprinted 1975), pp.20 ff.
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rejected opportunities to increase their individual earnings at the expense of
their collective values and interests: the most notable case in point was the
bonus systems bitterly resisted by both engineers and compositors at the turn
of the century as subversive of their autonomy, the quality of their work, and
of the solidarity of the craft community through the promotion of selfishness.52
This interpenetration of economic and moral concerns can be seen as well
in most of the principal objects of craft regulation. The control of apprentice-
ship, for example, was on the one hand a means of regulating the labour market
by restricting the supply of labour, but on the other such control was essential
to assure that young craftsmen received adequate technical training, and more
importantly as we have seen, that they imbibed the values of the craft community.
Likewise the craftsmen's attempts to exclude outsiders from their work represented
both a market strategy and an affirmation of their distinctive identity and
capacities. Similarly, the rules for work sharing and protection of casuals
among the compositors, and the rules against sub-contracting ('piece-mastering')
among the engineers were designed to protect both the living standards of the
collectivity and its solidarity by ensuring that no fraction of the group fell
victim to special exploitation. Even the standard rate, the linchpin of
regulation of wages and the source of collective bargaining, can be seen in this
light, insofar as it set minimum standards for all members of the craft community,
whatever the individual market values of their skills. (The standard rate did
not of course proscribe equality of earnings, since, as trade unionists were
fond of painting out, employers were free to pay any individual worker more; in
practice, however, it doubled as minimum and maximum for most workers on time
rates.)
52 See the conclusions of the TUC Joint Committee's Report on the Premium Bonus
System (Manchester, 1910).
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As the preceeding quotations suggest, the internal egalitarianism and
solidarity of the craft community had as its obverse a discriminatory and
exclusive attitude toward outsiders, especially labourers, but also to a
significant extent apprenticed craftsmen from other trades, as the numerous
demarcation disputes in engineering and shipbuilding demonstrate. Wright
captured the situation well when he observed in 1873 that,S3
Between the artisan and the unskilled labourer a gulf is fixed. While
the former resents the spirit in which he believes the followers of
genteel occupations look down upon him, he in his turn looks down upon
the labourer. The artisan creed with regard to the labourers is, that
they are an inferior class, and that they should be made to know and
kept in their place.
Robert Knight, General Secretary of the Boilermakers, confirmed Wright's
description of artisan attitudes when in response to charges of conflicts of
interest between his members and those of the Tyneside and National Labour
Union (an organisation which included many platers' helpers), he told the Royal
C . . 54omrn~ss~on on Labour:
There ought not to be if we could only get the labourers to keep their
places •••• The plater is the mechanic and as a matter of course the
helper ought to be subservient and do as the mechanic tells him.
The anonymous author of Working Hen and Women (1879) put these points even
more vigorously:
There is no place in which class distinctions are more sharply defined,
or strongly, or, if need be, violently maintained, than in the workshop.
Evil would befall any labourer who acted upon even a tacit assumption
that he was the social equal of the artisan - if, for instance, he added
himself unbidden to a group of the skilled hands of the shop who were just
chatting about things in general or even put his oar into a conversation
that they might be carrying on in his full hearing. Whenever h~ is
admitted upon an apparently equal footing it is the toleration and condes-
cension of the artisan, not the real equality of the labourer, that is to
be taken as understood.
53 T. Wright, Our ~ew Masters (1873), pp.5-6.
54 RC on Labour, Group A, q. 20,801-2.
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Lest one think that such phenomena were confined to the mid-19th century, a
non-apprenticed compositor's autobiographical reflections on 'Snobbery in the
F t ' . . th 1 1930 .. . 55ac ory , wr1tten 1n e ear y s, 1S 1nstruct1ve:
In the factory, workmen are segregated into classes, just as in the
social sphere people are segregated according to breeding or income.
But the standard by which the workman judges his fellows is quite
different from that which obtains in the world outside his factory
doors.
The standard, applied severly, sometimes cruelly, may be summed up
in the question, 'Have you been apprenticed to the trade?' Whatever
the snobbery which may exist in social circles, it cannot be more
rigorously applied than by the apprenticed to the non-apprenticed workman.
And whatever the humiliation which less well-off or less well-bred persons
may have to undergo from those more exclusively placed, it cannot be
deeper than the humiliation of the workman who has no indentures to show
his foreman ••••
Sooner or later the dreaded question, casually uttered, arises:
'Where were you apprenticed?' The hapless non-apprentice may save himself
from perdition by a downright lie (his secret always li~ble to be revealed),
or he may confess and be forever scorned of his fellowmen •.••
'Improver' is the factory's stigma, just as 'outsider' is society's
stigma upon one of its ostracised members. 'Amateur', applied occasionally
to an artisan by his workmates, is perhaps an even greater insult.56
Wherever craft regulation persisted to a significant degree into the 20th
century with it persisted the exclusiveness of the craftsman and his antagonism
to the non-apprenticed interloper. While the intensity of this reciprocal
antagonism during the second half of the 19th century doubtless owed something
to the centrality of the perceived (and to a great extent actual) break in the
class structure between artisan and labourer, its roots lay in the efforts of
craftsmen to defend their position within the division of labour as much against
55 Working Men and Women, pp.111-12. This quotation, like a number of the
preceding ones, has figured extensively in the literature on the labour
aristocracy. See for example, R. Harrison, Before the Socialists (1965),
pp.27-30, and E.J. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, p.275.
56 L. Katin, 'A Compositor's Point of View' in C.T.Cramp. ed. The Worker's Point
of View: A Symposium (1933) I pp.137-39. For a comparable account of the
experiences of an improver in engineering, see Watson, Machines and Men, chs.l-~
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the encroachments of management as against other workers, rather than from a
cultural disdain for the less skilled per se. The most cogent exposition of the
rationale for craft exclusion along these lines came from T.E. Naylor, General
Secretary of the LSe, defending trade union opposition to the employment of
women as compositors at lower rates:
Q. Would not your argument lead to stereotyping the present form of labour
in all departments?
A •••• As an abstract proposition, I would say that the present conditions
should be stereotyped rather than that any body of men should be deprived
of the right to live.57
Since the principle aim of craft regulation was precisely to 'stereotype' the
division of labour in conformity with skilled workers' conception of their
proper place within it, it is hardly surprising that this should have occurred
at the expense of those below (or indeed alongside) as well as above them in the
social order of the workshop.
Workshop Organisation: The Basic Unit of Craft Regulation
The most basic institution involved in the enforcement of craft regulation
was the organisation of craftsmen in each workshop. Because the long history
of workers' organisation in the printing industry, together with its relative
57 Naylor to Fair Wages Committee, q. 195. Cf. also Robert Knight's defence
of the platers' refusal to permit their helpers to do certain types of work:
A. We believe in the old_ adage of the shoemaker sticking to his last.
Q. Yes, but if you carry that principle very far you would separate the
working class into cast-iron divisions and it would be impossible for a
man to pass over from the class to which he belonged to another class.
Do you think that would be desirable?
A. I do not think it would be desirable for a man of one class to go to
another class ••••
RC on Labour, Group A, qs. 20,807-8.
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technical immobility over the centuries, facilitated the emergence of more
complex and formal institutional structures than elsewhere, (as well as
providing a wealth of evidence) we will focus our analysis of the nature of
workshop organisation on printing. At that point we will examine to what extent
engineering craftsmen were able to establish practices analogous to those of
their counterparts in printing.
The origins of the chapel basic unit of workshop organisation in printing,
predate the foundation of trade unions by several centuries: the first detailed
description in Moxon's Mechanick Exercises (1685) dates their existence from
"time out of mind", while the unions first appeared at the end of the 18th
century. The chapels became in principle subordinate components of the wider
organisations, while retaining in practice considerable freedom of action, as
a glance at Fleet Street today will demonstrate.S8 Moreover the chapels have
maintained a remarkable continuity of customs, practices, and functions over
the centuries: a sociologist's description of chapel life in Scotland during
the 1950s noted many of the same essential features as did 17th and 18th century
commentators. Given the fragmentary character of our evidence on chapel life,
this continuity justifies inferences from earlier and later accounts to the
59composing room of the late nineteenth century.
58 EVen in non-union houses chapels often played an important role in
regulating production. See the testimony on Eyre and Spottiswoode's in
SC on Stationery Contracts, evidence of G. Eyre, J.W. Prussia, and F.G.
Geleit; and cf. the description of the pre-war Cambridge University Press
in G. Scurfield, A Stickful of Nonpareil (Cambridge, 1956), especially
pp.27-28.
59 For selections from the early commentators, see Howe, London Compositor,
pp.22-23; the sociologist's account is contained in three articles by
A.J.M. Sykes, 'Trade Union Workshop Organisation in the Printing Industry -
the Chapel', Human Relations 13(1) 1960,'Unity and Restrictive Practices in
the British Printing Industry', Sociological Review, n.s. 8(2) (1960), and
'The Social Cohesion of a Trade Union Workshop Organisation', Sociology 1(2)
(1967) •
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The chapel concerned itself with the defence of the craft community
within the workshop against both internal and external threats. Internally,
the chapel occupied itself with the promotion of solidarity and cohesion among
the workshop community, taking as its basic principle the unity and equality
of all craft members in the ShOPi externally it was responsible for the
application of union rules and the enforcement of trade customs (some of which
might be peculiar to an individual printing house) against encroachments by
employers. In pursuit of its internal objectives the chapel supervised the
distribution of tasks and equipment among its members in order to insure that
no man found himself placed in an unfairly disadvantageous position. The chapel
would, for example, be involved in the rotation of workers between typesetting,
making up, imposition, and distributioni would see that essential but scarce
supplies of type and rule were not monopolised by a few workmen (a problem in
piecework houses): and would ensure that any extra payments were fairly
distributed among the members of the 'companionship', (a term for all the
craftsmen working together on a single shifti often abbreviated to 'Ship'~~O
In a similar but less respectable vein, chapel members might practice
restriction of output with various degrees of formality: Charles Manby Smith,
whose middle class origins and apprenticeship in a small non-society country
shop estranged him from the ethos of the craft community, reports the refusal
of his workmates in a London book firm during the 1830s to allow him to earn
more than £2 per week regardless of his output: the surplus production simply
60 Southward, Practical Printing, ch.31i D.F. Schloss, Methods of Industrial
Remuneration (1892), p.91; Sykes, 'Workshop Organisation', 'Restrictive
Practices', 'Social Cohesion'.
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piled up 'on the shelf' to be applied against the following week's stint.61
In keeping with its communitarian dimensions, the chapel organised
a range of collective festivities: three representative examples are the
'wayzgoose', an annual outing-cum-dinner to which employers and printing firm
suppliers were often forced to contribute; 'bienvenu', the obligation of new
arrivals to treat their shopmates to drink (a practice known elsewhere as
'footing'; and the celebration of marriages by a procession through the shop
during working hours, accompanied by the 'jerry', a loud crashing of tools
known in other trades as 'ringing in', and capped by the groom's provision
62of drink for all.
Chapel decisions were taken by majority vote of the members (confined to
society members in 'open' houses) who elected a 'Father of the Chapel' (more
or less the equivalent of a convener) and a clerk to record and implement their
decisions. To enforce its decisions upon its members the chapel had recourse
both to formal and informal sanctions. Formally, it could fine its members for
infractions of its rules, a practice known as 'chapelling' (such fines were
originally a substitute for beatings, but were apparently declining in frequency
61 Manby Smith, Working Man's Way, pp.l83-89.
62 For marriage processions, see ibid., pp.248-50; for bienvenue and wayzgoose,
Howe, London Compositor, pp.22-32; see also the articles by Sykes cited above,
and Cannon, Skilled Worker, passim. It seems likely that the importance of
drink in chapel life declined after mid-century with the simultaneous
development of working class respectability and tighter work discipline;
Manby Smith notes an 'improvement' in workshop mores in this respect, as does
Wright, but for the persistence of alcoholic consumption during working hours
into the 20th century, see the excerpt from a compositor's autobiography in
J. Burnett, (ed.), Useful Toil (1974), p.337; Manby Smith, Working Man's Way,
p.249; Wright, Working Classes, p.98.
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and effectiveness during the second half of the 19th century)63- alternatively,
it could recommend to the union executive the malfeasant's expulsion, which
would result in the loss of accumulated benefits - a powerful threat in the
days before the state provided social security - or even of employment if it
were a society house. Informally, non-conforming workmen could be 'sent to
Coventry' (ostracised) or find their work and tools interfered with in order
to drive them from the shop. In most cases of course both types of harassment
would be applied in tandem: Manby Smith's co-workers in one shop tormented him
until he struck one of them, whereupon he was chapelled to the 'tune of five shill~
and the fine converted into drink; eventually he felt compelled to leave the
64shop.
Of equal importance was the chapel's place in the larger framework of
craft regulation. Through a complex amalgam of collective bargaining, unilateral
regulation, and the development of custom and practice in each workshop,
compositors and their unions sought with varying degrees of success to control
most aspects of printing production, from the supply of labour through its
wages, hours, and modes of remuneration, to the quantity and quality of output.
Chapels might exercise independent initiative in this struggle on such matters
as the division of copy between 'establishment' ('stab' or time) and piece hands,
as well as between journeymen and apprentices; or in fixing the dinner hour and
other work breaks. At the same time, they were crucial sources of information
for union officials on the actual conditions in each shop, and were expected to
63 Child, Industrial Relations, p.l46.
64 Manby Smith, Working Man's Way, pp.161, 186-89; Howe, London Compositor, pp.22-
32; Southward, Practical Printing, ch.31; Sykes, 'Social Cohesion'; Musson,
TA, pp.l25-26; Child, Industrial Relations, pp.l43-44.
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exercise special vigilance in applying rules on apprenticeshop, working hours,
overtime, and casual employment enacted by broader union bodies. Thus the
chapels were at once partisans in a perpetual guerilla war aimed at pushing
back the 'frontier of control' between craftsmen and their employers on a shop
by shop basis, and front-line units when open hostilities erupted: the vast
majority of printing disputes during the second half of the 19th century involved
1 '1 f' 65On y a s~ng e ~rm.
As a result of the transformation of the industry during the first half
of the 19th century, workshop institutions created by craftsmen in engineering
did not attain the level of formal complexity of the chapels in printing,
particularly in their ritual dimension. Nonetheless, as contemporary testimony
indicates, Victorian engineers did evolve a set of analogous practices aimed both
at reinforcing the solidarity of the craft community and at defending its
bargaining position. We have already noted Wright's account of the initiation
65 Musson, TA, pp.54, 163-64; Child, Industrial Relations, pp.148-52. As the
minutes of the TA EC for the early 1890s show, chapel officials attempting
to enforce union policies ran a high risk of victimisation. See especially
the entry for 2.2.1895 on the Sheffield Telegraph. For the 'frontier of
control', see Goodrich, Frontier of Control; on custom and practice, W. Brown,
'A Consideration of Custom and Practice', British Journal of Industrial
Relations 10(1) (1972). For a description of the remarkable role of the
chapel in regulating production in Fleet Street today, see K. Sisson,
Industrial Relations in Fleet Street (Oxford, 1975), p.165:
The management exercises little or no executive control
in the production and maintenance departments in Fleet
Street. The first-line managers who are most closely
involved with the chapels are not in practice responsible
for the management in their departments. In effect theirs
is a technical role only. Put simply, the industrial
relations manager manages by negotiation, or more specifi-
cally, through the payment system. The chapels, for
their part, undertake to perform a number of tasks in
the manufacturing process. As the preamble to one typical
comprehensive agreement states: 'The purpose of this
agreement, which covers hours, payments and working
arrangements, is to provide a comprehensive production
service.'
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of the apprentice: through a combination of deliberate instruction, workshop
gossip, and practical jokes, the apprentice absorbed the values of the craft
community. Foremost among these, as Wright emphasised, was the craftsman's
autonomy in relation to his employer, embodied in his freedom to work at his
own pace or even on private tasks - ·corporation' work - defended by the
practice of 'keeping nix'; W.F. Watson records the continued existence of such
66private work at the turn of the century.
As in printing, group solidarity was reinforced by comrnunitarian
festivities marking the major rites of passage in the craftsman's life cycle:
completion of an apprenticeship, arrival in a new shop, and marriage all
provided occasions for the payment of 'footings' - treating with drink
by the workman concerned to his shopmates. Marriage in particular was marked
by the ceremony of 'ringing in':
On the occasion of his marriage, a working man takes a few days' holiday,
and on the day on which he returns to work does not come to the shop until
after breakfast. Then he receives his ovation in the shape of what is
technically called a 'ringing in'. Some of his intimates will know on
what day he is to return, and at that time on that day everything is got
ready for welcoming him. Scouts are placed along the road he has to
corne, in order to signal his approach, and in the meantime the men and
boys in the shop stand, hammer in hand, around boilers, plates of iron
suspended from beams, or anything else that comes handy that will give
out a good ringing noise when struck. The arrival of the subject of the
demonstration is duly announced by the scouts; all stand to their posts,
and the instant .he enters the shop, strike up a thundering peal •••
The ringers in each shop, having rung him through their particular
department, follow him as he passes out of it, until the whole body of
them are assembled in his own shop, and then the peal reaches its grand
climax •••there are perhaps five or six hundred men, all hammering their
best on high or sharp sounding metal •••• The ringing in is continued for
about five minutes, and then the proceedings are wound up with a hearty
cheer.67
66 Wright, Working Classes, pp.B3-l07; Watson, Machines and Men, pp.2l-23.
For another account of the initiation of an apprentice, using the same joke
of the 'speck in the eye' noted by Wright, see Taylor, Autobiography, pp.36-37.
67 Wright, Working Classes, pp.99-l00.
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These positive methods for ensuring cohesion among craftsmen were, as in
printing, supplemented by negative sanctions against internal dissidents.
Wright observed that any workman who entered a shop without paying due respect
68to its customs and traditions "•••would soon find himself in very evil case".
For him the shop would be 'made hot' - so hot, that as a rule, he would
have to leave it; and might thank his planets if he was fortunate enough
to escape personal violence.
EVen so circumspect a witness as William Allan, the first Secretary of the ASE,
testified to the Royal Commission on Trade Union in 1867 about the conduct of
69ASE members toward non-unionists that:
If the party had committed himself in some way in connection with the
trade, (i.e. had blacklegged or consistently violated trade regulations
- JZ) in all probability if he went into a shop we would put him in
Coventry.
In large enterprises such as arms or railway factories where managerial
efforts to enforce workshop discipline intensified as the century wore on, such
communitarian practices might survive at the price of being pushed out of
working time itself. In Armstrong's Ordnance Works, for example, craftsmen
maintained a newspaper club, but came to work early to read the papers; "At
six o'clock the bell rings and the whistles in the shop sound, and business
70commences". Similarly, at the largely non-unionised Swindon works of the
Great Western Railway, ringing in persisted to 1915:
A crowd of men and boys beat upon any loose plate of metal that will
return a large clang - such as lids of tool chests, steel bars, anvils,
and sides of coke bunks - and make as much noise as possible.
68 Ibid., p.84.
69 Royal Commission on the Organisation and Rules of Trade Unions and other
Associations, First Report, (3873),P.P. 1867, XXXII, q. 628.
70 Gordon, Foundry, Forge, and Factory, p.34.
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But as the observer went on to point out, the beginning of the working day
brought such activities to a close:7l
This is allover by the time the hooter sounds. With the starting of
the shop engine the men fall into work, and the marriage is forgotten
by the crowd.
As in printing, workshop organisation played a critical role in the
enforcement of craft regulation, serving at the same time as the first stage
of bargaining with employers. William Allan noted in 1867 the widespread use
of 'shop delegations', ordinarily composed of 3 workmen, to meet with employers;
the most successful forward movement between 1852 and 1890, the nine hours
movement, had its origins in the actions of shop delegations on the Northeast
72Coast. Beginning in the 1890s, under the impetus of the growth of piecework
and conflicts over technical change and workshop discipline, shop stewards
emerged as workshop representatives effecting liasons between District
Committees and workers in each shop. On Tyneside by 1890, it was "the custom
among the larger trades in the factories and shipyards" to depute shop stewards,
and "in some cases vigilance committees" to collect dues and to tell newcomers
73that "they will have to join or they can't work there". The 1892 ASE Delegate
Meeting authorised District Committees to appoint shop stewards responsible for
dues collection inspection of pay lines, providing information on workshop
conditions, and ensuring that new arrivals presented their union cards or joined
up; in Barrow, they were also charged "to keep a careful watch that no other
71 Williams, Railway Factory, pp.256-57.
72 RC on Trade Unions, qs. 659-60; J. Burnett, The Nine Hours Movement. A
History of the Engineers' Strike in Newcastle andGateshea~ Wewc~st~e, 1872).
73 Workman's Times, 28.11.1890, quoted in H. Clegg, A. Fox, and A.F. Thompson,
A History of British Trade Unions, 1889-1910, Vol.I, (Oxford, 1964), p.431.
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74trades encroach on our work". Originally agents of the District Committees,
shop stewards quickly assumed a semi-autonomous role, particularly where
participation in piecework bargaining became a major part of their functions,
since the union's Executive was at first unwilling to permit full-time officials
t t' , , 75o nego ~ate p~ece pr~Ces. By 1897 the President o£ the EEF could complain
that on the Northeast Coast,
In every shop and in every department there have been for years what
are known as 'shop stewards', members of the ASE, whose duties are
to see that the rules, written and unwritten, of their society are
carried out, and he is a brave employer who dare say 'nay' to their
demands, which if not granted will be followed by immediately calling
out every member of the Society in that shop;
another employers' spokesman writing at the same time referred to the shop
, 76stewards as "paid spies of the Soc~ety". Allowing for the polemical thrust
of the employers' claims, it is clear that by the time of the 1897 lockout
shop stewards were playing a role in craft regulation analogous to those of the
elected clickers and the Fathers of the Chapel in printing; Jefferys estimates
that "by 1909 some shop stewards had been elected in most of the major centres
of the industry".77
74 RUles of Barrow District Committees for shop stewards, 1897, quoted by
Weekes, ASE, p.10; Jefferys, Engineers, p.137; Hinton, Shop Stewards, pp.79-80.
75 ASE QR June and Dec. 1894; Jefferys, Engineers, p.139; Hinton, Shop Stewards,
p.80; G.D.H. Cole, Workshop Organisation (Oxford, 1923), pp.12-l5.
76 Col. Dyer, 'The Engineering Dispute: Some Plain Facts About It', Cassier's
Magazine, Nov. 1897, pp.97-4; B. Taylor, 'The Machine Question and Eight
Hours', ibid., p.97-l6.
77 Jefferys, Engineers, p.165; R. Croucher, The ASE and Local Autonomy, 1898-1914,
(Warwick M.A. Thesis, 1971).
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Craft Regulation and Collective Bargaining
As many subsequent commentators have noted, the distinction between
unilateral regulation and collective bargaining stems from the Webbs' contrast
between 'The Method of Mutual Insurance' and 'The Method of Collective
Bargaining' in Industrial Democracy (1897). The Webbs believed collective
bargaining to be the rational telos toward which trade unionism was developing;
like all evolutionists, they judged the present by reference to the future,
underestimating accordingly the importance of skilled workers' continuing
aspiration to regulate their wages and working conditions on the basis of the
customs and moral principles of their craft with minimal interference from
employers. Concommitant with the growth of collective bargaining in the Webbs'
vision ran the development of centralised administration, beginning with control
of finance and extending toward trade policy; subsequent interpreters, notably
Clegg, Fox, and Thompson, while paying somewhat greater attention to the
persistance of craft control, have followed the Webbs in viewing manifestations
of unilateral regulation and local autonomy as backward looking and vestigial.78
In reaction to the Webbs, and especially to the infinitely more arid
obsession of more recent students of industrial relations with 'formal'
organisation and procedure, an alternative 'rank-and-filist' school of inter-
pretation has grown up which locates the essence of craft unionism in the
customary control exerted by skilled workers through their informal workshop
78 Webbs, Industrial Democracy, pt.I, ch. Ill; History of Trade Unionism (1920
ed.), ch. 4; Clegg, Fox, and Thompson, Trade Unions, especially pp.~02 and 471.
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organisations, tending to treat other levels of trade unionism largely as
formal and bureaucratic superstructures cut off from the concerns of the
membership by the imperatives of collective bargaining.79
Arguing from such a rank-and-filist perspective, James Hinton has
questioned the basic terms of the debate in relation to the engineering industry~O
The Webbs' categories of Mutual Insurance ~ Collective Bargaining
have tended to set up a false polarity •••. They obscured the potential
continuity of relatively autonomous local or workshop levels of
bargaining, a continuity which the wartime shop stewards' movement
was to reveal clearly •••. The tradition of local autonomy •••far from
being an excrescence of unilateral regulation and the Method of Mutual
Insurance, •••represents the mainstream of the development of collective
bargaining from its pre-1870 workshop origins.
Hinton is undoubtedly correct in asserting that the contrast between unilateral
regulation and collective bargaining is overdrawn, and his demonstration of the
continuous importance of workshop collective bargaining in engineering from the
mid-19th century forward is both convincing and applicable to other crafts as
well. In seeking, however, to defend engineering craftsmen from the opprobrium
attached to unilateral regulation and to locate the core of craft unionism
firmly on the shop floor, Hinton has neglected the complementary dimension of
the continuity between mutual insurance and collective bargaining: the degree
to which the aims of unilateral regulation were extended into the methods of
collective bargaining. Just as much of what appeared to be unilateral regulation
in the Victorian engineering workshop also involved elements of collective
bargaining, so too much of the collective bargaining that occurred outside the
workshop partook of the spirit of unilateral regulation, especially prior to the
79 For references to this school of interpretation see the works cited on p.xi,
fn. 49 above.
80 Hinton, Shop Stewards, pp.78-8l.
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engineering lockout of 1897-8. In this vein, £or example, ASE District
Committees in the 80s and 90s sought to embody their internal rules and trade
customs governing the ratio of apprentices to journeymen and the amount of
overtime permissible in collective agreements with employers, albeit with varying
81degrees of success.
The LSC, the printing union with both the longest experience of collective
bargaining and the most effective practice of craft regulation clearly viewed
customary rules as complementary to the price lists which were in principle
82the outcome of collective bargaining; its 1891 scale specifies that,
I~ the event of any question arising whereon either the Book or the
News Scale is silent or not clearly defined, such questions shall be
governed by the custom of the trade (if any) or decided by mutual
agreement; it being understood that for work of an exceptional charact~r
the compositor is entitled to charge such special rates as will
adequately remunerate him for the time occupied on the work.
Similarly, William Allan, in setting out the forms of regulation available to
the ASE, described a continuum extending from the determination of the standard
rate, in which consultation with employers played a significant role, to union
rules (such as those against piece-mastering) which applied unilaterally to the
membership, to trade customs (such as restriction of apprenticeship) which
branches or districts enforced where they could. The difference between these
forms of regulation was evidently one of degree rather than kind, depending on
the local power of the union rather than on its aspirations.83
81 For instances of agreements on apprenticeship, see Webb Call. EA XVI, f. 6,
pp.42-53; de Rousiers, Trade-unionisme, p.275; ASE MJ & R, Oct. 1899; RC on
Depression, Second Report, submissions of ASE Hartlepool Branch, App.II, p.10;
and ASE ~ June 1894. On overtime limits see de Rousiers, Trade-unionisme,
p.281, and ASE AR 1892 and 1894; on collective bargaining, Burgess, Industrial
Relations, pp.47-48.
82 Reprinted in Howe, London Compositor, p.461.
83 RC on Trade Unions, qs. 685, 743~82, 905-6.
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As a result of dif£erences in institutional structures and in the history
of relations between skilled workers and employers, the framework of craft
regulation in the second half of the 19th century varied considerably, not only
between printing and engineering, but also among the three regional typographical
unions. Indeed, the most striking difference was that between the Lse on the
one hand and the Typographical Association (TA) and the Scottish Typographical
Association (STA) on the other. In London, the basic component of craft
regulation, the London Scale of Prices, emerged during the first decade of the
19th century as the outcome of collective bargaining between the LSe and a
committee of master printers. This scale, which governed book and jobbing work,
established an elaborate set of piece prices for different classes of work and
sizes of type, including a range of tasks subject to 'extra' charges. With
the addition of a minimum wage for stab hands and a maximum working week during
the l830s the London Scale remained essentially unaltered until 1891, despite
84wage advances in 1866 and 1872.
A separate news scale, established in 1820 and recast in 1868, took account
of the special conditions of newspaper work and the superior bargaining position
of newspaper compositors, who had been organised separately until 1854. More
detailed than the book scale, the news scale not only fixed the wages and hours
of the compositor on piece and stab work, specifying various extras and special
payment for overtime; it also banned apprentices from daily newspaper offices,
defined the minimum amount of work to which piece and casual hands were entitled
to per night, specified the division of 'fat' matter between workers and employers
on the one hand and among groups of workers on the other, and sought to ensure
84 Howe and Waite, LSe, pp.53-65, 95-99, 171-82; Howe, London Compositor, chs.
5,6, and 8. The 1810 Scale is reprinted in ibid., document LIII.
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the fair distribution of copy among all the categories of compositors - piece
hands, stab hands, and apprentices.8S
In a sense, therefore, the London Scale of Prices, though in principle
the outcome of collective bargaining, actually represented the ne plus ultra
of craft regulation: a comprehensive code governing all aspects of the craftsman'
position within the enterprise, accepted by the employers, with the resolution
of ambiguities in the hands of the common law of trade customs; thus, all future
negotiations would refer to the text o£ the Scale rather than to changing
economic realities, except as periodic adjustments of prices became necessary.
Consequently, the conventional mode of altering or intensifying regulation was
for the LSC to address a memorial to the employers demanding a revision of the
scale; conversely, the advent of composing machines would leaq the employers 'to
86demand the drafting of an entirely new scale.
The TA and the STA, unlike the LSC with its compact metropolitan base,
were essentially federations of local typographical societies subject to a
broad range of wages, hours, and working conditions, as well as levels of union
organisation. Hence rather than engaging in regional or national collective
bargaining, the provincial societies relied on unilateral regulation to fix
minimum standards within the whole of their jurisdiction, fixing in their rule
85 The 1868 Scale is reprinted in Howe, London Compositor, document, CXII.
'Fat' matter occurs when a previously charged block of type is reused with
minor alterations and charged as if freshly set by compositors. In current
practice, where advertisements are set on piece, block advertisements supplied
by the advertiser are still charged at the full rate by the compositor, and
the proceeds divided among the companionship. Ibid., pp.193, 196.
86 See the memorials of 1866,1872, and 1890 in ibid., documents LXXIX, LXXXII,
and XCIV; for the revised scale of 1891 and the first composing machine
scales, ibid., documents XCVII, CXV, exII, and CXXIV.
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books provisions which their branches were obliged to maintain in each area
and which each individual member was obliged to respect in his workshop. Thus,
for example, the Secretary of the Waterford Typographical Society testified to
the continual refusal of the TA to admit his society because of its inability
to enforce a limitation on the number of apprentices.87
A comparison of the rule books of the three typographical unions supports
this distinction to a certain extent. The LSe rules were primarily concerned
with its internal government; beyond that they fixed the wages and hours
permissible on stab work, prohibited casual engagements of longer than 2 weeks,
required 2 weeks notice of transfer from stab to piece work or vice versa, and
prohibited its members from 'smooting' (holding more than one job at the same
time) or sub-contracting. The TA added a fixed ratio of apprentices to journeymer
and from 1891 sought also to enforce minimum standards of remuneration for piece
hands; the STA likewise fixed an apprentice ratio and an overtime rate in its
88rule book.
An example of the different balances between collective bargaining
and unilateral regulation in practice can be seen in the respective responses
of the Lse and the TA to the deteriorating position of the piece hand during the
second half of the 19th century. The LSe convened a conference with the
employers in 1889 to discuss payment for 'slating' (time spent idle waiting
for copy), while the TA Delegate Meeting enacted in 1891 a set of rules governing
87 RC on Labour, Group e, P.P. 1893-4, XXXIV, qs. 27, 405-50.
88 Lse Rules 1886, 1890, 1893; TA Rules 1889, 1892, 1893, 1894; STA Rules,
1889, 1899.
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piece work which included payment for slating, leaving its enforcement to the
89branches. Similarly, even after the emergence of national collective
bargaining in the l890s the 1908 TA Delegate Meeting passed a series of new
restrictive regulations which would generate serious acrimony among employers;
90the STA followed suit some 4 years later.
But as we argued earlier, these distinctions between collective bargaining
and unilateral regulation should not be overstated. Many of the provincial
typographical societies maintained scales of prices - generally modelled on the
London Scale - and most addressed memorials to local employers to demand changes
91in wages and hours. Conversely, much of the collective bargaining aspect of
the London Scale was purely notional: the Master Printers' Association
disappeared completely between 1866 and 1890, so that the LSC was left to impose
compliance through its own efforts. In the absence of an organised partner for
collective bargaining, the LSe sought to maintain the lawlike and impersonal
character of the London Scale by convening an official committee of the Society
to adjudicate disputes over the interpretation of particular clauses; masters
and chapel representatives were regularly called before this committee, whose
92efforts at impartiality were acknowledged even by the employers. The LSC's
strategy, in this context was always to maintain its scale in its 'fair' houses
while seeking to spread it to the 'unfair' ones. As we have noted, moreover,
the union always held that issues not covered explicitly by the scale were
90 Report of TA DM 1908; Child, Industrial Relations, pp.207-8.
91 For examples of early provincial scales, see Howe, London Compositor, ch.9;
for quotations from memorials in Edinburgh, see Gray, Labour Aristocracy, p.S8.
92 LSC AR 1884, p.18; Vane Stow to SC on Stationery Contracts, qs.1830-33.
76
governed by 'the custom of the trade', in practice a form of unilateral
regulation.
As a result, the methods of the LSC in enforcing its scale, ostensibly the
product of collective bargaining, did not differ markedly in practice from those
of the provincial societies in imposing the provision of their rule books.
Throughout the 19th century multi-employer strikes remained the exception; the
main weapon of printing trade unionism in London and the provinces alike was
the celebrated 'strike-in-detail' which the Webbs identified as the hallmark of
the Method of Mutual Insurance. Non-complying houses were closed to society
members, a procedure often accompanied by boycotts and picketting, as well as,
from the 1880s forward, the exertion of political pressure on their customers,
, 11 b d' 93espec~a y government 0 ~es.
Obviously, to decree a rule or to call attention to a provision of a
scale was by no means successfully to enforce it, and employers often viewed
even the London Scale as a form of dictation placing arbitrary restraints on
their freedom of action. Edward Unwin of the well-known book form doubtless
expressed the views of many union as well as non-union employers when he tried
to dissuade the Fair Wages Committee in 1908 from forcing government contractors
to adhere to 'conditions agreed with the trade unions', as this would involve
94the introduction of the London Scale.
We have in the composing room what is called the London Scale; it is
full of intricacies, many of which are antiquated and obsolete, corning
between you and your customer at every turn. Ours happened to be a
very miscellaneous business when we broke from it in 1872; but up to
that time we were putting money into the men's pockets. For instance,
the head of the compositors would come to you when you were quietly
93 Child, Industrial Relations, pp.146-52; Webbs, Industrial Democracy,
pp.BO, 169-70.
94 Fair Wages Committee, q. 4463.
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doi.nq your work, perhaps, and say; 'You .must;not do that in that way! I
I What is the matter? I IThis .must; be done ao+and+so , I That is the thing.
While technically he may Be right according to the London Scale, yet
this is so upsetting, that the London Printers in society offices today
who have to bear with it, say to me that I ought to be very thankful
that I am non-society.
Indeed, a society house printer testifying with Unwin concurred that "
these conditions are extremely unfair and vexatious".95
As a national union with branches allover the country and in a variety
of sectors within engineering, the ASE resembled more closely the provincial
typographical societies in its mode of regulation that the LSC. Its peculiari-
ties stemmed in part from the aftermath of its defeat in the 1852 lockout. At
that point it struck the main components of craft regulation from its rules -
restriction of the number of apprentices, opposition to piecework, to systematic
overtime, and to 'illegal menl working at the trade - and entrusted their
enforcement in the guise of trade customs to the branches, not without success,
96as an 1861 survey domonstrates. In 1874 the ASE Delegate Meeting enacted as
a rule prohibiting the extension of piece work to shops where it was not already
being worked; here as well, however, the major source of initiative lay with
th d.i , 97e l.strl.cts. The main achievement of the ASE as a national organisation
during the 1870s,the conquest of the nine hour day, had its origins in a
movement of shop committees, which was taken up by the District Committees and
prosecuted without much support from the Executive.98 In the absence of national
95 J. Straker to ibid, q. 4467.
96 Jefferys, Engineers, p.42; Burgess, Industrial Relations, pp.36-37; for the
survey, see Jefferys, 'Skilled Engineer'.
97 Jefferys, Engineers, p.lOO.
98 Burnett, Nine Hours Movement; E. Allen, J.F. Clarke, N. McCord, D.J. Rowe,
The North-East Engineers' Strikes of 1871 (Newcastle, 1971); Burgess,
Industrial Relations, pp.41-43.
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collective bargaining prior to 1898# the districts were also the seat of such
negotiation with employers as occurred. As we have noted, certain District
Committees, especially on the Northeast Coast, were able in the 1880s and early
90s, to embody their work rules in agreements with association of employers;
wage rates, hours of work, hours and rates of overtime, local holidays, and
in some cases apprenticeship ratios formed the substance of such agreements;
though where piece work was extensively worked DCs tried to bring it within the
amb't f b" 99~ 0 collective arga~n~ng.
Another source of the continuing importance of local autonomy in craft
regulation within the ASE lay in the contradictions of its constitutional
structure. In principle, the ASE Executive Council, elected prior to 1892 by
the London branches alone, was merely an administrator of the society's finances
rather than an independent source of policy formulation. The policy of the
society was embodied in its rule book, and in the initiatives taken by its
District Committees; only the Delegate Meeting had the power to amend the rules,
and to prevent the growth of Executive autocracy, a Final Appeals Court possessed
100the definitive authority to interpret the rules. Moreover, while only the
EC could grant strike pay of Ss per week, the District Committees were permitted
to grant lOs out-of-work benefit, and therefore could easily undertake a strike
without the authority of the Executive. This apparent anomaly of centralised
finance without a centralised trade policy earned the ASE the disapproval of
99
Burgess, Industrial Relations, pp.45-48.
100 Weekes, ASE, ch.li Jefferys, Engineers, pp.10B-llO; Burgess, Industrial
Relation;:-pp.35-38.
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contemporary observers, who compared them unfavourably to Robert Knight's
Boilermakers, among them employers such as John Price of Palmer's shipyards,
Jarrow, as well as students of trade unionism such as the Webbs and Paul de
R . 101OUS1ers. The Delegate Meeting of 1892 strengthened centralised administratior
to some extent by providing for an elected Executive and for the appointment of
paid organisers; the former, however, possessed no more real power than had
their non-elected predecessors, while the latter, in principle agents of the EC
quickly became allies of the DCs by virtue of their involvement in day to day
1 1 ., 102oca negot1at10ns.
A constitutional structure of this kind does not persist over a long period
of time purely out of inertia, and the "fanatical attachment of the Engineers
103to an extreme local autonomy" was due to the deeply felt belief of engineering
craftsmen that they were as competent to manage their own affairs as they were
to regulate their trade. An equally important factor in the persistence of
local autonomy within the ASE was the heterogeneous and geographically dispersed
character of the jobs performed by its members, in contrast to the relatively
localised and homog~us structure of the shipbuilding industry which provided
the basis for the centralised organisation of the rival Boilermakers. Not only
were ASE members scattered among the disparate branches of the industry, from
the textile machinery shops of Lancashire and the shipyards of the marine
centres to the railway works at Swindon and Crewe and the giant arms factories
at Elswick and the Royal Arsenal, but significant numbers of engineers were
employed outside the industry itself, as mechanics, anciliary workers, and repair
101 Price to RC on Labour, Group A, q. 26,332; Webbs, Industrial Democracy,
pp.94-97; de Rousiers, Trade-unionisme, p.269.
102 Weekes, ASE, pp.7-8.
103 Webbs, Industrial Democracy, p.97.
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men in enterprises ranging £rom iron and steel £irms, to local authorities,
mines, 104ships, and even printing £actories. ASE members were therefore
naturally more reluctant to entrust the formation of union policy and the
conduct of collective bargaining for their diverse trades to a metropolitan
Executive and full-time officials than were their Boilermaker counterparts in
the shipyards, where conditions varied relatively little from one regional centre
105to the next.
In this context, the ambiguous distribution of authority within the union
naturally resulted in conflicts between the districts and the Executive,
particularly once inter-regional employers' organisation began to pose a threat
to the union's finances on a wider basis. In 1886, for example, the Glasgow
DC overruled one of its constituent branches which had given one of its members
permission to work two machines. The Executive Council supported the branch
and a drawn-out conflict ensued, involving efforts to deny DC members payment
of their expenses and culminating in the election of a new DC.106 In more
important cases, however, the outcome was less favourable to the Executive's
authority. In 1895 ASE men in Belfast struck to obtain wage advances, and the
Clyde employers acting in concert with those in Belfast, locked out their ASE
workmen in sympathy. The ASE EC, by this time elected on a national basis,
arranged a compromise which the Belfast men found unacceptable, and suspended
the men's strike pay in an effort to force them back to work. The 1896 DM,
l04 For the proportions of engineers in other industries see the 'Census of
Mechanics' cited in Hinton, Shop Stewards, p.24.
105 See the comments cited in note 101 above, and Reid, Shipbuilding, pp.1S9-63,
168-70, 388.
lOG Burgess, Industrial Relations, pp.4G-47.
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however, reaffi~ed the society's commitment to local autonomy by enacting a
rule prohibiting either the EC or any DC from ending a dispute without the
consent of two-thirds of the local members.l07 This conflict, together with
its outcome, presaged these which ensued once the ASE found itself locked into
a national collective bargaining procedure after its defeat in 1898. The major
confrontations between the Executive and the Districts arose over the latters'
resistance to wage cuts during recessions. District Committees struck without
Executive approval on Clydeside in 1903 and on Tyneside in 1908; in each case
the Final Appeals Court ruled that the EC could not suspend strike pay, resulting
in the demise of the Executive's conciliatory strategy and the resignation of
. W8~ts architect, General Secretary George Barnes.
As our analysis of the ASE suggests, the framework of cr.aft regulation 'was
intimately bound up with the institutional arrangements governing the distribution
of power and authority between different levels of union organisation, and nothing
was so productive of internal conflict as an external challenge to the existing
methods of regulation. Each of the typographical unions, the LSC, the TA, and
the STA, represents a different approach to the clash between executive authority
and local autonomy that so marked the internal policy of the ASE. In a sense,
the LSC and the TA in particular represent opposite policies:the former, with
its compact geographical base, its frequent meetings, and its well organised
constituent sections, was a bastion of participatory democracy; the latter, with
its scattered branches, rare delegate meetings, and apathetic membership, was
107 Ibid., pp.56-57; Jefferys, Engineers, p.141.
See below, pp.400-6.108
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109rather more of a "plebiscitarian dictatorship", in Musson's words.
Confined to the metropolis, the LSC was preeminently an activist,
democratic organisation. Its Quarterly Delegate Meetings were well-attended
and decisions about major strikes were reached in general meetings open to all
members, while rule changes, extensions of benefits, and strike levies were
in the hands of ballots which not infrequently overturned executive recommend-
ations. The News Department, independent of the rest of the society until 1854,
began to hold its own Delegate Meetings in the l880Si the unemployed formed a
separate chapel, which unsurprisingly was a major force advocating more militant
measures to combat unemployment in the 90s; jobbing hands and later linotype
i icoperators would likewise form internal groupings toward the turn of the century.
The LSC's executive itself, known as the 'Trade Committee', was until the late
1880s composed of twelve members elected three at a time by the Delegate Meetings
and serving for one year; after two years' service committee members were
forbidden to stand again for an additional two years. In 1888 a coalition of
the existing leadership with reformers stirred by the growing ideological
ferment in the labour movement combined to strengthen the Trade Committee's
authority by converting to election by a ballot of the entire membership and
by dropping the rule against terms of longer than two years; the News Department
h . t d t t t' h . 111was at t e same t1me gran e wo represen a 1ves on t e execut1ve.
109 Musson, TA, p.107.
110 LSC Trade Reports, 1885-1914, passim; Printers' Register Oct. 1890, p.4.
III LSC, 'Election of Committee', 9.1.1889,
1886, 1890; 'Our Trade Committee: Is a
Vigilance Gazette, July-Aug. 1888; 'Our
~., Nov. 1888.
LSC Trade Reports 1889, LSC Rules
Reconstruction Necessary?' ,
Trade Committee of the Future' ,
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The establishment of a more permanent executive by no means checked the
tendencies for internal debate and opposition to flourish within the LSC. In
the late 1880s, the dissatisfaction of rank and file compositors with aspects
of executive policy gave rise to an organised opposition movement, the Vigilance
Association. This movement, which emerged in the wake of a successful campaign
to abolish half-pay benefit for the unemployed in 1888, quickly became a focus
for opposition to the 'old unionist' policies and style of the executive. Its
monthly journal, the Vigilance Gazette, which ran from 1888 to 1889, announced
its intentions "To remedy •••defects in the administration of the LSC •..and to
ventilate grievances that may be brought to their notice".112 Associating
itself with demands for the eight hour day and a more militant trade policy,
by June 1888 the Vigilance Association claimed a membership of several hundred.
Though the VA seems to have faded out along with its Gazette sometime the
following year, other more overtly political opposition movements replaced it:
in 1890, 'The Progressive Association of the LSC' ,113 and in 1891 the 'LSC
Reform League'. The latter group announced its intention "to promote honest
and legitimate opposition to the existing leadership","to fight the bastard
trade unionism" of Drummond (the LSC General Secretary, an old unionist with
C' f l' , ) d b k ' 'f ,114onservat1ve political af i 1at1ons , an to rea up the g1 ts •
112 Vigilance Gazette, May 1888, and A.W.J. Hands, 'The Trade Committee: What
It Is and What It Should Be', ibid., June 1888. The LSC, unlike the TA,
possessed no official organ until 1906; a quarterly journal sympathetic to
the Executive, The Printer, begun in 1883, folded in 1888. See the attack
on the Vigilance Association in ibid., Aug. 1888.
113 LSC Trade Reports 1890; Printers' Register, Oct. 1894, p.4.
114 Workman's Times 12.3.1892 and 20.8.1892, cited in Clegg, Fox and Thompson,
Trade Unions, p.144. The gifts were mutual assistance societies within the
LSC to which several Trade Committee members belonged; they maintained
employment seeking facilities for their members and were widely accused of
monopolising the best jobs in the metropolis. Examples of their rules
survive in the Webb Collection.
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Opposition figures likewise sharply criticesed the Trade Committee's conduct
of the negotiations over the revision of the London Scale in 1890_91.115
In 1891 three members of the Reform League were elected to the LSC
executive (or Trade Committee as it was known), precipitating Drummond's
resignation.116 His replacement was the Secretary of the News Department, C.W.
Bowerman, who, though no new unionist, seems to have found cooperation with the
left much easier. The opposition followed up this success with a full-scale
campaign against the gifts, obtaining several majorities for their abolition in
membership ballots; while as a result of an executive-arranged compromise the
gifts were not actually dissolved, they were forced to open their ranks to all
LSC members and to abjure their employment-providing activities, so that they
seem to have played no further role in the politics of the union.117
115 See P.H.S., 'Advance of Wages Movement: The Executive. Exposed' in Lse
Trade Reports 1891.
116 Drummond's letter of resignation appears in LSC, AR 1891; see also the
interview with him in Press News, Mar. 1892, p.36:-and Clegg, Fox and
Thompson, Trade Unions, p.144; Drummond went on to a post with the Board
of Trade Labour Department.
117 'Reports to LSC QDMs', 2.11.1892, 1.2.1893, including the report of a
subcommittee on gifts and several ballots, in LSC Trade Reports 1892-3;
see also Printing News, Nov.-Dec. 1892 and Feb.-Mar. 1893. The Reform
League itself was disbanded in 1892 to set an example to the gifts, Clegg,
Fox, and Thompson, Trade Unions, p.144. The opposition within the LSC
seems initially to have been inspired more by party political allegiances
than by grievances about union government, though obviously it was the
existence of such grievances among the members which allowed the opposition
to gain a sympathetic hearing. I have not myself attempted to trace the
political affiliations of the oppositionists nor the evolution of political
debate as such within the LSC; hence I am relying in large measure on
conversations with Robert Baldwin of Manchester University, who is preparing
a thesis on socialists and trade unions in London, 1880-95. He suggests that
dissidents close to the Social Democratic Federation were more willing to
work within the official structure and to seek election to union offices
than were those associated with the Labour Elector, so that the latter were
displaced in influence by the former during the early 90s. The best known
SDFer in the LSC, Harry Hobart, who had played an important role in the
organisation of the Warehousemen and Cutters' Union, was elected to the
Trade Committee in 1891, where he remained for the next 20 years, emerging
in 1911 as the editor of the strike paper The Daily Herald.
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There were, of course, definite limits to the degree of internal
democracy in the LSC. Thus one socialist critic of the Trade Committee
complained to the Webbs in the early 90s that the "one great anomaly" in the
LSC,
•••is the fact that although the Committee's proposals are invariably
rejected by the delegates, they are nearly always very successful in
cases of ballot. As perhaps not more than 2-3,000 members of the 10,000
in the Society will attend any of the meetings during a period of some
years, even a cursory reflection would result in a suspicion that the
Committee's election and power of administration are due entirely to
their exploitation of apathy.i18
Such apathy is of course a dilemma of all democratic organisations, and in this
case testifies more to the reformers' inability to define a clear alternative
programme which would mobilise widespread support among the members rather than
to any institutional obstacles to the articulation of opposition within the
union. And while the reform movements within the LSC achieved no sweeping
changes in the society's structure (apart paradoxically from the strengthening
of the Trade Committee), their conflicts with the executive in themselves
strongly reinforced the union's democratic character, and ensured that the
grievances of the members could at critical moments exert a major influence on
union policies. Thus in 1896 rank and file rejection forced a renegotiation of
the linotype scale, at the risk of a major collision with the newspaper
publishers, while the discontent of the unemployed made itself felt in the
union's increasing commitment to the eight hour day during the following
decade, resulting ultimately in a general strike of book and jobbing printers
in 1911.
In the TA, on the other hand, composed of scattered local typographical
societies and run by officials elected by the Manchester branch alone, the
118 W.H. Boswell to Webbs, n.d., Webb Call. EA XXI, p.326
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Executive enjoyed far greater control over union affairs. Even in large
centres such as Manchester, participation in branch activities was low, and
between 1860 and 1890 the Executive exploited the apathy of the membership
and the ambiguities of the union's constitutional structure to fend off any
outside influence in the formulation of union policy. Using its control over
the Typographical Circular and over the wording of voting papers, the Executive
avoided convening a Delegate Meeting for 14 years after 1877. Naturally,
criticism from the branches of the Executive's undemocratic practices and
dominance by the Manchester branch escalated through the 1880s. Only the
threat posed by the advent of composing machines and the attendant need to
mobilise the rank and file behind a unified policy was sufficient, however, to
force the Executive to convene a Delegate Meeting in 1891; among the delegates'
first acts was to enact a rule that future DMs must be held every five years.
The deepening crisis caused by the rapid spread of the linotype, together with
mounting pressure from below, led to another DM in December 1893; there the
upsurge of democratic feeling expressed itself in a widespread demand for a
representative Executive elected by the membership on a regional basis rather
than by the Manchester branch alone. In the event, however, a new intermediary
institution was created, an annual Representative Council, elected direct~y by
the branches and functioning as an electoral college while at the same time
being responsible for reviewing reports and balance sheets.
The role of this new institution in the government of the TA was from the
start ambiguous and its functions quickly became the subject of fierce internal
conflict: designed as a reviewing body, the RC quickly assumed legislative
functions as well, with branches submitting resolutions to it as they would to
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a full-scale DM. Ultimately, the tension between the RC and the Executive
came to a head over the signing of the first linotype agreement in 1898,
which the RC rejected as insufficiently protective of the hand compositors'
interests; The Executive, skilled by long practice at the manipulation of
opinion within the society, successfully appealed over its head to the
membership by referendum. As a result of this clash the 1903 Delegate Meeting
dissolved the RC, though the EC itself was transformed into a representative
b d 1 d . 1 b . 119aye ecte on a reg10na aS1S. The TA Executive's victory left it in
effective control of the union, though rank and file revolts would occasionally
challenge its hegemony, as at the 1908 and 1913 Delegate Meetings; accordingly,
pressures for militant action to secure the shorter working week during the
1900s were less influential and the TA would be able to arrange a compromise
peace with employers in 1911 while the LSC would commit itself to an all-out
strike.
In its own way, the STA represented yet a third mode of resolving the tensi(
between local autonomy and executive authority within a framework of craft
regulation: nearly all power rested with the branches, while the Executive
played a minimal role. With a membership in 1890 of only 3,000, the STA, even
more than the TA, remained a federation of quasi-independent branches, dominated
by its most important constituents, Glasgow and Edinburgh. The Executive Council,
located in Edinburgh and composed of representatives from the major branches,
did not generate major initiatives in policy during the 19th century, though it
might, for example, encourage the tightening up of apprenticeship rules. In
general, conflicts between the branches, (especially between Glasgow where the
119 Reports of TA DMs 1891, 1893, 1898, 1903; Reports of RC 1893-98 in TC;
separate RC Reports 1899-1902; Musson, TA, pp.125-48.
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union was strong and Edinburgh where it was weaker after an unsuccessful
strike in 1871-2} paralysed such initiatives for concerted action as emerged
from the branches at Delegate Meetings: the most notable case in point was the
efforts by the Edinburgh and Aberdeen branches to develop some strategy to deal
with the prevalence of female labour that was the underlying source of their
weakness; the Glasgow branch blocked all proposals to liberalise society rules
d h ' ,,120as con ucive to weakening t e1r own pos1t1on. It was only in the face of
a threatened national lockout over rules changes enacted at the 1912 DM that
the STA Executive allowed itself to be drawn into regional collective bargaining
to any significant extent; even then the next year's delegates enacted a new
rule forbidding it to sign any agreements without first submitting them to a
rob h' 121me ers 1p vote. Thus the STA remained a bastion of unrestricted local
autonomy right up until the First World War.
Craft regulation, the expression of skilled workers' aspirations to
control the conditions under which they worked on the basis of their conceptions
of themselves as craftsmen, was thus compatible with a wide range of bargaining
arrangements with employers; similarly, the tensions between their desires for
direct control of their own affairs and the requirements of wider organisation
were productive of strikingly different internal political arrangements.
Contrary to the Whig assumptions of proceduralist theorists of industrial
relations, there was neither a sharp break between unilateral regulation and
collective bargaining, nor an ineluctable tendency for central authority to
120 Gillespie, STA, pp.52-59, 101-8, 203-5.
121 STJ, 1912-13; Child, Industrial Relations, pp.207-8.
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expand at the expense of local autonomy.
Nor was one form of organisation in itself more effective in securing
the aims of craft regulation. The outright suppression of dissent and the
persistence of uncontrollable internal strife both carried with them dangers
for trade union organisation. The "centralised absolutism,,122 practiced by
the TA Executive left it reluctant to trust the independent initiatives of its
members, and therefore led it to exacerbate the weakness of the union's
bargaining position by repeatedly caving in to employers' demands rather than
risk a confrontation. The LSC leadership, by contrast, confident of its
members' willingness to support militant action and conscious of the need to win
their active support for union policies, could adopt a much tougher negotiating
stance, and frequently achieved its aims by threatening, and on occasion taking,
strike action. Conversely, however, the endemic conflicts between the ASE
Executive, local officials, and the rank and file meant that union policy
oscillated between autocratic attempts to impose a centralised direction on
collective bargaining and its disintegration in the face of revived local
opposition, a dialectic which did much to undermine the effectiveness of craft
regulation and to prepare the way for the debacles of 1897-8 and 1922.
Just as the internal political styles of these various unions affected
their respective abilities to mobilise their members for major confrontations
with the employers, so too did they influence their capacities to form durable
alliances with other unions. Thus, as we shall see, the cohesive and partici-
patory LSC found it relatively easy to collaborate with the other London printing
122 Musson, ~, p.133.
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unions for common aims within the context of the Printing and Kindred Trades
Federation (PKTF), while the TA's cautious and autocratic style led it
repeatedly to withdraw from Federated movements to strike a separate (and often
less advantageous) deal with the employers. Similarly, the volatile and
fissiparous ASE was not seen as a reliable ally by the other engineering and
shipbuilding unions, who were persistently alienated both by its imperialistic
attitudes towards other organisations and by its leaders' inability to maintain
a consistent policy. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, these pronounced
contrasts in the political styles of the typographical unions and the ASE,
related but by no means reducible to regional and industrial variations in
market structure and the division of labour, would have a significant impact
both on the effectiveness of each union's framework of craft regulation and on
the outcome of conflicts over technical change.
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Chapter III
Arenas of Conflict, 1850-1890
•••With the steady increase in the price of labour, there is a
constant conflict gOing on, a perfectly peaceful one, between
employers and skilled labour; and it is shown in endeavours to
substitute skilled labour by machinery. (J. Price, General
Manager, Palmer's Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Jarrow, to
R.C. Depression, Third Report, q. 10,963.)
In a well-known section of the Prison Notebooks, Antonio Gramsci drew
what has become a celebrated distinction between "war of manoeuvre" and "war
of position" in relation to the social and political constraints on socialist
strategy. Gramsci argued that only a peculiar set of circumstances, such as
the crises of the state and the weakness of civil society in Russia in 1917, made
a rapid and radical contestation of the entire structure of society possible -
in his terms a "war of manoeuv~e". In the more stable liberal democracies of
Western Europe, on the other hand, where the density of civil society gave the
established regimes greater security and popular legitimacy, a more gradual
strategy of socialist transformation - a "war of position" - had become necessary.
Whatever the defects of Gramsci's argument as a normative framework for
socialist strategy, this distinction has considerable heuristic value for the
analysis of industrial conflict.2 In 'normal' times, when the structure of the
1 'State and Civil Society', in A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks
(ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, 1971), pp.206-76.
2 Some of the difficulties in Gramsci's political thought are cogently set out
in P. Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Grarnsci', New Left Review, 100 (1977)
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division of labour remains stable, it is generally treated as given by both
sides and together with the legal and political rules governing the relations
between labour, capital, and the state - creates the framework for both conflict
and compromise between workers and employers. In such periods, the conflicts
arising from workers' and employers' divergent definitions of their respective
interests are likewise regarded as normal - in Price's words as "perfectly
peaceful" though they may involve strikes and other sanctions, and do not in
principle require major shifts in strategy on either side. At moments of crisis,
when external pressures and internal developments undermine the continued
viability of the structure of the division of labour these same normal conflicts
may suddenly assume a new significance, as the tacit rules regulating relations
between workers and employers in the industry are called into question, and both
sides may therefore have to reconsider their strategies or even their conception
of themselves in the light of the dangers and opportunities raised by the new
't t' 3s~ ua ~on.
For our purposes, once this distinction between conflicts within a particular
division of labour - normal conflicts or war of position - and conflicts about
the structure of the division of labour itself - crises or war of manoeuv~e -
has been established, the crucial question concerns the relationship between the
two phases of industrial conflict. This relationship contains two essential
aspects. First, the outcomes of normal conflicts are not without significance
for the structure of the division of labour. The multiplication and intensifi-
cation of normal conflicts can itself point the way towards a crisis through the
3 For the concept of normal conflict in this sense, see Sabel, Industrial Conflict
especially chs. 1 and 4; for an alternative approach to the same issues, see
the discussion of the 'terrain of compromise' in Lazonick, Wilkinson, and
Zeitlin, 'Labour Process'.
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gradual erosion of one party's position, as for example the progressive
extension of piecework may subvert the standard rate or the rising price and
autonomy of skilled labour may threaten a firm's profitability. Second, and
equally importantly, if following the military adage, generals always prepare
to fight again the last war, so too, workers' and employers' perceptions as a
war of position gives way to a war of manoeuvre tend to be dominated by memories
of the previous major confrontation over the structure of the division of labour
(which may have occurred a generation or more earlier), and more forcefully by
their own experiences of the innumerable skirmishes along the frontier of control
which followed. Thus as a new wave of technical and organisational change begins
both sides will take as their first concern the prevention of any incursion by
the other into already contested terrain, while seeking to exploit whatever
opportunities arise to outflank the enemy and thereby to establish their claims
on a more secure footing within the new phase of the division of labour. This
latter pattern can be said to shape the entire history of conflicts between
skilled workers and their employers over mechanisation, as the former seek to
extend and strengthen their framework of craft regulation, while the latter
manoeuvre to free themselves from such encumbrances once and for all.
The years between 1850 and 1890 saw a progressive intensification of normal
conflict in both engineering and printing, a development which despite its
different sources in the two industries would precipitate major crises of craft
regulation in both cases during the 1890s. In engineering, the existing structure
of the division of labour and the tacit settlement between skilled workers and
employers which had emerged in the wake of the 1852 lockout were reaching their
internal limits as the returns from a pattern of extensive growth diminished, a
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problem exacerbated by the rising cost of skilled labour. At the same time,
British manufacturers were beginning to face increasing competition from
American and German producers operating on the basis of a more advanced division
of labour. In printing the crucial problem was the inability of hand composition
to keep pace with the rapid expansion of demand for printed matter and the
technical development of the printing press - especially important on daily
newspapers - and the intensifying competition among domestic book and commercial
printing firms, which depressed profit rates. Each of these developments put
growing pressure on the employers to cheapen and intensify the hand compositor's
labour, while ultimately seeking to mechanise it entirely.
In both industries these pressures placed the existing frameworks of
craft regulation under increasing strain and brought certain long-standing areas
of conflict between skilled workers and employers to the fore. It was the
attitudes and strategies formed by craftsmen and employers in relation to these
conflicts which would structure their initial response to the onset of technical
change in the 90s, and a close analysis of the arenas of conflict in the period
preceding mechanisation is therefore essential for an understanding of the
subsequent crises of craft regulation.
In many respects, the pattern of normal conflict between skilled workers
and their employers during this period was similar in engineering and in printing,
largely because of the similar objects of craft regulation in each case. In both
industries, craftsmen found themselves in recurrent conflict with their employers
as a result of their efforts to control entry to the trade, to maintain their
lines of demarcation, to defend the standard rate and their control over the
pace of work in the face of new forms of payment and supervision, and to regulate
95
the labour market as a whole. But while the underlying sources of conflict
were similar in the two industries, the pattern of conflict itself and the
salience of particular issues diverged substantially as a result of variations
in market structure, in the development of the division of labour, and especially
in the prior history of industrial conflict. In particular, the experience in
engineering of a previous wave of technical change and a major confrontation
between skilled workers and their employers in the late 1840s and 50s set it off
from printing with its relatively static technology (at least in the composing
room) and its more continuous history of industrial relations. As a result,
lines of demarcation were intrinsically more ambiguous and difficult to defend
in engineering and the threat of further mechanisation loomed larger than in
printing, where conflicts between craftsmen and employers focused more sharply
on issues of unemployment and underemployment. In the balance of this chapter
we will analyse the development of normal conflicts in each industry separately
before returning to a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of craft
regulation and the position of skilled workers on the eve of a major wave of
technical and organisational change in the 1890s.
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Engineering
The Emergence of a New Pattern of Industrial Relations: 1850s and 60s
As we have observed, the division of labour which prevailed in engineering
through most of the second half of the 19th century was itself the product of a
prior wave of technical change and industrial conflict during the 1840s and 50s.
As a result of their victory in the 1852 lockout, engineering employers formally
obtained the right to place labourers on machines, to employ non-union labour,
to introduce piecework, and to impose systematic overtime; in many cases they
also forced their employees to sign 'the document' renouncing trade union
membership as a condition of reemployment. The source of the exceptional bitter-
ness of this confrontation between employers and skilled workers lay in their
shared belief, itself shaped by the preceding period of rapid technical and
economic change in the industry, that the course of transformation of the divisior
of labour might result in the eventual elimination of skilled craftsmen as a
significant component of the engineering labour force.
In the event, however, neither the hopes of the employers nor the fears of
skilled workers proved correct, for a combination of technical and economic
reasons. The machines which were involved in the first wave of mechanisation in
engineering - the slide-rest lathe, the planer, the slotter, the shaper, and the
driller - only routinised a part of the engineering craftsmen's skills, while
the light special-purpose machine tools which would make it possible to routinise
large parts of fitters' and turners' skills were only developed in America after
1840 on the basis of a market for standardised mass produced goods which did not
exist in Britain during the same period.4 At the same time, the composition and
4 Saul, 'Mechanical Engineering' and 'Machine-Tool Industry'; N. Rosenberg,
Technological Convergence in the American Machine Tool Industry, 1840-1910',
Journal of Economic HistoEY, 23 (1963).
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rate of expansion of demand for British engineering products was changing.
The years between 1835 and 1850 represented the most rapid period of expansion
for the engineering industry before or since, fuelled by the growth of cotton
textiles and the railways, which naturally put the most extreme pressure on the
existing division of labour in the industry.5 After 1850, however, the rate of
growth of domestic demand slowed and export markets providing steady but less
spectacular growth became progressively more important to the industry as a
whole. As Burgess has shown, the period from the l850s to the l880s was marked
by a pattern of extensive labour-using growth, in which investment broadly
preserved the same ratios of capital to labour, so that the expansion of the
industry brought in its train a considerable expansion of the skilled labour
force: membership of the ASE, for example, grew from 9,737 in 1852 to 72,221
.86~n 1 91. The turn towards overseas markets and the development of new products
seem broadly to have encouraged increasing reliance on skilled workers by the
less standardised character of the demand, though this must be set against the
trend toward specialisation noted by many contemporaries, the result of the
development of the division of labour, however extensive.7
The changed economic context facilitated the emergence of a new pattern
of relations between skilled workers and their employers, as a war of position
replaced a war of manoeuv4~. Skilled workers could accept the presence of
labourers on certain types of simple machines without immediate fear for the
5 See especially Burgess, 'Technological Change', p.229.
6 Jefferys, Engineers, p.29l.
7 Burgess, Industrial Relations, ch.l, especially pp.25-28; on specialisation,
see pp.48-S0.
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disappearance of their craft, while employers, secure in the knowledge that
the new division of labour was an accomplished fact, could accept collective
bargaining and even concede many of craftsmen's specific demands on the organ-
isation of work, as well as on wages. Thus many of the issues that had sparked
the 1852 lockout became much less salient during the 1850s and 60s. The ASE
struck from its rules after the lockout its provisions against piecework, over-
time, and 'illegal men', together with its call for a 1:4 ratio of journeymen
to apprentices, leaving their enforcement to the discretion of the districts
and the branches. As the new pattern of industrial relations crystallised,
employers became more prepared to compromise on several of these issues. The
problem of systematic overtime, for example, was closely associated with the
period of rapid and unstable growth before 1850, as employers sought to keep
their machinery operating as long as possible to amortise theIr capital
investments during the boom before the onset of the inevitable slump. Accord-
ingly, the need for overtime diminished as the pace of growth levelled off after
mid-century, and a survey taken by the ASE in 1861 shows that despite the
variation in hours between districts, the principle of a standard working day
had become well-established and systematic oVertime contained; in most districts
a special overtime rate of time and a quarter had been established to discourage
the practice.8
Similarly, the ASE's opposition to piecework in this period centred on the
'piece-master' system, whereby a gang leader or piece-master sub-contracted to
perform a given job at a set price and was in many cases responsible for hiring
8 Jefferys, 'Skilled Engineer', pp.34-35; Burgess, Industrial Relations, p.25.
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his labour force. The piece-master generally kept a disproportionate share
of the gang's earnings for himself, which he often increased by hiring boys
and labourers rather than skilled men, and had a built-in incentive to drive the
men as hard as possible. This form of 'co-exploitation', particularly resented
by the skilled men, also tended to disappear with the stabilisation of the new
division of labour and the development of more modern methods of management.
By 1861, only 22 of 173 districts in the ASE reported any piece masters, and
75% of these were in Lancashire, the stronghold of piecework in general, though
even there individual piecework predominated. Roughly 10.5% of society members
were employed on piecework in ~, and as Table 4 shows these were concentrated
in the most standardised branches of the industry - the textile engineering
districts of Lancashire, the centres of locomotive building scattered around the
country, agricultural implement makers in the Southeast, and large arms factories
such as the Royal Arsenals at Enfield and Woolwich and Armstrong's on Tyneside -
while the vast majority of jobbing, general engineering, and marine engineering
shops were almost completely free of its influence. While the evidence is
inconclusive, it seems possible that piecework continued to decline into the
l860s; this at any rate was the judgement of William Allan who told the Royal
Commission on Trade Unions in 1867 that even in Manchester, the stronghold of
piecework, "there was not so much as formerly"; likewise, an ASE conference in
Lancashire in the same year reported its abolition in many districts.9
Even intrinsically less tractable questions such as that of 'illegal'
or non-apprenticed men engaged on skilled men's work became less salient in the
50s and 60s. This was the period when the ASE was able to establish a standard
9 Jefferys, 'Skilled Engineer', pp.39-44; Burgess, Industrial Relations, pp.25,
39-40. William Allan in RC on Trade Unions, q. 677.
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rate of wages in most districts and the problem of illegal men tended to become
subsumed by demands that particular jobs be paid at the district rate, whoever
performed them. Conversely, the ASE had amended its rules in 1852 to allow the
admission of men who had been working for five years at the trade if they were
earning the district rate. In practice, most of those meeting this criterion
would have served an apprenticeship, and while there is no hard evidence it seems
highly probable that where local conditions permitted, branches and district
committees continued to try to reserve particular jobs for ASE members. Given
the prosperity of the industry and the generally favourable character of the
new pattern of industrial relations, employers were prepared to make certain
concessions of these kinds. Similarly, as the division of labour stabilised,
the ASE was able to organise many of those who had entered the industry as
handymen but who had meanwhile moved into more skilled positions.lO For example,
Armstrong had originally recruited the labour force for his Ordnance Works from
outside the ranks of apprenticed workers, and these were for many years excluded
from the trade unions; in 1871, however, just before the nine hours strike, these
11men were admitted under the ASE's five year rule.
Broadly speaking, then, it seems correct to argue as does Burgess, that,
"•••what the ASE had failed to achieve in a direct confrontation with employers
during 1851-2, it realised piecemeal in the succeeding decades".12 But while
the structure of the new division of labour, together with a new pattern of
10 Burgess, Industrial Relations, p.40.
11 Evidence of J. Burnett in Webb ColI. EA XVI,pp.236-37. I am grateful to
Keith McClelland for calling this reference to my attention.
12 Burgess, Industrial Relations, p.30.
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industrial relations had become well-established in the two decades after
mid-century, it would be a mistake to conclude that this ruled out skirmishes
between skilled workers and their employers as to precisely where the 'frontier
of control' should be drawn. Despite its publicly expressed aversion to strikes
for example, the ASE Executive in 1866 supported workers at a Manchester
locomotive firm who struck against the appointment of a foreman whom they held
to be 'not qualified'; after two months the firm was forced to dismiss the
foreman.13
Moreover, not only did local and district collective bargaining over
wage rates intensify during upswings as skilled workers' bargaining power
increased, but the continuing fluctuations of employment caused by the intensity
of the business cycle in engineering as a capital goods industry, together with
new concerns among workers for leisure time, gave rise to a broad movement for
a shorter working week during the boom of 1871-2. The movement began in the
marine centres of the Northeast Coast, where recent industrial development had
been most rapid with the emergence of large employers like Armstrong and Palmer,
where association with shipbuilding gave added intensity to cyclical fluctuations,
and where the unions had hitherto been quite weak. The nine hours movement
therefore developed initially in large part outside official union structures,
mobilising the skilled and unskilled alike, but after the victory of the strikers
on the Wear, Tyne, and Tees, it quickly spread to other districts. The nine
hour day was widely obtained, though hedged round with qualifications that would
imperil its achievement during the depression that followed. The ultimate result
was a great increase in the power of the craft unions, especially on the Northeast
13 Ibid., p.41.
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14Coast which became one o£ the ASE's most durable strongholds.
Diminishing Returns and Intensification of Normal Conflict: 1870s and 80s
The boom of the early l870s proved in many respects the high water mark
of the period of extensive growth of the engineering industry based on dominance
of export markets and a static division of labour, and with it of the pattern
of relations between skilled workers and their employers that had crystallised
in the decades after mid-century. The forces subverting the pattern of
development of the 50s and 60s - which nonetheless persisted in modified form
up until the First World War in some sectors - came both from without and within.
While statistics on productivity are notoriously difficult to compile, especially
in so heterogenous an industry as engineering, there is some evidence to suggest
that the costs of skilled labour had begun to outrun the growth of productivity
by the l870s; the most recent estimates suggest that it was in this period that
the rate of productivity growth began to decelerate in British manufacturing
l~industry as a whole, as measured by aggregate statistics of output per man hour. -
Certainly, such a trend is what one might expect to find as the productivity
gains to be drawn from the extension of a given division of labour became
exhausted and as the consolidation of craft union organisation subjected employer~
to greater constraints in the management of their enterprises.
14 Burnett, Nine Hours Movement; Allen et al. Engineers' Strikes; Burnett in
Webb Call. EA XVI, pp.236-37.
15 Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, ch.4.
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The best direct evidence on this paint comes from the testimony of John
Price, General Manager of Palmer's Shipbuilding and Engineering Works, to the
Royal Commission on the Depression in 1886: while the volume of output, as
measured by nominal horsepower, rose by 160% between 1865 and 1882, as compared
to an increase in the number of skilled workers of 45%, the cost of labour per
unit of nominal horsepower rose from 23% to 30% in the same period, largely
because of the rise of skilled man's wages. Those of fitters at Palmer's
increased 32~% between 1871 and 1886, patternmakers 39%, boilermakers 33~%,
and labourers 26%; official ASE wage rates (not to be confused with earnings
which were often lower) rose 30-40% depending on the locality between 1850 and
1890.16 Price also pointed to the substantial impact of the shorter working
week obtained in 1871 in inflating labour costs, an experience employers would
. 17emphasise in their resistance to the eight hour day in the 18905. To be sure,
a best-practice machine tool firm which made innovations in product· design might
still achieve substantial gains in productivity without major changes in the
division of labour, though these would also be offset by the rising price of
skilled labour. Thus Greenwood and Batley, a leading Leeds toolmaking firm
achieved an average increase of output per man of 2.3% per year without any long
18term shift in the proportions of ASE members, machinists, and boys employed.
16 RC on the Depression, Second Report, App. IV and Third Report, qs. 10,963-67.
17 Ibid., Third Report, q. 10,599.
18 Floud, Machine Tool Industry, pp.197-202. While indices of productivity are
intrinsically problematic in 50 heterogenous an industry as engineering,
Floud's calculations are based on the weight of metal processed, which he
found correlated strongly with price, and therefore appears to take adequate
account of the changing complexity of the machines as well as of the sheer
volume of output. Using a similar measure, Phelps Brown and Browne found
that productivity in engineering fluctuated around a rising trend in the 1880s
and 90s only to drop sharply after 1900. Century of Pay, pp.177, 180.
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Another source of difficulties for engineering employers lay in the
depression which afflicted the world economy after 1873; its effects were
especially serious for exporters of capital goods, as the falling trend of
agricultural prices depressed the purchasing power of their overseas customers.
While economic historians have long debated whether the period between 1873
and 1896 can be globally characterised as a depression, as well as whether it
formed the downswing of a long cycle in capitalist development, a glance at the
output figures for the 70s and 80s for the capital goods industries in Britain,
especially iron and steel products and shipbuilding, should be sufficient to
highlight the differences in the economic climate between this period and the
19preceding 20 years. At the trough of the depression in 1879, unemployment of
trade unionists in engineering and shipbuilding reached 15%, while throughout
·20the 80s unemployment in the two industries ran 26% above the national average.
At the same time as it amplified the effect of cyclical fluctuations, which had
been relatively modest in the 50s and 60s, the onset of the depression put added
pressure on employers to reduce their costs, especially labour costs, which as
we have seen had been steadily rising.
Finally, the beginnings of competition from the developing industries of
Germany and America brought additional strain to bear on the existing division
of labour in British engineering. While the full force of American competition
did not make itself felt until the mid-1890s, and then largely in light machine
tools and mass produced consumer durables, competition was nonetheless developing
19 For a rather tendentious summary of the economic historical debate, see S.B.
Saul, The Myth of the Great Depression (1969), which should be read in
conjunction with Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, ch.I-5. Output figures for
these industries are in ibid., pp.248-49.
20 Burgess, Industrial Relations, p.26i Jefferys, Engineers, p.55.
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in areas such as agricultural machinery from the 1870s. Similarly, not only
did European markets begin to close themselves to British goods, but Germany
began to make inroads into British dominated markets in the underdeveloped
world in sectors such as locomotives and railway rolling stock and even steam
engines.21 Even where foreign competition did not actually make itself felt,
as in shipbuilding and marine engineering where British producers remained
overwhelmingly dominant right up to the First World War, employers' perceptions
of the threat from abroad could lead them to take a sterner line in relations
with skilled workers than hitherto, as the testimony of shipbuilders to the
22Royal Commission on the Depression suggests.
While the depression pressed engineering employers to find new ways of
increasing productivity and reducing the cost of skilled laboqr, it also
discouraged the large-scale capital investment that would have been necessary
for major changes in the division of labour by reducing demand and squeezing
profits. Consequently, in the 70s and 80s employers concentrated their attention
on cheapening and intensifying skilled labour within the structure of the
existing division of labour, the most important means of which was the extension
of piecework. The ASE since its inception had been a bitter opponent of
piecework, an opposition the Webbs ascribed to its subversive effect on the
23standard rate and collective bargaining in general. This aspect of piecework
21 Saul, 'Engineering'; Floud, 'Engineering Competition'; McLean, 'Engineering
Competition'.
22 Pollard and Robertson, Shipbuilding; RC on the Depression, Third Report, passin
23 Industrial Democracy, pp.291-92, 297.
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undoubtedly played a large part in skilled engineers' grievances against the
system. Foremost among their objections was the arbitrary manner in which
piece prices were fixed by the employer, generally without reference to collectivE
bargaining. As William Allan told the Royal Commission on Trade Unions in l867:2~
In many cases (I may say nine out of ten) the workman has no voice in
the arrangement of the price. The price is fixed by the employers and
if the workman will not take the job at the price he may leave it.
Equally important, however, was the tendency of employers to set an explicit
or implicit limit to piecework earnings after which the rates would be cut, so
that the increased effort of the men would merely result in the reduction of
rates, with all the benefit accruing to the employer; the operation of such
systems is clearly set out in the testimony of the managers of various department~
of Woolwich Arsenal to the Morley Committee on the Manufacturing Departments of
the Army in 1887.25 This practice might ultimately depress earnings below time
26wages, particularly if the rates were set with reference to an expert workman:
•••Employers generally give a piece of new machinery or whatever they
want doing into the hands of an expert workman, so that if he gets what
may be considered a fair wage, those who are not such good hands come
down to almost a starvation price.
At the same time, other objections to piecework by skilled engineers went
beyond the principle of collective bargaining as such to focus on the impact of
piecework on the constitutive solidarity of the craft community. As the General
Executive Council of the ASE put it in 1861, n.••it too often sets man against
man •••n27 Similarly, the rank and file engineer's belief in the existence of
24 RC on Trade Unions, q. 782.
25 Morley Committee, passim.
26 William Allan to RC on Trade Unions, q. 673.
27 Cited in Jefferys, 'Skilled Engineer', p.42.
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a 'lump of labour', i.e. a fixed volume of employment at any moment, (a not
unfounded view in a slowly growing economy) led him, as David Schloss attested
in the 1890s, to oppose the added production involved in piecework as taking
28work away from other men. Finally, skilled engineers tended to regard the
accelerated pace of work involved in piece payment as an affront to their dignity
as craftsmen, arguing that the practice led to 'scamping' and reduction of
1· ·11· 11 . 29qua 1ty. To quote W1 1am A an once aga1n:
•••We believe •••that the work in a great measure suffers, that it is
not done in so finished and good a style as if done by day work.
In 1874, presumably flushed with the victories of the nine hours'
movement and perhaps also alarmed by employers' encroachments, the ASE Delegate
Meeting enacted a new rule prohibiting the introduction of piecework into
districts where it was not already in operation. This led to a series of
disputes with employers: in 1876, for example, while ASE members were able to
prevent the spread of piecework to Nottingham, the introduction of blacklegs
led to the union's defeat in a rather more important strike at the Easton and
Anderson works in Erith, near London.30 It is difficult to judge to what extent
piecework was being introduced in this period, since the findings of an ASE
survey in 1876 and the Wages Census of 1886 contradict one another (see Table 4A) ,
but the evidence of strikes and internal debates within the ASE strongly suggests
that after a decline in the 50s and 60s piecework was once again on the rise in
the 70s and 80s, despite the union's prohibitions.31 A more comprehensive
28 Schloss, Renumeration, pp.43-44.
29 RC on Trade Unions, q. 673.
30 Webb ColI. EA XVI, f. 6, pp. 63-68; Jefferys, Engineers, pp.lOO-lOl; Burgess,
Industrial Relations, pp.39-40, 45-46.
31 For other disputes over piecework, see ASE MR Apr. 1886, p.36; Oct. 1887, p.37.
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survey taken by the ASE in 1891 showed that nearly 17% of its members were
paid by the piece. The incidence of piecework was spread very unevenly through-
out the country, with the cycle making districts of the West Midlands overtaking
Lancashire as the centre of the practice: 44% of ASE members were paid by the
piece in 1891, and in Coventry itself 80%; the uneven advance of piecework in
the different districts is shown in Table 4B. In areas where piecework had
long been established informal bargaining over piece prices had emerged,
particularly in the textile engineering districts of Lancashire, and in the
face of the union's inability to enforce its prohibition, motions to regulate
piecework were submitted to the Executive Council and the Delegate Meeting in
1878, 1885, and 1888. All were defeated, however, and it was only in 1892 that
local negotiations of piece prices was authorised by the union.32 Even then,
the Executive Council continued to express the union's traditional hostility to
piecework by barring the District Committee f~om negotiating lists of piece
prices and decreeing that .....shop rates of piece prices must be regulated
33voluntarily by those engaged in the system". While in some districts such as
Manchester, the District Committee sought nonetheless to provide guidelines for
piecework bargaining, in others local officials continued to forbid members to
accept piece payment. Similarly, even where the practice was in force, employers
complained consistently of the operation of informal systems of output
lcti 34restr~c l.ons.
32 Jefferys, Engineers, pp.100-l; Burgess, Industrial Relations, pp.4S-46.
33 ASE QR June 1894; Jefferys, Engineers, p.139.
34 Jefferys, Engineers, p.139; Clegg, Fox, and Thompson, Trade Unions, p.141;
and the series of broadsides 'Examples of ASE Interference and Restriction'
issued by the EEF, Nov. 1897, Webb Coll. EB LIX, 10-14.
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In some cases, employers who found piecework an inadequate stimulus to
improved productivity had replaced it with time work under close supervision.
At Armstrong's Elswick works, where arms production had led to one of the most
advanced divisions of labour in Britain the management found that the skilled
men tended to operate a 'limit system' to prevent rate cutting. As a result,
by the late 1880s piecework was eliminated on the bulk of the work, and special
foremen who later became known as 'feed and speed' men, had been appointed to
ensure that the machines were operated at what the management considered an
appropriate sp~ed. As the Managing Director, Captain Noble, told the Morley
Commission in 1887:35
•••Except in some specialities, we have very much discontinued
piecework, using other means to get a fair amount of work out of
the machines or the fitters, as the case may be •••• For example,
in the case of the big gun, if the foreman does his duty and takes
care to see that the machine is going at a proper speed~ and is
making a suitable cut, you gain nothing by putting on piecework.
As a result, the ratio of foremen to production workers in the various department~
ranged from 1:30 to 1:60, with the supervision especially heavy in the large
gun shops where the absence of repetition work discouraged piece payment; Noble
estimated that Armstrong's expenditure on supervision would be three or four
36times that of an ordinary engineering concern. Similarly, the Secretary of
the ASE's Tyneside District Committee told the Royal Commission on Labour,
presumably with Armstrong's uppermost in his mind, that on the Tyne, the foreman
was no longer a practical workman but rather a "task master, whose duty it is
to flog the men up to the highest pitch", though he went on to add that "•••there
is no more work turned out, because the workman, as a rule, knows his trade
37sufficiently well to evade the task master." These 'feed and speed' men would
35 Morley Committee, qs. 9012, 8998.
36 bOd~., qs. 9004-16.
37 w. Glennie to RC on Labour, Group A, q. 23,157.
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become an especially bitter point of contention between craftsmen and employers
in the district as the 90s wore on.38
Piecework and intensified supervision, however, were by no means the only
component of the employers' offensive against craft regulation. Machine manning
and the encroachment of labourers and handymen on skilled men's work, Price's
"perfectly peaceful conflict", once again became a problem. The value of the
handyman to the employer lay not only in his lower wages but also in the
greater docility resulting from this weaker market position. When first promoted
to machine work a handyman would be conscious that only good fortune had removed
him from the ranks of casual labourers; even when he had learned to operate more
complex machines, the lack of a wider training might still prevent the recog-
nition of his skills on the wider labour market. The consequent dependence of
such workers on the internal labour markets of particular firms naturally made
them less likely than apprenticed craftsmen to refuse piecework or overtime or
otherwise to challenge managerial authority in the workplace, as did their lack
1 f h f . 39of socialisation into the va ues ate cra t commun~ty.
It was not, on the whole, the introduction of new automatic and semi-
automatic machine tools such as turret and capstan lathes or milling machines
which were at issue: a leading British machine tool firm, Greenwood and Batley,
sold only 46 milling machines between 1874 and 1881, while the sales in Britain
of the leading producers of light machine tools of this kind, Alfred Herberts of
38 For later references to feed and speed men on the Tyne, see J. Ratcliffe
(ASE ODD, Tyne) to SC on Government Contracts, qs. 2468, 2506, 2536; de
Rousiers, Trade-unionisme, p.283; Schloss, Remuneration (1898 ed.), p.15;
ASE, Notes on the Engineering Trades Lock-Out, pp.68, 77; B. Taylor, 'Machine
Question', Cassier's Magazine, Nov. 1897, and below, pp.365-68.
I am grateful to Keith McClelland for pointing out the passage in Schloss's
book which is missing from the 1892 edition.
39
On the narrower horizons of the handyman in relation to the labour market,
see pp. 50, 391.
III
Coventry and the American firm Brown and Sharpe, only took off in the mid-90s
. 40under the impetus of the bLcycle boom. Rather, employers tended to make more
intensive use of the possibilities already available to them within the existing
division of labour, occasionally promoting handymen onto lathes from planing
machines, as Price of Palmer's noted, but more often multiplying the numbers of
planing, slotting, and shaping machines and with them the burgeoning class of
machinists, as well as introducing fitters' assistants. Thus in 1882 machinists
were 70% as numerous as fitters at Palmers, while in the Engine works of Harland
and Wolff in Belfast in 1892 fitters' assistants outnumbered fitters and
41machinemen and boys outnumbered turners. Another indication of these devel-
opments was given in a paper delivered by a managing engineer on the Tyne in the
90s, surveying the evolution of the division of labour in one large firm, who
noted that in 1873, the relation of fitters to machinists on simple engines was
1:1; by 1882, despite the introduction of more complex compound engines, the
ratio had increased to 1:2.31; similarly, whereas 1,022 men had been required to
produce 2,260 nominal horsepower by 1882 1,351 were able to produce 5,868
42nominal horsepower. In the large railway works at Crewe and Derby in the early
90s, Frank Galton found not only the widespread use of fitters' assistants, but
also the prevalence of the 'team system' under which a leading hand paced a
gang made up of several skilled men and a large number of boys, often on piece-
work; analogous working methods were reported by ASE District Delegates in the
40 Saul, 'Engineering', p.28, and his 'Mechanical Engineering' and 'Machine-Tool
Industry'; Floud, 'Engineering Competition'.
41 Price to RC on the Depression, Third Report, qs. 10,971, and Second Report,
Table 1; Harland to Webbs, Webb Call. EA XVI, f. 1.
42 Cited in report of ASE ODD 3 (Tyne), ASE MJ & R May 1897.
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new centres of the cycle industry in the West Midlands, especially Coventry,
N tt' h d" h 43o ~ng am, an B~rm~ng am.
This portrait of change should not, of course, be overdrawn. In the vast
majority of smaller, less specialised workshops which dominated general
engineering, craftsman still held sway and innovations such as machinists and
fitters' assistants were little known: in the early 1890s, for example, Galton
found the skilled men largely free from challenges from below in districts
like the Potteries, the ports of South Wales and the Bristol Channel, and even
in the railway shops in North Staffordshire.44
Where the newer machine tools came into operation, however, the ASE found
itself especially vulnerable. The Maxim-Nordenfeldt works at Erith and Crawford
near London was a large arms firm which had been established in the 80s,
specialising in the production of gatling guns and shells, both involving a
great deal of repetition work; the division of labour was accordingly particularl:
advanced and the firm boasted of its "nearly automatic" machines. In 1889, ASE
members sought to take advantage of the upturn in the labour market to resist
rate cutting, the introduction of piecework into new shops, and the promotion
of labourers onto machines. Their strike was directed by the Executive Council
itself, and was prosecuted with great vigour,including the unusual step of
withdrawing society foremen. Nonetheless, the firm was able to keep going quite
43 Webb ceri , EA XVI, f. 6, pp. 54-61, 63-68; ASE ODD 5 (W. Hidlands), ASE ~
June 1893; G.R. Carter, 'The Cycle Industry' in Freeman and Webb, Seasonal
Trades; F. Carr, Engineering Workers and the Rise of Labour in Coventry,
1914-39, (Warwick Ph.D. Thesis, 1979), ch.l.
44 Webb Coll. EA, f. 6, pp.42-53, 68c.
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successfully with blackleg labour, much of it drawn from their own labourers
and handymen; the union was thoroughly defeated after a ten month strike and
45many of the strikers were not reemployed. The defeat of the skilled men in
this dispute despite the official support of the national union, symbolised to
many the fragility of craft regulation in engineering, and formed a leading
factor promoting sentiment within the union for an opening of its ranks to
lower grades of workers which would surface in Tom Mann's candidacy for General
Secretary in 1892.46
Perhaps the most crucial weakness of craft regulation in engineering lay
in the ASE's inability to control apprenticeship effectively. In many respects
control of apprenticeship was the linchpin of craft regulation, providing the
key not only to the short-term market position of craftsmen but also to the
long-term control of the labour market. The multiplication, of apprentices, and
with them unapprenticed boy labour, was a source of cheap labour which could
depress journeymen's earnings and weaken their bargaining position. In this
vein, a Scottish representative of the ASE told the Royal Commission on Labour
that "Very nea~ly half" of all apprentices47
•..do not follow the trade for a considerable time, and you will find
in time of prosperity there is a great number of people come into it,
and they do odd jobs here and there, and instead of getting up the wages
you will find the result is that the employer has them all at command,
and so does not require to raise the wages.
In the long run, moreover, this practice would overstock the labour market,
often with badly trained youths who had not received a general training because
45 ASE MR Dec. 1889; Abstract of Proceedings of ASE Local Executive Council,
1888-90, pp.18-24; Jefferys, Engineers, p.IOI; Weekes, ASE, ch.l; Burgess,
Industrial Relations, p.50.
46 See below, pp.181-8S.
47 J. Lindsay to RC on Labour, Group A, q. 23,289.
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of employers' determination to use them as cheap labour, and were therefore a
constant danger to the standard rate. As the Steam Engine Makers' Society
(SEMS) put it in 1880:48
It used to be the custom on youth being put to the trade to be
taught all its branches but that custom has given way to the
subdivision of labour which prevails in all engineering firms now.
This is an evil for the workman which has already borne fruit,
for whenever a dispute takes place between our members and their
employers, there are hundreds to be found ready to take over places,
and each claiming to be a skilled mechanic, yet on inquiry being made
it is found that they are those who have been brought up on one
class of work alone.
Apprentices and boy labour could also undermine craft regulation in other ways,
since like handymen they were more likely to accept piecework as well as
extensive overtime.49 Finally, as we have seen, apprenticeship was the crucial
context in which craft values were passed on to the next generation, so that
the subversion of the institution threatened not only the future state of the
labour market but also the reproduction of the craft community itself. Histori-
cally speaking, it is noteworthy that the trades who were able to maintain
a substantial degree of craft regulation into the 20th century were precisely
those, who, like the printers and the boilermakers, were able to maintain
control over apprenticeship; it is this monopoly of labour supply which forms
50the basis of the exceptional power of the craft unions on Fleet Street today.
Though the ASE had rescinded its apprenticeship rule in 1852, the union
nonetheless sought informally to enforce a ratio of one apprentice to four
journeymen wherever possible; even in the 1890s, the union saw 1:3 as a maximum.
48 SEMS AR 1880, quoted in Reid, Shipbuilding, p.162.
49 Lindsay to RC on Labour, Group A, qs. 22,765, 23,022, and Webb ColI. EA VII,
f. 2, p.139, quoted in Reid, Shipbuilding, p.163.
50 Sisson, Fleet Street.
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Surveys conducted by the ASE in 1886 and 1891-2, and by the Webbs' researcher
Frank Galton in 1893-4, however, revealed the disarray of apprenticeship
limitation in practice. Only in a very few centres did employers explicitly
accept a fixed ratio of apprentices to journeymen: in the small ports of
South Wales - Cardiff, Barry, Newport, and from the later 90s, Swansea, a
1:4 ratio was enforced; in Workington and Hartlepool the limit was 1:2 (though
in the latter case the employers were evading the rule by the mid 90s); and
51the SEMS reported a 1:3 limit in Blackburn. Elsewhere, apprentices and boys
proliferated, reaching 6:1 in some departments. In Manchester, for example,
the District Committee sought to enforce a 1:2 ratio with little success: in
some branches of cotton machinery the ratio was more like 3:1; in Dundee, the
ratio in good times was 1:2, but in slumps 3:1; the average in Scotland as a
whole was in the area of 1:2.52 The Managing Director of a large modern firm
like Armstrong's, which had sought for decades to gain control of apprenticeship
by recruiting from the sons of its workmen whether craftsmen or not, wrote to
the Webbs that he could not for tactical reasons disclose the exact number of
his apprentices but "I take as many as I dare"; an ASE survey in 1894 found that
in five shops in the Elswick Ordnance Works, there were 365 apprentices to 482
3 d 1
.. 53ASE members and 10 aut non-un~on~sts. In the early 90s, the Armstrong men
51 On South Wales, see Webb Call. EA XVI, f. 6, pp. 42-53; ASE ~ Sept. -1894,.
MJ & R Aug. 1899; de Rousiers, Trade-unionisme, p.275. On Hartlepool,
Workington, and Blackburn, see submissions by ASE and SEMS to RC on the
Depression, Second Report, App.II; for employers' evasions in Hartlepool,
ASE ~ June 1894.
52 ASE AR 1894, p.xi; Whittaker to RC on Labour, Group A, qs. 22, 762-64; Breedon
(Manchester ASE DC) to Webbs, Webb Call. EA XVI, f.6; Lindsay (ASE DC Dundee)
to RC on Labour, Group A, q. 23289.
53 Webb ColI. EA XVI, f. 18, letter from Col. Dyer to B. Potter, 15.10.1891; ASE
QR June 1894; see also the testimony of Noble to RC on Labour, Group A, qs.
215, 213-19. Cochrane, Early History of Elswick, p.48, notes the prevalence
of internal recruitment at Elswick, and a preliminary analysis by K. McClelland
of a register of apprentices in the Armstrong papers in Newcastle covering the -
period 1856-1893 suggests that by 1871, the fact that a prospective apprentice'
father worked for the firm was considerably more important in securing admissic
than the father's occupation as such. I am extremely gratefUlto Mr McClelland
for sharing the preliminary results of his research.
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would feel the effects of the proliferation of apprentices in the works most
acutely: after a series of strikes concerning overtime and demarcation on the
Tyne in 1890-2, craftsmen at Armstrongs claimed that they found 24% of their
jobs had been taken over by apprentices and boys. As a result, the ASE on the
Tyne launched a special union for apprentices.54
The ASE's failure to maintain restrictions on the number of apprentices
was particularly striking by comparison with the success of its rival, the
Boilermakers and Iron and Steel Shipbuilders, which in the 1880s and 90s was
able to force employers to accept a ratio of 2 apprentices to seven journeymen.5S
In Sunderland in 1883, when employe IS sought to transfer the apprentices driven
out of the shipyards by their agreement with the Boilermakers to the engine
shops, the ASE struck in pursuit of a fixed ratio of 1:3. The employers
fiercely resisted this claim, believing, as one of their representatives later
.. Lab 56told the Royal Comm1ss10n on our:
The practical effect •••would be that the general standard of wages
would be forced up in the first place without any corresponding
benefit to themselves. They practically looked upon the demand to
restrict the apprentices as an invasion of their just right to
conduct their works in such a way as they t~ough fit, subject to the
existing law of the land.
The Sunderland strike dragged on into mid-188S without the skilled men being
able to shake the employers' resolve; in the end the men were forced to concede
54 Glennie to RC on Labour, Group A, qs. 23,069-70, 234, 237-38; reply by
Noble, ibid., q. 25,217.
55 Reid, Shipbuilding, pp.139-42; Pollard and Robertson, Shipbuilding, pp.l54-56;
de Rousiers, Trade-unionisme, chs. 7-8.
56 J. Haswell, (Secretary of Wear Shipbuilders' Association and Sunderland ITEA),
to RC on Labour, Group A, q. 25, 708.
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the employers' right to employ as many apprentices as they wished.57
Along with piecework, apprenticeship, machine manning, and other issues
which had receded into the background, during the more prosperous 50s and 60s,
systematic overtime had once again become a significant bone of contention by
the 80s. The depression itself encouraged employers to work capital equipment
for longer hours in upswings in hope of making up losses in slumps; the
particular relation of certain sectors to the business cycle, such as machine
tools or marine engineering, where customers delayed ordering new equipment until
the last moment and then demanded rapid delivery, likewise pressed employers to
introduce overtime; insofar as new capital investment was taking place from the
late 80s, employers as in the 40s sought to amortise their investments as quickly
as possible by working them round the clock. Systematic overtime also formed
part of the battery of employers' tactics designed to facilitate the cheapening
and intensification of skilled men's labour by weakening their bargaining
position. As John Whittaker told the Royal Commission on Labour, oVertime and
58attendant undermanning were favoured by the employer because,
•••He thinks it preferable to have a man standing outside the gates
ready to take the other man's job if he does not altogether suit him;
that is he has a standing menace against the other men. There is a
surplus labour outside the gate· which there would not be if he had
them inside the shop.
57 See the monthly bulletins issued by the strikers, 1883-85, Bishopsgate
Institute Library; ASE MR 1883-85, passim; Jefferys, Engineers, p.10l;
Burgess, Industrial Relations, p.46.
58 ..RC on Labour, Group A, q. 22,869; cf. also ASE AR 1887, pp.x-xi: It is a
well-known fact that extra payment for overtime is no deterrent to this
practice, for the employers know they can use the men in the streets against
those in the works."
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The result of this employers' offensive was a substantial increase in the
amount of overtime worked: in 1876 an ASE survey found that only 15% of all
workmen, union and non-union alike, worked overtime systematically; by 1892,
61 branches comprising 72% of ASE members reported systematic overtime, while
59, comprising only 16% of the membership worked no overtime at all.59 System-
atic overtime was seen by ASE members as a major contributor to unemployment,
as in Dundee where the practice was accompanied by 10% unemployment. The
abolition of systematic overtime accordingly emerged in 1887 as the first step
in an official campaign against unemployment launched by the ASE Executive
60whose ultimate goal was the eight hour day. By the early 90s, it had become
a general trade union tactic, at least on the Northeast Coast, and official
limits were in force in 5 districts comprising 12% of ASE memberShip.61 The
most heated conflict about overtime limits erupted on the Tyne in 1890-1; as we
have noted, the marked and intense impact of the business cycle on production
rhythms in shipbuilding and marine engineering gave overtime an added salience
in the marine centres. An ASE attempt to enforce a total ban on overtime
provoked employers' reprisals, and ultimately a general lockout on the Northeast
Coast. The dispute was sett~ed by the arbitration of the Mayor of Newcastle,
who arranged a limit of 18 hours overtime per man per month; the employers
accepted but evaded the agreement by sacking each man as he reached the 18 hour
59 Burgess, Industrial Relations, p.25; RC on Labour, Group A, q. 22,659 and
ibid., app., pp.466-7l.
60 ASE AR 1887, pp.x-xi.
61 RC on Labour, Group A, qs. 23, 041-44, 269-96; ASE AR 1892, p.xviii and 1894,
p.xi; de Rousiers, Trade-unionisme, p.28l; RC on the Depression, Third Report,
evidence of Price, qs. 11,030, 11,106. A minority within the ASE had moved
in favour of legally enforced eight hour day, though the union as a whole was
not yet committed to this position. Whittaker to RC on Labour, Group A,
q.22,8l6, and Glennie, ibid., q. 23,301; Weekes, ASE, ch.2.
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1· 't 62 h~m~. Elsew ere, the ASE seems to have been able to enforce overtime limits
in Cardiff and in the machine tool shops in Manchester; in the locomotive and
textile engineering works where there was more repetition work, employers
f 11 d 1· 't 63success u y resiste any ~m~.
Evident in the Tyneside overtime dispute was a disturbing new element,
which as in the 1889 Maxim-Nordenfedlt strike bode badly for the future of
craft regulation: the growing assertiveness of the less skilled. Engineering
labourers and handymen were increasingly less disposed passively to accept the
traditional craft practice of taking industrial action unilaterally without
regard for the labourers' interests. This traditional view was neatly
encapsulated by the craftsmen's response to a question about the labourers'
interests at a mass meeting held at Woolwich Arsenal in 1872 to consider the
64question of the nine hour day:
The labourers always improved their position in a ratio the same
as the mechanic, who had to fight the battle alone.
Since the 1870s the Tyneside and National Labour Union (TNLU, later the National
Amalgamated Union of Labour) had been trying to organise the less skilled in the
62 Glennie to RC on Labour, Group A, qs. 23,068-79; Noble to ibid, q. 25,192-205;
de Rousiers, Trade-unionisme, p.281.
63 de Rousiers, Trade-unionisme, p.281. In the preceaing discussion, as well
as that on apprenticeship and other points in this section, in addition to
my own researches I have drawn on A. Reid's careful and insightful analysis
of the evidence in the Royal Commission on Labour and in the Webb Collection.
See Reid, Shipbuilding, especially pp.156-78. I am extremely grateful to
Dr Reid for allowing me to consult his unpublished thesis.
64 Cited in Crossick, Artisan Elite, p.86.
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shipyards and engineering workshops of the Northeast Coast with varying
65degrees of success. Its response to the oVertime disputes of 1890-1 was
. 1 66unequ1voca :
We, the members of the mid-Tyne committee of the Tyneside and
National Labourers' Union, after having seriously considered our
position relating to the impending strike of engineers on the
OVertime Question, entirely disagree with the manner in which they
are trying to coerce other trades who are directly affected by them
into such a position without ever directly consulting them on the
matter, and therefore agree with the action of the Federal Board
(an organisation formed by the smaller sectional societies on the
Northeast Coast in 1889 - JZ) in being brought out on strike under
protest until they have recorded their vote for or against such
action, and we therefore intend to continue at work as long as the
employers find us employment.
Underlying the TNLU's resentment of the ASE's conduct was its disastrous
impact on union finances - ASE strikes forced the union to suspend benefits
several times during the 1890s - but its attitude was doubtless shared by
the mass of labourers and handymen on the Tyne and elsewhere who remained
. d 67unorgan1se •
By the early 90s, there were more than half a dozen small societies
scattered around the country which catered for the lower grades of engineering
workers. The largest of these, the United Machine Workers' Association (UMWA),
founded in 1844, had 2,500 members in 1890; other important societies included
65 See J. Lynch, 'Skilled and Unskilled Labour in Shipbuilding', Industrial
Remuneration Conference (1885); testimony of R. Knight (Boilermakers) and
W. OWen, (TNLU) to RC on Labour, Group A; Reid, Shipbuilding, pp.l15-27.
66 Newcastle Chronicle, 2.10.1891 in Webb ColI. EA XVI, f. 6.
67 Clegg, Fox, and Thompson, Trade Unions, p.89.
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the Lancashire-based Amalgamated Society of Metal Planers (1836), and the
rapidly growing Birmingham-based Amalgamated Society of Toolmakers (1882) which
had 700-800 members in the cycle making districts of the West Midlands, where
it was more successful than the ASE. All of these unions found themselves in
conflict with the ASE over recruiting, machine manning, and general tactics;
the ASMP, for example, found itself in dispute with the ASE in 1884, 1889, and
1895 over planers doing fitters' work. While all of these societies admitted
classes of workmen who would not have been eligible for the ASE - mainly planers,
shapers, slotters, drillers, and so on - and employed somewhat different methods
of organising - the AST, for example, did not expect prospective members to earn
the district rate before they could join - it is noteworthy that most did not
admit all workers in the industry: the AST described itself as "prepared to
admit any man who is a mechanic" and excluded under-drillers, slotters, and
planers, together with all others unable to set their own tools. Similarly,
because they catered for the most skilled of those excluded from the ASE, these
unions more and more came to imitate the latter's tactics, seeking to establish
a district rate, as well as to limit piece work 68and boy labour. Several
of these unions went so far as to attempt to bar others from ascending the same
ladder as themselves: the AST, for example, spoke of limiting "the influx of
69unskilled men", while one observer noted of the UMWA,
•••the curious fact that in several instances these men have protested
to their employers against the promotion of other men in the same way
they have been advanced.
68 On the AST, see Webb Coli. EA XXI, f. 15, and ibid., EB LII, fs. 19, 2J; on
the UMWA, ibid., EA XVII, fs. 2-3; ASE ODD for West Midlands to Webbs, Webb
Coli., EA XVI, f.6, pp.62-6Bb.
69 B. Taylor, 'The Blight of Trade Unionism', Cassier's Magazine, Jan. 1898,
p.219.
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These small unions of the less skilled, however, were by no means the
most formidable of the ASE's competitors. Throughout the second half of the
19th century, the ASE found itself in constant competition with smaller more
specialised, sectional unions for certain categories of membership and with
other metal working trades for certain classes of work, especially in the
shipbuilding industry with its complex division of labour. The union competing
most closely with the ASE for the same workers was the Steam Engine Makers'
Society (SEMS), founded in 1824, whose northern branches had refused to join
the amalgamation movement which formed the ASE in 1851. All members of the
SEMS were eligible for the ASE, but the former sought to preserve a more
exclusive character than the latter: up until 1885 the SEMS saw itself as a
union of all-round craftsmen and excluded more specialised men, such as those
in textile machinery; even once it accepted that the subdivision of engineering
into definite branches was an irreversible fact, the SEMS sought to preserve
its character as a union of the most highly skilled men in the industry,
eschewing organising efforts and offered higher benefits than the ASE. Despite
vigorous efforts by the ASE and later the United Patternmakers' Association
(UPA) to attract its members and extinguish the union, the SEMS retained 6,000
70members into the l890s and often collaborated with the ASE on trade movements.
More serious, perhaps, was the persistent conflict between the ASE and
other more specialised craft unions whose members were also eligible for the
ASE, such as the various societies of blacksmiths,71 and particularly the
70 On the SEMS, see J. Swift (General Secretary SEMS) to RC on Labour, Group A,
qs. 23,575 ff.; Webb Call. EA XV, f. 3; Reid, Shipbuilding, pp. 170-72.
71 See Reid, Shipbuilding, pp.100-l02.
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patternmakers. 72As we noted above, the patternmakers emerged from the
reorganisation of the division of labour in the 30s and 405 as the most highly
skilled workmen in the industry, responsible as they were for constructing
models and prototypes of machinery. In contrast to fitters and turners, the
patternmakers worked largely in wood, had a more expensive kit of tools which
required insurance, were less vulnerable to unemployment, and were often paid
a shilling or two more. Because of their greater skills, the patternmakers
were also able to enforce a five year apprenticeship in most areas, and were
generally employed on time work. The ASE had organised patternmakers from its
inception, but the latter, feeling that the ASE coul.d.mo t; effectively pursue
their special interests, often held aloof. When they joined, patternmakers
tended to form mutual aid clubs within the ASE, offering higher benefits and
defending their special interests in collective bargaining; by the mid-60s,
such clubs existed in many areas, along with a number of independent local
societies.73 The impetus for the formation of a national union came from the
nine hours movement on the Northeast Coast, as patternmakers resented being
drawn out on strike over an issue which they felt did not concern them, high-
lighting their feelings of being swamped by the hordes of fitters and turners
74in the ASE:
Patternmakers are essentially a large minority amongst the Engineering
craftsmen and there are many points of difference between us and the
general bulk of Engineers, and even if we were proportionally represented
with the other trades we were still in a hopeless minority and would
still have to bow to the will of those who neither understood our interests
or sympathised with them, to wit higher skill, tools, different material
72 See above, pp.
73 Webb Coll. EA, XVII, f. 11, pp.230, ff.; Mosses, Patternmakers, pp.ll-25;
Reid, Shipbuilding, pp.91-95.
74 G.P. Roberts, in Webb CoIl. EA, XVII, f. 11, pp.251-2, quoted in Reid,
Shipbuilding, p.92; cf. Mosses, Patternmakers, pp.5-9.
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(Wood), different training, etc ...as a craft the Patternmakers thought
they were more worthy of consideration than they got from the rank and
file of the ASE. These matters gave rise to much misgiving amongst the
patternmakers and they saw that if they were to secure any special
advantages in the future they would have to secure them apart from the
actions of the engineering trades in general.
The UPA launched an active recruiting campaign, maintaining a special 'poaching
clause' in their constitution waiving the entrance fee for members joining
from other societies, and by the early 90s had enrolled roughly half the pattern-
makers in engineering workshops, the rest remaining in the ASE. The ASE
responded to these developments by periodic attempts to lure members away from
the UPA, and by more concerted efforts to crush the union entirely (as it had
a previous London-based local society) by blacklegging on its members during
strikes. The most conspicuous example of this kind was a dispute in Belfast in
1891-2 when the ASE actually sent notices around to employers offering to fill
75the places of striking UPA members.
In some instances the UPA was prepared to cooperate in joint movements
76with the ASE, as in the 1891 overtime strike on the Northeast Coast. Given
this acrimonious history, however, it is hardly surprising that the pattern-
makers more often chose to hold aloof, especially where they felt inadequately
consulted. In the 1889 Maxim-Nordenfeldt dispute, for example, the UPA refused
77a request for help from the ASE:
75 W. Mosses (UPA, General Secretary) to RC on Labour, Group A, qs. 22, 363-67;
ibid., Patternmakers, p.99i UPA MR Apr. 1891 in Webb Call. EA XVII, f. 11,
p.243i ibid., EB XLVIII, ASE, 'Address to Workmen in the Engineering Trade',
(1888), f. 13; ibid., f. 18-19; and ibid., XLIX, f. 3. See also, Reid,
Shipbuilding, pp.93-94.
76 UPA MR Feb. 1891 in Webb Coll. EA XVII, f. 11, p.259.
77 UPA MR Nov. 1889 in Webb Coll. u~XVII, f. 11, p.248.
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As the question (piecework and machine manning - jz) does not affect
our men in the slightest degree and as the strike took place before
we were ever consulted or even informed, we have declined to have
anything to do with the movement.
After what they considered an ill-judged strike on the Tyne in 1888, the UPA
and several of the other sectional societies organised a Federal Board to
protect their interests against the actions of the larger unions:78
The Sectional Societies, indignant at the arbitrary manner in which
the ASE had acted, federated together with the avowed object of
resisting a repetition of any such behaviour in case of further wages
movements and asserting their right to be consulted before definite
action was taken •••• It is impossible to dissociate the action of our
contemporaries from their recent unsuccessful attempt at amalgamating
the various sectional societies, and it would seem that they, finding
it impossible to absorb their weaker brethren by fair means, had
resolved to shatter the confidence they have in their unions by showing
them their impotence to influence of themselves their relations between
their employers and members.
Engineering craftsmen's efforts to establish an absolute claim to certain
types of work brought them into acute conflict not only with their employers
and the less skilled, but also with other groups of craftsmen with similar
aims. In the form of demarcation disputes, these conflicts were concentrated
in shipbuilding and marine engineering, where the multiplicity of overlapping
trades combined with the intensity of cyclical fluctuations to make each craft
acutely conscious of the need to draw its lines of demarcation as broadly as
79possible to maximise employment. In the 1860s, the ASE had been drawn into
numerous disputes with the Boilermakers, another of the metal workers' unions
which had rejected amalgamation with the ASE in 1851, which died away as the
latter union consolidated its hold over the main hull construction operations
in iron and steel shipbuilding, leaving a heritage of rivalry and mutual distrus~:
78 UPA MR Jan. 1889, in Webb. ColI. EA XVII, f. 11, p.241; cf. also Clegg, Fox,
and Thompson, Trade Unions, pp.131-2.
79 P. Robertson,'Demarcation Disputes in British Shipbuilding Before 1914',
International Review of Social History, 20(2) (1975); Brown et al., 'Contours
of Solidarity'; Reid, Shipbuilding, pt.II, passim.
80 Reid, Shipbuilding, pp.150-54.
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This rivalry, together with the frequent strategic disagreements between the two
unions as a result of the ASE's involvement in collective bargaining outside
the marine sector, led the ASE, alone of the major unions concerned, to hold alooi
from the Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades (FEST) formed by
Robert Knight of the Boilermakers in 1890. The ASE's view, epitomised in its
subsequent refusal to join the Central Wages Board established by the Federal
81Board of Sectional Societies in 1893, was that,
We do not recognise that the time has yet arrived when our power has
diminished to such an extent as to warrant handing over our authority
to another body.
This attitude would cost them dearly in the struggle for the eight hour day
later in the decade.
With the ASE largely confined to the production and installation of marine
engines in the shipbuilding centres, the bulk of its quarrels over demarcation
came with the other outfitting trades, such as the plumbers, joiners, and the
brassworkers, though disputes also arose with the shipwrights and the tinplate
82men. The most virulent and destructive demarcation disputes of the period
were those between the engineers and the plumbers on the Northeast Coast in
1890-2, which were but a part of a wave of such conflicts sweeping the shipyards
at that time: between 1890-3 there was an average of one strike per month over
83demarcation on the Tyne. Conflicting claims over which trade should control
the installation of iron and copper pipes precipitated strikes and lockouts
first at Robert Stephenson's and then at Palmer's, with the employers supporting
the plumbers, who accused the ASE of trying to poach their members and drive them
81 ASE QR Dec. 1893; See also Reid, Shipbuilding, pp.150-54.
82 Robertson, 'Demarcation Disputes'.
83 Ibid.
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A final but significant measure of the ASE's ability to defend craft reg-
ulation lay in the level of unionisation it was able to secure, and the extent
to which it could enforce its district rates as standards for the trade. The
density of union organisation varied considerably by district and by sector.
By all accounts, the ASE was strongest on the Northeast Coast, where estimates
of membership ranged from 75 to 90% of those eligible in the early 90s, though
even there some shops were markedly better organised than others: Palmer's
85for example was 100% organised in 1892, while Armstrong's was nearer 60%.
Other ASE strongholds included marine centres such as Barrow, Birkenhead, Hull,
and the ports of South Wales; Lancashire, where the machine tool shops were
better organised than the textile engineering firms; and Scotland, where the
86overall density was 50% but higher along the Clyde. In general, then, the
ASE, as one might expect, retained a reasonable hold on the older engineering
centres, except for the railway towns, whose isolation together with the huge
scale of the railway works gave the employers a relatively free hand.87 But in
84 RC on Labour, Group A, evidence of Glennie, qs. 23,080-144; Price, qs. 26,284-
fff.; G. Cherry (General Secretary, Operative Society of Plumbers), qs. 23,339-
445. See also ASE MR Feb. 1892; Conference between Employers' Committee
and a Deputation of Engineers, Newcastle, 22.4.1892; ITEA and Tyne ASE DC,
'Engineers' and Plumbers' Dispute: Reprinted Correspondence', Webb Coll.
EB CXVIII; Robertson, 'Demarcation Disputes', pp.231-32; Reid, Shipbuilding,
pp.172-78.
85 Glennie, to RC on Labour, Group A, q. 23,234; Ratcliffe to SC on Government
Contracts, qs. 2472, 2569; Price to RC on Labour, Group A, q. 26, 344;
Noble to ibid., qs. 25,485-86 ••
86 On Barrow, ASE QR June 1894; de Rousiers, Trade-unionisme, p.271; on Birken-
head, ibid; South Wales, Webb CoIl. EA XVI, f. 6; on Hull, Seaton to RC on
Labour~oup A, 25,573; Lancashire, Webb CoIl. EA XVI, f. 6 and de Rousiers,
Labour Question, pp.266-8l, and Trade-unionisme, p.27l; Scotland, RC on Labour
Group A, q. 23,325. See also the submissions of the ASE to RC on the
Depression, Second Report, App.II, and RC on Labour, Group A, Apps.
87 Webb ColI. EA XVI, f.6; Williams, Railway Factory; K. Hudson, Working to Rule,
Newton Abbott, 1970.
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the newer centres of the industry - Coventry, Birmingham, and London - the
ASE had been able to make little headway, and these districts remained almost
to 1 od ° 1 88en ~re y outs~ e ~ts contro • In the industry as a whole, half of the 180,000
fitters and turners recorded by the Census in 1891 remained outside the ranks
of the ASE, while the much larger numbers of labourers and handymen added to
the pool of potential blacklegs.89 Despite the prominent part they have played
in debates on late 19th century British social and economic history, wages
statistics for this period are notoriously perilous ground. Even where
timework predominated, as in engineering, trade union standard rates cannot be
taken as a reliable guide to earnings; the depressive influence of short-time
working and periodic unemployment must always be taken into account. But the
efforts of trade unions, particularly the ASE, to establish their district
rates as a minimum standard for the trade formed a central component of their
attempts to regulate the labour market, so that the generality of their
standard rates provides an important indication of the effectiveness of their
framework of regulation.
Table 5 compares the existing information on the level of district rates
with the figures for average earnings given by the 1886 Wages Census. The
comparison between the level of district rates and the generally lower level
of average earnings cannot be taken too seriously, since the former generally
refer to individual towns and the latter to larger regions which include country
districts with lower rates; the contrast attenuates where both figures refer to
a single centre. But the more striking finding is the large proportion of
88 de Rousiers, Trade-unionisme, p.272; ASE ~ June 1893; ASE MJ & R Jan. 1897.
89 Burgess, Industrial Relations, p.82.
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fitters and turners whose earnings fell more than 10% above or below the
average (I assume that these were overwhelmingly below); thus beyond the host
of machinemen who were paid below the standard rate, some 15 to 30% of fitters
and turners in most districts were receiving less than 90% of average earnings,
which themselves often lagged behind the standard rate. Only in well organised
centres such as London and Manchester did these deviations fall under 15% for
both fitters and turners. Thus despite the small size of the sample (2,601
turners and 4,946 fitters out of 54,141 engineering workers), and the choice of
an unusually depressed year, these figures suggest that the ASE was encountering
significant difficulties in enforcing its district rates, especially outside
the larger industrial centres.
By the 1890s, therefore, craft regulation in engineering. was clearly in
a precarious condition. While the ASE remained one of the largest, wealthiest,
and best-organised trade unions in Britain despite its loose and decentralised
structure, with 100% membership among skilled men in many of the largest shops,
it was unable to prevent the extension of piecework, systematic overtime, and
boy labour, or to enforce restrictions on apprenticeship. Employers' efforts
to cheapen and intensify the skilled men's labour were tending, as Alastair
Reid has observed, "•••to create a workforce of young, strong, detail labourers
and to push out the older men with greater degrees of all round skill".90 As an
91unemployed member of the ASE told the Royal Commission on Labour:
90 A. Reid, 'Industrial Relations in the British Shipbuilding Industry, 1880-
1920', (unpublished manuscript, Cambridge, 1979), pt.II, p.165.
91 G. Clarke to RC on Labour, Group A, q. 23, 305.
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In our trade a man is no good except during 10 years of his life.
Before he is 30 he is told he is inexperienced, and the employer will
not give him the fair rate of wages, and after he is 40 they say he
is too old.
This claim was corroborated by J. Swift of the SEMS:92
The men are much harder worked and kept under closer surveillance,
whilst the preference for young and strong men is very marked, rather
than men of mature years, ability, and experience, and the need for
spectacles by a workman, in many firms, results in his removal.
Moreover, skilled engineers' lines of demarcation were complex and difficult
to police, an ambiguity which led them into conflict with most of the related
skilled trades with whom they competed for jobs and members. Similarly the
previous wave of technical change in the l830s and 40s had ensconced within
the division of labour a class of less skilled men whose promotion prospects
were blocked by the exclusive practices of the ASE and who would become a real
threat once further technical change called the existing division of labour into
question. Thus the onset of a renewed wave of technical and organisational
change in the l890s would find skilled engineers and theASE vulnerable to a
major employers' offensive, and badly placed to maintain their craft position
in the next phase of the division of labour.
92 Ibid., q. 23,612. For other references to the importance of spectacles, see
Reid, Shipbuilding, p.16l.
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Printing
During the second half of the 19th century, skilled compositors, like
their engineering counterparts, found their framework of craft regulation
increasingly challenged by employers' efforts to cheapen and intensify their
labour. Whereas in engineering the sources of employers' pressure lay in the
squeeze on profits resulting from the great depression and the rising cost of
skilled labour relative to productivity, together with fears of foreign
competition, in newspaper and periodical printing the central issue was the
inability of the traditional division of labour in the composing room to keep
pace with the rapid increase in demand and the technical changes in other parts
of the production process. While printing employers experimented with methods
of mechanising composition with increasing vigour from the 1860s onwards, no
technically and economically viable solution was available before the invention
of the linotype in America in the late 80s. In book and jobbing printing,
moreover, the larger employers were faced with declining profit margins and with
competition, not from foreign manufacturers using a more advanced division of
labour, but rather from provincial plants with access to cheaper and more docile
labour. But in each case printing employers, much more than their engineering
counterparts, were forced to seek what advantages could be gained by nibbling
at the framework of craft regulation within the structure of the existing
division of labour.
While all printing employers were naturally concerned both to speed up
production and to reduce labour costs, those in different sectors had different
priorities. The vast expansion in the output of the printing press, whose
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capacity grew tenfold between 1850 and 1900, with the largest gains brought
by the introduction of web-fed rotary machines in the 1880s, had a double impact
on the relation of the composing room to the rest of the printing process. On
the one hand, by increasing the output of printed matter relative to a given
body of composed type, the larger presses reduced the weight of composing room
costs in the total expenses of a printing firm; on the other, by augmenting the
speed and volume of press work, they drew attention to the composing room as a
d. 93major bottleneck for more rapid pro uctlon runs. Thus on newspapers and
periodicals where speed of production was of the essence, and where buoyant
profits minimised the need to reduce labour costs, employers concentrated their
attention on accelerating and intensifying hand composition. But where the
demand for the product was less urgent, and where profits were declining, as in
the large book and jobbing firms, employers made the reduction of composing
room costs a higher priority. Finally, in the many offices unable to afford
mechanisation, the introduction of the new presses by their larger competitors
created additional pressures both to cheapen and to intensify hand compositors'
labour if these enterprises were to remain afloat.
Among the most important methods used by employers to speed up work and
cut labour costs in the composing room was the manipulation of systems of
wage payment and supervision. Taken out of context, neither piecework nor
timework offersany special advantage to workers or employer: everything depends
on how the final price is arrived at and how much work is expected in return.
93 On the introduction of rotary presses and composing room costs, see Alford,
Letterpress Printing, pp.36-44.
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If, for example, the employer can arrange to pay only for the work he requires,
shifting the burden of fluctuations in demand and interruptions in production
onto the worker, piecework may be the most advantageous; if, on the other hand
he can obtain for time wages the level of effort which has customarily carried
with it higher piecework wages, then time payment may be preferable. From the
workers' perspective, timework offers at least a guaranteed standard of earnings,
while piecework carries with it the dangers of sweating and casualisation;
where workers are well-organised, however, piecework may allow their wages to
keep pace with the employer's demands for greater effort and higher output,
especially where the latter rank above the reduction of labour costs in
managerial priorities.
In printing, London had traditionally been the centre of piecework, with
the piece hand paid so much per 1000 'ens' according to the provision of the
London Scale of Prices; the provinces were dominated by time or 'establishment'
work, with the 'stab' hand receiving a fixed minimum wage for a fixed working
week. From the middle of the 19th century, however, there was a certain
convergence, as stab work penetrated London and piecework the provinces, though
Manchester, the stronghold of the Typographical Association, remained over-
94whelminglya stab town. In 1877, a survey of 320 offices conducted by the
LSC reported 3,192 compositors on stab to 2,079 paid by the piece, and its
submission to the 1886 Royal Commission on the Depression lamented that,95
94 On the rise of piecework in the provinces, see Musson, TA, pp.197-98.
95 RC on the Depression, Second Report, App.II, p.79; LSC Special Report 1877,
quoted in Webb Coli. EA XXI, p.290, which lists the number of stab and
piece hands in a dozen large houses, confirming the split between daily
newspapers and the rest; LSC AR 1885, quoted by Cannon, Skilled Worker,
p.69; F. Willis, 'Piece and Stab in One House', Vigilance Gazette, Dec. 1888;
LSC memorial 1890, in Howe, London Compositor, p.323; Printing News, Dec.
1894, pp.6-11. By 1897, the former Secretary of the LSC could report to
the Webbs that 7~% of LSC members worked on stab, C.J. Drummond to Webbs,
26.3.1897, Webb ColI. EA XXI, p.327.
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Formerly compositors in the metropolis were entirely employed on
piecework, but the tendency of late years has been to have a large
amount of work done on the 'establishment'; in fact, at the present
time, more than 50 percent of the book, jobbing, and weekly newspaper
work is produced in that way, the daily newspapers, however, being
still exclusively done on the piece.
In general, daily newspapers, where compositors were well-organised, the pace
of work intense, and employers able to pay, were worked on the piece, while
the more varied and less remunerative work in book, jobbing, and periodical
offices was more often done on stab.
It was the growth of what came to be known as the 'mixed system', the
'dual system', or 'piece-stab', rather than the simple extension of piecework
to stab districts or vice versa which constituted the main thrust of the
employers' enchroachments on craft regulation. This system, whereby stab and
piece hands worked side by side in the same printing office or 'house', was
disadvantageous to skilled compositors in several respects. Employers anxious
to cut labour costs arranged the distribution of copy so that the 'fat' and
well remunerated jobs were given to the stab hands and apprentices, while the
piece hands were saddled with the more time consuming and poorly remunerated
work. (On newspapers, where speed was of greater importance, the piece hands
would be given the simpler and more repetitive work, while the more complex
tasks might be done on stab; thus the demands of speed and economy might run in
opposite directions.) Thus the Lse complained to the Royal Commission on the
Depression that the increase in stab work had96
•••resulted in a great injustice to the compositor, for •..if he be
employed on the piece he too frequently obtains only such work as the
employer would not find profitable to have done on the 'establishment'.
A contributor to the Vigilance Gazette echoed this grievance:97
..•Any work up to, or slightly above, the average is given to the
'stab', with a driving clicker (printing foreman responsible for the
distribution of copy, jz), while the piece hands are given the
96RC on the Depression, Second Report, App.II, p.79.
97 Vigilance Gazette, June 1888; cf. ~ leader Jan. 1898.
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refuse, or what cannot be done profitably on stab.
98Similarly, a speaker at an LSC Delegate Meeting in 1890 charged that,
In a number of offices, stab hands were kept busily engaged while
the piece hands were made mere conveniences, who sat in their frames
until all the fat of the work had been given out.
Consequently, one of the central demands of piece compositors during this
period was for a fair division of copy. Delegates to the 1861 TA Delegate
Meeting proposed "that in mixed establishments ..•the piece hands take copy in
the same manner as the "stab, so that fat and lean be equally divided", though
the union felt itself too weak to put this resolution into effect.99 Similarly
the LSC News Scale of 1868 contained a provision for fair access to copy for
piece hands, a demand reiterated in their 1874 memorial to the proprietors of
weekly newspapers; analogous grievances over the division of copy led to the
closure of the Scotsman offices to STA members in 1872.100
The structure of supervision could exacerbate these grievances over the
distribution of copy. Where compositors were well organised, as in those houses
where the rules of the LSC were successfully enforced, piecework was administered
by the members of the work group or 'companionship' themselves, a system known
as 'working in pocket' • 101In such cases,
.••Each group enjoys the right of appointing its own foreman, subject
to the veto on reasonable grounds of the employers. The 'clicker' thus
appointed is the recognised intermediary between the master printer and
the companionship; his actions are under the control of his companions,
by whom he is remunerated on such terms as may be mutually agreed upon.
98 Vigilance Gazette, Feb. 1890.
99 MUsson, TA, p.203.
100 Howe, London Compositor, pp.440, 445; ~ Sept. 1872; A. Ross ~dinburgh
Typographical Society) to RC on Labour, Group C, q. 23,275.
101 Schloss, Remuneration, p.91; for chapel rules providing for the election
of clickers by the companionship, see Rules of Compositors' Chapel, Roworth's,
C.J. Drummond, Father of the Chapel, 1.11.77, in Webb ColI. EC 76, f. 7.
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Where employers were ahle to gain greater control over the organisation of
work, as was increasingly the case even in London by the 80s, they appointed
the clickers themselves. Since clickers were responsible for the distribution
of copy, this often resulted in favouritism and an attendant erosion of union
authority. The unions, therefore sought with limited success to procure the
'clamping' or 'boxing' of copy, with access governed by order of finished copy
.. 1021n str1ct sequence.
Even more important than the problem of the division of copy in mixed
houses was that of 'slating': while the stab hand was supplied with a steady
supply of copy, the piece hand might spend a large portion of time waiting for
copy, idle and unpaid. As each 'camp' finished his 'take' he would write his
name on a slate to reserve the next available copy. This system was especially
prevalent on daily newspapers, where the flow of copy was most irregular: piece
work therefore enabled the proprietor to compel the compositors to remain in the
103early hours in case of last minute revisions, at no cost to himself. Since a
piece compositor could spend as much as 25% of his time 'on the slate', this
practice could severely depress his earnings, tending toward casualisation in
extreme cases. One LSC member bitterly noted in 1888:104
102 vigilance Gazette, July 1888, p.22i Musson TA, p.204. A former Secretary
of the Lse claimed in 1850 that employers' ~ntrol of clicking was leading
to subdivision of labour and declining skill levels, Edwards, 'The Disease
and The Remedy', (1850). For other complaints on favouritism by clickers in
non-union houses, see LSC, 'Conditions of Working on the Globe and the People'
LSC Trade Reports, 1892, and the testimony of J. Perkes on Eyre and Spottis-
woode's Queen's Printer's chapel, se on Stationery Contracts, qs. 2571-83.
103 'Report of Slating Conference', LSC Trade Reports 1889; LSC News Department,
memorial 1890, in Howe, London Compositor, Document CXIV.
104 F. Willis, 'Piece and Stab in One House', vigilance Gazette, Nov. 1888;
'Report of Slating Conference'.
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•..how difficult it is for our piece workers to earn, even When
fully employed, what would only be considered labourers' wages
in many trades •••
Despite the virulence of complaints from London, the effects of piece-stab on
compositors' earnings were most keenly felt in the provinces, especially
where weaker organisation left compositors more vulnerable to employers'
pressure. In Edinburgh, where the compositors' position was undermined by the
presence of several hundred female competitors, a survey taken by the STA showed
that 26% of the sample were earning less than 20s weekly, while only 30% were
105earning the full stab rate of 30s.
In addition to depressing piece hands' earnings, piece-stab intensified
the pace of work for all compositors, as the piece hands strained to compose
the maximum possible when copy was available, while employers ~xpected their'
stab hands to produce more than the piece value of their wages if they hoped to
retain their more secure position. According to the LSc,106
With the increase of 'establishment' work the tendency is in the
direction of increased production •••the compositor •••employed on the
establishment is, as a rule, expected to earn considerably more
than the wages he receives ••••
In some cases, stab hands were actually expected to write a bill for their work
at London Scale prices of a minimum of lOs more than their actual wages.l07
105 STC Dec. 1890; Gray, Labour Aristocracy, pp.57-60; Gillespie, STA, pp.72~76;
letter to TC Aug. 1892, p.6.
106 LSC Submission to RC Depression, Second Report, App. II, p.79.
107 LSC News Department, memorial 1874, in Howe, London Compositor, p.441;
T.A.C. De Vere-Artlett, 'Piece-Stab', Printing News, Feb. 1893; letter
signed 'piece-stabber', ibid., Sept. 1893, and the subsequent correspondence,
~., 1893-93; T.E. Naylor, 'Report on Casual Labour and Piece-Stab',
4.6.1907, LSC Trade Reports, 1907.
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In no small measure, then, the growth of piece-stab was responsible for the
system of 'high pressure' production increasingly deplored by compositors
from the 1880s:108
Most of our good old-fashioned firms seem to be £ast departing from
their old mode of treating their employees, and in place thereof,
to be successfully introducing what they term reforms, most of which
have £or their object the endeavour to get as much high-pressure work
as they possibly can out o£ those they employ for as little payment
as they are obliged to give in return.
In opposition to these trends, compositors in London and the provinces
alike refused to sanction any form of ltask work' - a £ixed minimum output £or
stab hands - arguing that high output should be paid for through piece rates.
At the same time, the unions rejected bonuses for increased output as increasing
the discretionary power of the employer and a lever £or the intensification of
109work. While the TA officially opposed all 'limit systems', rank and file
compositors undoubtedly restricted output in practice, as the numerous complaints
of employers attest; the LSC went so far as to adopt a rule in 1895 "that no
member produce more than what has been agreed to by the chapel as to what shall
llOconstitute a fair day's work."
In addition to opposing bonuses and task work and seeking to ensure fair
distribution of copy between stab and piece hands, the typographical unions also
campaigned for payment for 'standing time'. In London, piece hands on daily and
108 F. Willis, The Present Position and Future Prospects of the LSC, (1881);
cf. also 'High Pressure', STC, Mar. 1885.
109 TA Executive Council Minutes, 18.10.1890, 6.3.1893, 17.6.1893; J. Eddy
(Glasgow Typographical Society) to RC on Labour, Group C, q. 27,281.
llO TA Executive Council Minutes,
TA., p.200j 'Report to LSe
Trade Reports, 1895.
2.11.1878, 25.2.1893, 19.2.1898, cited by Musson,
Quarterly Delegate Meetingl 6.11.1895, LSC
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weekly newspapers included demands for payment for time spent on the slate
in the memorials of 1874, 1889, and 1890. The 1891 News Scale, accepted by
the employers, promised redress in the form of 3d per hour for all time spent
in the office beyond nine hours working and one and a half 'cut' (waiting
for copy), though it is unclear how far this concession was implemented in
practice. III The 1891 TA Delegate Meeting enacted a similar rule for payment
for standing time, though the Executive noted the next year that few branches
h d b b f· 112a een a Ie to en orce ~t. In Edinburgh, compositors' efforts to secure
payment for standing time precipitated a major dispute at the Evening News,
f h . 113which resulted in a victory or t e proprletors.
While all compositors were agreed in their disapproval of the mixed sy~tem,
a marked division existed within their ranks as to the respective merits of
each system taken on its own, a split which naturally led to strategic disagree-
ments as well. These internal debates shed an interesting light on the
complexities of 19th century craftsmen's attitudes to piecework, showing that
shared assumptions about the nature of craft identity could lead to contradictory
practical orientations in the context of different traditions, levels of
organisation, and material circumstances. On the whole, these divisions followed
the traditional boundaries between piece and stab districts, with London
compositors supporting piecework against the objections of their provincial
111 Howe, London Compositor, pp.438-90.
112 TA Executive Council Minutes, 2.1.1892; Musson TA, pp.203-5.
113 Ross to RC on Labour, Group C, qs. 23,275-80.
140
counterparts, though dissenting views could be found in each union.
The critics of piecework and its defenders alike deployed a combination
f 'd 1 ' t f th ' 't' 114o econom1C an mora arguments 1n suppor 0 e1r POS1 10ns. Piecework,
charged its opponents, contained an intrinsic tendency to depress wages, because
in the absence of close regulation it promoted casualisation and was open to
abuses such as unpaid slating:
From a variety of causes piecework, year by year becomes less
remunerative. The tendency is toward larger staffs and
correspondingly smaller 'takes' to reduce 'standing time'. Where a
large staff cannot be accommodated we have brought into requisition
that most pitiable, most deplorable, and most degrading elder son
of piecework -'the gr~ss hand' (casual - jz) .115
Morally based objections to piecework focused on its subversive effects on
the craft community: as in engineering, skilled workers charged that piecework
promoted competition between craftsmen, intensified work, weakened the position
of older and slower workers, and lowered standards of craftsmanship. Despite
their later provenance, the anti-piecework resolutions presented at the 1913
116TA Delegate Meeting bring out these objections most forcefully:
Piecework does not produce the better compositor; on the contrary,
piecework is conducive to slovenliness. The piece hand is dominated
by the idea of gaining a wage and to do this he frequently robs his
fellow worker by hoarding up his sorts. (individual types, jz)
One delegate's moral indignation moved him so far as to damn the system as
"the Devil's own work".117
114 For the relationship between these types of arguments in trade union attitudes
generally, see Schloss Remuneration, ch.S.
115 TC Aug. 1892, p.6.
116 Resolution of Plymouth Branch, Report of TA Delegate Meeting 1913, pp.107-9.
117 Resolution of Bristol Branch, ibid.; for other examples of moral arguments
against piecework, see Vigilance Gazette, Nov. 1888, p.13; STC Oct. 1892.
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Where compositors were well organised and the pace of work intense, as
on daily newspapers, especially in London where compositors often elected their
own clickers, piecework was vigorously defended as the only means of ensuring
that high pressure work would yield high pay. Thus a mass meeting of London
compositors in 1899 overwhelmingly rejected a demand by newspaper proprietors
for a stab rate on daily newspapers in a language bristling with the rhetoric
of the customary rights of the independent artisan: timework would deny them
"the full value of their labour" guaranteed to them by piecework, "the
recognised system from what may almost be termed time immemorial".118 Another
defender of piecework argued in a similar vein that,119
•.•On piecework, there is the uncertainty of any regular guarantee
of a full week's money, but at the same time, men are more independent
and the present harsh discipline which has transformed modern printing
offices into mere prisons where men are afraid to look, let alone
speak, to each other, was scarcely known to exist.
Defenders of piecework, like its opponents, drew on the values of solidarity
to support their position: the elimination of piecework would drive older and
slower workers from the printing offices if employers were expected to pay
them as much as younger men; piecework allowed them to stay on with reduced
. 120earnJ.ngs.
118 LSC MS. 'Report to Special General Meeting, 21.10.99} in Lse Special 'Reports,
MRC 28/CO/l/10/6; cf. also the broadsheet issued by the Daily News 'ship,
'The Daily News and Its 58th Anniversary' (1904), Webb Call. EB LXXVII.
119 Letter to Printing News, Dec. 1894, p.13.
120 Report of Conference of the Typographical Societies of the UK, 21-23 Oct.
1886, pp.22-23; LSC Trade Reports 1886; Printing News, Dec. 1894, p.13;
for an employer's perspective, see Fraser to Fair Wages Committee, q. 4641.
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Thus depending on the nature of the work and on the effectiveness of
craft regulation, not only compositors' material interests but also their
interpretation of the values of autonomy and solidarity could lead them to
t k d i , , , k 121a e up 1vergent pos1t10ns on p1ecewor • Ultimately, these internal
disagreements blocked any systematic campaign by the typographical unions to
impose a single form of remuneration on the master printers in order to
eliminate the abuses of piece-stab. Resolutions to abolish piecework entirely
were presented to the 1886 general conference of Typographical Societies, and
to 1898, 1903, and 1913 TA Delegate Meetings; such proposals were actually passed
by regional conferences of the TA in 1896-99, and by the union's Representative
Council in 1901.122 Despite these vocal pressures, opposition by news
compositors usually prevented any of the typographical unions from actually
forbidding its members to accept piecework. Thus in 1869, an Edinburgh sub-
committee convened to consider the abolition of piecework deemed it "inexpedient
and impolitic to interfere with the existing mode of working in Edinburgh
printing offices".123 Only in Dublin in 1890 did the local independent
typographical society strike to abolish piecework outright, motivated by
grievances over the distribution of copy; in the event they settled for a small
, ' 124advance in p1ece pr1ces.
121 The Webbs believed that piecework was generally acceptable to compositors
because of the absence of mechanisation and driving overseers, though they
were aware of the existence of piece-stab. Industrial Democracy, pp.298-99.
As we have seen, this is too sanguine a view of conditions in printing
offices of the period; where compositors could not control the pace of work
and the administration of piece payment they pressed for time rates to
maintain minimum earnings.
122 LSC Trade Reports 1886, TC Oct. 1897; TA RC Report 1901, p.18; Musson TA
p.200.
123 Gillespie, STA, p.75.
124 Evidence of W. Merry, (Dublin Typographers' Providential Society) to RC on
Labour, Group C, qs. 27,451-503; the Edinburgh piece hands launched a
movement for the abolition of piecework in 1898 which was ignored by the
employers. MPA MC Nov. 1898.
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Closely bound up with piece-stab as a method of cheapening and intensi-
fying compositors' labour was what one commentator called its "most pitiable,
most deplorable, and most degrading elder son": casual labour. As in
engineering, the pattern of unemployment and underemployment was closely con-
nected with the pattern of fluctuations in demand and output. In contrast to
engineering, however, the most important such fluctuations in printing were not
so much the pronounced cyclical swings which dominated the capital goods
industries, but rather the seasonal cycle specific to the printing industry
itself. As we saw in Chapter I, the seasonal cycle in printing revolved around
the movement of demand for advertisements and publicity, in London, the 'London
Season' and the parliamentary timetable made their own contribution to
fluctuations in demand. Finally, on daily newspapers, the unpredictable arrival
of copy, dependent as it was on newsworthy events outside the .printing industry
itself, produced sudden changes in the size and layout of editions which often
required newspapers to take on extra hands at the last moment.
In this context, various forms of casuality represented a major threat
to compositors' earnings and to their framework of craft regulation, though one
London master printer doubtless exaggerated when he asked "Is there another
125trade under the sun with a larger proportion of casually employed workmen?"
According to an estimate by Musson based on the TA's records, the level of
casuality itself fluctuated with the movement of the business cycle: in good
125 F. Gaskell, Experience and Maxims of a Practical Printer (1890), p.38;
but cf. the experience of the truly casual trades as set out in Stedman
Jones, Outcast London, pt.I.
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years, one-eighth to one-fifth of all TA members might be in casual employment;
'1 th t" h' h' h h' d 1261n s urnps, e propor 10n m1g t r1se as 19 as one-t 1r • A survey taken
by the TA itself in 1892, more or less an average year, showed that in the 12
branches of the union with more than 200 members, some 20.3% were casually
employed: the proportions varied from 3.6% in Oxford to 31% in Manchester.
(See Table 6) There are no comparable estimates for the Lse or the STA before
the turn of the century; impressionistic evidence suggests that the pattern in
these districts was roughly similar to that reported by the TA.127 These
figures were likewise broadly confirmed by the Board of Trade's 1906 Report of
an Enquiry into Earnings and Hours of Workpeople, a source which must be used
with caution because of its small and not necessarily representative sample and
reference to the period after composing machines had been introduced; the
result of this survey showed 28.8% of all hand compositors working more or less
than a full working week (some of whom were clearly working overtime), and
pointed to the connection between piecework and casuality, as 33.7% of piece-
workers were working more or less than the standard working week.128
The irregular demand for labour on daily newspapers gave rise to the
employment of 'grass hands'; originally, compositors not wishing to work on a
particular night were allowed to select (and pay) their replacements. A related
126 Musson, TA, p.103.
127 See Fleet Street, 17.1.1903; Alford, Letterpress Printing, p.187; and Gray,
Labour Aristocracy, pp.57-60.
128 1906 Wages Census, Vol. VII, Printing and Paper Trades, pp.29 ff. The
Board of Trade survey appears to have overestimated the proportion of
newspaper printers because of their easier accessibility; it also recorded
only those workers employed during the last week of September 1906,
excluding those casuals who found no work that week.
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practice on weekly papers was the sub-contracting or 'farming' of the entire
production process to a single compositor who was responsible for hiring and
129paying the staff:
Weekly newspapers are not infrequently 'farmed' by members of the
Society (LSC), the farmer paying the full sale price to the compositors
engaged. In such. cases the farmer takes the newspaper from the
proprietor at a fixed price, engages his own compositors, and pays
them, the proprietor being perfectly ignorant of the men employed.
For example, Lloyd's Newspaper, the Illustrated London News, and the
Graphic are farmed, all the compositors being members of this society.
A survey conducted by the LSC News Department in 1891 highlighted the variety
of practices in the treatment of casuals. Of the 16 offices reporting, grass
hands received a guaranteed amount of copy in six offices; in five no fixed
amount was guaranteed; in two some casuals received guarantees while others did
not; and in three offices casuality had been abolished altogether. In most
cases, grass hands were employed directly by the master print~r, though in.
some offices they were hired instead by the companionship of compositors
themselves. It was in the latter instance that the casuals were worst treated:
in four of the five offices in which casuals received no guaranteed earnings
per shift, the companionship was their employer. Just as the ASE sought to
eliminate the exploitation of some of its members under piece-mastering, so
the LSC vigorously opposed the employment of grass hands directly by its members:
the 1891 News Department report urged that all casuals be hired by the master
printer and receive a guaranteed amount of copy, as stipulated in the 1868 News
130Scale.
129 C.J. Drummond, (former Secretary of the LSC), quoted in Schloss, Remuneration,
p.118. LSC members were forbidden to accept book or jobbing work on a
'farmed' basis." LSe Rules 1886, Rule XLIII.
130 'Report of the Committee on the System of Working in Each Office', Howe,
London Compositor, Document CXVI, and ibid., p.452.
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The maintenance of a small staff of permanent hands employed on stab,
together with the multiplication of insecure pieceworkers, enabled printing
employers to weaken the bargaining position of each group and thereby to
intensify work and depress wages, as we have seen in our consideration of piece-
stab. The full depressive effect of piece-stab on wages, however, was only
felt where piecework and casuality were combined. Despite its problems as a
source, a wealth of impressionistic evidence confirms the findings of the 1906
Board of Trade Enquiry in this respect: 84.9% of piece compositors earning less
than 25s per week were employed less than full time, while 60% of all piece
hands working less than full time earned below 25s, a relationship that held
131throughout the country when adjustments are made for relative wage levels.
In this context, efforts to limit the extent of the practice and to secure
minimum standards for casuals formed a major concern of the typographical unions.
In addition to their attempts to place responsibility for casuals in the hands
of the employers, the typographical unions sought to obtain a minimum guarantee
of earnings per shift, and to make casual labour more expensive than ordinary
labour. At the same time, the unions' more general tactics for maximising
employment, such as their attempts to reduce the hours of work and overtime, and
their prohibition of 'smooting' (one man working at more than one job) were also
designed to limit casuality, while after the turn of the century the LSC would
inaugurate a campaign designed to eliminate casuality itself.132
Despite the unions' efforts, the persistence of complaints from below
bears out the extent to which casuality continued to represent a major source
131 1906 Wages Census, Printing and Paper Trades: cf. also the survey of
Edinburgh pieceworkers' earnings cited above, p.137.
132 Child, Industrial Relations, pp.l41-42; Musson, TA, p.206i see below pp.279-
80.
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of weakness and impoverishment for compositors into the 1890s. One critic
of the LSC went so far as to charge that the employers' efforts to cut their
labour costs had resulted in the division of union members into three segments:
the 'first class' of 'full framers' which controlled the union; "the casual, who
is in and out, and who willingly accepts the crumbs that fall from the rich
man's table, and even the ordinarily employed piece hand is within this scope";
and last, "men who have neither the advantage of a regular 'grass' or the
influence of a 'gift'; men who have to trudge London's radius on the off chance
and on their own".133
Closely associated with piece-stab and casual labour as a source of
underemployment and the intensification of work was systematic overtime. As in
engineering, the immediate impetus for systematic oVertime carne from the erratic
134timing of demand in the industry:
with regard to overtime, there is probably no trade that suffers more
from the evils arising therefrom - especially systematic overtime - than
our own, and while we are not prepared to say that generally speaking
the evil is greater today than formerly, still we are convinced that very
much of this overtime could and should be avoided. Much of the blame no
doubt rests with ~he public, who, as a result of existing competition,
are in some cases promised proofs of their work in a ridiculously short
space of time, when a little pressure would induce them to supply the
copy earlier; while in other cases they insist upon work being done at
overtime rates, when such work could be produced in the ordinary way
without the least disadvantage.
Compositors opposed the practice first of all for its effects on the men employed:
"The members set their faces against Systematic Overtime, and firmly but
respectfully decline to kill themselves in order to live.,,135 At the same time,
133 Fleet Street 17.1.1903; cf. TC Nov-Dec. 1893.
134 LSC memorial 1890, Howe, London Compositor, p.321.
135 Ibid., p.3l7.
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systematic overtime was seen as a contributory factor in unemployment and
its reduction formed a key component of the typographical unions' strategies
for regulating the labour market: the TA, for example, formulated its
restrictions on overtime work in order that "as large a number as possible
should find regular employment, rather than that some should be totally
136unemployed while others are working late and early."
Accordingly, the London Scale fixed charges of 3d per hour for oVertime,
with prices increasing late at night, while the TA and STA left such regulation
to their branches, the largest of which enforced rates comparable to those in
137London. One means of reducing oVertime was to put up its price, and the
revised London Scale sharply increased overtime rates in 1891.138 Nonetheless,
an LSC survey in 1892 showed that of 185 chapels with 4,893 members reporting,
98 with 2,965 members worked 'systematic overtime', while 29 worked limited
overtime; the average for the two categories combined was 2.13 hours per man
139each week. With the onset of mechanisation and higher levels of unemployment
in the 1890s, printing craftsmen, like their counterparts in engineering began
to press for restrictions on overtime, often as part of a wider struggle for
the eight hour day to which all three typographical unions had become formally
committed in the late 1880s.140
136 TC Nov. 1874, quoted in Musson, TA, p.196.
137 Child, Industrial Relations, p.140; Musson, ~, pp.193-96.
138 Howe, London Compositor, p.353.
139 LSC, 'Report of Sub-Committee on Systematic OVertime', LSC Trade Reports 1892.
140 The LSC voted against a commitment to the legal eight hour day in 1887, but
reversed its position in 1889, and its new Secretary, C.W. Bowerman spoke
strongly in its favour to the RC on Labour. LSC Trade Reports, 1887, 1889;
Vigilance Gazette, May 1888, p.7, June 1. 1888, p.13; RC on Labour, Group C,
qs. 22,915-23,155. The TA membership voted narrowly to support the eight
hour day in 1888, but its General Secretary, H. Slatter, spoke strongly
against it to the Royal Commission; the STA, on the other hand, strongly
supported the eight hour day as a cure for unemployment. H. Slatter to RC on
Labour, Group C, q. 22,832; Ross to ibid., qs. 23,156-292; STA AR 1885;
STC June 1892.~
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As in engineering the key to the overall ef£ectiveness of craft
regulation lay in control over apprenticeship. No subject was more often
discussed at union delegate meetings or in union publications, and compositors
were unanimous in placing the multiplication of boy labour at the centre of
their difficulties in the labour market. The classic analysis encapsulating
this view was Edward Edwards' The Disease and the Remedy: An Essay on the
Distressed State of the Printing Trade, Proving it to be Mainly Attributed to
E. 141xcess~ve Boy Labour • 142According to Edwards,
•••The oversupply of apprentices is the cause of the distressed state
of the printing trade. No care has been taken to preserve any equality
of rule - supply with demand - demand with supply. Boys have been
apprenticed to the business with a perfect indifference as to how they
were to be employed at the expiration of their servitude, or whether
they were mentally capacitate to master the intricacies of the trade ••••
By 1850, Edwards estimated the number of printing journeymen in the UK at 8,500
compared to 6,000 apprentices, though as one might expect the situation was
somewhat better in London, where the numbers were 3,000 to 1,500 respectively.
(See Table 7A for a further breakdown)
It was not merely the quantity of apprentices but also their quality which
alarmed skilled compositors. The decline of indentured apprenticeships, and
still more the diminished technical content of apprenticeship meant that
apprenticeship was more and more becoming simply a source of cheap labour rather
than a means of imparting technical training. As the LSC told the Royal
Commission on the Depression of Trade in 1886:143
141 LSC Prize Essay (1850); a portion is reprinted in Howe, London Compositor,
pp.304-8.
142 Ibid., p.9.
143 Submission of LSC to RC on the Depression, Second Report, App.II, p.SO.
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Formerly an apprentice was placed under the care of a journeyman,
who was responsible to the employer for hi~ proper tuition, and
who was remunerated for the extra trouble and loss of time occasioned.
At the present time, however, apprentices are too often left to
pick up their trade the best way they can, being used by many employers
solely for the purpose of profit, and kept to the purely mechanical
portion of the trade, instead of being thoroughly taught the various
technicalities connected therewith, by which means alone they can
become thoroughly competent workmen.
144
An editorial in Printing News in 1892 put the same point more sharply:
In offices where work is sub-divided, the average apprentice
acquires as much knowledge of his trade as we have of the manners
and customs of the uninhabited islands.
Compositors' vigorous opposition to the use of apprentices on daily newspapers
and to the growing practice of putting apprentices on piecework stemmed from
, '1 145s~m~ ar concerns.
The multiplication of badly trained apprentices threatened not only the
long-term state of the labour market, but also the immediate bargaining position
of the journeymen. Apprentices might be favoured in the distribution of copy,
as in Edinburgh, or might actually take over journeymen's jobs as in Leeds,
where the local typographical society complained to the Royal Commission on
146the Depression that,
•••Of late years there has been a wide spread and constantly increasing
tendency on the part of employers to utilise the services of app~entices
for the performance of duties which properly ought only to be entrusted
to journeymen •.•• The reason for this irregular practice is, of
course, the greater aggrandizement of the employers.
144 'The Apprentice Question', Printing News, Dec.1894, pp.lO-ll.
145 'Report of LSC Special Committee on the Apprentice Question' (1877) in
Howe, London Compositor, document XCIII; Bowerman to RC on Labour, Group C,
qs. 22,945-50; letter to TC June 1891; LTJ Dec. 1906; for a first-hand
description of the consequences of piecework apprenticeship for training,
see T.A. Jackson, Solo Trumpet .(1953), p.25.
146 Leeds Typographical Society Submission to RC on the Depression, Second Report
App.ll, pp.78, 80.
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Particular offenders in this respect were 'turnovers', nominally apprentices
who had switched masters, but in general actually serving as partially trained
147cheap labour.
Each of the typographical unions, therefore, sought to regulate apprentice-
ship and in particular to restrict the ratio of apprentices to journeymen.
From its formation, the TA fixed in its rules a sliding scale limiting the
permissible number of apprentices to journeymen to a maximum of three regardless
of the size of the firm, tightening its rules in the 1870s to discourage newly
established offices from proliferating apprentices. Similarly, from 1873 the
STA set a ratio for its branches of 1:3, up to a maximum of 10 in any single
office. The LSC, on the other hand, did not have an official rule on apprentice
ratios until 1895, when the limit was set at 1:3, which had become considered
148the customary level. In a similar vein, each union made a seven year
apprenticeship a condition for membership and required turnovers employed in
149society offices to be reindentured to a new seven year term.
As Edwards' figures suggest, however, the typographical unions experienced
considerable difficulties during the mid-19th century in enforcing their
apprenticeship rules. The crucial problem lay in the multiplicity of small
printing offices in country towns outside the reach of union control. ISO
147 LSC 'Report on the Turnover System' (1867), Howe, London Compositor, pp.308-9;
'Report of Special Committee on Apprenticeship' (1877), ibid., p.313.
148 Child, Industrial Relations, pp.133-34; Musson, TA, Ch.10; Gillespie, STA,
Ch.8; Howe and Waite, LSC, p.20S.
149 LSC 'Report of Special Committee on the Apprentice Question'; Musson, TA
p.217; Gillespie, STA, p.9S.
lSO Report of TA Delegate Meeting 1877; TC June 1891; Musson, TA, pp.2ll-12;
'The Apprentice', Printing News, June 1893; Gillespie, STA, p.9S.
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While in well organised houses in the major centres the number of apprentices
might conform to the rule, the in£lux of apprentices from the small country
shops not only undermined the unions' control of the labour market but
encouraged employers in the major centres to evade the apprenticeship regula-
tions themselves. As a result, by the mid-1880s, apprenticeship regulation
was in disarray, at least outside of London, as the provincial unions'
submissions to the Royal Commission on the Depression demonstrate. (See Table
7C) In most towns reporting, the number of apprentices approached if not
exceeded the number of journeymen; Liverpool alone among the large printing
centres reporting appeared to be maintaining effective limits, with 120 boys
and 160 apprentices to 1,260 journeymen. According to surveys conducted by
the LSC between 1837 and 1890, the LSC's informal restrictions appear to have
been somewhat more successful than the formal rules of their provincial
counterparts: in 1880 a sample of 169 offices showed an effective ratio of
1:4 and by 1890 the ratio had improved to 1:4.5. (See Table 7B) Nonetheless,
this effectiveness Should not be overstated: the LSC's General Secretary, for
example, told the Royal Commission on Labour in 1892 that London was abundantly
stocked with boy labour; while an LSC survey in 1895 noted that in 17 society
offices 278 apprentices were employed to 503 journeymen, an excess of 88 over
the newly adopted 1:3 ratio.15l
The provincial typographical unions not only experienced general difficultie,
in enforcing their apprenticeship regulations at the level of the labour market
as a whole, but also found themselves drawn into frequent confrontations with
individual employers. Both the TA and the STA cited apprenticeship as the most
151 Bowerman to RC on Labour, Group C, q. 23,050; LSC, 'Report of Sub-Committee
on Unemployment', LSC Trade Reports 1895.
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frequent source o£ disputes, most of which they con£essed ended in victory
152for the employers. In this contest, the unions were forced in practice to
adopt a more flexible approach, as the TA's General Secretary confessed to the
Royal Commission on Labour: where the unions were well organised, however, as
in Manchester, Liverpool, and to a lesser extent Glasgow, tighter regulations
153were enforced. Conversely, in towns where the local typographical society
was unable to keep down the number of apprentices, the provincial unions
handled the problem by excluding them from the union, as the plaintive testimony
of the Secretary of the Waterford Typographical Society, which had 29 journeymen
42 ' d i 154to apprentices, 1n 1cates.
The inability of the unions to keep down the number of apprentices
appears to have evoked opposite responses in the TA and the STA. In the TA,
some branches advocated relaxing the ineffective ratios in order to construct
a defensible rule. Thus at the 1877 and 1891 TA Delegate Meetings, resolutions
were proposed to extend the ratios on the ground that they were unenforceable,
unfair to larger offices, and out of step with the increasing scale of production.
In each case, however, the majority of delegates rejected any extension for
fear that such measures would only encourage an overall increase in surplus
labour by undermining the position of those branches able to enforce the existing
155rule. While a similar motion was unsuccessfully proposed to the STA Delegate
152 Slatter t RC Lab G C 22 799 Rtf STA D 1 t M 'o on our, roup , q. , ; epor 0 e ega e eetLng
1891.
153 RC on Labour, Group C, q. 22,867.
154 Ibid., qs. 27,405-50, cf. above, p.74.
155 Reports of TA Delegate Meetings 1877, 1891; letters to TC June 1891.
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meeting in 1877, by the .mid-1880s a .movement had developed in Scotland to
tighten up restrictions on apprenticeship. In 1886, the Aberdeen branch called
for a special Delegate Meeting to combat the increase of apprentices in
Scotland, and 1889 Delegate Meeting instructed the Executive to enforce the
existing rule more strictly. In the context of the onset of a boom in 1889,
the STA was able to win strikes over this issue in Aberdeen, Hamilton, and Ayr,
leading to a reduction in the number of apprentices in many Scottish towns;
Glasgow, for example, claimed by 1889 that its ratio was fully enforced, though
in Edinburgh at least half of the offices exceeded the limits, and no maximum
per office was enforced.156 In London, too, the late 1880s saw a tightening
of restrictions on apprenticeship as part of a more general refurbishing of
union organisation and expansion of membership, a movement which according to
Child embraced all the London printing unions, the end result of which was the
formal codification of a 1:3 ratio in 1895.
Contrary to the Webbs' belief that the Device of Restriction of Numbers
157was dying out among compositors, therefore, regulation of apprenticeship
seems to have been reviving among the typographical unions from the mid-1880s
onward. It continued to be possible for boys simply to 'pick up' the trade
and even for non-apprenticed men to get work in many of the printing centres,
especially perhaps those organised by the TA; the STA, on the other hand, was
revitalising its restrictions in this period and pressure from below was leading
the LSC to move towards formal codification of its own limits.
156 Reports of STA Delegate Meetings 1877, 1889; STA AR 1889; letters to STC
June 1885, Dec. 1886; Gillespie, STA, pp.96-98.
157 Industrial Democracy, pp.464-68.
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Compositors' struggles to control entry to the trade were not, of course,
confined to the restriction of the number of apprentices. Printing craftsmen's
claims to control of particular jobs necessarily involved the exclusion of other
groups of workers. Unlike engineering, where a previous wave of technical change
had established within the workshops a class of semi-skilled workers which could
find itself in conflict with craftsmen over access to particular jobs, the
static character of the division of labour in the composing room (though not,
of course, in the machine room) meant that craftsmen's competitors were drawn
from outside the printing offices themselves, from the ranks of non-apprenticed,
non-unionised men, and in several areas from women as well. Consequently, in
printing, the level of unionisation provides a good indication of the extent
to which the compositors' unions were able to enforce their framework of
regulation, by keeping out those not already in the industry op the one hand;
and by extending their membership to cover workers already there on the other.
Printing offices were divided into 'union' and 'open' houses: in the
former a closed shop was operated, while in the latter unionists and non-unionists
worked side by side. Little information exists about the relative balance
between the two types, though a survey by the TA in 1904 revealed that 1,788
non-unionists were working alongside 12,814 unionists in the offices that were
. 158open to the1r members. It is clear, however, that the unions sought to
compel non-members to join, especially in well-organised branches, though their
leaders were careful publicly to sanction only moral persuasion; C.W. Bowerman
of the LSC, for example, told the Royal Commission on Labour that the union did
not conduct strikes against non-unionists. The infrequency of disputes over
158 TA, 'Returns of Journeymen and Apprentices', Musson, TA, pp.115-16.
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this issue in all three major unions suggests that it would be the non-unionists'
violation of union rules rather than their si~ple presence which might spark a
confrontation, much as William Allan described the situation in engineering in
the 1860s.159
The late 1880s and early 90s saw a general movement in each of the
typographical unions toward the renovation of their strained frameworks of
regulation through improved organising methods and greater local militancy:
it was in this period that certain unions appointed full-time organisers for the
first time. In many areas organising drives were launched, and it was for
example during this decade that the TA first began to penetrate the Southwest,
160long recognised as a union black spot. Alongside the tightening of restriction
on apprenticeship, the result was a rapid expansion of union membership: between
1880 and 1893 all three unions doubled in size, the LSC from 5,100 to 10,151;
the TA from 5,699 to 12,736; and the STA from 1,504 to 3,004.161
By 1890, the LSC appears to have unionised some two-thirds of London
compositors: its General Secretary asserted in 1896 that there were no more
than 3-4,000 compositors outside the union, a contention supported by the author
of the article on printing in the Booth survey; only 3 of 20 daily newspapers
. b . 162 h . dwere run on a non-un1on aS1S. In those towns were it mainta1ne a branch,
159 Ibid., p.114; Bowerman to RC on Labour, Group C, qs. 22,989-91.
the description of union recruitment in an open house in Warwick
Useful Toil, p.335; for Allan's testimony, see above, p.66.
Cf. also
in Burnett,
160 Musson, TA, pp.106-7; Child, Industrial Relations, Chs.7-9, passim.
161 Howe and Waite, LSC, p.338; Musson, TA, p.535; STA ARs, 1880, 1893.
162 Bowerman to SC on Stationery Contracts, qs. 409-30, 614-18, 689-96; see
also the exchange between T.C. Pigott, Comptroller of the Stationery Office,
and G.E. Arkell, in ibid., qs. 35, 39-48, 147-79, 210, 218, 302-48, 1,200-8,
2,418-2,441.
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the TA claimed by 1892 to have enrolled 80% o£ compositors; given the continuing
sketchiness of its organisation in the South and Southwest, however, Musson's
estimate of two-thirds seems a more likely, perhaps over~generous, global
figure.163 In Glasgow, the STA claimed 95% membership, while in Edinburgh,
the weak link in the union, the branch estimated that there were 400 male
non-unionists to its 800 members, together with at least 200 women.164
Apart from non-unionised men, the main threat to skilled compositors'
control of entry to the trade came from women. The main occupation for women
in the printing industry as a whole was to be found in bookbinding, but between
1871 and 1891, the Census records an increase in the number of female printers
(most of whom would have been employed on composition) from 700 to 4,500 or
1655.2% of total employment. Apart from Edinburgh, the main areas in which
female compositors were employed were the country towns of England and Scotland,
as the submissions to the Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade suggest.
(See Table 7C) Even in London, however, there were probably some 200 £emale
compositors by 1890.166
The position of the female compositor, together with the fears she
engendered among male trade unionists, can best be explored through an
examination of the situation in Edinburgh, where the system had developed to
163 Slatter to RC on Labour, Group C, qs. 22,771-85; Musson, TA, p.115.
164 Ross to Ibid., qs. 23,227-29.
165 Child, Industrial Relations, p.llO.
166 The LSC estimated 50 in 1885, AR 1886; Bowerman 100-150 in 1892, RC on
Labour, Group C, q. 23,157; Amy Linnett, a collaborator of the Webbs, put
the figure at over 200 in 'Women Compositors', Economic Journal Jan. 1892.
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its fullest extent. Women were introduced into Edinburgh printing offices in
1872 ft th t' 0 tOt Ok f 51 h kO 167a er e mas ers V1C ory ln a s rl e or a our wor lng week:
With a depleted membership, with chapels thoroughly disorganised,
the branch, for years after the strike, was not in a position to
take any effort to remedy the grievances of female labour, which
was now rapidly increasing, especially in the larger office.
By the time the system had stabilised in the late 80s, there were some 800
168female compositors in Edinburgh, mostly in the large book houses. In most
cases, women were confined to straight typesetting, often on reprint or
government work, while men performed the heavier tasks of making up and imposing
11 f h kOll d btl ° ° f h k 16Sas we as some 0 t e more s 1 e u ess remuneratlve postlons 0 t e wor •
Thus an STA representative complained to the 1908 Fair Wages Committee:170
•••There is a policy in giving the girls reprint work. It is simple
matter and easily got on with. Unfortunately some of our best
intellects turn out the most miserable specimens of penmanship
conceivable, and some of them are almost indecipherable. The result
is that the copy which is not decipherable is given to the piece-work
compositor, and he has to make the best of it. If it was a girl she
would throw the thing away, put on her hat and away she would go to
find other work •••• But the stab man, or the man who is being paid
a piece-work rate, he has got to do it and get what he can, possibly
spending more than half his time in trying to decipher it. There is
good reason why the easier work should be thrown to the girls.
167 'Statement of the Edinburgh Branch on the Female Question', STC Sept. 1904
see also Printers' Register Oct. 1904, suppl.; STA ARs 1871-73; Gillespie,
STA, pp.117-20.
168 This figure was confirmed for the following decade by both employer and union
representatives to the 1908 Fair Wages Committee: Fraser to ibid., q. 4,622;
G. Templeton (General Secretary, STA) to ibid., qs. 2,924-25. Ross of the
Edinburgh branch of the STA told the RC on Labour that there were 200 women
compositors in the city in 1892, a figure which seems improbably low,
particularly since his contention that their number had stabilised would lead
one to expect little change between then and 1908. RC on Labour, Group C,
qs. 23,227-29.
169 Linnett, 'Women Compositors'j Fraser to Fair Wages Committee, q. 4,583;
Templeton to ibid., qs. 2,924-25, 2966-70j Naylor to ibid, qs. 194,252.
170 Templeton to ibid., q. 2,970.
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The testimony o£ William Fraser, Managing Director of William Neill
and Sons, a large Edinburgh book firm, to the Fair Wages Committee in 1908,
provides the most detailed description of the position and methods of working
171of female compositors in the city. Neills employed 100 women compositors,
who formed the vast majority of the staff. These were on the whole employed
on plain typesetting, as elsewhere in Britain, while men paid on stab wages
were responsible for making up, imposing, and the more skilled work of laying
out advertisements, as well as for some supervision of the women. But more
unusually, women served a three year apprenticeship and were permitted to set
all classes of work - "Greek, Hebrew, Algebra, indeed anything you like";
whereas elsewhere in Scotland it seems to have been more common for women to
specialise in reprint work, and a training period of twelve months was normal.172
Similarly, some women became overseers and readers at Neills, 'while elsewhere
in Britain most female compositors left work after marriage.173
Half the women at Neills were paid time wages and half by the piece,
averaging some 16-18s per week, compared with the union stab rate of 32s.
The advantage to the employer, however, was not merely in the lower basic wages
of the girls. The employment of women, as a Dublin employer told the Fair Wages
Committee, allowed the masters to evade the onerous provisions of the union
Scales:
171 Ibid., qs. 4,573-4,687.
172 Naylor to ibid., q. 252; Templeton to ibid., q. 2,929.
173 J.R. MacDonald, Women in the Printing Trades (1904), pp.46, 172-74; Ross to
RC on Labour, Group C, qs. 23,271-72; Templeton to Fair Wages Committee,
q. 2,903.
160
Q. What are the real grounds £or your anxiety, apparently, to get
rid of the men?
A. The men are so greedy. For instance, a page with an illustration
in it - a solid page with a picture - the men charge as solid type;
and if the page is a little bigger than an ordinary page, they will
charge extra for putting that page in, besides charging it as
setting up so many letters. Of course we could not agree to that
kind of thing.174
More broadly, as Fraser told the Fair Wages Committee, the use of women compositor
on a wide scale weakened the union throughout the city, even in those shops where
175only men were employed:
The Compositors' Union in Edinburgh is not very strong, and we do
not consider it much. We make agreements with them, but they are
not strong.
Q. You have taken the strength out of it?
A. With the girls, yes.
\vherever women compositors were employed on a wide scale, male printers
were unanimous in regarding them as an important cause of union weakness and of
176unemployment in their own ranks. In this context, it is hardly surprising
the typographical unions made opposition to the use of women compositors one
of the cornerstones of their trade policy. The unions were normally careful,
however, to proclaim their opposition to underpaid female labour rather than to
women per ~ though remarks were occasionally made about the inappropriateness
of women doing 'men's work,.17fhus the joint conference of Typographical Societies
voted in 1886 to admit women as members of the unions if they could earn the
men's rate, and the LSC actually went so far as to enrol one female member, who
174 T. Richards to Fair Wages Committee, q. 4,674.
175 Ibid, qs. 4,686-87.
176 See for example STA AR 1884; submissions of Aylesbury branch of TA to RC on
the Depression, Second Report, App.II, p.81i LSC, 'Report of Sub-Committee
on Unemployment', LSC Trade Reports 1894.
177 Report of Conference of Typographical Societies, 1886, pp.23-25; Templeton
to Fair Wages Committee, q. 2,898.
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178was employed at William ~orris' Kelmscott Press. Women were to be excluded
as a consequence of the general logic of craftsmen's attempt to restrict entry
to the trade and to maintain their wages and working conditions rather than
because of sexual antipathy as such, though the male compositors were quite
prepared to sanction sexual discrimination to further their larger aims. As
the Secretary of the LSC put it when asked whether he wished to see the sexual
179division of labour stereotyped:
As an abstract proposition, I would say the present conditions should
be stereotyped rather than that any body of men should be deprived of
the right to live.
Although male trade unionists recognised that the cheapness of women's
labour stemmed from the fact that they were "easily sweated", they were not,
as a rule, quick to regard the organisation of women compositors as a solution.
In fact, when a feminist activist approached the STA with a proposal for the
organisation of women in Edinburgh, her overture was rejected,180
•••On the grounds that, if the females were organised, their position
would be improved as an industry for females, which would result in
a great accession to their numbers in Edinburgh.
178 This is not to say that many male compositors did not also hold sexist
attitudes concerning the inappropriateness of women performing 'men's
work'. See Naylor to Fair Wages Committee, q. 196; Templeton to ibid.,
q. 2,906; 'Our Female Rivals', STC Feb. 1886.
179 Naylor to Fair Wages Committee, q. 195.
180 'Statement by Edinburgh Branch on the Female Question', STC Sept. 1904;
cf. also the remarks of the General Secretary of the TA to the union's
1908 Delegate Meeting, quoted in Musson, TA, p.121.
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In the late l890s, however, the STA cooperated with Margaret Irwin in an
unsuccessful attempt to organise women compositors, and it would be this
strategy that would ultimately prove successful in Edinburgh.lSl
Thus wherever their local strength permitted, the unions continued to
insist on the exclusion of women, as in London, where the LSC's General Secretary
asserted in 1908:182
If it were not for the Union, I venture to think that women would be all
over the London trade. Fortunately, the London Union has been strong
enough to keep them entirely out; but these London houses, as soon as
they get beyond the sphere of influence of the London Union, by moving
20-30 miles outside, at once they set up the conditions that I know
would set up in London if they thought they could do so unchecked.
Surveying the printing industry on the eve of the introduction of the
linotype, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the position of the hand
compositor and his framework of craft regulation was increasingly embattled, and
in many respects deteriorating, in the face of employers' pressures to cheapen
and intensify his labour. We have already alluded to the pitfalls of 19th
century wages statistics. Nonetheless, there is a certain amount of evidence
that compositors' earnings were falling behind the rate of increase of the
labour force as a whole, and of certain skilled trades in particular. Considering
the movement of compositors stab rates, Bowley and Wood calculated, using a
weighted average, that these rose 21% between 1860 and 1891; Phelps Brown and
Browne's index of money wages shows that overall wage rates rose by 43.5%.183
181 See below, pp.321-28.
182 Naylor, to Fair Wages Committee, q. 246.
183 A.L. Bowley and G.B. Wood, 'The Statistics of Wages in the 19th Century ,
Pt. V, Printers', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, LXII (1899);
Phelps Brown and Browne, Century of Pay, p.358.
163
It is more difficult to show that compositors were falling behind other skilled
trades on this basis: Bowley's index numbers for fitters' and turners' wage
rates show a similar increase of 22-23%, while in London the rise in the LSC's
stab rate from 33s in 1860 to 38s in 1890 was matched by that of the ASE from
18434s to 38s.
In any trade where piecework payment plays a major role, however, time
rates do not provide a reliable guide to earnings: a pioneering study of
rivetters' earnings on Clydeside before the First World War suggests that in
only one year between 1889 and 1913 did these workers in practice earn the
185district rate. Printing was no exception in this regard: far more than
any lag in the rise of stab rates, it was the growth of piece-stab and casuality
which depressed wages. In Dublin, for example, a master printer testified in
1861908 that piece hands were unable to earn the stab rate; in this respect, the
situation in Edinburgh provides an extreme example which illuminates the general
187trend:
The position of the piece compositor has for years been one of peculiar
hardship. Subject to all the vicissitudes of a fluctuating trade, his
precarious and uncertain earnings have been further endangered by the
more general adoption of the stab system, the large increase in the
number of apprentices, and the introduction of female labour.
184 A.L. Bowley and G.H. Wood, 'Statistics of Wages - Engineering and Shipbuilding
Trades', pts. X-XIV, ibid., 68-69, (1905-6). The figures for printing in the
1886 Wages Census are based on such small samples as to be of little value.
185 S. Price, 'Clyde Rivetters' Earnings, 1889-1913', (unpublished paper, Glasgow
University, 1977), cited by Reid, Shipbuilding, pp.SI-52; for a more detailed
discussion of the difficulties of 19th century wages statistics for piece-
working trades, see ibid., pp.SO-61.
186 Richards to Fair Wages Committee, q. 4,666.
187 Memorial of Edinburgh Typographical Society 1891, cited in Gray, Labour
Aristocracy, p.S8.
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The LSC likewise recognised that piece-stab was the crucial issue for comparison
of earnings with other trades: in relation to the other major printing trade,
188the machine managers, the union noted in 1890 that they,
...are already far better paid as a rule than compositors, owing to
the fact that they have no piece scale to contend with.
While compositors in regular employment on daily newspapers, especially in
London, ranked among the best paid manual workers in the country, these made
up only some 10% of the total, even in London. As for the rest, compositors
themselves were convinced that their earnings were falling behind those of
other skilled trades, and this argument formed an essential component of their
demands for wages increases after 1890. The LSC, for example, provided a two
page table of hourly rates in other London trades to sUbstantiate their claim
that,189
•••The London compositor •••has not kept pace with the times ..• he has
looked on •••while other trades have improved their position •••.
Even as the rise of piece-stab and casuality was undermining compositors'
earnings and security of employment, the pressure of rapidly rising demand for
printed products on the traditional division of labour in the composing room was
leading to an intensification of supervision and of the pace of work equally
subversive of the hand compositor's autonomy and craft status. By the late 1880s,
'high-pressure' production had become an insistent theme of rank and file
grievances, as elected clickers were replaced by managerial appointees in many
190offices, and compositors could decry the emergence of
188 Lse memorial 1890, in Howe, London Compositor, p.317.
189 bOd f~., p.319; c • the Edinburgh memorial 1891, in Gray, Labour Aristocracy,
p.S8. Alford concurs in this view of the London situation. Letterpress
Printing, pp.203, 210-27.
190 F. Willis, The Identity of Interests of Employers and Employed U889).
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•••The factory system adopted in so many of our large houses. Take
one house as an instance. After the bell has been ringing for the
space of three minutes a line is drawn on the time book by the time
keeper, and those who sign under the line are deducted a quarter of
an hour ••••
An editorial in the Scottish Typographical Circular went so far as to claim,
albeit with a certain degree of hyperbole, thatl9l
The thinking age of printing has long since passed away, and with it .••
much of that refined grace of manner that constituted a compositor's
claim to be considered one of the 'aristocracy of the working classes'.
These pressures from employers then were straining compositors' framework
of craft regulation to its limits. The general trend was identified by one
192London writer, again with some degree of overstatement:
There can be little doubt that we are utterly unable at the present time
to regulate in a fair and impartial manner a consistent mode of working
in the various houses open to us, or in case of necessity, to tackle,
with a reasonable chance of success, any decent sized house that may feel
inclined to depart from the London Scale and customs •••• If we glance from
end to end of our so-called 'Fair' houses, what do we find to be the state
of many of them? Is it not a fact that they contain abuses of all kinds?
Abuses that are as a rule antagonistic to the interests of the workmen
employed therein?
As we have seen, the technical content of printing apprenticeship was
declining during the second half of the 19th century. Contemporary observers
noted a parallel tendency for the quality of the apprentices themselves to decline
a development which may serve as an index of popular perceptions of the declining
193status and prospects of the compositor:
191 ~ Mar. 1885; cf. also 'Present Day Tendencies', ibid., Feb. 1893.
192 Willis, 'Identity of Interests'; cf. Fleet Street 17.1.1903# p.l.
193 Speaker to Printers' Managers and Overseers Association, quoted in LTJ
May 1906, p.S; cf. also 'Is the Printer Deteriorating' (answer: yes), STC
Aug. 1886.
166
We now seem to get the failures at school, the rif~aff of the streets,
the rejects of other trades. I can remember when printing was an
occupation to which the lower middle class and upper lower class were
glad to put their sons, when the printer ranked as being a grade higher
than the joiner, the brick-setter, and the fitter .••• We ought to get
the pick of the lads bred by our working class and the cream of the day
schools. A business like ours •.•ought to attract the brighter boys of
the artisan class, to say the least.
While this argument cannot be proved without some representative information on
the changing social background of printing apprentices, the view that its
quality was declining is supported by such fragmentary statistical material as
, 'labl 1941S ava1 e.
Against this evidence of decline must be set the undoubted successes of
the compositors' unions in defending and even pushing back the frontier of
control in certain areas, largely as a result of improved organisation from the
mid-1880s onwards. The unions were able vastly to increase their membership
and to extend their organisation to new districts; equally importantly, they
were able to tighten their control over apprenticeship and to keep out female
labour in most areas. This reinforcement of the effectiveness of compositors'
exclusiveness, itself a response to the deterioration of their earnings and
control over the organisation of work, would stand them in good stead in the
course of their struggles to gain control of new machinery during the following
decade.
194 I.C. Cannon tried to show that the proportion of middle class apprentices
declined over this period, by comparing figures taken from the Stationers'
Company records for the first half of the 19th century with data obtained
from a sociological survey about the fathers of men employed in the industry
in the 1950s. Since Cannon accepts that the Stationers' records overstate
the proportion of middle class recruits for the earlier period, while his
own figures for the later period were apparently based on oral testimony about
quite distant events, his findings have little independent value. Cannon,
Skilled Worker, pp.86-88. It is striking, however, how few of the compositors
appearing in Crossick's analysis of marriage records in Kentish London in
the 1870s were themselves the sons of printers. Crossick, Artisan Elite,
p.116. For evidence of children of compositors succeeding their fathers in
the trade, see Alford, Letterpress Printing, p.199 for the 1870s, and testimon:
of G. Eyre (Eyre and Spottiswoode's) to SC on Stationery Contracts, q. 938
on the 1890s.
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Craft Regulation in Question
On the basis of a thorough examination of conflicts between skilled
workers and employers in engineering and printing, during the second half of
the 19th century it is clear that the frameworks of craft regulation and the
position of craftsmen themselves were coming under increasing strain from
employers' pressures to cheapen and intensify their labour. Despite the previous
history of mechanisation in engineering, the technology in both industries had
remained relatively static until the 1890s, and the main threats to craftsmen's
position came from changes that could be implemented within the existing division
of labour: new methods of supervision and wage payment, systematic overtime and
casualisation, and the employment of inferior grades of labour (boys, handymen,
and women) figured among the major forces undermining skilled workers' earnings,
security, and autonomy. At the same time, wherever possible employers struck
at the linchpin of craft regulation in the long term by multiplying the number
of apprentices and by eroding the technical content of their training by con-
fining them more and more to subdivided and repetitive processes, often paid
at piece rates. It is important to recognise the extent to which these processes
were already underway before the onset of a new wave of mechanisation in both
industries in the l890s; it was in large measure the inadequacies of these
methods of increasing productivity and decreasing labour costs which drove the
employers towards a new phase of innovation, while craftsmen's struggles against
the new methods were in many respects an extension of those against the old. In
no sense, therefore, can skilled engineers anti compositors in 1890 be conceived
unproblematicallyas 'labour aristocrats' in the sense intended by many users
of the term, i.e., as enjoying high and regular earnings and retaining unchallenge
168
control over the organisation o£ production.195
While the challenges faced by skilled workers and their unions in printing
and engineering during this period were in many respects similar despite the
divergent structures of the two industries, there were important dif£erences,
particularly in the development of the division of labour, which influenced
in no small measure the possibilities for the defence of craft regulation and
for alliances between these skilled trades and other groups of workers. The
previous wave of mechanisation had brought into the engineering workshops a large
class of semi-skilled labourers who could be promoted onto existing types of
machines where production processes were sub-divided and simplified. This
possibility, which was unavailable in the composing room, undoubtedly rendered
engineers' efforts at restricting apprenticeship more dif£icult and helps to
explain the greater success enjoyed by the printing unions in this regard. The
relative stability of typesetting technology meant that compositors' main
competition after as well as before 1890 came from men and women not already
ensconced within the division of labour; this fact, coupled with the greater
homogeneity of the printing industry as compared to engineering, made compositors'
lines of demarcation and exclusion less ambiguous and more defensible than those
of engineers. As a result, the typographical unions appear to have been able to
organise a significantly larger proportion of those able to do compositors' work
than could the ASE and the SEMS. At the same time, compositors enjoyed
relatively amicable relations not only with other printing trades, but even with
195 For uses of the concept of the labour aristocracy in this sense, see Hobsbawm,
'Labour Aristocracy' in his Labouring Men and his 'The Labour Aristocracy
Reconsidered' (paper delivered to the 7th International Economic History
Conference, Edinburgh, 1978); Gray, Labour Aristocracy; Crossick, Artisan
Elite. For a parallel argument about most shipyard trades, see Reid,
Shipbuilding, especially chs. 2-7.
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the various groups of printing labourers whose unionisation they encouraged
in the late 1880s,196 whereas in addition to their endemic conflicts with
handymen and labourers, engineers found themselves in constant dispute with
other skilled trades, a fact which undermined any long term possibility of
cooperation against the employers. These differences in engineers' and printers'
relations with other groups of workers and in their ability to defend their
framework of craft regulation within the existing division of labour would play
an important role in determining each group's relative ability to defend itself
against more fundamental assaults on its position during the 1890s.
196 See below, pp.294-97, 302-3.
PART II
MECHANISATION AND CRISES OF CRAFT REGULATION, 1890-1914
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Chapter IV
From War of Position to War of Manoeuvre
1890-8
In both printing and engineering, the 1890s marked a period of major
upheaval in the division of labour as a result of a new wave of mechanisation
and labour-saving investment, leading to a crisis of craft regulation. Skilled
workers in both industries found themselves involved in bitter conflicts with
their employers as the former sought to gain control of the new techniques and
to neutralise their impact on the position of craftsmen within the division of
labour. In each case, moreover, the struggle over the consequences of
mechanisation developed directly out of the endemic normal conflicts between
skilled workers and their employers during the previous phase of the division
of labour and to a great extent represented a continuation of those struggles
by other means. Despite the similarities in the form of the crises of craft
regulation in the two industries, however, their underlying causes were in
many respects different, as more strikingly would be their respective outcomes.
The crisis in printing was above all a crisis of expansion, whose roots lay in
the inability of hand composition to keep pace with the rapid expansion of
printing output, especially of daily newspapers, and with the concommitant
development of the printing press. In addition to seeking means of cheapening
and intensifying hand compositors' labour within the existing division of
labour, printing employers were actively engaged from the l860s onward in
experimenting with various forms of composing machines; the new element in the
situation after 1890 was the availability of an economically and technically
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suitable candidate in the shape of the linotype. In engineering, on the other
hand, the roots of the crisis lay above all in the exhaustion of the returns from
an extensive development of the existing division of labour and in changes in
the market position of certain sectors of the industry, and only secondarily
in the greater availability of new automatic and semi-automatic machine tools.
More striking than the differences in the causes of these crises were the
differences in their outcomes, both in the short and the long-run. In
engineering, conflicts between craftsmen and employers over the reorganisation
of the division of labour led to a full-scale national lockout in 1897-8, in
which the unions' defeat resulted in the imposition of an employer-devised
system of industrial relations and ultimately to a significant deterioration
in the craft position of skilled workers. In printing, by contrast, craftsmen
were quickly able to win control of the new machines through agreements with
the employers, and after the turn of the century, to consolidate their control
through a mixture of confrontation and negotiation. These crises and the
explanation of their divergent outcomes will occupy us for the balance of this
thesis; this chapter treats the emergence and initial phases of conflicts over
the reorganisation of the division of labour in each industry between 1890 and
the end of the decade, the point at which the different outcomes had begun to
crystallise with the signing of collective agreements on composing machines in
printing and with the defeat of the ASE in the great lockout. Subsequent
chapters will follow the story up to 1914, focusing on the consolidation of
craft regulation in printing after 1898, and on its revival in engineering
during the same period.
The main events of the period, both in engineering and in printing, have
received considerable attention from historians, and our pri~ary purpose, there-
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fore, is to examine them in the context of our central explanatory problem -
the relationship between craft regulation on the one hand and technical change
and the reorganisation of the division of labour on the other, rather than to
provide another comprehensive narrative. Nonetheless, it will be necessary at
many paints to draw attention to issues in the narrative which have been
ignored or under-emphasised in the existing historiography. This is especially
true as regards two themes which fit uneasily with the proceduralist assumptions
derived from industrial relations theory which have informed so much of the
historiography: the role of rank and file activity and opposition in shaping
relations between union executives and employers; and the problematic relation
between the formal negotiation of collective agreements and their implementation
on the shop floor. As we will attempt to show, conflicts over the introduction
of new technology can best be understood in terms of a triangular relationship
between employers, union executives, and the rank and file (with lower levels
of union organisation such as district committees playing a shifting role
between the union and its members), so that pressure from below often placed
significant constraints on the agreements which could be reached through
collective bargaining. Similarly, neither in printing nor in engineering did
the negotiation of collective agreements, whether the Terms of Settlement or the
linotype scales, in itself resolve the questions of control over new
technology; instead these agreements provided a new framework within which
1conflicts between skilled workers and employers would be fought out.
1 The main sources in the existing historiography for narrative accounts of this
period are, for printing, Musson, TA; Child, Industrial Relations; Gillespie,
STA; Howe and Waite, LSC. For engineering, Jefferys, Engineers; Weekes, ASE;
Wigham, Power to Manage; Croucher, Local Autonomy; Burgess, Industrial Relations
and the detailed narratives of the 1897-8 lockout cited in note 63 below.
On the whole, the proceduralist assumptions described above are more character-
istic of the historiography of printing than of engineering; Weekes, ASE, and
Croucher, Local Autonomy, in particular emphasise the role of pressure from
below in overturning agreements reached between the ASE Executive and the EEF,
and in subverting the application of the Terms of Settlement after 1898; I
have been influenced by their work in formulating my own views.
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Engineering: Normal Conflict, Mechanisation and Confrontation
The stability of the pattern of investment and with it of the structure
of the division of labour in engineering during the decades after 1850 rested
on two related economic conditions: the commanding position of British engineer-
ing products in world markets, and the absence of a significant demand in Britain
itself for standardised, mass produced engineering goods. Beginning in the l870s
and with accelerating force in the 80s and 90s, the first of these conditions
was eroded by the emergence of American and German competition, first in
European and Third World markets and ultimately in Britain itself. While the
emergence of the sewing machine and developments in armaments had provided some
scope for mass production methods in the 1880s, it was only with the bicycle
boom that a broad-based demand emerged in Britain for a product with standardised,
interchangeable parts; it was this demand which effected the diffusion in Britain
of the new automatic and semi-automatic machine tools adapted for mass production
which had been developed in America during the preceeding half-century, a process
of diffusion which ultimately spread beyond the cycle industry to touch the older
2sectors as well. While the gradual exhaustion of the productive possibilities
of the existing division of labour in engineering, coupled with the impact of
the depression, had driven employers during the 70s and 80s to seek means of
undermining craft regulation, neither the diverse character of demand nor its
2 While the sewing machine was a product similar in character to the bicycle,
and could in principle have exerted a similar influence in drawing automatic
machine tools into the British engineering industry, Saul has argued that it
failed to do so because of the institutional separation of the production of
sewing machines from the rest of engineering in Britain. The vast majority
of British sewing machines were build by the Singer plant on Clydebank, which
also produced its own machine tools, so that the demand for sewing machines
exerted no pullan the machine tool industry as that for cycles would do.
Saul, 'Mechanical Engineering·.
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slow rate of growth had encouraged them to embark on a major new wave of
capital-intensive, labour-saving investment. The onset of such a new wave of
investment, sparked by the bicycle boom, emerged within the context of
intensifying normal conflict between skilled workers and their employers, leading
rapidly to a major confrontation over the consequences of technical change for
the division of labour.
As we saw in Chapter II, the machine tools involved in the reorganisation
of the division of labour in British engineering during the 1830s and 40s did
not permit the routinisation of the whole of what had been the work of the
all-round craftsman; these innovations still left a considerable margin of
operation for more specialised skilled workers, particularly the fitters and
turners, a space broadened considerably by the extensive development of the
industry after mid-century. From the 1840s, however, American manufacturers
operating behind steep tariff walls developed a new generation of lighter
automatic and semi-automatic machine tools and precision gauges to cater for a
burgeoning demand for mass produced consumer durables - typewriters, small arms,
agricultural machines, sewing machines, and so on - for which the American
market provided much greater support than did that of Britain.3 S.B. Saul has
described the technical capacities of the most important American innovations
which made it possible in principle to routinise a much larger proportion of
. h . d 4skilled labour ~n t e ~n ustry:
The turret lathe had a round or hexagonal block which rotated about
its axis with a hole in the middle of each side into which tools were
inserted and brought successively into contact with the work. In its
automatic form •••it was ideally suited to the production of many kinds
3 Rosenberg, 'Technological Change'; Saul, 'Mechanical Engineering', and
'Engineering'.
4 Saul, 'American Impact', p.22; for more detail on technology, see Floud,
Machine Tool Industry, Ch.2.
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of duplicated small parts, since drilling, boring, turning and facing
could all be done on the same machine. Another radical change came
through the milling machine in which the ordinary cutting tool of the
planer or shaper, for example, was replaced by a rotating disc or drum
with teeth cut in the rim. With its continuous motion the machine was
technically more perfect than the reciprocating tools which wasted power
on the return stroke, it had a broader working edge than the traditional
tools, and above all, unlike them could cut to any geometrical shape.
Milling machines were used for many operations which had previously been
carried out laboriously by hand but one vital development was their
adaptation for the cutting instead of the casting of gears. It was most
important to obtain accurate gears as the speeds of mechanisms began to
increase so markedly and when the automatic machine appeared in 1877 it
became possible to produce them cheaply and in quantity. The grinding
machine largely displaced the more costly scraping and became ~ndispensible
in any shop working to fine limits. There was too the micro-caliper for
machinists which played a major part in raising standards of accuracy.
As we noted in Chapter III the impact of new American machine tools on
British engineering practice before the 1890s was negligible, despite earlier
various efforts to introduct them into Britian. Whitworth and others were able
to persuade the British government to build a factory to make guns with inter-
changeable parts in the l850s and a distributor of American machine tools was
operating in Britain from 1865 onwards. Nonetheless, the first factory
completely equipped with American machine tools was a machine gun works set up
in 1889; similarly, those British manufacturers marketing light machine tools,
among them Greenwood and Batley, experienced little demand for these products in
5the 70s and 80s. It was the bicycle boom of the mid-1890s which sparked the
change. Bicycle production began to develop in the West Midlands from the late
1880s, rising steadily in the face of the general downturn in trade in the early
90s, but really taking off during the home boom which began in 1895. In contrast
to most upturns in the trade cycle in Britain between 1850-1914 in which exports
5 Saul, 'American Impact', 'Machine-Tool Industry'.
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and foreign investment played the leading role, the second half of the 1890s
saw a revival led by domestic consumption, centred on house building, bicycles,
6and brewing, as a result of rising real wages. Bicycle production expanded
massively between 1895 and 1897, as can be seen from some of the following
indicators: the export of cycles and parts from Britain rose by 33.9% from
1895 to 1896; the number of cycle manufactures in four major centres (London,
Nottingham, Coventry, and Birmingham) more than doubled between 1894 and 1897;
the number of bicycles dispatched by rail from Coventry rose from 113,000 in
1895 to 216,000 in 1896 before falling to 142,000 in 1898.7
This enormous surge of demand for cycles brought in its train a similar
demand for the new generation of machine tools required to produce them. Imports
of American machine tools consequently mushroomed: total British imports from
the US of 'Iron and Steel Manufactures' increased in value by more than sixfold
between 1894 and 1898, to some £4 million at 1913 prices; American exports of
8'metal working machinery' alone amounted to some £350,000 by 1898. British
machine tool firms prospered similarly: Alfred Herbert's sales rose from £5,000
in 1896 to more than £50,000 in 1898; John Lang's from £20,000 to £50,000 during
the same period, as did many of the makers of the new tools. Where Herbert had
employed 12 men in 1887, he employed 500 in 1897, and between 1890 and 1897, the
total sales of nine major British machine tool makers nearly tripled.9
6 J. Blackman and E.M. Sigsworth, 'The Home Boom of the l890s', Yorkshire
Bulletin of Economic and Social Research 17(1) (1965).
7 Harrison, 'British Cycle Industry'; Blackman and Sigsworth, 'Home Boom',
pp.86-88.
8 Floud, 'Engineering Competition', p.Gl; Saul, 'American Impact', p.26.
9 Saul, 'Machine-Tool Industry', pp.30-35; ibid., 'American Impact'.
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The same decade saw a major increase in the competitiveness of American
(and to a lesser extent German) engineering products in world markets, including
the British home market, as the total export figures quoted above demonstrate.
Before 1890, British engineering manufacturers had experienced competition in
European and Third World markets from the Americans in products like agricultural
machinery and from the Germans in locomotives and steam engines, but after 1890
a whole range of American mass produced consumer goods - typewriters, sewing
machines, cycles - and the lighter machine tools required to produce them swept
into world markets, as their prices fell with the maturation of the rival
industries behind their tariff barriers.IO
While the new machine tools were best suited to mass production, they
were flexible enough to be used on less standardised work as well, since in some
areas they extended the technical capacity of the engineering workshop in
absolute terms: thus the milling machine enabled gears to be cut rather than
cast, and the new lathes allowed turning work to be done to closer tolerances.
Thus the intensification of foreign competition, together with the example of
the cycle makers, the falling prices of the new machine tools and the improved
network of distribution in Britain, encouraged manufacturers in the older as
well as the newer sectors of the industry to experiment with the new techniques.
In most cases, this amounted to the piecemeal introduction of new machine tools,
perhaps occasioned by the normal depreciation of old plant, rather than whole-
sale scrapping of existing machinery in the interests of a transformation of
the division of labour, but the process went furthest in those older sectors
which most closely approximated to mass production, notably textile engineering.
10 Saul, 'American Impact', 'Mechanical Engineering', 'Engineering', 'Machine-
Tool Industry'; Floud, 'Engineering Competition', Machine Tool Industry;
McLean, 'Engineering Competition'.
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Many Lancashire textile machinery firms purchased milling machines, for example,
and one leading enterprise, Brooks and Doxey, owned 160 by the late 90s;
similarly, locomotive makers and marine engineers began to install light British
and American machine tools when re-equipping their shops during the same period.
In the machine tool sector itself, when expanding demand induced Lang's,
specialists in high-class lathe-making, to equip a new shop in 1896, they added
13 American machines, including five automatics to the conventional run of
B °to h hO 11r1. 1.S mac l.nes.
The result of this renewed wave of mechanisation, though it affected above
all newer sectors like cycle making and certain types of armament production whilE
having a more marginal impact on the core of the older sectors themselves, appear~
to have been significant productivity gains in the industry as a whole. Phelps
Brown and Browne's index of throughput in engineering shows productivity based
on weight of metal processed increasing by nearly one-third between 1890 and
1899, which may provide some rough indication of the extent of change, though,
as we have noted, there are difficulties in using weight alone as an index of
productivity in so variegated an industry as engineering, particularly during a
o d f 0 i h th 1 0 f hO 0 0 0 12 Iperl.o 0 l.nnovat on w en e camp eX1.ty 0 mac 1.nery 1.S 1.ncreasl.ng. n a
similar vein, one union source claimed that the time needed to produce a
component of an engine bearing in "a successful engineering organisation"
dropped from 98.2 minutes in 1890 to 28 in 1900, a greater reduction than in
any other decade between 1880 and 1930.13
11 Saul, 'Machine-Tool Industry', p.29; Blackman and Sigsworth, 'Home Boom',
pp.85-86.
12 Phelps Brown and Browne, Century of Pay, p.176.
13 Amalgamated Engineering Union, MJ Feb. 1932, cited by Burgess, Industrial
Relations, p. 27.
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This new wave of mechanisation inaugurated during the mid-1890s coincided
with a period of intensifying normal conflict between skilled engineers and
their employers. As we saw in the previous chapter, the impact of the great
depression and of declining returns from extensive growth pushed employers to
seek means of cheapening and intensifying skilled labour within the existing
division of labour during the 1870s and particularly the 80s. With the revival
of trade between 1889 and 1892, skilled engineers, like their counterparts in
printing (albeit with less success), launched a major counter-offensive involving
both local militancy and organisational reform. The union counter-offensive
aimed to regain ground lost during the depression on a broad front of issues
ranging from wages to the regulation of apprenticeship, machine manning, pieceworK
and oVertime, and ultimately looking forward to the conquest of the eight hour
day.
The Maxim-Nordenfeldt strike against cuts in piece rates and the employment
of handymen on machines was one example of this renewed militancy (and its
pitfalls in practice), but the movement was concentrated above all on the marine
districts, whose connection with the sharp cyclical fluctuations of the ship-
building industry encouraged workers to take the fullest possible advantage of
the leverage afforded by a boom. Thus, for example, ASE District Committees
in the Bristol Channel in the early 90s won agreements from their employers to
. . h umb f . 14respect union restr1ct1ons on overtime and ten er 0 apprent1ces.
Similarly, ASE members in the Naval shipyards at Barrow-in-Furness began
f 1 f k . h .. 15success ul y to re use to wor W1t non-un10n1sts. It is likewise from the
early 90s that employers on the Clyde and in other marine centres began to
14 See above, pp.7l, 115.
15 ASE ~ June 1894; de Rousiers, Trade-unionisme, p.272.
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complain of the operation of informal piecework ceilings.16
The real storm centre of this movement was, however, the Northeast Coast,
which had become the best organised district in the ASE by the early 90s. In
1889, ASE District Committees in the region formed a single coordinating committee
for the Tyne, Wear, Tees, and Hartlepool from which they launched a major
offensive for the recovery of ground lost on wages and craft regulation in the
17preceding slump. By April 1890, the Northeast Coast committee had won not
only an advance of wages but had also obtained a reduction of one hour in the
working week, and later that year it embarked on a campaign for the limitation
18of overtime whose partial success has already been noted. It was during this
period that the ASE nationally was stepping up its efforts to swallow the smaller
sectional societies and to assert i~claims to disputed classes of work, res~lting
in, for example, strikebreaking activities against the patternmakers in Belfast
in 1891-2. On the Northeast Coast, demarcation disputes with the Plumbers
erupted into a series of crippling strikes in 1891 and 1892 which did much to
mobilise employers' animosity towards the ASE.19
At the same time, a reform movement was underway in the ASE, inspired both
by internal developments in engineering and new currents in the wider labour
movement. The organisational weakness of the ASE, demonstrated by the failure of
the Maxim-Nordenfeldt strike despite close Executive involvement and by the
16 EEF 'Examples of ASE Interference and Restrictions', Nov. 1897, Webb Call.
EB LIX, fs. 10-14.
17 ASE MR Feb. 1889.
18 ASE MR Apr. 1890; see above, PP.118-l9.
19 See above, pp.126-27.
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general disarray of craft regulation in the industry, prompted an interest in
reconstructing the government and policies of the union among members concerned
about its capacity for industrial action. The revival of socialism and the
enthusiasm for the 'New Unionism', epitomised by the London dock strike of 1889,
led young engineers, particularly those close to the centre of socialist
agitation in London, to become dissatisfied with official union policies of
moderation in demands and in industrial action, abstention from outside political
activity, and hostility to broader forms of union recruitment and organisation.
These activists also expressed the view, by no means confined to socialist
circles, that a reorganisation of the Executive and the structure of the society
was essential to put more militant trade policies into practice.
This growing reformist impulse found its chief voice in the candidacy of
Tom Mann for General Secretary of the ASE following the death of Robert Austin
in 1891. Apprenticed as an engineer, Mann joined the Social Democratic Federatior
in the early l880~ moving later into the Independent Labour Party, but his rise
to political prominence dated from his central role (along with Ben Tillet and
John Burns) in organising the Dockers' Union in 1889, whose president he remained
at the time of his ASE candidacy. Mann was also closely identified with the
movement for the legal eight hour day (to be achieved by legislative as well as
by voluntary, i.e., industrial, means), having published a well-known pamphlet
'What a Compulsory Eight Hour Day Means to the Workers' in 1886.20
20 .Repr~nted, 1972.
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Mann did not, however, campaign as a socialist or directly challenge the
craft basis of the ASE. Instead he aimed his appeal at all those desiring
change in the union. In his platform, Mann argued that the membership of the
21ASE should be extended to embrace:
Every workman engaged in connection with the engineering trades, •••
who is called upon to exhibit mechanical skill in the performance of
his labour. This would include men on drilling machines, toolmakers,
diesinkers, and electrical engineers.
Mann did not explicitly attempt to modify commitment of the ASE to the protection
of the skilled engineer's craft position, but rather proposed a reorganisation
of the government of the society to make the Executive Council a more effective
instrument of militant industrial action. The EC, which was at that time a
part-time body composed exclusively of London representatives, should become a
full-time elected one assisted by paid district organisers, th~ better to press
for the "abolition of systematic overtime and the reduction of normal working
hours", as well as to fight wage reductions.22
Contrary to what is often supposed, the bulk of Mann's proposals, which
sought to bridge the gap between the defence of craft regulation and the new
unionism were also supported, at least in principle, by the 'old unionist'
leadership of the union. In 1891, for example, the old Executive Council advised
the membership to support the following proposals to be considered at the
Delegate Meeting the following year:23
21 Election Address, 22.1.1892, Webb Coll. EB XLVIII, f. 17.
22 Ibid.
23 ASE MR June 1891, pp.31-32. I am grateful to Robert Baldwin of Manchester
University for calling this reference to my attention. The conventional
view can be found in Jefferys, Engineers, p.136; Burgess, Industrial Relations,
p.51.
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1) ...The extension of our preamble to the utmost limit, enabling us to
include within our organisation all those engaged in our trade; the
object to be attained being to prevent our employers using with such
disastrous consequences to ourselves the partially-skilled men, who
through the introduction of labour-saving machinery have become an
integral part of our trade, when attempting to better the conditions
of our members or resisting innovations, every interest being guarded
and protected by a system of grades or classes.
2) The unprecedented increase in the number of members, branches, and
district committees, during the past three years, the certain growth
of our Institution in the future, has rendered it absolutely essential
to devise methods, other than those at present existing, whereby the
continually increasing business devolving upon the Local Executive
Council can be speedily and efficiently dispatched.
Despite his economical campaign and a record turnout of over 50 per cent,
Mann was unable to overcome the forces of inertia within the ASE. He ran well
in certain areas - especially London, Scotland, and the West Riding of Yorkshire
but John Anderson, the Assistant Secretary and a clear representative of the
old guard, defeated him by 1,000 votes. While there is no substantial informa-
tion about the social composition and political views of Mann's supporters,
Weekes' close analysis of the campaign suggests that there was little support
for a major opening of the society to the less skilled or for socialist ideas
as such; the strength of Mann's campaign thus represented sentiment for a more
militant industrial orientation rather than for any fundamental shift in the
24ASE's goals.
As a result of the movement for reform within the union, the 1892 Delegate
Meeting passed a number of changes in the ASE rulebook. Though influenced by
the ferment created by Mann's candidacy, these rule changes fell considerably
short of what might have been attempted had Mann been victorious. Most signifi-
cantly, the Executive Council became a full-time body elected by the membership
24 Weekes, ASE, ch.2.
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as a whole, with a regional organisation composed of six Organising District
Delegates (ODDs) to assist it. At the same time, however, the autonomy of the
District Committees was reaffirmed and even strengthened, as these were
empowered to convene mass meetings on trade questions and local negotiation of
piece price lists was authorised. The delegates hotly debated the extension of
ASE membership to other classes of workers in the industry, with London and
Liverpool leading the fight for the broadest possible admissions policy· and
Scotland and Manchester acting as centres of conservative resistance. In the
end, such groups as roll-turners, die-sinkers, electrical engineers, and some
machinemen were made eligible for full ASE membership (though whitesmiths,
bicycle-makers, engravers, sheet-iron workers, and agricultural fitters were
rejected)and special sections were created for those skilled workers over thirty
who were for various reasons ineligible for full membership. But an apprentice-
ship and the ability to earn the standard rate remained the basic criterion for
full ASE membership, and members in the special sections both received lower
benefits and were excluded from any active participation in ASE affairs.25
The 1892 reforms had considerable impact on the organisation of the ASE,
but they should not be understood as a major radicalisation of the union or a
serious attempt to transform it into an industrial union. The strengthened
Executive Council was better suited to direct coordinated industrial action, but
policy formation remained primarily in the hands of the District Committees who
retained the right to grant out of work benefits and therefore, to strike
without Executive approval. Since the DCs, which were dominated by skilled
25 MS. Report of ASE Delegate Meeting, Leeds, June 1892, Webb CoIl. EA XVI, f. 5,
pp.188-89; ASE Rulebook 1892, Rules I, XIX, XXII, and XXIII; Jefferys,
Engineers, p.137; Weekes, ASE, pp.35-36.
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workers with a strong craft orientation, were responsible for recruiting the
new grades of workers, it is hardly surprising that the new sections remained
largely a dead letter and the ASE overwhelmingly a union of fitters and turners.26
The main area where the reformers had some substantial effect on national
union policy was on the question of the eight hour day, which in its voluntary
(as opposed to legislative) form was simply an extension of the movement of
the preceding decades for the shortening of the working week. Although the
leader of the nine hours movement, John Burnett, had become General Secretary
of the ASE in 1874 and had founded a Nine Hours Maintenance League, few
subsequent initiatives to extend the principle emanated from the Executive
Council. The experience of unemployment during the 80s gave rise to renewed
interest in a shorter working week as a means of tightening craft regulation
and soaking up surpluses in the labour market; after conducting several ballots
among the membership in the late 80s and early 90s, the ASE EC chose the election
of a Liberal government in 1892 as the occasion to press for the eight hour day
in all government establishments, a goal achieved in 1893. As in 1871, however,
the impetus behind the movement for a shorter working week came from the
districts, newly reinforced by the professional ODDs. Amidst a host of local
campaigns against non-unionists, labourers doing skilled men's work, the extension
of piecework, and wage reductions, the downturn of trade in 1893-4 saw a turn of
attention towards the eight hour day as a response to unemployment surpassing
10% among ASE members. By 1894, firms in London, Sunderland, Manchester,
Birmingham, Woolwich, Sheffield, Plymouth, and Newcastle had conceded the eight
26 Weekes, ASE, pp.41-53; Burgess, Industrial Relations, p.52.
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hour day, and "the ASE appeared to be within sight of a universal 48 hour week."27
But with the deepening of the depression in 1895, the eight hour movement
temporarily ground to a halt.
Unsurprisingly, the counter-offensive launched by skilled engineers after
1889 elicited a parallel response from employers, especially in the marine
districts where union pressure was itself strongest. Earlier efforts to create
a national federation of engineering employers launched by Armstrong after the
nine hours strikes of 1871 had foundered on the divisions between marine and
inland producers, although the Sunderland apprenticeship strike of 1883-5
eventually led the Northeast Coast firms to affiliate. But while the ITEA
had members in some 17 engineering districts by the mid-90s, it remained a
loose confederation of local employers' associations without the power to
. . 1 1 28undertake act~on on a nat~ona sca e.
It was the resurgence of craft militancy from the late 80s onwards which
provided the impetus for the creation of a centralised national employers'
federation in 1896. Coordination among the local employers' associations on
the three rivers of the Northeast Coast had developed out of the Sunderland
apprenticeship dispute in the early 80s, and by the 90s employers throughout the
region were operatitiga unified system of blacklists directed against union
activists known as the 'character note' system, whose abolition figured
27 Weekes, ASE, ch.3, especially pp.7S-78; ODD Reports in ASE QRs, 1893-4
passim.
28 Wigham, Power to Manage, ch.l; see also above, pp.30-31.
in the 80s that the ITEA was launching a national campaign
wards regional wage differentials, see ASE AR 1885, p.xi.
For ASE fears
to level down-
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prominently among the demands of strikers in 1890-1.29 In the course of the
disputes with the ASE over restriction of overtime and demarcation between 1890
and 1892, the Northeast Coast employers had developed the tactic of turning
disputes at a single firm into regional confrontations by locking out ASE
members in stages of 25% per week, and were establishing links with engineering
30employers in other districts, mainly on the Clyde. The extent of the North-
eastern employers' alarm at developments on the trade union front emerges most
clearly from a memorandum written by Col. Dyer, Managing Director of Armstrong's
and later President of the EEF, for Sidney Webb in 1894, explaining the firm's
decision to abandon plans for the construction of a plant for steel plate making
which it believed would in principle be economical:31
At one time we intended to lay down this plant; the drawings were
ready and all arrangements made, but owing to the rapid succession
of labour troubles in this district during the last few years, we
have finally decided not to increase our works in any way or expend
any more capital in developing them; indeed, the tendency is all the
other way and it is not improbable that we will gradually decrease
them. Each strike we have has diverted some of our customers to France
and Germany, and once they get them they never let them entirely out
of their hands again. Our wage book shows the result all too plainly:
after each strike there has been a reduction in the amount paid in
wages. A small proportion is recovered, but in each case there has
remained a permanent decrease which has resulted in the fact that we
are now paying less than half the wages we were paying five years ago.
By 1895, the Northeast Coast branch of the 1TEA had gone so far as to set up an
elaborate mutual strike insurance scheme, with machinery modelled on that of the
Durham coal owners whereby members could elect to pay in so much per man
employed per week, and would receive a similar amount from the general fund in
32case of a shutdown.
29 For testimony on the 'character note' system, see the evidence given to the
RC on Labour, Group A, by W. Mosses (UPA), qs. 22,387-98, 22,555-78; J.
Whittaker (ASE), qs. 22,682, 23055-62; and A. Noble (Armstrong's), qs. 25,256-
64; ASE MR Feb. 1889.
30 Wigham, Power to Manage, pp.19-21; and above, pp.
31 Webb ColI. EA XXI, f. 18. My emphasis.
32 Details of this scheme are given by B.C. Browne (Hawthorn, Leslie, and Co.) in
a letter to A. Smith, Secretary of the EEF, 15.5.12. EEF Archives, 1(4)1.
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Meanwhile, engineering and shipbuilding employers on the Clyde had
launched a new attempt at a joint national employers' federation in 1889,
reportedly under the influence of the Shipping Federation,33 but failed to
attract a significant number of non-Scottish firms. Thus the engineering firms
in this organisation had decided to withdraw in 1890, but it was only as a
result of a request from the Northeastern employers for assistance in the 1892
demarcation dispute that a separate North West Engineering Trade Employers'
A .. f d 34ssoc~at~on was orme. A standing committee of Northeast Coast employers
was established for collective bargaining purposes under Armstrong's auspices,
but the crucial step towards a national federation was taken the following year.
With the revival of trade late in 1895, engineers sought to regain the wage
reductions imposed during the preceding slump, and ASE District Committees
launched advance movements in a number of areas, including Belfast and the
Clyde. The employers in these two districts agreed to support each other in
case of a dispute; when a strike broke out in Belfast, the Clyde employers
locked out 25% of ASE members in their shops despite the willingness of the
local DC to accept a lower rise than their counterparts in Belfast. Faced with
this display of employer militancy, the ASE Executive hastened to arrange a
settlement, bringing the Belfast strikers back to work against their will by
suspending strike benefits. In a move that presaged the outcome of later clashes
between the Executive and the districts within the union, however, the 1896 ASE
Delegate Meeting censured the EC's conduct of the dispute, passing a new rule
prohibiting either the Executive or the District Committees from closing a dispute
without the consent of two-thirds of the strikers; the DM's judgement was later
33 Clegg, Fox, and Thompson, Trade Unions, p.82.
34 Wigham, Power to Manage, pp.20-21.
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35upheld by the union's Final Appeals Court (FAC).
The success of coordinated action in the Clyde-Belfast dispute provided
the spark for the formation of the EEF, which brough together the employers'
associations of the major marine centres of the Northeast, Clyde, Belfast and
Barrow. The intensified normal conflicts of the early 90s had prepared the
ground for this breakthrough in employer organisation, but the sense that the
introduction of new machinery might provide an opportunity for a significant
transformation of the division of labour likewise stiffened the employers'
resolve: it is by no means accidental that Armstrong's, the moving force in
the new organisation, should have found itself as both a marine and arms producer
in the forefront of both normal conflict with the unions and mechanisation.
The new organisation was governed by an elected Executive Board with regional
representatives; firms' contributions and voting power were proportional to
their total wage bill, and Federation decisions were binding on local associ-
ations, which were prohibited from taking independent action on matters of
'general importance' without consulting the Executive. As a practical weapon
against the unions, the Northeast Coast 'character note' system was to be general-
ised throughout the Federation by the 'enquiry form' which prohibited members
from employing strikers from other firms. The interconnection between the
emerging crisis of mechanisation and the intensification of normal conflict
during the preceding decade emerges clearly from the detailed objectives set out
35 Board of Trade,'Report on Strikes and Lockouts in l895~ (C. 82311 P.P. 1896,
LXXX, pt. I, pp.32-36; Wigham, Power to Manage, pp.22-24; Weekes, ASE,
p.83; Jefferys, Engineers, pp.140-4l. For the respective powers of the EC,
OM, and FAC in the ASE constitution, see above, pp.78-79.
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in the Federation's rules:36
To secure mutual support and cooperation in dealing with demands made,
and actions taken, by workmen or combinations thereof, on all matters
or questions affecting the general and common interests of the said
trades, including therein such questions as interference with Foremen,
unreasonable demands for wages, employment of apprentices, hours of
labour, overtime, limitation of work, piecework, demarcation of work,
machine work, and the employment of men and boys on machines.
With the accelerated diffusion of new machine tools after 1896, the problem
of machine manning moved rapidly to the centre of the mounting tensions between
the ASE and the newly established EEF. In August 1896, for example, 500 fitters
and turners at Earle's Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Hull, struck against
the employment of a handyman member of the UMWA on a milling machine. After a
four month strike, the dispute was resolved through the intervention of the
Board of Trade; the handyman was to remain, but future machin~s would be worked
by craftsmen. In the eyes of the ASE, this decision,37
•..forced recognition of the principle that machines which supersede
hand skilled labour should be manipulated by skilled and fully-paid men.
The society's newly elected General Secretary, George Barnes, put the dispute
. b d . 381nto roa er perspect1ve:
The same question will doubtless have to be fought out elsewhere, and
it is of the utmost importance that we shall be clearheaded in regard
of it. It should never be lost sight of that the proportion of machine
to hand work is an increasing one, and that to lose control of the
machine is to a large extent to lose control of the trade.
36 EEF, 'Conditions of Federation' (1896), reprinted in Wigham, Power to Manage,
app. B, pp.290-81.
37 ASE MJ & R Jan. 1897, p.40.
38 ASE AR 1896. Detailed information on the Earle's strike can be found in the
EEF Archives, Series M(8)1, and Executive Minutes, 26.11.1896; see also
Jefferys, Engineers, p.l43; Weekes ASE, p.84; Burgess, Industrial Relations,
p.60.
192
A similar dispute at Dunsmuir and Jackson's in Glasgow the following month
provoked a more vigorous response from the employers: the EEF threatened to
lock out 25% of ASE members nationally each week until the ASE Executive
compelled the strikers to return to work, a demand with which the latter
immediately sought to comply. In the event, the non-unionist at issue left
the firm, but the dispute highlighted the stakes involved and pointed towards
h 1· f 1 f . 39t e 1kelihood 0 an eventua con rontat10n.
During the early months of 1897, disputes over machine manning multiplied,
and with them the threat of a national lockout. ASE members at the Sunderland
Forge and Engineering Company were unable to prevent the employment of handymen
on horizontal boring machines at wages 5-6s below the district rate, and similar
. 40disputes appeared at Elswick, Barrow, Glasgow, and Belfast among other places.
Having resolved in November 1896 to coordinate resistance to union claims on
4]machine manning, the EEF was determined to make its stand on the principle that:
The machines are the property of the employers, and they are solely
responsible for the work turned out by them; they therefore will
continue to exercise the discretion they have hitherto possessed by
appointing the men they consider suitable to work them.
Normal conflicts as well as the machine question continued to fuel the movement
towards a full scale confrontation between the EEF and the ASE. Disputes had
39 EEF Executive Minutes, 24.8.1896; Jefferys, Engineers, p.142; Weekes, ASE,
p.83; Wigham, Power to Manage, pp.32-33; Burgess, Industrial Relations, p.60.
40 Board of Trade Labour Department, Report on Strikes and Lockouts in 1897,
(C. 9012), P.P. 1898, LXXXVII, pp.lii-liv; ASE MJ & R, Jan-Apr. 1897; EEF
Executive Minutes 26.2.1897; Jefferys, Engineers, p.143; Weekes,~, p.84.
41 Letter from EEF to ASE, Dec. 1896, quoted in Weekes, ASE, p.84; see also EEF
Executive Minutes 26.11.96 and Wigham, Power to Manage, p.33 for the resolu-
tion on the machine question.
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arisen earlier in the year over 'interference' by ASE shop stewards with
foremen at Barrow and on the Clyde; a series of disputes over wages for warship
trial trips on the Northeast Coast and restrictions on overtime at Sunderland,
Barrow, Hartlepool and the Clyde escalated tensions between the ASE and the
42employers.
In March 1897, therefore, the EEF again threatened a national lockout over
the whole panoply of issues in dispute with the machine question in the forefront,
and a confrontation was only averted by the suspension of the disputes pending
a general conference between the Federation and the ASE Executive the following
43month. The purely local disputes about trial trip wages and overtime were
quickly resolved by joint negotiations, but the machine question proved much
less tractable. In 1896 the EEF had been prepared to concede control over
certain machines to the ASE - basically sliding and screw-cutting lathes and
44large boring machines - in exchange for a free hand on the rest. But by the
time of the machine conference in April 1897, the Federation's leaders, conscious
of their growing power and infuriated by the recurrent challenges to managerial
prerogatives, had become determined to secure complete freedom to man all
machines as they pleased.
Underlying the conflict between the employers and the ASE over machine
manning were both a practical clash of interests and strikingly different concep-
tions of political economy and the respective rights of skilled labour and capital
42 Board of Trade, Report on Strikes ••.l897; EEF, 'Examples of ASE Interference
and Restrictions', Webb CoIl. EB, LIX, fs. 10-14, 17; ASE MJ & R Jan-Apr. 189,
43 EEF Executive Minutes 12.3.1897; Wigham, Power to Manage, pp.34-35.
44 EEF 3Executive Minutes 1 .8.1896.
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in relation to the costs and benefits o£ technical change. These divergences
appear clearly in the debates at the April conference. As we have seen, both
skilled workers and employers were agreed that certain machines could be worked
45as well by handymen as by craftsmen. The employers were determined, however,
to reserve to themselves the right to decide which machines should be worked by
craftsmen and which by handymen, using pure market criteria, since in their
view, ".••the machines are the property of the employers and they are solely
46responsible for the work turned out on them." The introduction of labour-
saving machinery and the concommitant reduction of labour costs was, moreover,
't' 47essential to repel foreign compet~ ~on:
If we do not produce a cheap article, the foreigner will. We are
rapidly being put out of the markets of the world .••. Unless we
choose to keep a level with the competitors round about us, we
shall go to the wall.
The ASE, for its part, asserted a counter-claim based on rights earned
through the acquisition of skill through apprenticeship against those of the
48employers based on property:
If the employers say they have a property in the machines, we might just
as well say we have a property in our skill and our labour. We each of
us have an interest in the trade. Each of us might say we have a
property in something and we would get no forwarder •••. Our main
contention is that those who are displaced by the introduction of the
repetition system should at least have the first benefit from it, having
served what we term a legitimate apprenticeship to the trade.
45 See the quotations from the 1897 Machine Conference cited above, pp.46-47.
46 Letter from EEF to ASE quoted by G.N. Barnes, Machine Conference, 1897, p.53.
The logic of the employers' position was set out more fully at a conference
some dozen years later:
I have never liked this question of safe-guarding a mechanic in his work,
because, in fact, he does the work better and cheaper than a semi-skilled
man does ...• It is not because a mechanic has any additional right to do
the work, but because he does it better. That is where his strength is.
'Verbatim Transcript of Central Conference, 31.5.1911', EEF Archives M(4)1.
47 Dyer to ~., p.36; cf. also ibid., pp.28, 49-50.
48 Statements by Barnes and Crompton to Machine Conference 1897, pp.s3, 13.
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Accordingly, the ASE reiterated its claim for "the right to work any machine
made by our trade and used by our trade". Conscious of its exposed position,
the union was prepared to treat the machine question as essentially a problem
of wages: the union therefore proposed that local joint boards of workers and
employers be established with Board of Trade arbitration to decide which
machines should be worked at the skilled men's rate.49 These proposals would
most likely have proved unworkable in practice, since the class of work rather
than the type of machine was the key determinant of skill requirements. As one
50employer told union representatives at a subsequent conference:
When you come to try and rate the machines, I think you will be up
against this difficulty that exactly the same machine is used for
totally different purposes. Take a machine in the textile trade
which is practically automatic and the man has nothing to do but
feed it, that identical machine may be used by general engineers
for things that there is no repetition about.
But in any case, the employers had become committed to an unyielding defence
of managerial prerogatives, and were no longer disposed to consider compromise
solutions, and there are likewise indications that the ASE rank and file would
have rejected any retreat from the principles of craft regulation.51 The
conference therefore broke up without reaching any agreement on the machine
question, leaving the threat of a lockout still outstanding.
49 Machine Conference 1897, pp.54 ff.
50 B.C. Browne, in 'Verbatim Report of a Conference between the EEF and Engineer-
ing Unions other than the ASE, 26.2.1914', EEF Archives A(4)11. For a
confirmation of this point by union representatives, see the testimony of J.
Ratcliffe CASE ODD, Northeast) to Machine Conference, 1897, pp.20-21; and an
ASE turner at the Rowan locomotive works in Glasgow to the TUC JC, Premium
Bonus, p.28.
51 For fears that the ASE rank and file would reject any scheme for the rating
of machines that involved the levelling down of conditions between districts,
see the remarks of F. Rose CASE ODD mid-Lancashire) to Machine Conference 1897,
p.48.
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In the event, however, it was not the machine question itself which
triggered off the impending national lockout, but rather the resumption of the
movement for the eight hour day, this time outside the Federation's sphere of
influence in London. In April, a joint committee of London shipbuilding and
engineering trades, including the Boilermakers and the SEMS among others along-
side the ASE, issued a manifesto to employers demanding the establishment of
the eight hour day in all London firms. In the tight labour market of the boom,
the movement appeared headed for success: 3,000 ASE members in the city were
already working eight hours, and by July 65 of 95 London employers surveyed by
52the ASE had conceded the demand. OVertime was banned pending concessions in
May, and the joint committee announced its intentions to strike all hold-
out firms from the beginning of July. The stakes were raised still further by
the ASE Delegate Meeting at Carlisle in June, which disavoweo the compromise
offered to the employers on the machine question and proposed to fight for
skilled men's rights to work the new machines rather than simply ensure that
whoever worked them be paid the standard rate.53 Meanwhile, the EEF had been
energetically seeking to win over the inland firms associated with ITEA: with
the intensification of conflict over mechanisation and craft regulation (as well
as the takeover of a leading Manchester machine tool firm, Whitworth's, by
Armstrong's), Manchester and Bolton had been drawn into the Federation earlier
in the year. Faced with the threat of the eight hours movement, the loosely
organised London employers applied for membership in the EEF, and the Federation
responded by threatening a national lockout if the London strike notices were
not withdrawn. The ASE, backed by several smaller unions, refused, and the
52 ~., June 1897.
53 ASE MJ & R July 1897, pp.44-45.
~7
54lockout began in early July.
While the buoyancy of trade, the determination of its members, and the
unprecedented level of ASE membership and resources (which had reached 87,000
and £254,000 respectively by the end of 189@,55 all appeared favourable to the
union, its underlying position was nonetheless weak. Despite its numbers, the
ASE had only succeeded in organising half of the fitters and turners in the
industry, not to mention the army of handymen, labourers, and machinists,
capable of working the new machine tools. At the same time, its history of
conflict with other unions made it impossible to count on their support in the
event of a showdown. The Patternmakers, the Plumbers, and the various blacksmithE
societies had all along refused to be drawn into the joint committee, while the
Boilermakers' Executive, preferrring to work for the eight hour day through the
Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades which ASE had refused to join,
56withdrew from the London movement over the protests of its local members.
For the most part, such labourers as were organised were equally unsympathetic
to the ASE. The ASE had alienated the Gasworkers by seeking to have their
members removed from new machines,S7 while the NAUL, which had instructed its
54 Wigham, Power to Manage, pp.38-43i Weekes, ASE, pp190-92i ASE, Lock-out.
55 Jefferys, Engineers, p.292.
56 ASE, Lockout, pp.4, 20-27i Cummings, Boilermakers, p.l04i Weekes, ASE,
pp.92-93; Reid, Shipbuilding, pp.94-9S, 102-3, 152-53. The principal
unions which did support the ASE were the closely related SEMS and the
UMWA.
57 ASE MJ & R June 1897.
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members to remain at work during ASE-led strikes on the Tyne in the early 90s
adopted a similar course in 1897:58
As neither our members nor the union have been consulted in any way
on the question of the eight hour day in the engineering trade, and
seeing that the engineers refused to allow the labourers to act with
them in the last advance, and seeing that our members are chiefly
employed in districts outside London, and will therefore not receive
any benefit whatever the ultimate settlement is, the Executive Council
advises our members to remain at work.
The employers, on the other hand, had achieved an unprecedented degree of
collective organisation and had been preparing for a national lockout since 1896.
Plans had been drawn up for a strike levy on its members, for the establishment
of a Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society to win supervisors away from the ASE, and
for a boycott of all engineering firms not supporting the lockout.59 The eight
hours demand, moreover, proved an ideal catalyst for the unification of the
diverse sections of the industry. To employers already infuriated by the
multiplication of local disputes and by ASE demands on machine manning, and
alarmed at what they believed to be an ascendency of 'New Unionism' in the ASE
with the election of George Barnes, ILP member and protege of Tom Mann, as
General Secretary in 1896, the renewal of the eight hours movement was the
final straw. A substantial reduction in working hours would at a single stroke
reduce productivity, raise costs, and undermine the competitive position of
58 Quoted in N. Todd, 'Trade Unions and the Engineering Industry Dispute in
Barrow-in-Furness, 1897-8', International Review of Social History, 22(5)
(1975), pp.38-39. The main exception to this pattern among unions organising
less skilled workers was the UMWA, which supported the ASE despite demarcation
disputes earlier in the year. See above, p.l9l. As we have seen, however,
the UMWA was already in the process of transforming itself into a more
exclusive union modelled on the ASE, with which it cooperated closely in
negotiations with the EEF to revise the Terms of Settlement in 1901, 1907,
and 1912; the two unions, together with the SEMS, amalgamated in 1920 to
form the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU).
59 EEF Executive Minutes 24.4.1896, 26.11.1896, 21.3.1897.
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firms from all sections of the industry, regardless of the opportunities for
mechanisation in their sector, and so quickly rallied the bulk of engineering
60employers behind the EEF's banner.
Ideologically and politically, the ASE was likewise on weak ground.
Although the ASE Executive attempted to deflect the issue from the machine
question to that of shorter hours, the employers were able to present the
lockout as a struggle over managerial prerogatives and resistance to technical
change. At the same time, the ASE's habits of independent action as well as
its craft exclusiveness had alienated significant sections of the labour movement,
and limited help was therefore forthcoming from that quarter, despite the official
commitment of the TUC to the eight hour day. The EEF's success in representing
the union in the press as an enemy of progress challenging property rights under
socialist inspiration undermined any possibility of the support from middle class
public opinion which had been instrumental in workers' victories in the 1871
nine hours strike and the London dock strike.6l The engineering lockout was,
moreover, an integral component of a national legal and industrial offensive
by employers seeking to roll back the gains realised by the new unionism and the
craft unions during the boom years after 1889; this general counter-offensive
culminating in Taff Vale provided an exceptionally unfavourable climate for any
60 For a selection of employers' views, see the letter and articles reprinted
in ASE, Lockout; The Engineers' Strike: A Series of Articles Reprinted from
'Engineering' (1898); the articles already cited by Col. Dyer and B. Taylor
in Cassier's Magazine, Nov. 1897; and B.C. Browne, 'The Engineering Dispute'
National Review Jan. 1898, reprinted in his Selected Papers, (Cambridge, 1918).
61 On public opinion during the lockout, see ASE Lockout, and R.O. Clarke, 'The
Dispute in the British Engineering Industry, 1897-8: An Evaluation',
Economica, (May 1957), pp.134-35. On 1871, see Allen et al., Engineers'
Strikes; on the Dock strike, see Stedman Jones, Outcast London, ch.17.
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. . 1 d· .. d . 1 f . 62un10n 1nvo ve 1n a maJor 1n ustr1a con rontat10n.
The 1897-8 lockout has received detailed attention from a number of
historians, and we will only recapitulate here the elements necessary for our
broader analysis of the struggle over the reorganisation of the division of
63labour in the industry. The EEF expanded its membership rapidly during the
dispute, absorbing the district associations of the ITEA; by its close in
January 1898, the Federation encompassed most large engineering firms outside
the railways, with newly affiliated district associations in Hull, Keighley,
Leicester, Liverpool, Nottingham, Oldham, Preston, Sheffield, the West of
England, and West Yorkshire. 702 firms had joined the lockout by the time of
its conclusion compared to 180 at its onset; the Federation's boycott tactics
were particularly important here, persuading many London firms. which had conceded
the eight hour day to reverse their stand and join the lockout.64 As one
65pro-employer source conceded,
62 J. Saville, 'Trade Unions and Free Labour:
in A. Briggs and J. Saville (eds.), Essays
Fox, and Thompson, Trade Unions, ch.2.
The Background to Taff Vale',
in Labour History (1960); Clegg,
63 For accounts of the lockout, see inter alia, Board of Trade, Report on Strikes •
.1897, pp.lii-lx; Clarke, 'Dispute'; Weekes, ASE, ch.4; Wigham, Power to
Manage, ch.2; Jefferys, Engineers, pp.144-48; Clegg, Fox, and Thompson,
Trade Unions, pp.16l-68.
64 EEF, List of Employers Who Resisted the Demand for a 48 Hour Working Week;
EEF Executive Reports, 1897-98, passim; Wigham, Power to Manage, pp.53-54.
65 F.W. Hirst, 'The Policy of the Engineers', Economic Journal, Mar. 1898,
p.127. See also Board of Trade, Report on Strikes •••in 1897, pp.lvi-lvii.
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It cannot be doubted that the organisers of the Employers' Federation
have exercised pressure of the most extraordinary kind upon employers
who did not wish to join them, and had no complaints against their
work people. The Federation has compelled tactful employers to
sacrifice themselves to the non-tactful; and it may be expected that
some of the small firms which have been forced into the lockout will
be ruined.
The ASE was even more scathing on the Federated employers' manipulation of
66their purchasing power to coerce sub-contractors:
The Elswick autocrats have tremendous monetary influence throughout
the country, and can use it to an extent little dreamt of by people
outside the engineering trade. Their purchasing power over the goods
of engineering employers is enormous, hence their power over those who
are dependent on their smiles. EVen so, and when persuasion has failed
to convince the maker of circulating pumps, or steering engines, or
electrical plant, or the hundred-and-one tools used in the Federation
workshops, he is "politely" reminded that orders will be missing from
his book, and so the trick is done.
At its peak, the lockout involved some 45,000 men and some 25% of ASE
members; nonetheless, the withdrawal of the ASE men was unable completely to
paralyse production. Some major firms like Hawthorn, Leslie, and Company of
Newcastle ceased production entirely, believing that their works could not be
run without an adequate quota of skilled workers; most, however, continued
operations at a reduced level, using blacklegs supplied by professional strike-
breaking organisations like the National Free Labour Association and by
promoting their labourers onto skilled men's work.67
66 ASE MJ & R, July 1897.
67 B.C. Browne, evidence to Royal Commission on Trade Disputes and Combinations.
Report, Cd. 2826 , P.P. 1906, LVI, q. 2574: " ••• Our works were out and we
did not bring a single man in or try to do so; it is absurd to SUppose that
we could find a thousand high-class engineers willing to come and work in our
place during a strike, and we had simply to let the work stand until the men
were tired and came in again." On organised blacklegging, see W. Collinson,
The Apostle of Free Labour, (1913); E. Barnes, Alfred Yarrow, His Life and
~ (1923); 'How to Win a Lockout', by S.Z. de Ferranti, speech to Manchester
District Engineering Trades' Employers' Association, Dec. 1897, reprinted in
Wigham, Power to Manage, app. C; Clegg, FOX, and Thompson, Trade Unions,
pp. 163-64. Early in the dispute, the EEF hired a private army of "retired
soldiers, members of the police force, and others" to stand around factory
gates and defend the blacklegs from intimidation by pickets. EEF Executive
Reports 35, 12.8.1897.
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Some indication of the significance of this latter measure can be found in
a survey conducted by the EEF after the lockout in two marine and two inland
districts: in the marine districts, with 69 firms a total of 450 unskilled
men had been promoted onto skilled men's work (the bulk of them onto machines);
in the inland districts with 52 firms, 430 labourers were promoted. (See Table 9)
Even where organised labourers and craftsmen formed joint lockout committees,
as in Barrow-in-Furness, old antagonisms undermined cooperation; a dispute over
the payment of commonly raised strike funds at differential rates to craftsmen
and labourers resulted in the demise of solidarity and a return to work by
sections of the latter.68 Although the ASE was able to raise some £366,000
(only £116,000 from outside sources, however), the strain on its finances of
supporting the locked out men (including many non-unionists) which came to
£30,000 per week eventually became intolerable. By November 1897, with no
concessions from the employers in sight, the ASE Executive was investigating
69peace terms.
Whereas during the previous confrontation over the reorganisation of the
division of labour in 1851-2 engineering employers had sought the outright
destruction of the trade unions, by 1897 a certain shift in attitudes was
discernable. To be sure, Col. Dyer, waxing euphoric over a visit to the Carnegie
works at Homestead in the pages of the Times, asserted that the Federated
employers were "determined to obtain the freedom to manage their own affairs
which has proved to be so beneficial to the American manufacturers as to enable
them to compete so successfully in what formerly was an English monopoly", and
68 Todd, 'Engineering Industry Dispute'.
69 Jefferys, Engineers, p.147.
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Alexander Siemens the head of the London employers' association went so far
as to suggest that the dispute would ultimately be settled individually
between masters and men, with the unions excluded.70 But even the most
sanguinary expostulations of the trade press made it clear that not trade
unionism per se, but rather craft regulation was the main target of the
employers' wrath: thus Engineering wrote that "trade unionism as it is now
practised in the British engineering industry ••..must be smashed", and Dyer
himself argued that "to deprive a Trade Union of the power to retard progress
and hinder development by dictating to an Employer how he shall manage his
works does not necessarily involve the extinction of Trade Unionism, nor does
"d rob"" km ,,711t ten to prevent co 1nat10n among wor en ••••
The EEF for its part insisted throughout the dispute that it aimed not
to smash the ASE, but rather to establish managerial prerogatives on a firm
basis once and for all. The object of a national lockout, in fact, was first
and foremost to coerce the ASE Executive into forcing its members to abandon
their efforts at craft regulation on a local level, hence the lockout threats
even in the case of unauthorised strikes like that at Dunsmuir and Jackson in
1896. Thus with victory in sight in the fall of 1897, the EEF rejected mediation
by the Board of Trade and drafted a set of 'Terms of Settlement' designed to
establish managerial control over the organisation as the cornerstone of a new
national system of industrial relations.72
70 Dyer to the Times, 5.9.1897, reprinted in ASE, Lockout, pp.74-75; A. Siemens
to Daily News, 7.10.97, quoted in Clegg, Fox, and Thompson, _T_r~a~d~e~U~n~i~o~n~s~,
pp.164-65.
71 Engineering, 24.9.1897, my emphasis; ASE, Lockout, p.74.
72 For the rejection of government mediation and the text of the employers'
proposals, see ASE, Lockout, pp.l18-26, 134-37.
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The employers' demands, which formally sanctioned the workman's right to
belong to a trade union, but provided for individual bargaining over piecework,
and to a lesser extent over wage rates and overtime as well, were received by
the labour movement and by an influential section of progressive public opinion
as a major threat to the principles of collective bargaining. While the
employers undoubtedly adopted an extremely restrictive view of the legitimate
functions of trade unions, the ensuing controversy is revealing as much for the
light it sheds on the difficulties of drawing a clear line between craft
regulation and collective bargaining as for its bearing on the issues at stake
in the dispute.
Sidney Webb, one of the leading canvassers for the men's case, presented
the view shared by the majority of intellectual supporters of the labour movement.
Decisions as to "the adoption of material, the choice of processes, and the
selection of human agents" which belonged to the "employers' management of his
own business" could in principle be clearly separated from the decisions
concerning "the conditions under which the human agents are to be employed"
which constituted the "legitimate sphere of trade unionism" and were therefore
"not a matter for autocratic decision by one of the parties to the wage contract,
but for bargaining between the employer who seeks to impose such conditions and
the workmen who have to work under them." In practice, of course, these decision~
passed "imperceptibly" into one another, so that some limited collective
baz ca i h' d . f h' b .. bl 73rg 1ning over t e 1ntro uct10n 0 mac 1nery ecame 1nev1ta e:
73 'What is Interference?' letter to Daily Chronicle, 24.10.1897, reprinted in
ASE, Lockout, pp.116-17; for similar statements, see the letter in defence
of collective bargaining signed by 15 Oxford dons, and the statement on the
'Legitimate Functions of Trade Unionism', signed by F. Harrison, J.M. Ludlow,
H. Crompton, E.S. Beesly, and S. and B. Webb, in ibid., pp.133-34, 148-52.
This interpretation of the issues at stake in the dispute is echoed by Clegg,
Fox, and Thompson, Trade Unions, pp.166-67.
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Whether or not a machine shall be introduced or speeded up, or how
many machines are to be kept running, is for the Employer, for the
Employer alone, to decide •••• But on what terms the new machines
shall be worked, or what shall be the intensity of the toil to be
exacted from each man, is clearly as much within the 'legitimate
sphere of Trade Unionism' as the settlement of the Standard Rate
or the Normal Day.
While the absence of a practical line of demarcation between these two
spheres might in itself have cast doubt on the notion that a form of collective
bargaining could be established which posed no threat to managerial prerogatives
and the rights of property, the commitment of skilled engineers to practices of
craft regulation in which their perceptions of market interest were fused with
their identity as craftsmen rendered this prospect even less plausible. The
figure involved in this debate who most explicitly recognised the limitations
of the economistic conception of collective bargaining put forward by the Webbs
was J.M. Ludlow, whose Christian Socialist convictions and support for cooperativE
production led him to advocate a conception of the worker which was not far from
the craftsmen's own self-image though he rejected their exclusive attitude toward~
the unskilled. Thus Ludlow insisted that collective bargaining was only one of
the proper functions of trade unionism:
The Trade Union represents for me in its ultimate development the workers
organised for their common benefit, and I know of no purpose of common
benefit that should be excluded from its action.
Thus whereas the Webbs argued for collective bargaining over the terms on which
new machinery should be worked solely as a means fa safeguarding workers' economic
position, Ludlow defended it as an end in itself, and argued that the workers'
rights should extend towards that notion of job property rights which the Webbs
denounced:
74 'Addendum to the declaration on the 'Legitimate Rights of Trade Unions',
ASE Lockout, pp.l49-5l.
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...!consider the workers fully entitled to have a voice in respect to
the introduction of machinery ..•• The introduction of a machine may be
the absolute confiscation of a worker's labour-power which is his property,
and to whatever degree it amounts to confiscation, the man, !hold is just
as much entitled to compensation as the Employer would be if a railway
company took his land and knocked his works down, however beneficial the
line might be to the public. Nor, indeed, is he alone damnified; all of
his fellows are so prospectively, whom the introduction of similar
machines may oust from their employment elsewhere.
The ASE Executive advised its members to reject the employers' terms
because of their potential impact on collective bargaining, and the latter
followed suit in two ballots in December 1897. This last display of resistance
coupled with the public campaign on its behalf, allowed the union to wrest from
the employers the addition of a set o~ explanatory notes to the Terms of
Settlement which explicitly recognised the legitimate functions of trade unions.
The revised terms were accepted by the ASE Executive after being ratified by a
membership ballot, and the men returned to work at the end of January 1898,
75seven months after the onset of the lockout.
The preamble of the revised Terms of Settlement set out its general
principles:
The Federated employers, while disavowing any intention of interfering
with the proper functions of Trade Unions, will admit no interference
with the management of their business, and reserve to themselves the
right to introduce into any Federated workshop, at the option of the
employer concerned, any condition of labour under which any members of
Trade Unions here represented were working at the commencement of the
dispute in any of the workshops of the Federated employers.
75 See the Verbatim Report of a Conference between the Federated Engineering
Employers and the Joint Committee of Affiliated Trade Unions, Nov.-Dec. 1897
(Glasgow, 1897); ASE, Lockout, pp.127-29, 134-37, 140-44, 153-62.
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Six points embodied the rights claimed by the employers: 1) "freedom of
employment": management could hire any worker it chose, including non-unionists,
although workers were also free to join unions; 2) employers were permitted to
institute piecework systems at prices mutually agreed with the individual worker;
3) firms were permitted to demand up to 40 hours overtime per man per month;
4) management was entitled to engage workers at mutually agreed rates, thereby
prohibiting the ASE from contesting the wages of the unskilled; 5) limitations
on the ratio of apprentices to journeymen were prohibited; 6) employers could
place any suitable worker on any machine at a mutually agreed rate. The Terms
of Settlement contained one novel element: a "proposal for avoiding disputes".
Recognising the degree of local autonomy in the ASE, employers sought to prevent
unofficial strikes over local conditions by instituting a three-step grievance
procedure according to which no strike could take place without first going
through a national conference between the union Executive and the EEF. In this
way, the EEF hoped to contain rank and file resistance to the reorganisation of
the division of labour by forcing the ASE Executive to discipline its members
76through the constant threat of a national lockout.
The 1897-8 lockout represented a major defeat for the ASE and for the
principles of craft regulation. As in 1852 skilled craftsmen seeking to defend
their position within the division of labour had been unable to withstand a
sustained assault from employers determined to introduce new machinery and to
win control over the organisation of production. There was, however, one major
76 'Terms of Settlement, 1898', reprinted in Wigham, Power to Manage, app. D,
pp.285-89; ibid., pp.54-62; Weekes, ASE, pp.lOO-114.
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difference between 1898 and 1852. The 1852 lockout carne at the tail end of a
major reorganisation of the division of labour, even as market conditions were
beginning to change, and inaugurated a period of relative stability based on the
extensive development of the new division of labour. The 1897-8 lockout, by
contrast, occurred at the onset of a period of renewed technical and organi-
sational change: in effect, both sides attempted to settle the principles in
question before any thoroughgoing reorganisation of the division of labour could
be emplemented. During the succeeding decades, employers sought to use the
advantages conferred upon them by the Terms of Settlement to reorganise engineer-
ing production, while skilled workers were determined to defend their craft
status in the workshops, whatever policies the ASE Executive might adopt at the
national level. The extent of the reorganisation of the division of labour in
engineering during the years before the First World War woudl depend to a great
extent on the progress of this struggle.
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Printing: Towards the First Composing Machine Agreements
While printing employers during the second half of the 19th century
concentrated their attention on cheapening and intensifying the labour of
hand compositors in an effort to overcome the bottleneck which traditional
methods of composition placed on the rapid expansion of output, particularly
on daily newspapers, they were acutely conscious that such measures were
ultimately unsatisfactory: a true solution to the problem of rapid, cheap, and
efficient composition would require successful mechanisation. Accordingly,
newspaper proprietors experimented repeatedly with various composing machines
from the l820s onwards, though no adequate solution in technical and economic
terms was reached until the perfection of the linotype in the ,early 90s.
These preliminary attempts at mechanisation, which we have so far kept to one
side in our analysis, shed an important light on the introduction of the linotype
both in technical terms and in relation to the respective responses of workers
and employers to their use, and therefore require examination in their own right.
Despite earlier experiments, the first partially successful attempt at
machine composition was the Hattersley, invented in the late 1850s and first put
into operation during the following decade. The basic principle involved was
that of a magazine of moveable types stored alphabetically above a typewriter-
style keyboard; the compositor filled his stick by depressing the appropriate
keys. Justification and distribution, however, still had to be done by hand,
(or in the latter case by a separate machine), while its output - an average of
3-4,000 per hour - though greater than that of the hand compositor by some 1,500
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to 2,500 ens per hour, was not sufficient to make the machine economical if
all work were paid for at trade union rates. As John Southward, the premier
trade journalist of the period observed:77
It is by the employment of boys and girls in this process that the
success of composing machines depends .••it is impossible for the
machines to be worked with profit if irregular labour is prohibited.
It was therefore this question of "irregular labour" on distribution which
formed the main area of conflict between the unions and newspaper proprietors.
Other contemporary composing machines such as the Kastenbein (used by the Times
after 1872) involved similar principles, though the Thorne, developed just
before the introduction of the linotype in the late 80s, included an automatic
distributor, which required specially nicked and therefore fragile types.
Moreover, all pre-linotype composing machines were subject to frequent break-
downs, so that none of them could be said to have offered an adequate solution
78to the problem of mechanical composition even in a technical sense.
Despite their technical disadvantages, however, provincial newspapers began
to introduce Hattersleys in small numbers from the late l860s, thereby obliging
the unions to formulate policies for their operation. The first Hattersley was
77 Quoted in Howe and Waite, LSC, p.229.
78 For the technical development of composing machines, see Musson, TA, especiall~
pp.99-101, and ibid., 'Newspaper Printing'; J. Southward, 'Type-Composing
Machines'; J.S. Thompson, History of Composing Machines (Chicago, 1904);
L.A. Legros and J.C. Grant, Typographical Printing Surfaces (1916).
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introduced at the Hull Eastern Morning News in 1866; a subsequent installation
at the Bradford Times in 1868, using boy labour on distribution, resulted in
the closure of the office. During the succeeding quarter-century Hattersleys
were installed on a number of large provincial papers, mainly in Lancashire and
Yorkshire. Liverpool became the most important centre: of 33 Hattersleys still
79operating in 1895, 23 were located there.
The introduction of four Hattersleys at the Southport Daily News in 1876
precipitated an important policy shift within the TA on the use of unapprenticed
boys and girls on distribution. Already in 1868, the union's Executive had
formulated a strategy of securing control over the operation of composing
machines by union journeymen and apprentices rather than outright opposition to
their use; now, with the support of the local branch, the EC agreed provisionally
to allow the use of unbound boy labour on distribution rather than see the
Southport office closed. Opposition from the districts, especially from
Manchester, the strongest local branch, demanded a firm stand against "cheap
boy and girl labour", but the Executive's position triumphed at the 1877
Delegate Meeting. A ballot held the following year endorsed the EC's view
that the union should frame its rules with an eye to "how such machines can be
msot advantageously worked by the journeyman printer, without prejudice or injury
to the employer", and empowered the Executive to regulate the question on a case
79 Musson, TA, pp.100-10l; table compiled by the TA Executive Council, reprinted
in Howe, London Compositor, pp.198-99. Howe attributes these figures to
1893-4, but it seems more likely that they formed part of the TA Executive
Committee's 'Report to the Representative Council on Composing Machines',
which though missing from the TA records is excerpted in LSC, 'MS. Report
to a Special General Meeting, 1.1.1896', LSC Special Reports.
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. 80by case bas~s.
The diffusion of Hattersleys in provincial newspaper offices quickly gave
rise to disputes with employers of much the same character as those generated
by hand composition: among the most prominent were those over the level of
piece prices and their relation to stab rates; unfair distribution of copy
between machines and case hands and the slating of the latter; and attempts by
employers to obtain higher output on the machines through copy marking (i.e.,
measuring output of stab hands) and bonuses. Apart from the question of cheap
labour on distribution, the core of the TA Executive's attitude toward composing
machines (which was in this respect identical to that of the rank and file) was
so far as possible to subsume them under the existing framework of regulation
for hand composition while at the same time exacting increased wages through
high piece prices.
In July 1886, a conference convened by the Liverpool branch of the TA
formulated a set of rules for the operation of composing machines analogous to
those governing hand composition, including among other provisions the restriction
of their operations to recognised journeymen and apprentices; fair distribution
of copy between machine and case hands with payment for slating; and the
81prohibition of copy marking and bonuses. After negotiations with the
Liverpool newspapers a modified version of these rules was distributed throughout
the TA as a model for other branches in 1889. Elsewhere, TA branches enjoyed
80 Musson, TA, pp.22l-23; Report of TA Delegate Meeting 1877; TC June 1893,
pp.5-6.
81 TA EC Minutes, 3.7.1886, reprinted in Musson, TA, pp.223-24.
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varying degrees of success in enforcing these regulations; piece prices and
employers' demands for higher output posed particular problems, though no
strike ensued.82 As the pace of mechanisation accelerated after 1890 with the
introduction of Thornes and linotypes, tension with employers and rank and file
grievances increased apace; one result was an unsuccessful movement from
Manchester to eliminate girl labour on Hattersley distribution.83
In London, meanwhile, the only paper using composing machines was the
~, a non-union house, so that the question of union regulation did not arise.
In 1891, however, newspaper proprietors made their first attempt to introduce
composing machines into society houses, Thornes at the Sportsman and Hattersleys
at the Daily News. The latter expected to work the distributors with girl
labour on the provincial model, but met with fierce opposition from the LSC:
in the words of a representative from the Daily News chapel, union members
"were not prepared to endanger compositors' work to suit any inventor." After
several weeks of pressure, the paper gave way, agreeing to pay LSC members the
stab wage of 38s to work the distributors, while the operators themselves would
. 84be paid by the p1ece.
82 See the reports of delegates to the TA
Operators, Apr. 1893, and EC Minutes,
3.10.1891, 5.12.1891.
Conference of Composing Machine
7.6.1890, 18.10.1890, 15.9.1891,
83 Letters to TC Apr.-June 1893; Report of TA Special Delegate Meeting Dec. 1893,
pp.71-73.
84 This agreement also provided for equal distribution of copy between case and
machine hands. See LSC Trade Reports 1891; testimony of Bowerman and Sanders
to TA Conference of Composing Machine Operators, pp.13-17; and Bowerman to
TA Delegate Meeting 1893, pp.49-50.
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The Sportsman, however, presented greater difficulties for the LSC.
The proprietors'dissatisfaction with output when the machines were worked on
stab led them to demand a piece scale, but at rates which the LSC considered
unacceptably low. Matters came to a head in February 1892, when several machines
were found with their straps cut, having been doused with what the proprietors
contended was beer and urine. Though the LSC compositors had apparently left
the building several hours earlier, the proprietors seized on the incident to
lock out the union men on the grounds of their general hostility to the machines.
The LSC responded with a boycott, setting out in the process its general policy
on machinery: they did not oppose mechanisation per se, but like their counter-
parts in engineering they insisted that:85
If machinery is to be introduced, we claim a right to benefit by
its introduction; but if it can only be made to pay at the expense
of those who have served an apprenticeship to the trade, we submit
that in such an event no real advantage is derived.
Despite the boycott, the Sportsman's proprietors held their own ground and the
86office remained closed thereafter to LSC members.
Though proprietors anxious to speed up composing room production were
prepared to fight for the Hatters1ey, Thorne, and other early composing machines,
these did not prove adequate to the demands of daily newspaper production.
Beyond their technical defects, these composing machines did not reduce overall
85 Circular issued by LSC Feb. 1892, reprinted,in Howe, London Compositor,
document eXXI.
86 On the events in question, see Bowerman to RC Labour, Group C, qs.23,128-43,
and to TA Delegate Meeting 1893, pp.49-50; H. Batten Smith (Ashley, Smith
Ltd., proprietors of the Sportsman) to RC on Labour, Group C, qs. 28.524-63;
LSe Trade Reports 1892; Press News Jan.1892, p.39; Newspaper Society MC Apr.
1892; Printers Register Feb.1892, supplement p.vii.
215
labour costs, requiring cheap labour on distribution to break even, and adding
costs where regular compositors were employed on all tasks, as at the Daily
News. Stressing the intellectual content and variety of the hand compositor's
work, John Southward outlined in 1890 the essential features for the successful
composing machine of the future: speed, accuracy, simpliCity, freedom from
breakdowns, and automatic justification and distribution. While initially the
linotype could not meet these requirements, the models in operation by the early
1890s did.87
Invented by Otto Merganthaeler in New York in 1886 and rapidly diffused
throughout American newspapers, the linotype, unlike its predecessors, did not
Use moveable types of the kind employed by the hand compositor; instead it cast
each line as a whole from hot metal. When the compositor depressed the keys of
his keyboard, a series of reversed matrices were released from the magazine which
cast the letters in molten lead flowing through the machine, thereby producing
a series of slugs or 'lines o'type.' The matrices automatically returned to
their place in the magazine, while the used slugs were simply returned to the
melting pot to be recast, solving the problem of distribution, while the matrix
for each letter included the appropriate amount of spacing, thereby eliminating
the need for internal justification, though the operator remained responsible
for hyphenation and justification of columns. At the same time, the linotype
proved capable of producing an average of 6,000 ens per hour, as much as four
to five hand compositors.88 The linotype, as a result, quickly swept the field
87 Southward, 'Type-Composing Machines', and his Progress in Printing and the
Graphic Arts during the Victorian Era (1897).
88 See the technical works cited in note 78 above, and Southward, Progress in
Printing.
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of its rivals: according to a TA survey, by 1895 there were over 250 linotypes
89operating in the provinces to 33 Hattersleys and 14 Thornes. By February
1896, according to the Linotype Company's published figures, 157 printing
establishments were using a total of 743 linotypes.90
Despite its rapid success in the field, contemporary observers - technical
experts, employers, and workers alike - were quite unsure of its potential
impact on the hand compositor. Two related issues figured prominently in the
ensuing debate: the level of skill required to operate the linotype and its
potential effects on employment. One leading line of interpretation, which
found supporters among both employers and workers, derived from orthodox political
economy. This view, similar to that propounded by engineering employers at the
April 1897 machine conference, held that the introduction of the linotype,
whatever its short-run effects, would ultimately increase the volume of employment
by increasing demand through lower prices; we may call it the Theory of Increasing
91Demand.
Optimism about the level of skill required to operate the linotype went
together with this positive view of its potential effects on employment. On the
eve of mechanisation, most compositors, having lived through generations of
89 TA EC survey in Howe, London Compositor, pp.498-99.
90 Linotype Company, Report of Directors to the 7th Annual Meeting of Shareholders
1896, Webb ColLEB LXXIV, f. 61.
91 For a general statement of this argument, see J. Samuelson, Labour-Saving
Machinery (1893), and Webbs, Industrial Democracy, pt.II, ch. VIII; for early
examples of its application to the printing trades, see the frequently
reprinted article by an American master printer, T. De Vinne, Printers'
Register Sept. 1889, Vigilance Gazette, Apr. 1889; TC Sept. 1889; Printing
News, Jul.1894; STC Apr. 1891; and speech by the General Secretary of the TA,
H. Slatter, in TC Jan. 1891.
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false alarms, simply did not believe that composing machines would ever pose
a real threat. A whimsical poem printed in the Typographical Circular in 1889
thus derided the possibility of an "iron comp.", concluding that:92
•.•The summer time will come again and winters' winds will blow,
And many a harvest time will come again and go,
Ere the thing of cranks and gearing takes the place of pen and ink,
Or supplants the toiling typo with his power to work and think.
Even once linotypes were widely introduced, many observers argued that they
still required the use of a fully trained hand compositor. In 1890, Southward
h d d 1·· f han.i . 93a rawn attention to the inherent 1m1ts 0 mec an1sat10n:
•••Much more has to be known than is necessary for the typewriter
operator •••• If the machine compositor can't read his copy and deal
with it as the ordinary compositor does he can't make the machine
remunerative. What is gained in typesetting is lost in correction if
the operator isn't a properly trained compositor .••• The manual
compositor •••is not a mere animated machine, picking up type, and
arranging it in a tool. He is deciphering his copy, spelling the word~
•••punctuating them, and probably just before coming to ·the end of
each line considering how to make a proper division of the word
according to etymological rules and printing customs. This cannot be
done for him by any machine however ingenious.
Speaking three years later, with the diffusion of the linotype well underway,
Southward reiterated his basic conviction on the indispensibility of the fully
trained compositor, while arguing that vigilant trade unionism was essential if
compositors were to secure a fair share of the benefits of mechanisation, in
94contrast, for example, to the experience of sewing machine operators. In a
similar vein, the American master printer T. DeVinne's widely reprinted article
on the linotype in America argued that the mechanisation of composition, like
that of the printing press, would both increase the total demand for skilled
92 'The Type-Setting Machine', TC June 1889, p.10.
93 Southward, 'Type-Composing Machines'.
94 Speech to the Glasgow branch of the British Typographia, Southward Collection,
St. Bride's Foundation Institute Library.
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labour and would require better workmanship, thereby enhancing rather than
weakening the position of the skilled craftsman.95
Trade unionists, were, of course, quick to assert the continuing indis-
pensibility of skilled hand compositors as machine operators. Some union
spokesmen went so far as to claim that the increased pace of linotype work
required greater attention and concentration from the operator than did hand
work (and therefore entitled the former to a higher reward).96 Rank and file
critics of mechanisation, on the other hand, did not claim that composing machineE
eliminated the need for skilled labour, nor were they on the whole concerned to
refute the general economic arguments of their opponents on a theoretical level,
preferring to draw attention to the actual displacement of hand labour brought
about by their introduction. Where such critics engaged the Theory of Increasing
Demand, it was to note that while the overall demand for labour in the economy
might indeed grow as a result of the mechanisation of composition, the increase
might well take place in another sector than their own: the linotype might
multiply engineers while decimating compositors.97
Perhaps the most important set of expectations, those of the employers,
remain more obscure. It would be important to establish to what extent printing
employers hoped, like their counterparts in engineering, to use machinery to
95 See note 91 above.
96 Slatter, in TC, Jan. 1891; TC June 1893; STC Apr. 1891, May 1892; LSe, 'Report
of Special Committee on Composing Machine~ LSC Trade Reports, 1896.
97 Print 15.7.1896; Printing News, Oct. 1892, Aug. 1893, Sept. 1894.
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free themselves once and for all from the "unfair and vexatious conditions"
imposed on them by the typographical unions. The disarray of employers'
organisation in the early part of this period - permanent employers' associations
in printing were formed largely as a result of the conflicts over the linotype -
means unfortunately that our principal source for the early 90s is the trade
press, a source which presents added difficulties because of the latter's London
bias. The trade press generally supported the Theory of Increasing Demand on
ideological grounds, especially in the early 90s. As the displacement of hand
compositors multiplied, however, giving rise to more acute conflicts between
unions and employers, it began to echo the hardening position of the latter:
the argument that a linotype really required no more skill to operate than a
typewriter, which became a favourite theme of employers' grievances, also became
. . d 98prom1nent 1n tra e comment. In a similar vein, the British and Colonial
Printer and Stationer, a leading London-based trade paper, observed in a special
issue on the linotype in December 1895:
Though mechanical composition, owing to its economy, will beyond
doubt also tend to increase the amount of composition, it can never
so multiply it as to find occupation for the great number it will
displace .••• In a more or less early future we are certain to witness
the departure of the familiar newspaper 'camp.' with the steady 'click,
click, click, of the type in his stick ••• '99
The few retrospective comments by employers support the view that their
initial response, conditioned by the failure of previous experiments in
mechanical composition, was one of scepticism as to the significance of the
linotype and its impact on composing room skill requirements, with their attitude
hardening as the capacities of the machines made themselves felt. Thus Sir
98 See BCPS 18.1.1894 •
.99 ~., 25.12.1895, p.l.
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Edward Lawson, the proprietor of the Daily Telegraph, rallying a meeting of
London newspaper owners for a revision of the LSC's composing machine scale at
a meeting in December 1895, noted that when he first saw the linotype he found
it "beautiful" but was convinced that it would never work. lOa Similarly, George
Eaton Hart, the proprietor of the Financial Times explained in 1903 the initial
willingness of the employers to concede that linotype operators should be
recruited from the ranks of fully-trained compositors:
•••The majority felt that, given the requisite ability for manipulating
a keyboard and the acquirement of technical knowledge of the machine,
the training which a compositor received in the rapid decipherment of
manuscript, spelling, and punctuation, was a necessary factor towards
making a skilful operator.
But this opinion was by no means unanimous and shifted in the course of the
ub . 101s sequent conflicts with the un1ons:
On the other hand, the inventors of the machine, and one or two isolated
printing houses, claimed that the compositor was not now a necessity.
Any educated typewriter or clerk could, they said, after a few months'
training, operate the machine equally with the old-world compositor, and
at a lower rate of wages. The Economic Printing Company was formed to
demonstrate this, and to some extent was successful. It is beyond
question, however, according to the opinion of most leading practical
printers, that it does not require the training of a compositor to
successfully work the Linotype or similar machines.
While the Linotype Company later turned against the skilled compositors,
it too did not originally see their elimination as part of the machine's appeal.
On the contrary, the manufacturers sought from the outset to establish good
relations with the unions, encouraging its machines to be worked by apprenticed
compositors. Thus in 1892, the Economic Printing Company, a subsidiary of the
Linotype Company itself signed an agreement with the LSC to hire society
compositors at a 4Ss stab rate, though the agreement soon collapsed over
loa Report of the Meeting of Newspaper Proprietors and Printers with London Member
of the LUA, 7.11.1895, Webb ColI. EB LXXIV, f. 57, p.lO.
101 G.E. Hart, 'The Trouble in the Printing Trade', Magazine of Commerce, June
1903, p.398.
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complaints of low output and the LSC's refusal to negotiate a piece rate.
Still, at the time of the Sportsman dispute, the chairman of the Linotype
Company was suffiCiently persuaded of the LSC's good faith to write to the Royal
Commission on Labour defending it against charges of opposition to machinery,
and as late as May 1893, he praised the fair conduct of trade unionist towards
h' d" 102mac ~nery at a stockhol ers meet~ng.
Whatever their initial attitudes towards machinery, the best way to
understand the development of printing employers' strategies - like those of
skilled workers - will be in the context of the unfolding conflicts over its
introduction, to which we now turn. The timing, as well as the form, which
these struggles took varied significantly from region to region, according to
the divergent patterns of industrial structure, union political style, and
relations between unions and employers, especially between London and the
provinces. It will accordingly be necessary to treat separately the evolution
of these conflicts in the English provinces, London, and Scotland in the course
of producing an overall account.
102 Statement quoted by Webbs, Industrial Democracy, p.407; letter to RC on
Labour reprinted in Press News, Aug.1892. On the Economic Printing Company
and the LSC, see Child, Industrial Relations, p.175; on negotiations between
the TA and the Hattersley and Thorne companies, see TA EC Minutes 1893, passin
and Musson, TA, p.228.
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Provinces
The first wave of introduction of the linotypes was centred on provincial
papers, where weaker union organisation and the smaller scale of production
made proprietors quicker to experiment than their London counterparts. Within
a few years of the installation of the first linotypes in the offices of the
Newcastle Chronicle in 1889, with the elimination of initial technical flaws,
these machines were sweeping the field of their competitors on provincial
papers. The proliferation of composing machines brought in its train a
multiplicity of different local arrangements for their operation: stab and
piece rates as well as hours and conditions of work all varied significantly
from town to town. At the same time, employers' efforts to secure increased
output were leading them to adopt methods of output measurement and bonus
payment which were anathema to union regulation.
As a result, the TA Executive found itself increasingly pressed to form-
ulate a uniform set of rules for the operation of composing machines. The
union's efforts were guided by their underlying strategy toward mechanisation -
one which they shared with the rank and file -: the status quo ante should
be defended as far as possible without actually opposing the introduction of the
machines themselves. The existing framework of regulation should be strictly
applied to the machines so that neither hand nor machine compositor should
experience any disadvantage, while at the same time the men sould receive a fair
share of the benefits from increased productivity. In this context, no change
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was envisaged in the mode of regulation: union rules would continue to set
minimum standards for the jobs open to their members, with the detailed
conditions of operation to be settled through local negotiation with employers.
The first step in this direction was the convening of a conference of
composing machine operators in February 1891. Neither this conference nor the
Delegate Meeting the following September (the first in 14 years), however,
were able to establish a code of regulation for the machines. The only principles
to emerge from these gatherings were the reaffirmation of the restriction of
machine work to recognised journeymen and apprentices, and the opposition to
bonus systems and output measurement, though the delegates proposed as well that
mechanisation serve as the occasion for a reduction of the working week to
10348 hours. It was only in March 1893, after several years of continuous
negotiations at branch level that the TA Executive was able to formulate a
rudimentary working code for composing machines: the working week was fixed
at 48 hours on night work (on morning papers) and 50 for day work (evening
papers); stab rates were pegged at a minimum of Ss above hand rates, with the
10piece rates for the various machines set as a proportion of existing hand rates.
By this time, the strategy of strict control was already creating problems
with employers, particularly in relation to demands from the latter for increased
output and lower piece rates. Officially, the EC's view was that compositors
on stab work - whether case or machine - should neither guarantee to produce a
103 Report of 1891 Delegate Meeting; Musson, TA, pp.224-2S.
104 TA EC Minutes 20.5.1893; the rules themselves are reprinted in Musson, ~,
p.227.
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fixed output ('task work') nor place a ceiling on the numbers of lines they
set. Thus the Executive prohibited an agreement for guaranteed output on
machines in Newcastle, and rejected bonuses and copy marking in Manchester,
105Nottingham, and Bradford. Where local resistance to pressures for increased
output went as far as a declared limit on output, as at the Sheffield Telegraph
and Bradford Observer in 1893, the EC felt compelled to intervene; the net
effect of its policies, however, was to identify the union leadership with
rank and file efforts to restrict output and constrain mechanisation.106
While no actual strikes or lockouts broke out over the operation of
composing machines during these years, the union policy of tight control was
placing it on a collision course with the employers in several of the most
important centres of linotype operations. At the Sheffield Telegraph, for
example, disagreements over output and piece rates were assuming an acute form
in early 1891. Throughout the year the proprietors charged that the machine
operators were failing to work the linotypes at full capacity and demanded a
piece rate of 3d/l~OOO ens as a solution; the men, in turn, proclaimed with
Executive backing their readiness to resign rather than accept such a rate, and
complained of excessive supervision and speed on the machines. Though a
confrontation was avoided, the proprietors appear to have used the displacement
105 TA EC Minutes 16.9 and 18.10, 1890, 2.10.1891, 3.6 and 29.7, 1893;
conf;rence of Composing Machine Operators, p.24: "The President said
the Council had over and over declined to sanction the marking of copy, and
if the Nottingham operators did it they had only themselves to blame."
106 TA EC Minutes 25.2 and 19.11, 1893.
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of labour resulting from mechanisation as a means of victimising union
activists.107 In Newcastle, the introduction of the linotype under a system
of copy marking accelerated the discharge of older men. But once copy marking
was prohibited, the Chronicle and the Journal simple hired young men at bonus
wages to set the pace. The branch president was dismissed in 1893 for
"chapelling" one such operator for "slogging", and several other union militants
were sacked later in the year for refusing to accept output measurement; all
. d . 108rece~ve strike pay from the Execut~ve. Similarly, in Nottingham, the
treasurer of the Guardian chapel was dismissed, and the overseer charged the
Father of the Chapel with operating a limit system. Thus the proprietors
announced that if output did not improve they intended to "clear all out,
whether old servants or not, and have a fresh set.,,109
Even as newspaper proprietors were growing restive at union restrictiveness,
the actual experience of composing machines was breeding a wealth of grievances
among the rank and file. The bulk of these grievances concerned the relation
between machine and hand work. First and foremost was hand compositors' fear
that the linotype would displace them outright. Whatever the ideological force
of the Theory of Increasing Demand as a guide to long-term employment prospects
107 Ibid., 11.3.1891; 2.1, 20.2, 27.2, and 24.9,1892; 2.2.1895. See also the
testimony of the Sheffield branch to Conference of Composing Machine
Operators, pp.28-30.
108 TA EC Minutes, 25.2, 4.3, 18.3, 1.4, 16.9, and 25.11, 1893; letters to
TC Jan and May 1893; reports of strike pay in TA Half Yearly Reports,
June and Dec. 1893, memorial of Newcastle Branch, 'To Newspaper Proprietors
Using Composing Machines', in EC Minutes 18.3.1893.
109 Ibid., 17.6.1893.
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in the industry, the short-run experience of mechanisation particularly in
Sheffield and Newcastle fed the anxieties of the rank and file. By December
1893, the union estimated that in 16 towns 217 machines had already displaced
110262 men, and the actual figure may well have been larger. Another major
complaint stemmed from the relationship between machine and case hands working
in the same office. Frequently, proprietors concerned to make the machines pay
kept their operators well supplied with copy while the case hands stood idle; to
the latter this practice was simply a more pernicious form of slating. Mechani-
sation led naturally to fully developed forms of piece-stab, creating large
disparities in income between hand and machine compositors, and provoking conflict
of interest between case hands anxious to minimise the impact of mechanisation
on their wages and employment and machinists seeking to maximise their earnings
IIIby accepting piece rates or bonuses. Finally, compositors ~laimed that the
linotype required an intensification of work for the machine operators themselves.
112As the Newcastle branch put it in their demand for the 48 hour week:
Our experience •••has conclusively proved that .•.a man can
at a machine eight hours, continuously working his fingers
brain, without being very much more exhausted than by hand
not remain
and his
compositing.
110 Report of TA Delegate Meeting 1893, p.44; for a more optimistic estimate by
the Linotype Company, see ibid., p.169.
see EC Minutes 1893, passim; letters to
Composing Machine Operators, p.30.
For complaints about displacement,
TC Jan. and May 1893; Conference of
111 1891 Conference on Composing Machines, summarised in Musson, TA, pp.224-2S;
TC June 1893; Conference of Composing Machine Operators, p.30.
112 Memorial in TA EC Minutes 18.3.1893. See also speech by Slatter to
Conference of Midland Branches, 29.4.1893, in TC June 1893: II The work of
the machine was far more exacting than hand labour."
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Thus throughout 1893 pressure mounted from the branches on the EC to
convene a Delegate Meeting to consider its policies toward composing machines.113
A speaker at a conference of Midland branches in April 1893 summarised the
general attitude of the rank and file:
Was it right for men to work machines when hand compositors were
standing? The machines ought to be regulated not to a maximum but
to a minimum.
In this spirit, the conference called for the promotion of stab work on
h" d h f f 1 1 "f d h" h d 114mac Lnes an teen orcement 0 equa s atLng or case an mac Lne an s.
With the TA Executive under simultaneous pressure from employers and the
rank and file, a special Delegate Meeting convened in Sheffield in December 1893
to formulate a comprehensive policy toward composing machines. Open to rank
and file influence, this Delegate Meeting enacted a strategy which represented
the apogee of· strict regulation. Local agreements should embody three basic
principles: 1) compositors should receive a "fair and reasonable share of the
benefits"; 2) machines should result in shorter hours; 3) ".•.the ordinary staff
of the establishment should have the first right and the first choice to operate
the machines, and so minimise as far as possible the displacement of labour"
(i.e., existing hand compositors should work the machines rather than younger
men recruited from outside). Similarly, the delegates sought to restrict cheap
labour by prohibiting employers from training their apprentices on the machines
alone: only apprentices in their final two years could work the machines. The
EC view that training on the machines should take place at the employers' expense
113 TA " 1893 "EC MLnutes passLm.
114 TC June 1893; see also calls for high piece rates to discourage mechanisation
in ~., Mar. 1893, opposition to piecework on machines, ibid., Aug. 1892,
and a prediction of a "pitched battle" over machinery, ibid., Sept. 1893.
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was likewise reaffirmed: trainees should receive the stab rate for at least
three months, and union members were forbidden to learn to operate the machines
in their spare time.
Following the traditional hostility to piecework in the union, the
Delegate Meeting considered a proposal that all machines should be worked on
stab. While some delegates argued that in addition to the traditional moral
and economic objections to piecework, its operation on machines created an
incentive to higher output and thereby displaced more hand workers, news hands,
as in the pre-mechanisation debates, argued that stab work would simply
encourage copy marking, resulting ultimately in a demand from employers for
piecework effort at stab wages.llS This latter perspective won the support of
a large majority, and delegates concentrated their attentions on resistance to
pressures for increased stab output: a resolution was passed prohibiting
machine operators from accepting bonuses, marking copy, or assisting "in any
method which may be suggested for the purpose of testing the amount of his
composition."
At the core of the Delegate Meeting's strategy was the view that "machines,
being an innovation, should be treated as such, and they as members of the
Typographical Association should make them as costly as possible to the intro-
ducers." Accordingly, the delegates restricted the hours of work for machine
operators to 48 on a day and 42 on night work - though the resolution of the
115 For previous debates over piecework, see above, pp.140-42.
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1891 DM for a 48 hour week had not yet been implemented - in part to minimise
the displacement of labour. Minimum stab rates for linotype work were fixed
at 40s (day) and 42s (night) and piece rates at 2~d/l,000 ens (day) and 3d
(night) with time and a half for overtime; in most cases these ran well beyond
the 10% increase proposed by the EC. Finally, the dual system (piece-stab)
was prohibited and equal access for copy demanded for case hands.116
Rank and file demands for watertight control over composing machines
had thus been enacted as formal union policy, but as the experience of preceding
years already indicated, the Executive would find it nearly impossible to enforce
the resolutions of the Delegate Meeting in the face of determined opposition
from employers. During the next few years, disputes over the operation of the
linotype multiplied in the branches, as employers pressed for acceptable piece
rates and higher output. In Newcastle in 1894, turnover apprentices were put
on linotypes, and a full-scale strike over piece rates on the Leader and the
Chronicle was narrowly avoided, though four unionists were dismissed.117
Similarly, union activists at the Sheffield Telegraph charged in 1895 that the
management was operating "•••an organised system •••by which men •••likely to
maintain society principles were being gradually got rid of". In February of
the same year, the proprietors posted notices offering to teach men the linotype
in their own time; those who refused were dismissed.118 As employers' attitudes
116 Report of Delegate Meeting 1893; Musson, TA, pp.228-30.
117 EC Minutes 12.5 and 1.9 1894; TC Oct. 1894; Half-Yearly Report, June 1894.
118 EC Minutes 2.2 and 18.2 1895; 25.1.1896.
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hardened on the question of tuition, the Sheffield experience was frequently
repeated; similarly, friction over union rates on linotypes led to stoppages
and dismissals in Blackburn, Bolton, and Kendal in 1894-95, to cite only those
cases where strike benefits were paid.119
Employers did not long remain content to pursue their resistance individuall:
As in engineering, the struggle over new technology precipitated the development
of wider forms of collective organisation. In February 1894, a deputation from
the Linotype Company supported by several large provincial newspapers met the
TA Executive to demand lower piece prices; in April, a conference of linotype
users in small towns (populations under 120,000) met in Manchester to demand
proportionally lower piece prices, sending a delegation to convey this message
to the EC. These initiatives culminated a year later in the formation of the
Linotype Users' Association (LUA), which would become a national organisation
f . 120o newspaper propr~etors.
At the same time, the TA Executive found itself involved in hostilities
with the Linotype Company itself. In 1893, the EC had entered negotiations with
the various composing machine companies, hoping thereby to alleviate rank and
file pressures; though no agreement was reached on piece prices, the manufacturers'
responses were cordial, especially from the Linotype Company. By 1894, however,
the unions' restrictionist policies - especially their insistence on paid tuition -
119 Ibid., 8.2.1896; Half-Yearly Reports, Dec. 1894 and Dec. 1895.
120 EC Minutes 28.4.1894; BCPS 19.5.1895, p.8. Cf. also Musson, TA, pp.233-34,
who mistakenly dates the formation of the LUA in 1896. The correspondence
with organised proprietors is reprinted in Report of TA Delegate Meeting 1893,
and summarised in Musson, TA, p.228.
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had incensed the Linotype Company to the point of establishing its own training
schools to loosen up the labour market. Having fallen out with the LSC over
similar issues, the Company placed advertisements in all the major papers
addressed 'To Unemployed Young Men' calling upon them to come and be trained
to the lucrative occupation of machine compositor. Here was a real threat to
the unions' hold over the trade: whatever their objections to composing machines,
they had been able to restrict their operation to fully trained compositors and
thereby exert considerable control over working conditions; if the labour market
were thrown open to all comers, craft regulation and with it the position of
hand compositors might be entirely swept away. A fierce polemic ensued, in the
course of which the Linotype Company accused the TA of antagonism toward labour-
saving machinery. Complaining bitterly of the exhorbitant wages paid to machine
operators, the Company's directors announced that they no longer intended to
submit to "the inexorable demands and dictation of the compositors' trade
unions" now that they were training their own operators; plans were already
underway for a second school in Manchester.121
In the face of these threats from the employers, the TA Executive, which
had always placed control of the machines above the strict regulation of working
conditions, rapidly began to give way. As the number of linotypes multiplied,
the position of case hands in news offices became increasingly tenuous: to
prevent their complete elimination, the EC abandoned its opposition to the dual
121 See advertisements reprinted in TC Oct. 1894, and 'The Ravings of the
Linotype Company Directors', in TC Nov. 1894; TA EC Minutes, 25.7.1894.
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With the spread of victimisation on the question of paid tuition and with the
spectre of the Linotype Company's training schools, the Executive retreated
here as well, permitting operators to accept free training in their spare time.
As the Executive told the Representative Council in 1895, the conflict over
training schools threatened the linchpin of union strategy, restriction of
123machine work to fully trained compositors:
In their attempt to enforce these rules the EC have been on several
occasions thwarted by the action of the Linotype Company in recommending
to new users of the machines, operators who have qualified without any
remuneration at their 'school' in London. The users, in many cases,
have not been slow to avail themselves of these men, and, as a matter
of course, our members employed in such offices have been displaced.
Under these circumstances, it is a matter for serious consideration
whether it would not be policy on the part of the Association to make
the question of tuition an open one between the users of the machine
and the branch •••• Against these propositions it may be argued that by
adopting them we should have so many more operators than there would
be machines to work that the rush for 'sits' would inevitably bring down
prices; but on the other hand, it must not be forgotten that they would
be our own members who had joined the Association on principle, over
whom the Linotype Company had no influence; whereas under present
circumstances, the influence over imported operators is in the hands of
the Company, who are not slow to hold them up as a menace to us in any
dispute between ourselves and the users.
Already in 1894-95 the Executive had found itself unable to enforce the
40s minimum stab wage in local negotiations, pressing instead its original goal
of a 10% advance, but it had not felt able to accept lower piece prices than
those fixed by the 1893 Delegate Meeting.124 Arguing to the 1895 RC the
necessity of flexibility in this area, the Executive pointed to the crux of the
125problem:
122 'Report of RC Meeting', TC Oct. 1894.
123 TA EC 'Report on Composing Machines', quoted in LSC, 'MS Report to a Special
General Meeting, 1.1.1896', LSC Special Reports.
124 Musson, TA, pp.233-34.
125 TA Ee, 'Report on Composing Machines'.
233
•••These are the only conditions under which we can maintain control
of the machines, which if once lost •••would be far more disastrous to
our trade than their introduction has been.
Chastened by the victimisation of union activists, by rising expenditures on
strike benefits (the amount spent on strike pay 1893-97 was triple that of the
preceding five years) ,126 and by the defeat of strikes over composing machines
in London and Scotland (Scottish Leader Edinburgh 1890, Sportsman London 1892,
and Glasgow Evening Citizen 1893), the RC accepted the Executive's arguments for
127a strategic retreat.
The newly formed Linotype Users' Association quickly came to see a
national agreement on the machines as the solution to its problems with the
unions. Thus in June 1896, the LUA approached the TA EC proposing a conference
to standardise wages and working conditions in provincial towns. The union was
initially unwilling to abandon its traditions of local bargaining, which allowed
it to bring national resources to bear upon isolated employers, but under
pressure from the LUA, which had helped to obtain a revised composing machine
scale from the LSe in 1896,128 representatives from the two organisations met
for the first time in February 1897.129 Despite the proliferation of local
disputes in 1896-97, the RC in 1897 reaffirmed the rank and file's commitment
to local bargaining, which the LUA saw as "inimical to a general and lasting
adjustment of rates and rules.,,130
126 Child, Industrial Relations, p.172.
127 'Report of RC', TC Nov. 1895.
128 See below, pp.246-53.
129 TA ~ Minutes, 11.6.1896; Musson TA, pp.234-35.
130 TC Nov. 1897; EC Minutes 28.5.1898.
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As the negotiations dragged on, employers' attitudes hardened. Already
in 1896, Lascelles Carr, the Secretary of the LUA and proprietor of the Cardiff
Western Mail had demanded that the EC give him assurances that their men were
not operating "a private understanding whereby their output was limited", and
131later dismissed all unionists who refused to mark their copy. The columns
of the Linotype Users' Monthly Circular for these years abound with complaints
about exhorbitant piece prices and restriction of output: the linotype operator
was frequently compared with an ordinary typist and appeals for confrontation
were by no means absent. One employer for example contrasted the timidity of
the LUA with the militant posture of the Engineering Employers Federation, while
132another urged the speedy establishment of a provincial training school:
We shall not be able to get wages much reduced till there are more men
able to take up the work. Again the establishment of sqch provincial .
schools would be a most salutory check on the demands of the TA, and
would be of the greatest help in case of a dispute leading to a strike.
The Morning management came off victorious in their strike because
there were men in London whom they could call in at a moment's notice:
but where would any provincial office be in like circumstances?
The general view of employers was summarised by a correspondent to the LUA
Monthly Circular on the eve of the first agreement with the TA:133
Unless the employers are prepared to present a united front to the
operators they will be gradually eaten up, and the advantage o£ the
machines will be gradually eaten up by the exhorbitant demands for
working them.
131 Ibid., 31.10 and 7.11, 1896.
132 LUA MC June and Sept. 1898, Oct. 1897: on the Morning strike, see below,
p.251.
133 Ibid., Nov. 1898.
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While the organised employers were stepping up pressure on the TA for a
national agreement, discontent with the effects of the machines was intensifying
among the rank and file. By far the most important source of distress was the
displacement of hand compositors; the years of the most rapid diffusion of the
linotype, 1894-96, coincided with the trough of the trade cycle to create the
highest level of unemployment among compositors since the end of the Napoleonic
134Wars. Estimates of the actual extent of displacement varied: a correspondent
to the Typographical Circular spoke of hundreds of compositors displaced and
the Secretary of the LSC estimated 20% displacement in the provinces; one
135employer, however, put the additional unemployment at 5%. The TA Executive
itself estimated in 1895 that in offices using composing machines, the total
number of men had dropped by a third from 1445 to 881.136
All observers agreed, however, that significant displacement was taking
place, particularly among older men; it was said that only young men could
sustain the pace of the machines, an argument adduced to justify high piece
137rates. The problem of displacement dominated rank and file consciousness
during these years, as dark fears for the future of the skilled compositor
multiplied. One Liverpool compositor, no doubt overstating the general pessimism,
went so far as to claim that the trade was no longer worth following because,138
134 Musson, TA. p.103.
135 TC May 1894; Printing News, Apr. and Jul. 1894.
136 The TA's estimates, table reprinted in Howe, London Compositor, pp.498-99,
are based on 44 offices using 242 machines; the Linotype Company itself
reported that by the end of 1894 there were 423 machines in use in 94
offices, so that even subtracting London offices, the TA figures are most
likely an underestimate, Report of Directors to 7th Annual Meeting of
Shareholders, 1896, Webb Coil. EB LXXIV, f. 61.
137 TC May 1894 and Apr. 1896; TA Half-Yearly Report, June and Dec. 1895;
Report of TA Delegate Meeting, 1898.
138 Letter to Printers' Register May 1896, pp.4-S.
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the composing machine •••does the maximum amount of work with the
minimum amount of labour; it throws men out of work allover the
country •••• Composing and distributing machinery is going to do
for printing what Richard Arkwright's spinning jenny did for the
cotton industry.
Despite these dire predictions, we must be careful to note the limits of
mechanisation during the late 90s: comparatively little bookwork and almost no
jobbing work was being done by the machines, and even on daily newspapers display
work remained the preserve of the case hand as did making up and imposing.
Before we conflate the compositor with the hand loom weaver, it should also be
noted that machine operators in most instances were receiving higher wages for
f 1 . 139ewer hours than their manua compet1tors.
The anxieties of hand compositors gave rise to a variety of proposed
solutions, some old, others more novel, at least within typographical ranks.
Many of the rank and file continued to support a hard line against the machines,
demanding the preservation of high rates for machine work and the rigorous
140application of union rules. Though the inability of the Executive to enforce
these policies had become increasingly evident, one writer, lamenting the use
of linotypes on new classes of work, argued as late as 1897:
141"It is useless saying we cannot resist the machine; I say we can and we must."
139 'A Revolution in Printing', Sunday Times 20.1.1895, in Webb ColI. EB LXXIV,
f. 29; LUA MC May 1900; Diblee, 'Printing Trades', p.ll.
140 E.g., TC May 1894
141 Ibid., Feb. 1897.
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One area where restrictionist attitudes were gaining support was in hostility
to piece rates, especially on machine work. Letters to the Typographical
Circular called for the abolition of piecework on machines, the branches sent
resolutions to the EC, and conferences of the Midland and Southern branches
do 01 1 0 1896 7 d 1899 to 1 142passe Slml ar proposa s ln - an respec lve y. These movements
culminated in the substantial support shown for the abolition of machine piece
work at the 1898 Delegate Meeting, though not sufficient to change union policy.14
The most important focus of rank and file demands, however, was the
upsurge of interest in a shorter working week. While TA members had endorsed
the principle of a legal eight hour day by a small majority in 1888, the idea
had aroused little interest.144 Now, with mounting unemployment, compositors,
like their counterparts in engineering, turned increasingly to the shorter
working week as a solution to the problems of the trade. A correspondent to the
145TC spoke for a growing number of his fellows when he argued:
There is only one method of grappling with this ever spreading evil
(the displacement of hand labour by machines - jz), and that is to be
sought for in the reduction of the hours. These machines are introduced
to save labour and we must see to it that they really save labour •.••
If machinery is to be a blessing for all, and not merely a means of
extracting extra profit for the employer, the hours must be reduced as
near as possible in proportion to the saving effected by mechanical
development and improvement.
142 Ibid, Aug. 1894, Oct. 1897; Musson, TA, p.200.
143 Report of TA Delegate Meeting 1898.
144 See above, ch.III, note 140.
145 TC May 1894.
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While some protagonists of the shorter working week saw the problem in
terms of industrial action, others advocated political methods, often employing
1" " 1 1" 146an exp ~citly soc~a ist ana ys~s. In fact, the mid-1890s saw a tremendous
efflorescence among compositors of interest in labour political representation
and broader socialist ideas: a number of correspondents to the Typographical
Circular argued that the ultimate solution to the problems of mechanisation lay
in the socialisation of the means of production, and they appear to have found
147a not unsympathetic audience. Branches such as Nottingham and Birmingham
declared their allegiance to labour political representation in a socialist
language in 1894; by 1897, a socialist had been elected Assistant Secretary (in
1900 General Secretary), and the TA became one of the first unions to affiliate
to the Labour Representation Committee in 1900.148 It would not perhaps be too
much then to claim of the TA as the Labour Chronicle did of the Edinburgh
Typographical Society, that it was "driven to socialism" by the struggle over
h 1" 149t e ~notype.
Alongside the growth of socialist ideas oriented toward the state,
mechanisation also encouraged compositors to turn to a form of socialist activity
with deeper roots in the union's history, producers' cooperatives. Since 1869
the TA had been associated with the Cooperative Printing Society in Manchester,
146 See ibid., Sept. 1895 and Feb. 1897.
147 Ibid., Dec. 1894; Jan., Jul., and Sept. 1895.
148 Musson, TA, pp.346-52.
149 Labour Chronicle, May 1895, quoted by Gray, Labour Aristocracy, p.l73
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which, however, rapidly became more a "profit-sharing jOint stock company than
d' . ,,150a pro ucers cooperat1ve. In 1893, labour newspapers were established in
Bolton, Newcastle, and Bradford, aimed at providing employment for displaced
hand compositors while providing an organ for independent labour activity.1Sl
Similarly, the Nottingham, Leicester, and Blackpool branches founded cooperative
printing offices during the same period, while Northampton unsuccessfully
proposed to the 1893 Delegate Meeting that the Executive invest in such projects
152to relieve unemployment. At the 1898 OM, a resolution was passed supporting
cooperative production, looking forward to the day when the TA, "having become
an association of producers •••could do without the capitalist altogether,
d h h h Id th' t d of the~r labour."lS3an w en t ey s ou reap e JUs rewar As a result,
several more cooperative printing offices were established in the years that
followed, often with TA investments, though the movement never grew large
154enough to have a significant effect on employment.
Despite the growing anxiety among the rank and file about the effects of
composing machines, the TA Executive concluded an agreement with the LUA on
standard stab rates for linotypes in December 1898. As if to lend urgency to
the negotiations, a strike broke out in Bath over the 48 hour week for machine
operators while the two sides were meeting; the proprietors of the Chronicle
150 Musson, TA, p.360.
151 Newcastle Evening News, first issue, 1893; BCPS 31.5.1894; letter to TC
Nov. 1893, 'Composing Machines V. Cooperative Newspapers'. In 1893, the
Echo, a strike paper published by the locked-out compositors of the
Glasgow Evening Citizen was also transformed into a labour daily; copies
in St. Bride's Foundation Institute Library.
152 Musson, TA, p.361; TC Jul. 1893; letter to ibid., June 1898.
153 Report of TA Delegate Meeting 1898, p.29.
154 Musson, TA, pp.361-62.
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and the Argus were able to keep their papers running with London-supplied
blacklegs, a lesson which was doubtless not lost on the TA Executive.lSS
Inspired by the strength of rank and file feeling and by the difficulties of
framing an agreement, the EC left piece rates to local bargaining. Stab rates
for the linotype were set at l2~% above existing case rates (much disagreement
would ensue as to whether this should be treated as a maximum or a minimum) ,
with a 48 hour week for day work and 44 for night; overtime would be paid for
at ordinary machine rates. Most importantly, all operators were to be members
of the TA, with preference to be given to those already employed in particular
offices. Apprentices could only work the machines after three years, at a
ratio of no higher than one to every three journeymen, and operators were
guaranteed three months' stab wages before being placed on piece rates.lS6
Although this first product of national collective bargaining recognised
most of the crucial tenets of craft regulation (especially monopoly of access
to the job to trained society craftsmen and restriction of the number of
apprentices), opposition to the linotype agreement emerged rapidly from the
branches, as rank and file members feared that it would lower existing machine
rates. The conflicts over mechanisation had precipitated unprecedented upheavals
in the internal government of this historically oligarchic union, bringing about
new levels of membership participation and the establishment of a Representative
'1 I' i th d d 157, 1'" , 1" dCounc~ ear ~er n e eca e: un~lateral y Jett~son~ng un~on po lc~es agree
155 LUA MC Dec. 1898.
156 TC Jan. 1899.
IS7 On the internal government of the TA, see above, pp.aS-87.
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by the Delegate Meeting, the Executive found itself once more accused of
dictatorial conduct: as a correspondent put it to the TC:158
The members naturally object to having their thinking done for them,
considering it a reflection on their intelligence; and steps ought
to be taken •••to make such a course impossible in the future. Such
a system of settling vital questions is too primitive for present
day trade-unionists. Our officials must be delegates - not dictators.
By April 1899, resolutions attacking the agreement and the Executive had been
forwarded by 26 branches, including Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield,
159and Newcastle. This opposition movement reached its zenith at the RC meeting
in ~ay. The delegates emphasised the Executive's previous disregard for the
rates laid down by the Delegate Meeting, and criticised the details of the
agreement, censuring particularly the absence of a minimum stab wage or a
higher rate for overtime, together with the extension of opportunities for
apprentices to work the machines. By a vote of 21-7 the delegates instructed
the EC to reopen negotiations with the LUA on these points.160
The Executive, confident of its control over the union and conscious of
the employers' militancy, refused to be bound by the RC's decision; arguing
that only moderation could ensure control of the machines, they put the issue
to a referendum. With roughly half the members voting, the EC position
triumphed by more than 2 to 1 (3,566 to 1,496 in favour of the agreement itself
and 2,919 to 1,611 against the RC-backed censure of the EC.)16l While traditional
Executive domination of the union played an important role in this outcome, so
too did the absence of any alternative strategy and the material benefits
162enjoyed by machine operators.
158 TC Apr. 1899.
159 TC Mar.-Apr. 1899.
160 Report of RC, 1899.
161 !£ Nov. 1899.
162!£ May, June, Sept., and Oct. 1899.
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The 1898 linotype agreement by no means ended disputes between provincial
compositors and their employers; indeed as we shall see in the next chapter,
the interpretation of the agreement itself became a major source of disputes.
Nonetheless, the agreement shaped the terrain on which future skirmishes
would develop, and by ratifying skilled craftsmen's control over the machines
it ensured the latter a favourable position in subsequent struggles over the
frontier of control itself.
London
The progress toward collective agreements on composing machines in London
in many respects moved through similar stages as in the provinces. London
newspapers were initially slower to adopt the machines, but larger and more
competitive than their provincial counterparts, they introduced them more
rapidly once diffusion was underway. At the same time, the existing traditions
of collective bargaining compressed the time elapsing between introduction and
agreement. One fundamental difference between the Lse and the TA played a
crucial role in these developments: the much more extensive existence of rank
and file participation in decision making in London. Unlike the TA, LSe
policy was formulated by Quarterly Delegate Meetings, General Meetings were well
tt d d d emb h' b 11 ' f tl d E t' d " 163a en e , an m ers 1p a ots not 1n requen y reverse xecu 1ve eC1S1ons.
Thus inevitably, rank and file discontent with the effects of the linotype would
163 0 1 1" f h b 82 85n the interna po 1t1CS ate LSe, see a ave, pp. - •
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act as a more serious constraint on the Executive's freedom of action in
collective bargaining than was the case in the TA.
The first linotypes in London were installed in 1892 at the offices of
the Globe, a notorious non-union house, but the LSC was able to reach ari
agreement the same year with the Linotype Company enabling its members to work
164in the latter's subsidiary, the Economic Printing Company. In 1893, the
LSC was forced by the newspaper proprietors to open negotiations over a composing
machine scale as a condition for considering the revisions demanded by the union
in the general news scale. Initially the Executive had preferred stab arrange-
ments on the machines to safeguard the operators, but employer pressure and the
traditional preference of London news hands for piecework soon prevailed,
particularly when it became apparent that substantially higher wages could be
d h ho 165earne on t e mac ~nes. In June 1894, a conference of newspaper proprietors
agreed upon a preliminary scale for composing machines with the LSe, fixed to
run until the end of 1895. The agreement specified that all operators should
be LSC members with preference, as in the provinces, to be given to hand
compositors in the affected offices; piece rates were set at 3~d/l,OOO on
evening papers and 3~d for morning ones - considerably higher than in the
provinces - while case hands and machine operators were to 'lift' (i.e., start
work and receive copy) at the same time, though provisions were made for transfer~
b d ho 166etween case an mac 1nes.
164 'Conditions of Working at the Globe and the People', LSC Trade Reports 1892;
Child, Industrial Relations, p.175.
165 Bowerman to TA Delegate Meeting 1898, pp.46-50.
166 The agreement is reprinted in Howe, London Compositor, pp.497-50l
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It is evident from these terms, which were exceptionally favourable to
the LSC - indeed the union later argued that the employers had been "caught
. ,,167 h . d id f· fnapp1ng - t at newspaper propr1etors 1 not at 1rst recognise the ull
potential of the linotype nor did they intend to use the machines as a wedge
to escape from craft regulation; rather the machines were immediately swallowed
up within the existing framework of regulation. In this context, the rudimentary
character of employers' organisations in London should be noted: despite the
long traditions of collective bargaining there (which bore more resemblance to
unilateral regulation with some wage bargaining added than in other industries),
the London Master Printers' Association had dissolved between 1866 and 1890,
reviving only in the face of union demands for a comprehensive updating of the
168London Scale.
Dissatisfaction with the hastily agreed 1894 machine scale rapidly spread
among employers with the accelerated diffusion of the machines themselves. The
Economic Printing Company soon quarrelled with the Lse over the low output of its
members, replacing them with non-union men; as we have seen, the Linotype Company
in 1894 opened a training school in London to relieve the constriction in the
169labour market. Disagreements between the LSC and the Company over payment
for tuition led to the closing of the school to union members, and to the
newspaper appeal 'To Unemployed Young Men' which so agitated the TA as well.170
167 'MS Report to a Special Delegate Meeting, 14.12.18951, LSe SEecial ReEorts,
p.3.
168 See above, p.26.
169 See above, pp.230-1.
170 See the LSC's reply, 'The LSC and the Linotype', LSC Trade 1894.ReEorts,
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The Linotype Company became greatly dissatisfied with the 1894 Scale from
the moment of its inception, believing the piece prices to be prohibitive and
thus a brake on the sales of their machines. Thus the Company issued circulars
to London newspaper proprietors calling for a revision of the scale, and
offered the LSC £20,000 worth of equipment for training its members if it would
agree to lower prices; at the same time, a 'Mutual Society of Linotype Operators
and Employers' was organised to provide benefits for non-union men comparable
171to those offered by the LSC.
As a result of the Linotype Company's pressure, the LSC was having
17'problems retaining control over the machines, despite the terms of the agreement:"
Some difficulty was being experienced in obtaining the observance
of the 'preference clause', coupled with the fact that the only
place in which our members had the opportunity of learning (the
machines - jz) outside their own offices was no longer available.
Negotiations were therefore reopened with the Linotype Company, but remained
deadlocked over the question of revisions in the scale.173
171 Circular in Webb Call. EB LXXIV, f. 40; and 'Report to Special Delegate
Meeting, 14.12.1895': "•.•The directors of the Linotype Company were up
in arms immediately they heard of the terms which had been agreed on in
June of 1894. Almost before the ink was dry, circulars were issued pointing
out the portions of the scale to which exception was taken by the Company,
and eventually both the Economic Office and the Linotype Depot or school
were closed to our members •••" See also LSC AR 1896 and Printers' Register,
Nov. 1894. For the circular criticising the 1894 scale, see Webb Call. EB
LXXIV, f. 41.
172 'Report to Special Delegate Meeting, 14.12.1895', p.6.
173 Child, Industrial Relations, p.175, claims that a new agreement was reached
but never implemented.
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Meanwhile, resentment at the working of the 1894 scale was building up
among London employers, who like their provincial counterparts, were aggrieved
above all about high piece prices and low output. By late 1895, the linotype
was in operation at the offices of the Daily Telegraph, the Globe, the People
the Morning, the Lady, and the Financial Times, among others (as well as at
large book firms such as Kelley's, Wyman's, and Straker's). At a meeting with
the LUA in November, the London newspaper owners, led by the Morning, served
notice on the LSC that the 1894 scale would not be renewed at the end of the
year. Sir Edward Lawson of the Telegraph, himself a former compositor and
defender of trade unions, claimed that the compositors "hamper and handicap the
machines to a terrible extent", accusing them of imposing "conditions which put
a premium on bad work, and which worked directly to his disadvantage"; other
speakers denounced the requirement of paid tuition and the 'ex.tras' that pushed
the real cost of machine composition as high as 6d/l,000.174
Faced with this surge of employers' militancy and convinced of the
indefensibility of the 1894 scale, the LSC Executive opened negotiations with
the newspaper proprietors, prepared to compromise over a new scale. The
employers were convinced that a far-reaching victory was at hand, won without
a battle. The British and Colonial Printer gaily predicted the disappearance
of the skilled compositor in the "more or less early future", and spoke of the
union's transition from active to passive resistance as a result of the expanded
labour market; this judgement was echoed by the chairman of the Linotype Company
174 BCPS, 26.12.1895, p.2; Lawson, in Report of Meeting of Newspaper Proprietors
•••7.11.1895, Webb Call. EB LXXIV, f.57, pp.lO-ll. See also Printing News,
Oct. 1894 and ~ 2.7.1896.
247
. th . 1751n e same 1ssue.
But even as employers' dissatisfaction with the working of the 1894
scale was mounting, the coincidence of the trough of the trade cycle with the
introduction of the machines was generating bitter opposition among the LSC
rank and file over the displacement of hand labour. Though estimates of actual
displacement ranged from 5 to 20%, the LSC's expenditures on provident benefit
more than doubled from 1886-90 to 1891-5, from £5,000 per year to £12,000.176
During 1894-95, LSC activists, led by members of the unemployed chapel pressed
for more militant trade policies and tighter enforcement of union rules as a
remedy for unemployment. Thus in early 1894, a ballot of the membership
approved for the first time a formalisation of the apprentice ratio, with a
majority in favour of the extremely low figure of 1:6, half the customary ratio;
the urgency of a 48 hour week was affirmed at a Special General meeting later
177that year. The Executive argued that the results of the apprenticeship
referendum were contradictory (both 1:3 and 1:6 ratios had passed) and argued
than only the existing 1:3 ratio could be defended.178 In 1895, a sub-committee
on unemployment, established under rank and file pressure, identified composing
machines as a major cause of increased unemployment, along with boy labour,
systematic overtime, and piece-stab. A ballot on the committee's recommendations
175 ~, special issue on the linotype, 25.12.1895, pp. 2, 25.
176 Child, Industrial Relations, p.179; for estimates of displacement, see
above, pp.226, 235.
177 'Report to LSC Quarterly Delegate Meeting, 7.2.1894'; 'Report to Special
General Meeting 28.8.1894', LSC Trade Reports, 1894.
178 LSC, 'Circular on the Revised Rules', Trade Reports, 1894.
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refused an outright ban on overtime, but resolved "that no member produce
more than has been agreed to by the chapel as to what shall constitute a fair
day's work", in hopes of resisting the intensification of work.179
On the question of composing machines themselves, the News Department's
Annual General Meeting in 1894 demanded strict regulation: "as practical men,
it must be their great object to control the machine; otherwise there would be
great displacement of labour." The meeting emphasised particularly the
importance of simultaneous 'lift' and 'cut' for machine and case hands to ensure
1 d i , . f 180equa ~str~but~on 0 copy. Similarly, an editorial in the semi-official
Printing News noted the "feelings of dread if not actual hostility" manifested
by compositors in the face of "a revolution which threatens the livelihood of
a large body of workers"; likewise one of its correspondents demanded that
181machines must not be allowed to become cheaper than hand labour.
In December 1895, the union Executive reached a provisional agreement on
a revised composing machine scale with London printing employers: the daily
news scale agreed in 1894 was replaced, and supplemented by new scales for weekly
news and book work. The key changes involved a reduction in piece prices of
179 'Report of Sub-Committee on the Unemployed', Reports of Quarterly Delegate
Meetings 7.8 and 6.11, 1895, in LSC Trade Reports 1895
180 A proposal to eliminate piecework on the machines was rejected. Report of
News Department Annual General Meeting, 14.4.1894, in Printing News, May 1894.
181 Ibid., Apr., 'Sept., 1894, and 'The Unemployed', ibid., May and Oct. 1894.
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~d/l,OOO (instead of the ~d demanded by employers); the reduction of the paid
tuition period from three months to four weeks (as opposed to its abolition);
and the abandonment of the principle of simultaneous lift and cut for machine
and case hands, though a guaranteed minimum wage was introduced to protect the
latter. At the same time, the revised scale included the first formal recognition
by employers of a 1:3 ratio of apprentices to journeymen in weekly news and book
offices (they had long been prohibited entirely in London dailies). 182
Following union rules, the Executive submitted the agreement to a Special
Delegate Meeting for ratification. Arguing that ·whether we like it or not, the
machine is undoubtedly 'here to stay''', the EC pointed out that a failure to
ratify the agreement would result in "entirely losing the hold which at present
the Society possesses over the machines." In the immediate future, LSC
members would find the Telegraph offices closed to them, and perhaps soon many
183others. An additional factor promoting moderation on the part of the
Executive was the fear, much played upon by the trade press, that if attempts
to safeguard the interests of the case hands led as far as a strike, the machine
184operators would secede from the union to cut a separate deal with the proprietors.
Despite these warnings, the delegates rejected the provisional agreement,
demanding the preservation of the old piece prices and the principle of sim~lt-
aneous lift. At a Special General Meeting on 1 January 1896, the membership as
182 Revised Scale in Howe, London Compositor, pp.504-6.
183 'Report to Special Delegate Meeting, 14.12.1895'; LSC Trade Reports, 1895
on trouble at the Telegraph, see Report of the Linotype Company Shareholders'
Meeting, 27.5.1895, Webb ColI. EB LXXIV, f. 59.
184 See 'Report to Special Delegate Meeting, 14.12.1895'; Printers' Register,
Feb. 1896; BCPS 6.2.1896; MPA MC Feb. 1896.
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a whole endorsed the delegates' action by a large majority, voting a strike
levy of 6d per week, ignoring a warning from the Executive that "..•in this
instance discretion will be the better part of valour •••." As the Linotype
Company and certain employers were seeking a confrontation, the EC urged the
members to consider that "...an adverse vote will probably place them - so far
as public sympathy is concerned - in the undesirable position of attempting to
f· h hi ,,1851.gt mac 1.nery.
In the event, however, the predicted general collision between employers
and the LSC failed to materialise. A group of American newspaper editors and
managers who had been advising the London proprietors on strategy at the time
observed that, "the first thing that strikes us is the want of unity among
London newspaper owners, or the absence of any common policy.,,186 By contrast,
the LSC Executive could later report that "probably at no previous period of the
Society's history has a question arisen having so strong a tendency to unite
the trade as the one under notice", despite the tensions reported between machine
and case hands. The significance of the unity and militancy of LSC members was
not lost on the proprietors: it was187
•••a fact to which the tone characterising the meetings held in the
earlier part of the year bore excellent and unmistakable testimony,
and which undoubtedly had the effect of bringing about an agreement,
which in other circumstances might not have been obtained.
185 'MS Report to Adjourned Special Delegate Meeting 11.1.1896' ,
Special General Meeting, 1.1.1896', LSC Special Reports,
of the ballots, see LSC Trade Reports 1896.
'MS. Report to
186 'Synopsis of Opinions and suggestions during the Past Fortnight by American
News Editors and Managers Passing through London re the Agreement between
the London Morning and Evening Papers and the LSC which Expires 31 December
1895', n.d., Webb ColI. EB LXXIV, f. 33.
187 LSC AR 1896, p.20.
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In the context of the newspaper proprietors' reluctance to undertake joint
industrial action, the LSC Executive was able to pacify Lawson of the Telegraph
at least for the moment with a promise to seek plenary powers for future
negotiations. While eschewing an immediate lockout, Lawson nonetheless
announced his intention to implement the new scale unilaterally, attempting to
persuade his men to leave the union, and in an interview with the Trade Committee,
".•.claimed .••his right to be master of his office •••to be able to use the
machines when and how he liked."188 A confrontation did develop, however, in
the offices of another firebrand of employers' militancy, the Morning, over the
tuition clause and preference for old hands. The Linotype Company supplied 25
blacklegs from its training school, and according to its directors, the propri-
f . 189etors 0 the Morn1ng,
•••were able to make the change from a unionist office to a non-unionist
office without the least disturbance to the business - it never occasioned
there the loss of a half-hour in bringing out the paper.
The Morning was further aided by a court injunction prohibiting the LSC from
either withdrawing its men or picketting the office.190 A further dispute in
April led to the closure of the office to LSC members.19l
188 'MS. Report of Interview with Sir Edward Lawson, 23.1.1896', LSC Special
Reports, MRC; see also 'MS. Report to a Special General Meeting, 25.1.1896',
in ibid.
189 Report of the Linotype Company Shareholders' Meeting, 23.3.1896, Webb ColI.
EB, LXXIV, f. 60, p.25.
190 'Report to a Special General Meeting, 25.1.1896', LSC MS. Special Reports.
191 Printers' Register, Mar. and June 1896.
252
With employers on the offensive and opponents of the agreement unable to
propose a clearcut alternative strategy to that of the Executive, a ballot of
the membership at the end of April granted the EC plenary powers to renegotiate
the scale with the employers. In the ensuing negotiations, the Executive were
able to capitalise on the strength of rank and file feeling to extract an
additional concession from the employers, the restoration of simultaneous cut
and lift for case and machine hands with a guarantee of fair distribution of
192copy, and the revised scale was signed in July. One possible explanation of
the employers' moderation, beyond the endemic disunity in their ranks, lay in
the striking profitability of the linotype, even under union restrictions.
Composing room costs were among the most important expenses of operating a
newspaper, and estimates of the savings effected by the machines ranged as high
as 20-40%, even with higher wages for machine operators; an authorative study
from the following decade, when the capacities of the machines had become
193better established, put the savings at 66% over hand labour. The greater
speed of linotype production also meant that papers could increase their circu-
lation and so gain more than their actual saving on labour costs. In this context
Lawson's claim that the Telegraph was only saving 4% on its costs helps to
explain that paper's special militancy.194
192 'Report of Special Committee on Composing Machines', LSC Trade Reports, 1896;
the revised agreement is reprinted in Howe, London Compositor, document
CXXIV. See also C.W. Bowerman, 'Provisional Agreement ~ Machine Composition'
13.1.1896; 'The Machine Question', 9.6.1896; and 'Amended Proposals re
Working Conditions', LSC Trade Reports, 1896.
193 BCPS 26.12.1895; TC Dec. 1895, TJ May 1910; G.E. Hart, The Linotype: A
Comparison of Cost (FMP, 1908)
194 Interview with Lawson, 23.1.1896', LSC Special Reports.
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While the revised agreement averted a full-scale confrontation between
the LSC and the employers over control of the linotype, it by no means satisfied
militants in either camp. Print, a short-lived paper founded in May 1896 to
further "the interests of the rank and file of British printers", published an
editorial in July criticising the Theory of Increased Demand and predicting
increased displacement of labour as a result of mechanisation; another article
in the same issue mounted a merciless attack on the LSC EC, urging the members
to stand firm against the unjustified reductions in piece prices demanded by
195employers. Similarly, many employers found even the revised agreement a
major fetter on their ability to reap the full benefits of the linotype, and
inaugurated demands for a daily news stab rate to contain the upward movement
of machinists' wages. But as in the provinces, the 1896 agreement on composing
machines provided a framework within which subsequent conflicts between workers
and employers would be fought out, without settling the question definitively;
the upshot of these conflicts will be examined in the next chapter.
Scotland
In Scotland, by contrast to London and the English provinces, the advent of
the composing machine did not result in a collective agreement between the union
and the employers covering the region as a whole during the 1890s. Even more
195 Print, 15.5.1896, 15.7.1896. The Secretary of the LSC was at this time
arguing that reports of displacement of labour had been exaggerated and
that the problem would ultimately prove to be of transitory importance.
Interview with C.W. Bowerman, ibid., 15.10.1896.
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than the TA, the Scottish Typographical Association remained a loose confederatior
of local societies dominated by the main centres of Glasgow and Edinburgh. This
structure discouraged the growth of regional collective bargaining since the
vast disparity of conditions between the main centres and the lesser provincial
towns undercut the basis not only for unified campaigns by workers but also for
the cooperation among employers that was so important in the establishment of
regional and national collective bargaining in the rest of the printing industry
d . . .. 196an 1n eng1neer~ng. When the Scottish employers were able through the threat
of a general lockout to extract a national agreement from the STA in 1913 in
the face of the latter's attempt to implement unilateral changes in working
conditions, this new departure followed upon a major upsurge of workers'
197militancy and upon the example of the English employers.
At the same time, the relative success of employers' efforts to cheapen and
intensify hand compositors' labour paradoxically limited the effects of the
introduction of the linotype on the position of the latter. Outside of Glasgow,
wages were on the whole lower and craft regulation weaker than in comparable
English centres, despite the revival of apprenticeship controls in the late 80s
and early 90s. Piece-stab and female labour in particular offered employers
methods of lowering labour costs which were widely used in Edinburgh and Scottish
provincial towns. The introduction of composing machines was therefore slower
and less dramatic in its effects than in England, and the disputes it evoked
centred on its connection with employers' attempts to depress piecework earnings
196 See above, pp.87-88.
197 See below, pp.328-30.
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more than on compositors' strategies of tight control. Conversely, in many
areas mechanisation led to a direct improvement in the position of skilled
compositors since the large gains in productivity it offered made possible an
easing of employers' pressures to cheapen and intensify hand labour.
None of the pre-linotype composing machines appear to have made any impact
in Scotland, but it was in a Edinburgh newspaper office in 1890 that the first
strike over the linotype in Britain occurred. The proprietor of the Scottish
Leader, having purchased a set of linotypes which were then still in an experi-
mental stage, demanded that the compositors bind themselves as operators for a
two year period at fixed rates. (42s stab for two months; 3d/l,OOO thereafter)
Upon their refusal to sign a long-term contract of this kind, the compositors
were ordered to leave the union or face dismissal, and a dispute over the supply
of 'matter' (printed work) from an unfair office precipitated a lockout the
following day. The union, offering to seek arbitration, proposed that either
the London or Manchester scales be applied, and a public meeting was organised
under the auspices of the Trades Council to draw attention to the contrast
between the paper's policies and its liberal principles. In the event, the
proprietors fomld the union men difficult to replace and the linotypes less
profitable than expected, and in 1892 they unsuccessfully approached the STA
with a view to reopening the office. The following year, the linotypes were
withdrawn and replaced with women and turnovers on hand work; the paper itself
collapsed in 1894.198
198 STA ARs 1890-94; STC June and Sept. 1890; TC July 1890.
256
By 1891 linotypes had begun to appear in Glasgow in significant numbers,
demanding a response in terms of union policy. The STA, like its English
counterparts, was above all concerned to secure control over the machines for
199their members:
What we have to fear, and against which we must protest with all our
energy is the introduction of unskilled labour to work the machines,
thereby supplanting the technically educated compositor.
Accordingly, the 1891 Delegate Meeting formulated two basic rules for the
operation of composing machines: 1) all machines should be worked by duly
recognised journeymen and apprentices in their final year (to be included in
the overall ratio), and 2) no compositors were to work on piece rates until
200they could earn the branch's stab rate. In the second of these provisions,
as in the conflict at the Scottish Leader and later at the Glasgow Evening
Citizen, we can see Scottish compositors' anxiety to prevent the use of the
machines as a means of securing cheap labour rather than of improving product-
ivity, a fear which stemmed from the experiences of previous decades. Though
the union formulated no other general rules for the operation of composing
machines, compositors in Scotland as in England sought to win higher wages and
shorter hours from their introduction, while protecting the hand workers' access
201to copy.
The initial reaction of Scottish compositors toward the linotype was one
of optimism in relation to its effects on the prospects of the hand compositor,
199 STA AR 1890, pp.28-29.
200 Report of STA Delegate Meeting 1891, p.32.
201 See e.g., the rules of the Aberdeen branch, STA AR 1891, p.8; testimony of
G. Templeton to STA Delegate Meeting 1898.
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provided that strict conditions o£ operation were maintained.202 In 1893,
however, a dispute over piece prices provoked another major lockout at the
Glasgow Evening Citizen, as compositors complained that only one operator could
203earn the stab rate, and at a public meeting called during the strike, a
compositors' speaker set forth their claims in relation to mechanisation in
terms that recalled the attitude of the LSC at the time of the Sportsman
d' 204~spute:
Machinery mayor may not be an unmixed good for the labouring classes,
but it ought to be a help for skilled artisans. And i£ it were brought
into play for the purpose of robbing labour of its just rights and claims,
than it was incumbent on us to say, 'Thus far it shall come, but not
farther, and this is in the best interests of our trade and our country.'
Liberty is dear to us, and we shall not barter our birthright - as
the proprietors of the Citizen would have us do - for their mass of
pottage.
The locked out compositors formed a strike paper, the Echo, under a similar
banner which expressed the concept of the rights of skilled labour in the
language of an earlier tradition of political radicalism:205
After some initial success, the Echo, like other papers founded by displaced
hand compositors in England, was transformed into a labour daily financed by
local unions; its growing insolvency, however, precipitated a commercial take-
206over some two years later.
Though the STA convened a conference on composing machines in 1895, linotypesl
were slow to be introduced in Scotland, and it was only in 1896-97 that the region
202 STC Apr.-May 1892.
203 STA AR 1892; The Echo 9.1.1893.
204 Ibid.,10.1.1893.
205 Ibid.,9.l.1893.
206 Gillespie, STA, pp.121-22.
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saw a substantial inrush of machines. Linotypes were then installed in Paisley,
Inverness, Aberdeen, and three new Glasgow offices, as well as in the non-union
207Scotsman office where substantial displacement of hand labour occurred. As
in the English provinces, the difficulties of defending high piece rates,
coupled with an attempt to maximise employment, led Scottish compositors to
. 208favour stab rates on the mach~nes:
They saw that they were not likely to be able to maintain in the
future the very high rates on piece that they had been able to
maintain in the past •••• On the other hand, a stab rate would
provide more employment than a piece rate.
While the STA EC emphasised the limited impact of mechanisation on employment
and therefore opposed any attempt to frame a general machine scale, the Glasgow
branch, which had experienced the greatest displacement of labour opened
negotiations with this aim in mind in 1896.209 Following the ·resolution of an
impasse over the 48 hour week for machine operators, the Glasgow branch signed
an agreement on a piece scale with the employers in 1898, over the objections
of the Executive. A stab agreement quickly followed and this became the chief
210mode of operating the machines throughout Scotland.
Although many branches continued to report displacement of hand compositors
211the STA Executive still felt able to contend in 1898 that:
207 STA ARs 1895-97.
208 Templeton in Report of TA Delegate Meeting 1898, pp.44-45.
209 See STA ARs 1896 and 1897, p.S; also 'Extinguishing the Comp.', STC Jan 1897:
"The displacement of hand labour •••has not yet •••reached an acti~stage."
210 STA ARs 1896-99.
211 STA AR 1898, p.S.
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The encroachments of composing machines have
extent that many of our members anticipated.
enough to be displaced by their introduction
situations elsewhere.
been felt, but not to the
Those who were unfortunate
have been able to find
Thus when the Scottish Linotype Users' Association proposed a conference to
establish a uniform scale for working the machines in 1900, the STA Executive
refused, preferring to continue the branch level negotiations. Significantly,
the employers made no attempt to force the issue and no regional agreements
signed until 1913.212were
The relatively sanguine attitude of the STA Executive toward composing
machines and its reluctance to engage in regional collective bargaining, sprang
not only from the internal traditions of union government, but also from the slow
spread of the machines outside Glasgow and its more limited impact on the
position of hand compositors in provincial towns. Thus while the cheapness of
labour and weakness of union organisation discouraged mechanisation - Edinburgh
book firms as late as 1908 saw cheap female labour as an alternative to mechani-
213sation - the improved productivity and profitability it afforded seems to have
made possible an improvement in the position of Scottish compositors. Thus in
Paisley, the local branch reported that the linotype led to a decline in the
demand for casual labour, while Falkirk noted that the machines stemmed the flow
of apprentices into news offices. EVen in Glasgow, where the pattern more
nearly resembled that of England, mechanisation brought about the elimination of
214the few existing pockets of female labour.
212 STA ~ 1901, pp.13-17.
213 Neill to Fair Wages Committee, q. 4593; Printers' Register, Jan. 1910.
214 MacDonald, Women in the Printing Trades, pp.172-74; STA ARs 1896, p.42 and
1897, p.39.
260
Conclusions
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, significant divergences had
opened up between the outcomes of conflicts between skilled workers and their
employers over the introduction of new technology and the reorganisation of the
division of labour in printing and engineering. In engineering, the employers
had seized on the introduction of new machine tools as the occasion to redouble
their assaults on craft regulation, and by means of their victory in 1898, had
wrested from the ASE its formal acceptance of managerial prerogatives in the
manning and operation of machinery and in the general organisation of production.
In printing, on the other hand, skilled workers had more or less peacefully
obtained relatively complete control over the operation of composing machines,
securing advances of wages and reductions in hours for the machine operators,
together with special rules to protect the interests of the remaining hand
workers. At the same time, however, there were significant regional variations
in the outcomes within printing, attributable to differences in industrial
structure and union political styles. Thus in Scotland, the introduction of the
linotype did not provide the occasion for the emergence of regional collective
bargaining as in the English provinces, while the LSC's superior bargaining
power and more participatory style enabled it to win better protection for hand
workers and larger advances for machine operators than could the more authoritar-
ian TA.
While a comprehensive explanation of these divergences must await our
account of their consolidation and development up to 1914, some preliminary
reflections may be in order here. The first concerns the essential similarity
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in the reactions of skilled engineers and compositors to the threat posed by
the introduction of new machinery. In each case, skilled workers' basic aims
were to neutralise the impact of mechanisation on their position in the division
of labour by capturing exclusive rights to work the new machines, to prevent
any encroachment on craft regulation in matters such as the method of wage
payment or the intensity of supervision, and where possible to win more
advantageous terms in relation to traditional union concerns such as wages,
hours, and overtime.
Thus in a sense, the Webbs were correct to observe a transition in skilled
workers' attitudes towards machinery from opposition to a demand to control its
conditions of operation.215 But if skilled workers had in this respect as i~
. 216others learnt the new "rules of the game" (to use Hobsbawm's memorable phrase),
an alternative set of values underlay their efforts to control the impact of
new machinery on the division of labour which often threw them into conflict
not only with their employers, but with the logic of the market economy itself.
The employers themselves had no doubt that the shift in workers' attitudes was
essentially tactical, and observed that the 1atters' efforts to safeguard their
place in the division of labour irrespective of technical change continued to
mark the essence of their position. Thus one employers' spokesman drew an
explicit parallel between the policy of the ASE and that of the Luddites:217
215 Industrial Democracy, pt. II, ch. VIII; see also Brown, Sabotage, ch. 4.
216 'Custom, Wages and Workload' in Labouring Men.
217 B. Taylor, 'The Machine Question and Eight Hours', Cassier's Magazine, Nov.189
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Just as the handloom weavers of Yorkshire and Lancashire denounced
the power loom for superseding their labour, so the ASE •••say the
labour-saving machinery introduced into modern engineering shops
has taken the place of their craftsmen. Only, instead of denouncing
and trying to destroy, they insist upon the exclusive (or practically
exclusive) rights to the working of the machinery by the members of
their uninn.
Another engineering employer explicitly confronted the Webbs' contention that
. 1 d t h' i that wh~le,2l8un~ons were no onger oppose 0 mac ~nery, argu ng •
This may be true in the main ..•the conditions of introduction are
often so severe that they practically become prohibitive; for it is
not worth while for an employer to introduce labour-saving machinery
if the machinery is to be 'throttled'.
As employers became more militant, moreover, each union was forced to
retreat somewhat from its original strategy of strict regulation. In fact, the
demands ultimately accepted by printing employers in relation .to control of the
machines and the shorter working week were clearly more 'extreme' than those
which precipitated the engineering lockout. Skilled engineers and compositors
were therefore set apart not by the character of their response to mechanisation,
but rather by their differential ability to enforce their demands.
Of crucial importance in this lesser ability of skilled engineers to defend
their position in the division of labour was the vulnerability of their lines of
demarcation to competition from other groups of workers. Whereas the static
technology of the composing room had produced sharp and defensible lines of
demarcation, the previous wave of technical change in engineering had created a
218 F.W. Hirst, 'The Policy of the Engineers', Economic Journal, Mar. 1898, p.l25.
The author had heard the chapter of Industrial Democracy on trade unions and
machinery given as a lecture at the London School of Economics.
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space in the division of labour for new grades of workers who could expect to
be promoted onto better jobs opened up by the new machine tools unless obstructed
by the ASE; at the same time, the variable uses of the new machines made it
impossible to draw up a list of machines which could clearly be reserved for
craftsmen. The structural weakness of the ASE's position had been ex-
acerbated by its own aggressive and sectionalist policies, which alienated not
only the new organisations which had been formed by the less skilled, but also
the more powerful craft unions in adjacent trades whose assistance might have
enabled the engineers to repel the employers offensive.
The differences in the behaviour of the employers were as striking as the
similarities between that of craftsmen in the two industries. Engineering
employers proved capable of creating a strong and centralised national organisatior
to attack the pretensions of craft regulation, while printing employers remained
divided amongst themselves, albeit more strikingly in the London newspaper trade
than in the provinces where the Linotype Users' Association was beginning to
develop more durable forms of employer cooperation and collective bargaining.
The superior cohesion and militancy of the engineering employers was the product
not only of the objective differences between their market position and that of
their counterparts in printing, but also of subjective differences in attitude
rooted in their distinctive experience of technical change and industrial conflict.
Thus engineering employers' experience of a previous wave of technical change
in the 1830s and 40s made them more prepared to believe that the innovations of
the 90s might allow them to displace skilled workers from their central position
in the division of labour, while the intensified normal conflict of the late 80s
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and early 90s disposed them to accept the risks involved in a full-scale
confrontation with the unions. In this respect, compositors were fortunate
that the breakthrough to mechanical composition came in the newspaper sector,
where workers were particularly well organised and employers at once divided
amongst themselves and able to afford the costs of a favourable settlement,
rather than in book printing, where employers were both more cohesive and more
militant.
While these variations in structure and strategy were already beginning
to generate divergent results in the two industries by the turn of the century,
their outcomes had by no means been fully determined. Neither the collective
agreements on composing machines nor the Terms of Settlement fixed the new
division of labour emerging in each industry; rather each set of agreements
defined the framework within which skilled workers and their employers would
contest its shape in the decade and a half before the First World War. In the
succeeding two chapters, we will trace the consolidation and modification in
these preliminary settlements to 1914, first in printing and then in engineering.
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Chapter V
Confrontation and Consolidation:
Printing 1898-1914
By the close of the last decade of the 19th century, the initial storm
clouds over the introduction of the linotype had cleared. In London and the
provinces alike employers had signed collective agreements conceding control of
the new machines to union compositors; despite the evident displacement of
numerous' case hands, especially those over forty, obituaries for the skilled
compositor had proved premature. Yet these arrangements had taken shape rapidly,
before employers had been able either to grasp or put into effect the full pro-
ductive potential of the linotype, and no major test of strength between them-
selves and the unions had cemented the new balance of forces. In fact, the few
strikes connected with the introduction of the machines during the 1890s had
generally resulted in victory for the employers. Hence the collective agreement~
of the 1890s marked an uneasy truce rather than a final settlement, as resentment
over their terms and consequences abounded in both camps.
During the succeeding decade discontent with the high cost of machine
composition and with union restrictions on the use of the machines prompted
printing employers, particularly London newspaper proprietors, to seek major
modifications of the linotype scales. But while several individual proprietors
proved willing to challenge the unions directly, with varying degrees of success,
the intensity of competition and the perishability of their product made newspape
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owners as a group shrink from a major confrontation. It was rather the large
book and jobbing firms, with their more standardised, less perishable product,
who led the resistance to the demands of the printing unions. The linotype was
less central to the operations of the book firms, which found the less cost-
reducing monotype more suitable for their needs; the book proprietors' resistance
was also stiffened by their declining profit margins, their vulnerability to
provincial competition from plants enjoying non-union wages and working conditions
and their own opportunities for decentralising production to the countryside.
Meanwhile, continuing unemployment among older hand compositors, coupled with
widespread discontent over the intensifying pace of work, led the rank and file
and ultimately the printing unions themselves to press with increasing vigour
for a shorter working week and tighter enforcement of craft regulation, especiall}
on machine work. The resulting campaign for a universal 48 hour week, conducted
in alliance with the new unions of the less skilled under the auspices of the
National Printing and Kindred Trades Federation (NPKTF), gave rise to a general
strike of printing workers in London in 1911; a nationwide strike was averted
only by a last minute agreement between provincial unions and employers' associ-
ations. While the outcome of the strike in London was initially something of
a stalemate, ultimately resolved in favour of the unions through government
intervention and tight wartime labour markets, the ability of the unions to
withstand a prolonged strike marked a crucial step in the consolidation of their
control over composing machinery and in the ascendency of craft regulation in
the industry as a whole. Similarly, in scotland, an alliance between skilled
compositors and the new unions of the less skilled was able to win the eliminatior.
of the underpaid female labour which had been the historic source of weakness for
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the STA, especially in Edinburgh, and thereby to establish the control of
Scottish compositors over machinery and working conditions generally on a par
with that of their English counterparts. In this chapter, we will trace
the mounting pressures towards confrontation between workers and employers
which reached their crescendo in the 1911 London printing strike, together with
the growing consolidation of craft regulation in the industry.
London
While conflicts over the introduction of the linotype had initially been
most acute in the provinces, with the conclusion of the first collective
agreements the storm centre of conflict between workers and employers shifted
to the faster-paced and more profitable world of London newspaper printing. The
Lse's acceptance of a revised piece scale in 1896 by no means silenced employers'
complaints about the working of the machines. The large number of 'extra'
charges in the new scale pushed up the price of machine composition substantially;
many proprietors accordingly began to demand the institution of a stab rate for
daily news work on the machines. (Stab rates were already in force for book and
weekly news work on the machines.) Initially, as We noted earlier, the Lse had
preferred stab work until it could ascertain the capabilities of the machines,
while the proprietors had called for piece rates to push up output. By July
1897, feeling among daily news compositors ran so strongly in favour of piece
rates that they vehemently rejected an offer from the employers of a stab rate
1at a level that they had demanded only four years before.
1 Bowerman to TA Delegate Meeting 190B, pp.46-4B.
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At a conference early in 1899, a group of newspaper proprietors led by
the Linotype Users' Association demanded a cut of ~d/l,OOO in the piece rate
2and the creation of a stab rate for daily news work. At a mass meeting held
in late March, news compositors overwhelmingly rejected a daily news stab rate
as denying them the full value of their labour, as interfering with their
freedom, and as conducive to the abuses connected with piece-stab.3 The
proprietors of the St. James Gazette then locked out their society compositors,
replacing them with blacklegs from the Linotype Company's training school, much
4as union leaders had feared; the office remained closed to the LSC thereafter.
LSC members responded in May by voting a strike levy of ls per person for six
weeks to prepare for a possible confrontation. In the event, however, only the
Morning Herald (the former Morning, which had returned to a union basis under
new management earlier that year followed the St. James Gazette's lead, threat-
ening a lockout if a news stab rate were not introduced. Under this duress, the
Trade Committee accepted a stab wage of 63s per week, which was in turn rejected
by the News Department. The threatened lockout ensued, followed by union picket-
ing, boycotts, and circulars; the office was closed to the society, but the paper
itself did not long survive, and the St. James Gazette followed it into oblivion
5soon thereafter.
2 LSC 'MS. Report to a Special General Meeting, 25.3.1899', Special Reports, MRC.
3 Ibid.; see also above, pp.14l-42.
4 Printers' Register, May 1899.
5 Ibid., Sept. 1899; LUA MC June, July, and Sept. 1899; MFA MC Sept. 1899;
LSC Jubilee Souvenir, 1848-1923 (1923), p.22. For a statement by the new
proprietor of the Morning Herald of his views on the issues at stake in the
dispute, and the advantages of a news stab rate, see MFA MC Sept. 1899,
pp.332-36.
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Meanwhile, renewed militancy was developing among the LSC rank and file.
In February 1899, a Delegate Meeting passed a resolution demanding a rise in
the ordinary stab rate - which had stood at 38s since 1891 - to 42s; a supporting
statement to the Trade Committee from the chapel of the large book firm Wyman
and Sons argued sharply that the real wages of London Compositors had fallen
behind those of the machine minders in absolute terms, as well as relatively
behind those of their provincial counterparts, while the strong financial
position of the society justified a militant approach. At the same time, a
movement led by the unemployed chapel pressed for a conference with the employers
to secure the 48 hour week and to place new limits on overtime. The Executive
cautioned that raising the book scale would only accelerate the departure of
. 6
large book firms from London, but its objections were overridden by the members.
In the face of this upsurge of militancy, the employers temporarily
abandoned their demands for a cut in machine piece scales and for a daily news
6 Lse Trade Reports 1899; LSC AR 1899, p.22; 'MS. Report to a Special General
Meeting, 21.10.1899', Special Reports, which includes the text of the Wyman's
resolution. The previous year had seen the LSC launch a campaign for the
revision of its overtime rules which would have prohibited members from
working overtime two days running without an intervening absence of eight
hours from the office. After initially refusing to respect this rule, the
master printers ultimately signed an agreement in March 1899 which established
not only the principle of the eight hours' break, but also that overtime
rates should apply to the following day's work if the compositor had not
been permitted to go home the night before. LSC ARs, 1898-1900; the text of
the agreement appears in AR 1900, p.4l. On the movement of book work out of
London, see the reply of the London MFA to the LSC's memorial of 1890, reprinte
in Howe, London Compositor, pp.325-26; and the testimony of Bowerman to se On
Stationery Contracts.
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stab rate. In the spring of 1900, an Lse General Meeting endorsed the
proposals of the unemployed to make the 48 hour week and higher oVertime rates
central planks of the advance movement; speakers for the resolution argued that
the reduction of the working week would lower unemployment since the intensi-
fication of labour had reached its limits during the previous decade. Given
the narrow majority in favour of the 48 hour week, the Trade Committee judged
the time inopportune to press the employers on the issue. Once again, however,
their decision was overturned by a stormy General Meeting in September, which
7reaffirmed the demand for a shorter working week and a 5d/hour overtime rate.
The resulting memorial to the employers called for a 40s stab wage for call-
hands, the 48 hour week, and an increased overtime rate. These demands were
justified by reference to rapidly rising prices, especially rents, together with
the increased commuting time consequent on suburbanisation; under pressure from
b i , 8the Executive, the union announced its willingness to accept ar ~trat~on.
Initially, the employers refused to consider the LSe's demand, but faced
with a strike levy they eventually agreed to accept arbitration by George
9Askwith of the Board of Trade. In the ensuing arbitration, the Lse representativE
argued that the economic position of the London compositor had deteriorated
relative to other skilled trades, while the linotype had effected a 20% rise in
output per man since 1891. The result was a marked intensification of work
, 10for all compos~tors:
7 'MS. Report to a Special General Meeting, 29.9.1900', Lse Special Reports;
LUA Me Oct.-Nov. 1900.
8 Memorial in LSe Trade Reports 1901.
9 'MS. Report to a Special General Meeting, 5.1.1901', Lse Special Reports.
10 Notes of the Proceedings of an Arbitration between the Lse and the London MFA
before G.R. Askwith, 11.2.1901 (1901), p.56.
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Under existing conditions - the alteration in the keen competition
for work perhaps - we find that the position of the compositor has
materially altered in that there is a higher pressure and a higher
speed •••required of the worker today than formerly.
The Master Printers dominated by the large book and jobbing firms offered one
basic argument in opposition: the existing disparity between labour costs in
London and the provinces:ll
Provincial competition ..•is the crux of the whole question. If you
make work in London more expensive than it can be done for in the
provinces, it naturally follows that the work will go where it can
be done cheapest.
Askwith awarded the LSC an increase of ls in the stab rate (to 39s) and a
reduction of the working week to 52~ hours (from 54); while explicitly cautioning
the union in his award about the increasing importance of provincial competition
in the book trade.
Askwith's warning rapidly proved well founded. Fifteen firms resigned
from the MPA rather than grant the terms of the arbitration while others stepped
up the pace of decentralisation to avoid the new rates, as the trade papers
assured the employers that 'There's Plenty of Room Outside.12 Large book and
jobbing firms such as Unwin's (Woking), Clowes and Company (Beccles, Suffolk),
Hazell, Watson, and Viney (Aylesbury), and Kelley and Company (Kingston) had
all established country plants in the area surrounding the metropolis before
1900; in the wake of the arbitrator's award Wyman's, Harmsworth and Son (Gravesene
and Adlard and Son were driven to follow suit.13
11 Ibid., p.132.
12 R. Lake (FMP) to Industrial Council, Enquiry into Industrial Agreements,
Minutes of Evidence, q. 6432; article in the Daily Express 28.3.1901,
reprinted in MPA MC Jan.-Feb. 1901
13 Unwin's: A Century of Progress (1926), pp.37-38; Report of Linotype Company
Shareholders' Meeting, 23.3.1896, Webb Coll. EB LXXIV, f.60, p.24; LUA MC
Apr. 1901; Report of TA RC 1901; Alford, Letterpress Printing, pp.74-77-.-
The high cost of land as well as that of labour was an added factor promoting
decentralisation: see W. Hazell, lecture to the London Chamber of Commerce on
'Advantages and Disadvantages of Removal of Works from London in the Country' ,
reprinted in MPA MC May 1905, pp.59-60; cf. also Hall, Industries of London,
ch.6.
272
Militant spirits among the employers continued to fulminate against the
LSC. Major Vane Stowe, Secretary of the London MPA was quoted in a newspaper
report in June 1901 to the effect that it would perhaps have been better had a
strike ensued "to teach the men the identity of interests between themselves
and their employers" while urging London employers to move to the country
14"where labour is cheaper and the domination of the LSC can be escaped."
Similarly, Hart, the Managing Director of the Financial Times observed at the
LUA Annual General Meeting in 1901 that:1S
In London our difficulties are not so much the price we pay per 1,000 •••
it is the multitudinous and vexatious conditions imposed upon us by the
Society in working these machines. Some of these are of a most troublesome
kind. We have charges for lifted matter and a resistance of any knowledge
of what an operator may be setting even if we are paying the piece price.
The same year brought the grievances of printing employers to the attention of
a wider audience with the publication of E.A. Pratt's articles in the Times on
'Trade Unionism and the Crisis in British Industry', which accused compositors
among a multitude of sins of systematically restricting output on composing
machines, charges reaffirmed in a more temperate and knowledgeable reply by the
Managing Director'of the Manchester Guardian in the pages of the Economic Journk~
Yet despite the exhortations of men like Hart that employers should force the
unions "•••to stand face to face with us as a body, in the same way that they
14 Printers' Register, June 1901; but cf. reports of his retraction in ibid.,
July 1901.
15 LUA ~ May 1901. 'Lifted matter' refers to block advertisements charged by
the compositors even if supplied from outside.
16 E.A. Pratt, Trade Unionism and British Industry (1902), pp.148-52; G.B. Diblee
'The Printing Trades and the Crisis in British Industry', Economic Journal
Mar. 1902. For employers' comments on both pieces, see MPA MC Jan.-Feb. 1902;
for union refuations, see TC Feb. 1902, pp.1-4.
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take care we should attack them", most London newspaper proprietors were
reluctant to join the LUA or to cooperate with the Linotype Company's training
school, presumably because of fears of being drawn into a confrontation with
th . 17e un~ons.
Following the settlement of the 1901 advance movement, London newspaper
employers immediately resumed their pressure on the LSC to renegotiate the
machine scale, demanding a stab rate for daily news work, the right to shift
machine hands to case as the occasion arose, and the establishment of a
standing committee composed of equal numbers of employer and union representativE
which would be empowered both to adjudicate disputes over the interpretation of
existing agreements and to enact new rules as necessary. The employers were
prepared to pay as much 67s 6d as a stab wage for morning papers (for a 42 hour
week, with 47s 6d for evening papers), but the rank and file remained adamant on
all three of the disputed points: the Executive reported that the membership
18would reject even a £10 stab rate.
With negotiations still stalemated at the end of 1903, a new management
at the Daily News determined to follow the example of the Morning Herald and
17 Diblee, 'Printing Trades', pp.6-7; complaints of the Linotype Company in
Newspaper Society MC May 1901.
18 'Report to Special General Meeting, 1.11.1902' and circulars of proposed
changes in machine scale, LSC Trade Reports 1901-1903; Printers' Register,
Dec. 1901 and Feb. 1903; statements by Bowerman and Vane Stow regarding
news stab rate in ibid., supplements, June 1903, pp.iii-iv, and Oct, 1903,
pp.ii-v; report by Hart to LUA Annual General Meeting, LUA MC May 1903.
See also a letter from the 'LSC Vigilance Committee' insisting that machine
operators should not be permitted to do case work, Fleet Street, 11.2.1903;
the employers' case is set out at length in Hart, 'The Trouble in the Printin~
Trade', Magazine of Commerce, June 1903, pp.398-400.
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the St. James Gazette in imposing a stab rate by force. In February 1904,
therefore, the News locked out its union compositors, replacing them with a
complete alternative staff which had secretly been recruited in advance. The
experiment was not, however, a great success; according to a deputy editor of
19the paper:
The chaos in the composing room on that first night was so hellish, and
the paper, when at last it was brought out was such an apalling journal-
istic nightmare, that John Burns ..•was hurriedly called in to effect a
'settlement.'
The compromise negotiated by Burns entailed the News rehiring its union men in
exchange for a case rather than a machine stab rate (advantageous in relation
to display work); the blacklegs were paid off at a cost to the paper of some
£4,000.20
The outcome of the attempted coup de main at the Daily News, like that of
previous clashes between London newspaper proprietors and compositors over the
working of the linotype, heightened the uncertainty of the situation. To
dispense with the services of union compositors clearly enhanced managerial
freedom in the operation of the machines and might prove successful in the
longer run, as it had on some Scottish papers in the 1870s; but given the
complexities of producing a daily newspaper and the LSC's control over the Fleet
Street labour market, such experiments might prove costly and inefficient in
other respects, as at the Daily News; where persisted in they might undermine
the position of an already weak paper, as at the Morning Herald, the St. James
19 E.C. Bentley, Those Days (1940), p.240.
20 Printers' Register, Feb. 1904 and supplement; LUA MC Feb. 1904; MPA MC Feb.
1904; circular from Daily News 'ship, 'The Daily News and Its 58th
Anniversary', Webb Coll. EB LXXVII, f.2.
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Gazette and earlier at the Scottish Leader, each of which closed within a few
years of dismissing their union compositors.
The settlement at the News fanned the flames of militancy on both sides.
Despite the discomfiture of the News, the LUA deplored the moderation of the
. t b . 21propr~e ors, 0 serv~ng:
It is to be hoped that the Lse will profit by the timely warning they
have received. When a body of men can be secured from different towns
capable of producing a 16 page edition of a London daily in the manner
performed by the union men who were engaged for that purpose, it is
clearly demonstrated that the trade unions do not monopolise all the
best workmen in the craft. We understand that not one train was missed
while the non-unionists were producing the paper.
Similarly, Hart of the Financial Times called for the free use of the machines
which were "•••hedged around with all kinds of prohibitions and all kinds of
claims - how it should be worked and when it should be worked ......, citing the
example of the News as demonstrating the possibility of putting out a daily
paper without the LSC. On the union side, a General Meeting overwhelmingly
rejected a proposal to allow machine hands to work at case for up to 16 hours
per week, fearing accelerated displacement of hand workers. Meanwhile, opposi-
tion to the settlement persisted in the News Department, though it was not until
August of the following year that the London newsmen passed a resolution
demanding the abolition of stab for case hands at the Daily News. Given the
intensity of bad feelings and distrust on both sides, negotiations between the
22employers and the LSC ground to a halt.
21 LUA MC Feb. 1904.
22 'Ballot on Dual System', 17.6.1904, LSe Trade Reports 1904; Resolution of
News Department on Daily News, Printers' Register, Jan, 1906, supplement.
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During the same period, the monotype began to be introduced in London,
primarily in book houses, but also on some weekly and monthly periodicals.
Applying the principle of the Jacquard loom to typesetting, the monotype
consisted of two parts, a keyboard and a caster. The keyboard punched holes
in a tape which when fed into the caster produced freshly cast moveable types
which could be melted down and reused. As with the linotype, the traditional
problems of distribution and justification were largely overcome, while the
advantage for book work lay in the fact that the tapes could be stored and
reused for reprints. While the monotype's cost reduction in relation to hand
labour was somewhat less dramatic than that afforded by the linotype, (a
savings of 50% as opposed to 66%) its special suitability for book production
ensured a rapid diffusion: by 1913 60 London establishments had installed a
23total of 250 keyboards.
The LSe began to formulate a scale for the monotype in 1902, eventually
settling on a rate of 3d/l,OOO for book work and 3 1/8d/l,ODO for weekly news
with stab fixed at 45s. These proposals' were rejected out of hand by the
employers, who refused to consider a monotype piece scale and were determined to
secure more advantageous terms than they had for the linotype, and no general
agreement was reached in London until 1923. Most newspapers did not use mono-
23 J.S. Elias, The Monotype from a Printer's Point of View, (FMP, 1908) i Hart,
The Linotype; Alford, Letterpress Printing, pp.50-63. In many respects, the
monotype more closely resembled the most recent phase of innovation in type-
setting than did the linotype; in early forms of photocomposition, the
typesetter likewise produces a coded tape which when fed into the computer
results directly in printed copy rather than in lead as with the monotype.
On the monotype, see the technical literature cited in chapter IV, notes 78
and 88; on more recent developments, see A. Smith, Goodbye Gutenberg: The
Newspaper Revolution of the 1980s (Oxford, 1980), especially chapter 6.
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types, though the Times, then a non-union house, installed them in 1909.24
Despite its failure to negotiate a scale with the employers, the LSC on
the whole retained control of the monotypes, most of which were worked on stab.
This control was not, however, maintained without challenge from the employers:
the major threat came from the latter's attempt to introduce women on the
machines, which was turned back only after a complex legal battle. In the wake
of Taff Vale, the London book firm of Straker and Sons introduced female
operators on the monotypesi the LSC struck and were followed by all the other
printing trades under the auspices of the metropolitan PKTF. The firm then
unsuccessfully sought an injunction against picketing and began an action for
damages against the LSC for conspiracy, which it withdrew in the face of an
unfavourable decision in the related case of Ward and Lock.25 After this
preliminary trial of strength, no major employer challenged the LSC's control
of the machines, though women were employed as monotype operators in some small
shops in London and more frequently in the provinces, at least up to 1914.26
The end of 1905 saw the revival of forward movement within the LSC with
the adoption by a large majority of a limit on overtime of eight hours per man
24 When the Times changed hands in 1914 and became a union house, an agreement
was reached with the LSC on a monotype scale. Child, Industrial Relations,
p.182.
25 LSC AR 1904, p.32; C.J. Bundock, The Story of the National Union of Printing,
Bookbinding, and Paper Workers (Oxford, 1959), pp.143-44; Clegg, Fox, and
Thompson, Trade Unions, pp.347-48; see also below, p.303.
26 Cf. TA Delegate Meeting 1903, p.29. Unlike the TA, the Lse did not seek to
control the monotype caster and so avoided conflict with the employers on this
issue. On the monotype in London, see Child, Industrial Relations, pp.18l-82i
and reports of negotiations and provisional scales in LSC Trade Reports
1902-5; see also the account of the LSC Quarterly Delegate Meeting 5.11.1902
in Fleet Street, 17.1.1903.
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per week. Similarly, a Delegate Meeting in January 1906 voted stiff fines
for any compositor accepting the bonus payments to which the employers were
27resorting along with time clocks in an effort to increase output.
The mounting tensions between the LSC and London printing employers came
to a head over the Hampton's dispute in 1906. Following a dispute with its
machine minders earlier in the year, the proprietors of this London book firm
decided to convert to a non-union house, locking out its previously neutral LSC
compositors along with other trade unionists. Suspicion mounted within union
circles that the London MPA was masterminding the dispute in an effort to break
the deadlock over the monotype scale and the machine stab rate on a house by
house basis; Alf Evans of the Warehousemen and Cutters (also Secretary of the
London section of the National Printing and Kindred Trades Federation) reported
that at a meeting with the Hampton's manager and Vane Stow of the MPA, the
28latter informed him that,
•••If he was starting a printing office tomorrow, he would not employ a
single Trade Unionist: and in spite of the fact that the Compositors had
refused to withdraw their men, he strongly advised Mr Reeks to lock them
out, and held out as an inducement that if he did so "he would undertake
both to find him men and to get all his work done for him until such time
as he had filled their places."
27 'Report of Special Committee on Overtime' and ballot 14.10.1905, LSC Trade
Reports 1905; on bonuses, 'Report to Quarterly Delegate Meeting 1.1.1906'
in ibid., 1906, and leader in LTJ June 1906, pp.5-6. For employers'
arguments on bonuses, see LUA Annual General Meeting 1904, LUA MC May 1904.
A similar motion to raise the price of casual labour was rejected by Lse
members in the autumn of 1905: MPA MC Sept. 1905. For a strike at Hazell,
Watson, and Viney over the introduction of time clocks in 1905, see Alford,
Letterpress Printing, p.7l.
28 A. Evans to Daily News, 16.6.1906, quoted in LSC, 'Committee's Report on the
Negotiations with the Master Printers' Association', 9.6.1906, p.12, LSC
Trade Reports 1906. This document also contains an extensive account of
the background to the dispute.
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An LSC Special General Meeting therefore voted in June to present the London
MPA with an ultimatum calling for a general strike of London compositors
together with the other Federated printing unions for the 48 hour week if the
Hampton's men were not immediately reinstated; the eight hour per week overtime
limit which the employers had refused to discuss was likewise to be implemented
on the spot. Upon receiving this ultimatum, the newspaper proprietors promptly
withdrew from the MFA (which had all along denied any involvement) to form a
separate negotiating body, the Newspaper Proprietors' Association. So great
was their desire to avoid the disruption of a city-wide printing strike that
they secured the settlement of the Hampton's dispute, reportedly by paying off
the management to the tune of £6,000.29
Flushed with the collapse of the employers' front in the Hampton's dispute
and agitated by the sharp downturn in trade after 1907, Lse militants pressed
forward on all fronts. The movement to improve the position of the casual hands
and to eliminate the remaining vestiges pf piece-stab which had begun in 1905
gathered momentum, based as it was on longstanding union preoccupations. As an
LSC circular argued in 1907:30
29 LSC, 'Committee's Report on the Settlement of the Dispute with the Master
Printers' Association', 2.16.1906, LSC Trade Reports 1906; MFA MC June 1906;
Printers' Register June 1906; Howe and Waite, LSC, pp.3l6-l7. In return for
their mediation the newspaper proprietors secured an agreement from the LSC
that it would negotiate separately with them in the future, and that it would
enter into a conference with the London MFA over the new overtime limit. The
machine operators within the LSC, interestingly enough, also began to feel
the need to safeguard their special interests within the union shortly after
this dispute, forming a 'Machine Compositors' Vigilance Association', LTJ
Jan. 1908. An attempt to form a breakaway union of machine compositors faile(
in l89B, as it had in 1895-6; see LSC AR 1899, p.22, and above, pp.
For other examples of conflicts between case and machine hands, see Printers'
Register, May 1910, MFA MC I-tay1910.
30 T.E. Naylor, 'Committee's Report
LSC Trade Reports 1907; cf. also
MPA ~ Sept. 1905.
on Casual Labour and Piece-Stab', 4.6.1907,
the letter from an LSC member reprinted in
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The position of those of our .membazs who are numbered among the
casually employed has long been a matter of serious concern to
the trade at large. It appears- to be inevitable, from the nature
of our calling that a certain proportion of our members must be
available at all times to meet the specific contingencies of the
business as they arise. This fluctuation of work in the different
seasons of the year results in the frequent displacement of a large
number of men who are thus deprived of that continuity of employment
which alone enables them to earn a living wage.
The Lsa voted accordingly to increase the rate for casual work from 9d to lOd
per hour, and to fix the minimum engagement for casual hands at two days, with
the aim of cutting the practice to the minimum. To curtail the element of task
work being imposed where piece-stab was still in operation, LSC stab hands were
urged to write bills (i.e. submit a written account) only for the number of
31hours worked rather than for the number of lines composed. The LSC's militant
campaign once again led the master printers to concede ground: the union's
proposals on casual labour were accepted by the MFA at the beginning of 1908,
though union spokesmen later complained that many firms evaded the agreement.32
On the organisational front, the forward movement was reflected in the
union's strenuous efforts to extend its control to non-society houses, not only
within the London radius but also beyond. (The London radius was 15 miles from
the GPO.) Though most of its attempts to colonise London houses were unsuccessfu=
the society captured Spottiswoode's, a major holdout since 1836, through a
revolt of the employees against the proprietors' wishes.33 In June 1907, after
31 'Report on Casual Labour and Piece-Stab'.
32 LSC, 'Casual Engagements', Trade Reports 1907; Naylor to Industrial Council,
Enquiry into Industrial Agreements, Minutes of Evidence, q. 8392.
33 Printers' Register July 1908; on unsuccessful attempts to reopen Unwin's
Eyre and Spottiswoode's,Ballantyne's, and Hanson and Company, see the
organiser's reports in AR 1907, p.4l; for the Globe and the Times, see ibid.,
1908, p.54.
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the breakdown of amalgamation negotiations with the TA precipitated by the
34decentralisation of London firms the Lse unilaterally extended its radius
to 40 miles from the GPO, establishing branches at St. Albans, Towbridge,
Watford, Letchworth, and Dorking.35
The most important development within the LSe, however, was the growing
commitment of its membership to the demand for the 48 hour week. In 1907, the
National Printing and Kindred Trades Federation to which the LSC was affiliated
invited the society to ballot its members on a joint movement for the 48 hour
week; the Lse voted in favour by a margin of 7,512 to 533.36 With unemployment
at its highest levels since 1894 and concentrated among older members by the
impact of composing machines, a Special Committee of the LSC reported in 190$
in favour of the 48 hour week as the basic solution to the overall problem.
Hence when the NPKTF presented its memorial for the 48 hour week to the employers
in May 1909, the LSC was solidly behind it.37
In some senses the demand for the 48 hour week was qualitatively new,
supported as it was by arguments referring to the increasing importance of
34 See below, pp.300-l.
35 Howe and Waite, LSC, p.274. The LSC had been trying to organise workers in
provincial branches of London firms even before 1907: see Printers' Register,
Feb.-Mar. 1906.
36 LSe AR 1911, p.32; on the history of the NPKTF, see below, pp.293 ff.
37 The Special Committee's report accepted the view that mechanisation might
ultimately increase employment by increasing demand, and argued that composing
machines were a contributing but not determining cause of increased unemploy-
ment. 'Report of SC on Unemployment', LSC Trade Reports, 1908. For other
complaints about unemployment, see ~Jan-Mar. 1906.
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commuting time and the intensification of work resulting from mechanisation;
but at the same time, this demand flowed directly from the traditional
strategies of craft regulation. This link between old and new in union
strategies can be seen quite clearly in an article on labour-saving machinery
in the London Typographical Journal:38
What can the Trade Unions do to ward off the worst effects of this
disturber of their peace? Fight the machine as did the Sheffield
operatives of old? Cut the straps, withdraw the screws, clog the
gears? No - a thousand noes; that way madness lies. For though
master of our destiny today, tomorrow the machine will be the servant
of all. Till that day arrives the Trade Unions must frame a policy
of their own. First and foremost, the unions must safeguard every
approach to the machine taking care that none but their own members
shall have a hand in its manipulation. Selfish though the policy of
exclusion may appear to be to our critics, it is the only means the
Trade Unionists have of stemming the influx of cheap labour that usually
coincides with the introduction of labour-saving machinery, and while
consenting to cooperate with the employers, the unions must insist on
their members being paid the maximum rate of wages possible under the
new conditions. The users of the machine will never fail to reap a
rich harvest; therefore, it is but fair that the operatives should
receive a greater share of the increased product, especially when it
is remembered that they will be called upon to help support the dis-
placed men out of work.
In this quotation are crystallised all the ambiguities of the 48 hours movement
from the perspective of the skilled compositor: an element of socialist rhetoric
and analysis, coupled with forward looking demands, emerging from and reaffirmin~
the traditional framework of craft regulation and exclusiveness in the face of
mechanisation. As we shall see below, the struggle for the 48 hour week would
become the focus not only of workers' resentments about the consequences of
mechanisation, but of those of their employers as well.
38 Ibid., Jan. 1906, p.13.
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Provinces
Although the focus of conflict over mechanisation shifted strongly to
London in the decade after 1908, it should not be supposed that the provinces
remained entirely quiet. In fact, despite the absence of any strikes over
mechanisation as such, the TA's expenditure on strike and victimisation benefits
averaged nearly 2,000 a year higher between 1899 and 1908 than during the
b h i " d ' 39tur ulent period of the mac ~nes ~ntro uct~on. While the 1898 stab rate
agreement had averted the threat of a clash between employers and the TA, and
had provided a new framework for collective bargaining, the agreement itself
was fraught with ambiguities and soon generated divergent interpretations.
The employers treated the l2~% advance case rates as a maximum, while the
TA in turn naturally argued that it be treated as a ~inimum, with stronger
branches entitled to keep the higher rates already in force. The ~embers of the
LUA therefore began to enforce wage cuts On the machines, and when the Oldham
branch of the TA held out for its 40s rate, the employers threatened reprisals
against the union. Despite much bitterness, the LUA position prevailed in
practice, as machine operators recouped lost wages through increased overtime,
and thus lost the benefit of shorter hours.40
A second important area of dispute arose over the relationship between
machine and case rates. Here, the LUA maintained that the l2~% referred to
39 1893-98, E449 per year, 1899-1908, El,385 per year, derived from a table
in Musson, TA, p.536.
40 The 1898 agreement provided for higher rates of overtime pay only once
normal case hours had been worked. TA Executive Council Minutes, 18.11.1899;
LUA MC Jan.-Feb. 1899; TC Jan. 1899; Musson, ~, p.238. On overtime, see
Report of RC 1899; LUA MC Dec. 1898; LUA Annual General Meeting reported in
TC June 1899.
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case rates existing in December 1898, while the TA insisted on automatic pro
rata readjustments. The LUA rejected arbitration, so that a reversion to local
bargaining soon threatened. While the TA Executive could not force the LUA
to accept the principle of automatic readjustment, its position quickly prevailec
as a result of a series of local collisions.41 A third sticking point lay in
the employers' demand that they be permitted to transfer machine operators to
case at will, especially in jobbing houses where the nature of the work varied
considerably. The TA sought to impose tight controls over this new version of
the dual system, which had been rejected in London as prejudicial to the
interests of the case hands; on this issues as well, the union's conviction of
, 42weakness led it to give way in pract~ce.
Under these circumstances, considerable rank and file discontent with
the terms of the agreement naturally persisted. An upturn in trade in 1901-2
generated a host of local advance movements, many pressing with considerable
success to recoup the 1898 machine wage cuts. Several branches, for example,
contested the overtime provisions of the agreement, demanding that higher rates
come into effect after 48 hours. Elsewhere demands were raised for a shorter
working week, as in Bolton, Sheffield, and York; in the latter two towns joint
movements for the 50 hour week coordinated through the local PKTF secured
d t' t 53 d 52 h ' 1 43re uc 10ns 0 an ours respect1ve y. The London correspondent of the
41 LUA MC May-June 1901, May 1902j TA Delegate Meeting Report 1903, p.25; Musson,
TA, pp.238-39.
42 Operators transferred to case were guaranteed half a day's pay at the machine
rate. LUA MC May 1901; TA, Report of Delegate Meeting 1903, pp.28-29~ MUsson,
TA, p.239.
43 LUA MC Dec. and Feb. 1900; PKTF, Report of 13th Meeting, 31.8.1901, p.3.
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Typographical Circular doubtless spoke for many compositors when he urged that
employers' pressures for increased output be met by sending overzealous workmen
44to 'Coventry':
Employers are no longer satisfied with average results some try coercion,
others coaxing, others bribing to get more, but so long as the master's
and workman's interests are unidentical, the master may try to get as
much, but the workman will try to give as little as he reasonably can.
Similarly, the union's Representative Council, motivated by traditional moral
and economic arguments against piece work, met proposals from the employers for
a national piece scale by calling fro the outright abolition of the practice.45
On the apprenticeship question, where the employers were seeking an extension
of the established 1:3 ratio for larger offices, the conference of Midland
Branches in 1902 passed a resolution calling for the strict observance of the
existing rule to minimise the displacement of hand labour; a motion from
Nottingham to limit apprenticeship still further was rejected only because of
46a general conviction of weakness.
Employers were no more satisfied than union members with the results of
the agreement. The LUA continued to press for a machine piece scale, initially
formulated as a uniform rate with modest cost of living increments for larger
47towns. Equally important, however, was employers' discontent with the output
of the machines and with the union's attitude to bonuses and measurement of
output. Employers began to use slugs and inducators to measure output on stab,
a practice which engendered sharp responses from opponents of 'task work' among
the rank and file. Disputes broke out over these issues in 1899 at the Cardiff
44 TC Dec. 1900.
45 TA, Report of RC 1901; cf. also a similar unsuccessful motion at the previous
year's RC meeting.
46 TC Nov. 1902, pp. 4, 13.
47 TA, Report of Delegate Meeting 1903, p. 24; Musson, TA, p. 240.
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Western .Mail (run by Lascelles Carr, Chairman of the LUAl and at a large
48Leicester book firm; the latter was closed to TA members. Under pressure
from the employers, the union Executive agreed to permit output measurement,
provided that the operator was not called upon to conduct the measurement
itself nor the results used to impose a task work regime.49 Nevertheless, the
employers insisted that the union's attitude .....was undoubtedly intended as a
means of restricting the output of the machines," and Pratt's accusations to
h f 'th 'd 1 ' 1 '1 50t is e fect in the Times met W1 W1 e approva 1n emp oyer C1rc es.
It was in this context that the Linotype Company stepped up its training
programme in the provinces, predicting that51
•.•before a very long time has elapsed, there will be more difficulty
in getting a really good jobbing hand than a linotype operator able to
do his 6,000 ens an hour.
Similarly, a speaker at the LUA Annual General Meeting in 1901 won applause
for his plea to newspaper proprietors to educate their readership for the
inevitable confrontation with the unions:52
There is no class of the community and no class of operatives more
sensitive to criticism, I think, than the journeyman printer. Might
we not use the power we have as newspaper proprietors, and occasionally
give them, through the newspapers, some of that criticism which is about
the least thing they desire. You will have to face this fact that bye
and bye you will have to fight the operators. This will depend very
largely at the time upon the public sentiment. Now we might do a great
deal with regard to the future by educating public opinion, by informing
the public of the methods adopted by the printers.
48 MFA MC June 1899; LUA MC Apr. 1899.
49 TA EC Minutes, 2.12.1899, quoted in Musson, TA, pp.346-47; Report of RC 1900.
50 LUA Annual General Meeting, reported in TC June 1899; LUA MC May 1900; Diblee,
'Printing Trades'; MFA MC Jan.-Feb. 1902.
51 LUA MC May 1900.
52 Ibid., May 1901.
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But despite the dissension in both camps, the TA Executive Council and
its policy of moderate regulation remained firmly in control of the situation.
While some speakers at the 1903 Delegate Meeting reiterated their opposition to
piecework ~ se, the delegates voted the Executive plenary powers to conclude
a machine piece agreement with the LUA, while reaffirming support for a tolerant
line on linotype indicators. At the same time, the Representative Council,
whose influence had been declining since its unsuccessful opposition to the
1898 machine stab agreement, was abolished, a step which marked a clear restor-
ation of Executive control over union policy after the challenges from below
sparked off in the 90s by the struggle over the linotype.53 The EC itself
was replaced by a 'District Executive Council', whose members were elected on a
regional basis, but Manchester was still over-represented in the new structure,
and this reform did little to ease the stranglehold of the General Secretary and
. 54his circle over un10n government.
The linotype piece agreement concluded in October 1903 represented a
clear victory for the Executive's strategy. The proposals of the LUA for a
'universal' piece rate were bypassed, as were attempts to abolish 'extras' and
legitimate bonuses. Piece prices on the machines were set at one third of
current case rates in each branch, with a minimum of 2dJl,OOO, 15% extra for
night work, and a guarantee of 30 hours composition per week with standing time
53 For a self-congratulatory speech by the General Secretary on the success of
the EC's strategy regarding composing machines, see Report of RC 1900, p.13;
and for a similar view, see 'Capital and Labour', TC Nov. 1900, where the
far-seeing policies of the Executive are counterposed to the "hasty and ill-
advised line of conduct" advocated by "some rabid enthusiasts".
54 TA, Report of Delegate Meeting 1903; Musson, TA, pp.146-47.
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55paid for at the machine s.tab rate. This agreement did not in practice
satisfy the employers' desires for higher output at lower rates, and few if any
introduced piecework on these terms, so that stab became universal in the years
56that followed. Consequently, employers turned their attention even more
strongly to methods of increasing output on stab; as the President of the LUA
told its Annual General Meeting in 1904.57
•••We did not look for any satisfactory solution of the rate of
remuneration for setting on the linotype machines until they had
recognised what is known as the bonus system.
The next few years saw the TA confronted by mounting pressures from the
newly established Federation of Master Printers (FMPy8for an extension of the
apprenticeship scale and for a monotype agreement which would be more favourable
to employers than those governing the linotype had proved. In these negotiations
as in previous encounters with employers, the TA EC appears to have been guided
by a pervasive conviction of organisational weakness - founded in part on its
own reluctance to rely on independent rank and file initiatives - and was there-
fore prepared to make concessions rather than risk a full-scale confrontation.
Certainly, the failure of the only major strike of the period, a five month
attempt to win an advance in the stab rate in Hull in 1904, despite the cooper-
ation of the local PKTF could only have reinforced this perspective.59 Hence
55 TC Nov. 1903; Musson, TA, pp.240-41.
56 President of the TA to TC Oct. 1897, quoted in Musson, TA, p.241.
57 LUA A 1 G 1 M . 1904 19 4 f 1nnua enera eet1ng reported in TC June 0; c • a so report of
its Annual General Meeting 1905, reported in TC July 1905.
58 On the establishment of the FMP, see below, pp.298-300.
59 Printers' Register May 1905; MPA MC Sept. 1905; NPKTF ~ 1904.
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though feeling among sections of the membership ran strongly against any
extension of the apprenticeship scale, the Executive was prepared to accept
the position that changes in the scale of production required larger firms to
be able to employ more apprentices; only disagreements with the employers over
60the exact change in ratios prevented the conclusion of an agreement.
From the early years of the century, the monotype had begun to appear in
large numbers in book houses in the provinces as in London. The TA accordingly
found itself drawn into negotiations over scales for the machines from 1902,
first with the Monotype Company and then with the FMP. Initially, the union
sought to obtain similar conditions to those won on the linotype, but as in
London the less vulnerable book firms held out for better terms, and negotiationf
collapsed over union demands for the 48 hour week and control over the casters.
Here too, however, the TA Executive's consciousness of the union's precarious
control of the labour market led it to accept the employers' terms, in contrast
to the situation in London, where the superior bargaining position of the LSC
together with its more open structure permitted militant members to force a
more aggressive policy on the Executive and the employers. The monotype
agreement concluded in August 1905 granted a 12~% increase over case rates on
stab for a 52~ hour week (48 for night work), while the piece scale was fixed
at 25% of existing case rates, with a l~d/l,OOO minimum and 15% extra for night
work; piece hands were guaranteed 35 hours work with payment for standing time.
More importantly, the union was unable to secure exclusive control over the
keyboards and was forced to abandon temporarily its claims to the caster. On
60 TA, Correspondence and Report on the Apprentice Question, submitted to 1908
Delegate Meetingi Musson, TA, p.215.
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the whole, therefore, these agreements were much less favourable to compositors
than the linotype ones had been, reflecting not only the superior bargaining
position of the book firms, but also the greater experience and organisation
61of the employers.
While the union's defeat in the Hull strike might have reaffirmed the
prudence of conciliatory policies in the eyes of the Executive, the slump of
1906-8 nonetheless provoked a sharp recrudescence of rank and file resentments
and fears over unemployment, bonuses, and output measurement. One writer in
the Typographical Circular probably spoke for a substantial part of the member-
ship when he lamented the tendency for national collective bargaining to remove
"••.individual response from the rank and file of trade unionism, leaving it
contented in the belief that the best terms possible can be aTranged by officials
with the united employers •••", a method which "•••will have the effect of
weakening the rank and file of trade unionism in a very serious way.,,62 In any
event, the columns of the Circular for those years abound with articles on
unemployment and the urgency of a positive strategy; when the NPKTF called for
a ballot in 1908 on the 48 hour week, TA members, like their London counterparts,
supported the proposal by a large majority.63 Similarly, complaints abounded
over the diffusion of indicators on composing machines, variously denounced as
"little better than espionage", "an attempt to sweat the workman of average
ability", and a system of "slave-driving" which sought to secure piece work
61 Musson, TA, pp.24l-46; for a critique of the agreement, see TC Apr. 1906.
62 W. Wesson, 'The Federating of the Employers', TC May 1906, pp.1-3.
63 TC May, Sept., Oct., Nov., 1906i Musson, TA, p.296.
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effort at stab prices by "setting men against each other".64
In November 1907, the conference of Midland Branches, generally the most
militant in the union, passed a vigorous resolution against the use of
. d' t . h' 651n 1ca ors on compos1ng mac 1nes. Throughout the Spring and early summer of
1908 a flood of resolutions from the branches to the upcoming Delegate Meeting
poured in calling for an immediate campaign to secure the 48 hour week and for
the abolition of the indicators. The Delegate Meeting itself was the scene of
a veritable rank and file revolt. Delegates passed a militant resolution for
the 48 hour week, while voting to limit overtime to eight hours per man per week
and to increase its price. Indicators, bonuses, and task work were prohibited,
as speakers denounced the devices in the most ferocious terms:66
In the old days they used to use the lash upon slaves; in these modern
times I suppose they would use an indicator.
The arbitration clause inserted in the rules in 1891 was likewise deleted as
a further expression of the mood of the meeting. The results of the Delegate
Meeting were not wholly at odds with Executive policy ~.the delegates rejected
a motion to renegotiate the linotype agreements and agreed to to an extension
of the apprentice scale- but the net effect was to strengthen dramatically the
advocates of unilateral regulation and tight control within the union against
the exponents of national collective bargaining and moderate regulation.
64 See the quotations from the TC in Musson, TA, p.296.
65 TC Oct. 1907.
66 TA, Report of DM 1908, pp.3l-32.
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Unsurprisingly, the employers' associations were quick to protest
against this resurgence of unilateral regulation, refusing to recognise any
changes in working conditions arrived at without their consent.67 The rules
revision movement only confirmed the hardening attitudes of the provincial
employers, which had already appeared in the negotiations over the monotype
scale, in the demands for an extension of the apprentice scale, and in the
growing tendency for non-unionists to be given preference as overseers in an
68attempt to tighten managerial control over the shopfloor. Despite the efforts
of the TA Executive to keep separate the questions of apprenticeship, rules
revision, and shorter hours, all three strands of conflict became inextricably
entangled with the emergence of the national campaign for the 48 hour week,
as we shall see in the next section.
67 MPA MC June 1909; Musson, ~, pp. 164-66.
68 Pratt, Trade Unionism; Diblee, 'Printing Trades', resolutions against the
employment of union foremen were passed at the Annual General Meetings of
the LUA and the FMP in 1907 and 1908 respectively: TC June 1907; MPA MC
June 1908. For resentments over the appointment of an outside foreman at
one Fleet Street printing works, see Jackson, Solo Trumpet, pp.30-32.
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Federation, the Movement for a Shorter Working Week, and the1911
Fifty Hours Strike in London
Before embarking on an account of the events leading up to the 1911
strike for the 50 hour week in London, it will be necessary to sketch in the
evolution of the expanded forms of cooperation among both printing unions and
employers, together with the conflicts between the LSe and the TA, which would
play such a crucial role in its denouement.
A federation of printing unions, whether on a metropolitan or a national
basis, had been mooted seriously since the mid-1880s, but a series of schemes
had foundered on the rocky issues of the constitution of its executive, the.
basis of its finances, and the terms of collaboration in disputes. Thus in
1885, the LSe launched a scheme for a metropolitan printing and paper trades
federation, which elicited widespread support from other unions but was
ultimately rejected by the Society's own membership mainly because it provided
for equal representation on its executive of the smaller craft societies and
the more numerous Lse.69 A national Printing and Kindred Trades Federation
(PKTF) was formed in 1890 as the result of an initiative by James Kelley of the
Lithographers; it sought to secure uniform working conditions throughout the
country and to coordinate relations with employers; no independent fund was
established and other unions were only to be asked to intervene in disputes if
blacklegs were called in. The LSe and the London-based Printing Machine Managers
Trade Society (PMMTS) attended its initial conferences, but ultimately declined
69 'Notice of a Special General Meeting to Consider the Report of the Delegates
Appointed to Devise a Scheme for the Federation of the Metropolitan Printing
and Paper Trades, 27.11.1886, LSC Trade Reports, l886iLSC AR 1886; F. Willis,
'Federation of the London Printing Trades', Printing News, June 1894, p.4.
294
to participate, so that the Federation survived on a purely provincial basis.70
In 1894 a renewed attempt was made to form a metropolitan federation, this
time under the auspices of Alf Evans, leader of the Warehousemen and Cutters,
one of the new unions of less skilled printing workers organised in 1889; the
influence of the new unionism was evident in its objects, which included joint
movements for the 48 hour week and against the employment of non-unionists, and
in its organisational structure, which called for the establishment of an
independent strike fund based on contributions from each affiliated union of
713d per member per quarter. The LSC had from their inception enjoyed extremely
cordial relations with the new unions, which were established with the assistancE
of socialist compositors and with financial contributions from the union itself,1
70 'Report to Adjourned Quarterly Delegate Meeting 12.11.1890', LSC Trade
Reports 1890; PKTF, 'Objects and Rules' in Report of the Second Meeting of
the PKTF, 20-21.4.1891; 'Interview with D.D. Leahy of the PMMTS' in Printing
News Sept. 1892, p.9; Child, Industrial Relations, pp.194-9S; Musson, TA,
pp.285-89.
71 '48 Hour Week and Federation' 25.5.1894, LSC Trade Reports 1894.
72 The Printers' Labourers Unions was formed in 1889 as a result of a strike
organised by two compositors who were also members of the SDF; one of these,
G. Evans, became its first secretary. The LSC supported the new union with
weekly collections in its chapels, and the PLU, together with the Warehousemer
and Cutters, another new union founded at the same time with the assistance of
LSC members including Harry Hobart, took over the Compositors' old premises
in 1892. The PLU, renamed the National Society of Printers' Assistants (NSOPA
in 1899, maintained especially close links with the LSC through its Secretary
C.W. Bowerman, who received the union's support as a parliamentary candidate
from 1903 onwards, was invited to open the new NSOPA headquarters in 1906
and became an honorary member of the union in 1917. R.B. Suthers, The
Story of NATSOPA, 1889-1929 (1930), pp.11-12, 16,24; Moran, NATSOPA~p.ll-l:
18; Bundock, National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers, p.112;
Child, Industrial Relations, p.18S. For detailed information on the role of
socialist compOSitors in the formation of the PLU and the Warehousemen and
Cutters, see Vigilance Gazette Feb. 1890; Justice, 31.8, 7.9, 14.9, 21.9,
2.11, and 9.11, 1889; The Commonweal 7.9.1889; and The People's Press 21.6.1Sc
I am grateful to Robert Baldwin for supplying these references to articles
in the socialist press.
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in contrast to the P!~TSt whose members faced competition from unskilled press
. 73hands for the top jobs in the mach1ne rooms. Nevertheless, the Compositors
were not yet prepared to collaborate on an equal basis with these unions in a
Federation, and the LSC Executive successfully urged its members to hold aloof
from the proposed Federation because of its provisions for equal representation
for large and small unions and because of the absence from its ranks of certain
th f .. 74o er cra t soc1et1es.
The growing enthusiasm for Federation in London was intimately bound up
with the expanding support for militant trade policies and socialist ideas
within the LSC, as well as with a growing sense of vulnerability kindled in
part by the conflicts over mechanisation. Thus an editorial in favour of
Federation in Printing News in 1892 emphasised the importance of the growing
73 The PMMTS initially contributed to the PLU strike fund, though its Secretary
commented in 1892 that despite the assistance of the union, "I would like
to see more friendliness displayed by the machine minders." 'Interview with
T. O'Grady', Printing News, Nov. 1892, p.9. With the growing diffusion of
the rotary press, relations between the machine minders and the semi-skilled
machine hands who were often promoted to machine minding posts, especially
in the provinces, cooled markedly. NSOPA changed its name to the National
Society of Printers and Assistants (NATSOPA) in 1912 in response to demands
by the PMMTS and the TA that it force its members either to refuse promotion
to skilled jobs or surrender them to the craft unions. By 1914 matters had
gone so far the PMMTS, the STA, and the Stereotypers and Electrotypers formed
a 'triple alliance' against the 'usurpation' by members of NATSOPA "of the
positions hitherto held or in any work or section of work constituted for
apprentices and skilled craftsmen." Suthers, NATSOPA, pp.39, 45; Moran,
NATSOPA, pp.17, 19, 23-24, 53, 55, and ch.6; Isaacs, Printing Press, pp.59-60;
Child, Industrial Relations, pp.111-12, 192-93; Musson, TA, pp.249-63.
See also above, pp.34-5.
74 See the arguments by A.E. Holmes in favour of the LSC's joining the Federation
and those of Bowerman against in '48 Hour Week and Federation'.
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interdependence of production for compositors' bargaining position in case of
strikes, a theme which would find repeated echoes in union discourse during
75succeeding decades:
In the case of the compositors' leaving work, the employer can,
without much difficulty, supply their places with more or less
incompetent material; but when the matter affects the machine room,
they hesitate to entrust expensive machines to the care of loafers
who haunt the fringes of a strike, or suddenly appear from parts
unknown when trouble is on, like vultures scenting offal. The
average employer who pays from £200 to £2,000 for a machine, is not
over anxious to entrust it to the care of these 'minders' and would
much rather make terms than run any risks.
The emphasis in this appeal is clearly on the necessity for Federation between
the Lse and the other craft societies, rather than one embracing all the
printing unions, and such was also the perspective of the union's Executive,
which opened negotiations for this purpose with the TA and PMMTS in 1895.76
The growing membership and financial stability of the new unions combined
with the ominous example of the engineering lockout to undermine the LSe's
exclusive attitudes, and it joined a reorganised metropolitan Printing and
Kindred Trades Federation in 1897. The new structure embodied a compromise
between equal and proportional representation of the affiliated unions, with
the Executive elected by delegates assigned on the basis of one for every 500
members up to a maximum of ten; the Federation could not raise money beyond that
necessary to cover the costs of its administration; and the potential for joint
involvement in disputes was carefully regulated by its Executive, in deference
to the LSe's reservations.77 The new unions of the less skilled were quick to
75 Printing News, Oct. 1892, p.8; cf. LTJ Jan. 1906.
76 Bowerman in '48 Hour Week and Federation', p.ll; Willis, 'Federation of the
London Printing Trades', Printing News June 1894.
77 Lse AR 1897, p.20.
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take advantage of the added bargaining power afforded by the alliance with the
LSC and the other London craft unions. A Federated 'Fair Houses' list was
established to promote the employment of union members in the non-craft
departments of printing houses, and the influence of the PKTF proved critical
in securing recognition from the London Master Printers' Association for NSOPA
in 1901. 78
In the provinces, meanwhile, the establishment of the PKTF had led to
the formation of local Federations which served as the framework for advance
movements, often aimed at securing shorter hours, in which the TA played an
important role. These enjoyed a not inconsiderable success, particularly in
Sheffield and York, where Federated movements won small reductions in the
79working week. By the end of the 90s the provincial Federation, under the
impetus of the TA, had agreed to convert to a financial basis by forming an
80independent strike fund. Once the London Federation had been established on
a firm basis, negotiations were quickly set in train for a fusion with the older
provincial organisation. A conference in December 1900 of the London and
Provincial Federations agreed to amalgamate and thereby establish a National
Printing and Kindred Trades Federation ~PKTF). The new body was supported by
13 unions with a total membership of 43,000, including the 3 typographical
unions, most of the other craft societies, and new unions such as NSOPA and the
Warehousemen and Cutters; unlike its predecessors, the NPKTF involved a common
78 Ibid., 1900, p.31; Moran, NATSOPA, p.31.
79 See above, p.284 i Child, Industrial Relations, p.196.
80 Musson, TA, pp.29.0-92i for the TA's support for a national Federation with
high subscriptions, see Report of Delegate Meeting 1898, pp.11-12, 20-27.
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strike fund, based on contributions of Is per member per annum in order to
finance strike benefits of lOs per week, scaled down from the original
proposals to meet the reservations of the London craft societies. The Admini-
strative Council of the new Federation was a modified version of the compromise
which had been adopted in London: each affiliated society of 5,000 members or
less was entitled to one representative, with another for every additional
5,000 members up to a maximum of three. Before any union took steps which
might provoke a dispute which would involve the Federation, its Administrative
Council had to be consulted, and Federated disputes once underway could only be
concluded by the Executive itself. At this conference, too, the crucial motion
for expanded union cooperation had been proposed by the Warehousemen, though the
limited gains achieved by the LSC in the 1900-1 advance movement, coupled with
the increasing organisation of the employers, doubtless spurred on the
81Federation process.
These steps towards broader cooperation among the printing unions were
paralleled by the evolution of organisation among their employers. The London
MFA had been reestablished in 1890 as a result of the LSC's demand for a
revision of its Scale of Prices, and a Linotype Users' Association (composed
chiefly of provincial newspaper owners) had been formed in 1894 to negotiate
with the TA over the introduction of composing machines. The emergence of local
branches of the PKTF demanding reductions of hours in the late 90s provoked the
81 Reports of the 11th, 12th, and 13th Meetings of the PKTF, 1899-1901;
Conference of the Provincial and London Federations re Amalgamation, 13.l2.l9C
LSC ARs 1899-1901; rules of the NPKTF in ibid., 1901; Musson, TA, pp.292-93. A
compositor writing in the SOP paper Justi~n 1900 argued tha~the failure
of the LSC to secure the 48 hour week had demonstrated the obsolescence of
'sectional strikes' and the need for Federation, a theme which would be
taken up more widely in 1911. Article reprinted in MFA MC Jan. 1900; cf.
Daily Herald 4.2, 13.2, and 21.2, 1911.
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formation of local Master Printers' Associations in Birmingham, Yorkshire,
Leeds, Bolton, Reading, and Leicester, and 36 such bodies had been established
by 1901.82 While plans for a Northern-based Federation of Master Printers were
encouraged by the London MPA in the mid-90s, the first serious initiative for
a national Federation was launched in 1897 by the Glasgow and West of Scotland
Lithographers' Association, and a meeting was convened in Leeds the same year
under the joint sponsorship of the Glasgow and Yorkshire MFAs.83 The movement
towards the creation of the NPKTF and the establishment of a common strike fund
galvanised the employers into forming their own organisation in 1901. While
the founders of the new Federation of Master Printers ~} were careful to
declare that " .••the Federation is not intended as an instrument to injure
Trade Unions ••••" and included among their aims the elimination of "unhealthy
competition" through the diffusion of modern cost-accounting methods, they
nonetheless observed that the "abuse" of trade union power had made it " .••
essential that there should be Associations of Employers to meet the employees
84on equal terms":
••.It is well known that the old proverb 'Union is strength' applies
with great force to labour questions, and that the existence of a
powerful organisation on the side of the employers will tend to that
calm consideration of any question at issue, which is so necessary to
maintain harmony between the employers and employed of any trade ••••
Accordingly, the FMP's rules dictated that "no step of general importance to the
printing trade as a whole shall be taken by any Federated association or
82 MFA MC Feb. 1897, Nov. 1899; Child, Industrial Relations, p.201.
83 Souvenir of the 5th Annual Meeting of the FMP and Allied Trades of the UK,
May 1905, pp.16-17.
84 MFA MC Apr.-May 1901, pp.48-S1, June 1901, pp.61-64i Sessions, FMP, pp.40-52;
Child," Industrial Relations, pp.161-62, 199-201.
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inidividual member, without previous consultation with the council", and urged
that no union "working rules" be recognised without its consent.8S
While collaboration among printing unions nationally was developing
through the activities of the NPKTF, relations between the TA and the Lse were
becoming increasingly strained. At issue here was principally the problems
created by the establishment of branches by London book houses just outside the
metropolitan limits, a process which had accelerated after the 1901 arbitration
86award. This development was sharply reflected in the two unions' relative
growth rates: in 1891 the LSC had 9,350 members to the TA's 10,836; by 1908
they stood at 12,202 and 20,254 respectively.88 Both the Lse and
the London-based PMMTS felt they could organise workers in the metropolitan
fringe more effectively than the TA, and pressed accordingly for the extension
of the London radius from 15 to 30 miles from the General Post Office. A series
of abortive conferences with the TA ensued between 1903 and 1906, with the lattel
union presenting counter-charges of ill-treatment of its members seeking work
in London. Matters were brought to a head by the establishment by Wyman's
of a new Reading branch employing non-unionists, boys and girls at substandard
rates. In the face of TA inaction, the Wyman's compositors organised an
independent union and applied to the NPKTF for recognition under LSe protection.
As a result of the ensuing fracas the Lse unilaterally extended its radius to
40 miles, setting up a number of provincial branches; the TA, then formed its
d h' t l' t' 88own Lon on branc ~n re a ~a ~on.
85 E. Howe, The British Federation of Master printers (19501; Musson, TA,
pp.162-64i Clegg, Fox, and Thompson, Trade Unions, pp.345-46.
86 See above, pp.271-72.
87 Tables in Musson, TA, p.535i Howe and Waite, LSe, pp.338-39.
88 Special Conference of the NPKTF, 3-4.7.l907~ 'The London Radius Question',
~ July 1907, pp.7-8i Musson, TA, pp.271-76.
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As a result of mediation by the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC,
amalgamation proposals were considered in 1908 by the TA, LSC, STA, and PMMTS.
Though ballots of all four societies' members were favourable to the formation
of a single typographical union with centrally administered benefits, an
impassable deadlock was reached over the LSC's insistence that it retain local
control over trade policy, including strike decisions. The outcome of these
negotiations demonstrated that as in 1848, when the first attempt at a national
typographical association had collapsed, the most important divisions among
skilled printers were still the regional variations in bargaining power, trade
. 89policy, and internal polit~cs.
While the level of Federation contributions and strike benefits was raised
in 1904 and local PKTF branches continued to grow in number and influence,
during the early years of the century the efforts of the NPKTF Executive found
their efforts to affect the conduct of negotiations with employers and major
strike decisions frustrated by the fact that real power continued to rest with
the individual unions, whose leaders retained the right to decide for example
which of their members should receive Federation strike benefits.90 It was the
movement for the shorter working week which drew the Federation into a wider role
in collective bargaining. From its inception, the idea of Federation had been
closely bound up with that of reductions in working hours, particularly in
London where NSOPA and the Warehousemen and Cutters had served as its leading
advocates. Such movements were of greater significance for these new unions of
the less skilled which were both more deeply influenced by socialist ideas and
more dependent for their organisational growth on recognition from employers and
89
~., pp.276-79.
90 Ibid., pp.293-96i Child, Industrial Relations, pp.195-97.
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the achievement of minimum conditions. through collective bargaining than were
the craft societies which could still enforce their work rules to a significant
extent in each office. Thus within the NPKTF it was the leaders of the unskillec
and semi-skilled unions who were the first to propose a joint movement to
secure the 48 hour week. At the annual meeting of the NPKTF in 1904 Evans of
the Warehousemen and Cutters moved a resolution for the eight hour day, and in
911906 Smith of NSOPA introduced a similar call for the 48 hour week.
In 1907 the Federation Executive approached the leaders of the member
unions on the possibility of a joint movement for the 48 hours; 11 societies
reported favourably, four on the basis of ballots, although the TA Executive
Council characteristically expressed scepticism about its ability to fight such
92a campaign in its weaker branches. Ballots of the Federated unions in 1908
showed a clear majority in favour of the proposal; the LSC voted to press the
demand for the 48 hours on its own if the Federation failed to take it up.93
In May 1909, following the ballot of the members of its constituent unions, the
NPKTF presented a·memorial to the employers demanding the 48 hour week, a step
which provoked the TA Executive Council to express once again its reluctance to
d' ,94support ~rect act~on. After an initial refusal to consider the question, the
FMP conferred with the NPKTF in July, and again the following February, without
95reaching any agreement.
Already at this stage a marked contrast was emerging between the caution
of the provincial unions led by the TA, and the more militant line put forward
by the London Federation under the auspices of the LSC. While this gap was in
91 NPKTF ARs 1904, 1906.
92
~., 1907, p. 7.
93 t.sc AR 1911, p.32.
94 NPKTF AR 1909, p.6.
95 LSC ~ 1911, p.32; MFA MC June 1909; NPKTF AR 1909.
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part a product of the weaker bargaining position and less participatory
political style of the TA, it was also the result of its recent conflicts with
the LSC over recruitment and amalgamation, as well as of earlier resentments of
LSC decisions first to hold aloof from Federation with the provincial unions
and then to insist on a lower rate of contributions to the common strike fund.
At ~he same time, the LSC's relations with the less skilled unions in the
London PKTF was being cemented by the latter's assistance in the victories in
the dispute over female mono type operators at Straker's in 1905 and in the 1906
'd" 96Hampton s 1spute. Thus during the Straker's dispute, the Warehousemen and
97Cutters' leader had commented proudly:
For the first time on record we had the printing trade unions welded
together as one body, the Compositors, Lithographic and Letterpress
Machine Minders, Vellum Binders, Machine Rulers, WarehQusemen, Cutters,
Printers' Assistants, Platen Machine Minders, and Stone Preparers all
fighting for one cause.
The contrasting attitudes of the LSC and the TA towards militant industrial
action were likewise signalled by their reactions to the FMP's proposal in
1909 to establish a 'Board of Conciliation' for the printing trades, whose
crucial feature was that no strike or lockout would take place until the matter
under dispute was referred to the Board; any innovation by either side which
might precipitate a stoppage of work was to be suspended until after its ruling.
The TA, together with some of the other national unions, was prepared to accept
this scheme, while the LSC declined, citing the advantages of more aggressive
tactics for a London-based union like itself:98
96 See above, pp.277-79.
97 Quoted in Bundock, National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers,
pp.143-44.
98 'Conciliation Board for the Printing Trades', 24.8.1909, LSC Trade Reports
1909; NPKTF, Conciliation Board for the Printing Trades, Ch.d. 1909?li Howe
and Waite, LSC, p.22i Musson, TA, p.295; Child Industrial Relations, p.214;
Clegg, Fox, and Thompson, Trad;-Unions, p.438.
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The LSC differs from the other societies in being centralised, whereas
they are spread over the entire country; and it is conceivable that
circumstance puts us in a specially favourable position for enforcing
our demands and insisting upon our decisions being carried out. It is
true that we have lost houses through strikes and lockouts; but such
losses are still possible under the scheme of arbitration. And it is
impossible to say how many houses we have gained, or retained in the
face of serious differences, through the fact that we had the power to
strike immediately the Committee deemed it necessary to resort to our
chief weapon of defence.
Meanwhile, the TA and the employers had become embroiled in negotiations
over the 1908 rules revision and the extension of the apprenticeship scale. The
LUA in particular took strong exception to the ban on indicators; as its
President told the union in 1909:99
The principle involved in this is that you are seeking to step into
our offices and declare what shall be the mechanical arrangements by
which we shall produce some of our work. We hold that ,you have no
right to decide that there shall be a wheel less or an attachment less
on the machine that does not involve your membership in any additional
labour, and which does not concern him beyond the fact that we are
getting an approximate knowledge of the machine ••.•
Four conferences ensued during 1909 between the TA on the one hand and the LUA,
and the Northern and Southern Newspaper Owners' Federations on the other in a
futile attempt to resolve the issues of the new union rules on indicators and
overtime; three conferences with the FMP during the same year on the apprentice
question proved equally abortive.lOO Hence with pressure building up from the
branches, the TA Executive elected to implement the new rules unilaterally from
May 1910. Similarly in London, rank and file discontent with stalled negotiation
produced militant action: an LSC Delegate Meeting, dissatisfied with the eight
hour per week overtime limit, voted to increase its price by a substantial margin
101in order to expand employment.
99 Printers' Register, July 1909; ibid., June 1909.
100 Musson, TA, pp.165, 215.
101 LSC Trade Reports 1909.
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The TA's decision to implement the new rules unilaterally galvanised the
employers into a rapid response, overcoming their traditional fragmentation.
Representatives from the FMP, the LUA, the Northern and Southern Newspaper
Owners' Federations, and the Irish Newspaper Society met in September, agreeing
negotiations.
to oppose jointly any attempt by the union to implement its rules pending further
102As the statement issued by the conference warned:
Many associations have declared in favour of united action, even to
the extent of a lockout in support of any district where attempts may
be made to force the adoption of the rules without modification, and
even those who have the largest interests at stake, and from the nature
of their business would suffer most severely in the event of a stopp~ge
of work, are gravely considering whether a general lockout would not be
a lesser evil than submission to the dictates of the TA.
In May 1910, a year after the presentation of its original memorial, the
Administrative Council of the NPKTF agreed to reorganise the movement for the
shorter working week into two stages: 50 hours, to begin on 1 January 1911,
and 48, to begin the following year. The membership of the affiliated unions
was to be balloted on the presentation of strike notices on 1 January should the
employers refuse to concede the 50 hours. In October, the Lse balloted its
members, who resolved by a substantial majority not only to support the Federated
movement, but also to pursue independent strike action if the employers refused
the demand in January. At a Special Delegate Meeting on November 16, the LSe
instructed its representatives to press the Federation Executive to insist that
the whole of the memorial - i.e. the 48 hours in 1912 as well as the 50 hours in
1911 - be conceded by the employers as part of any settlement. The total ballots
of members of the Federation showed a majority of 32,586 to 14,866 in favour of
proceeding with the terms of the memorial, but at the meeting of the Administrati'
Council, the provincial delegates forced through a motion demanding a further
103conference before any strike notices were tendered.
102 MPA ~ Sept. 1910. My emphasis.
103 LSC AR 1911, pp.33-34.
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On December 7, the London MFA organised a meeting to oppose the
Federation's demands. Arguing that shorter hours would add 15-20% to
composition costs, representatives of over 400 firms voted "to resist the
demand to the utmost, and accept the notices from the men should they be
tendered." The London MPA further instructed its representatives to fight
on against any hours reductions should the FMP agree to meet the unions in
conference. Meanwhile, the FMP held out the offer of a conference, but only to
be held on 10 January, i.e. after the strike notices were to have been tendered.
In the face of these tactics, the gap between provincial delegates wishing to
suspend the notices entirely and Londoners pressing for more resolute action
widened considerably; a compromise was reached committing the federated unions
4 1.'f d 104to tender notices on February no agreement was reache • In preparation
for the possible confrontation, the London unions held a mass meeting in the
Albert Hall on New Year's Eve, attended by 7-8,000 printing workers - skilled
and unskilled alike - who reaffirmed their support for the movement. Similar
gatherings were held throughout the provinces during the last week of December
and the first week of January, but the TA Executive Council became convinced
that the strike movement was fundamentally a London-centred venture £rom which
105the provincial unions should hold aloof.
In explaining the more cautious attitude of the provincial unions, especially
the TA, towards the 48 hours movement, it is necessary to emphasise not only
their weaker bargaining position and less participatory political style, but also
the different constellations of employer opposition they faced. In London, the
104 Ibid.; NPKTF AR 1911; MFA MC Nov.-Dec. 1910; TA Executive Council Minutes
17.12.1910. -
105 LSC ~ 1911, p.35; BCPS 5.1.1911; Newspaper Owner, 7.1.1911; MFA ~ Dec. 1911.
TA Executive counci~nutes 17.12.1910, 8.1.1911; TC Feb. 1911.
~7
newspaper publishers, having already conceded the 48 hour week and withdrawn
from the LMPA, held aloof from the employers' resistance movement, whereas in
the provinces, the TA faced the possibility of a complete national lockout
embracing book and newspaper firms alike as a result of the disputes over rules
revision and apprenticeship.
The January 10 conference with the employers merely confirmed the deadlock.
The FMP offered a reduction of half an hour to 52 hours, arguing that the
benefits of mechanisation had been eaten up by increased competition, and that
the movement of work out of London in particular made any substantial addition
to labour costs unacceptable. The Federation representatives, led by the LSC,
argued that the linotype had meant a saving of 25-30% in production time, while
mechanisation had displaced labour and intensified work.106 .The following day
the London MPA issued a statement regretting the offer of the half-hour
reduction made by the FMP, while the TA Executive Council met with the FMP in
a last minute attempt to resolve the rules question. At the meeting of the
NPKTF Administrative Council on the 13th, the provincial delegates expressed
their unwillingness to tender notices on February 4th, arguing instead for
another attempt at negotiation. At this point, the London strike committee, led
by the LSC, elected to pursue the demand on its own. Their action was endorsed
by a Special Delegate Meeting of the LSC on the 18th and the London Printing
Trades Committee was formed in association with the Warehousemen and Cutters;
most of the other London unions joined the following week. On the 21st, the
Committee concluded an agreement with 16 friendly firms - known as the
'Compromise Committee' - securing the 50 hour week for the next five years,
106 Verbatim Report of a Conference Between the NPKTF and the FMP, 10.1.1911,
Webb Coll. EB LXXIX, f.9.
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107while notices were tendered to the rest of the employers. A strike paper,
the Daily Herald, was then established to build public support, quickly reaching
a circulation of over 20,000. Following a final abortive conference on the
25th several large book houses locked out their union employees, and despite a
last minute intervention by Askwith and Buxton of the Board of Trade, who inducec
the FMP to offer a compromise of 51 hours (without being able to guarantee that
it would be respected by those firms which had already paid off their union
men), the strike began on 4 February.
Within the first week, some 350 printing offices had conceded the 50 hour
week. The final number of concessions was put at somewhere over 500, the bulk
of which surrendered quite early in the strike. The dispute rapidly settled
into a contest between the London printing unions led by the LSC and somewhat
more than 100 firms (many of them quite small) gathered round the half-dozen
largest book firms which had announced their intention of permanently converting
to a non-union basis; the MPA Secretary claimed that these large firms alone
employed more than 8,000 men; these were also the leading firms with country
branches, such as Spottiswoodes at Colchester, Waterlow at Dunstable, Hazell
108Watson and Viney at Aylesbury.
Both sides stated quite clearly that the issue was not merely the 50 hour
week but the future of craft regulation in the industry together with the
accumulated grievances over the methods and consequences of the introduction
107 Naylor to Industrial Council, Enquiry into Industrial Agreements, Minutes
of Evidence, qs. 8378, 8411; LSC AR 1911, p.38.
108 Union estimates in LSC AR 1911, p.40; Daily Herald, 6.2.1911; MPA Secretary
quoted in ibid. For the employers, see MFA MC Feb. 1911; Printers'
Register Feb. 1911; Newspaper OWner 18.2.1911-.-
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of composing machines. Lake, the Secretary of the London ~A, announced early
in February that the dispute had come to centre on the question of the open
109house:
We have been forced into our present attitude by the irksome restrictions
of the men's unions. Particularly undignified is the position we have
been obliged to adopt in relation to oVertime. In cases of emergency
even, we are obliged to ring the compositors' secretary in order to
secure permission for the men to work half an hour beyond the maximum
allowed for one week.
Similarly, an article by the previous Secretary of the MFA attributed the strike
to the LSC's transgression of the "legitimate functions of trade unionism":110
It is altogether illusory to suppose that the antagonism of the masters
is the result of the demand for a less number of working hours - the
present crisis has been precipitated by the continually growing spirit
of dictation on the part of the men's representatives as to how the
masters shall carryon their business, even to the minutest details.
Another master printer traced the origins of confrontation to IIfour acts of
war" perpetrated by the LSC: 1) the 1906 Hamptons dispute; 2) the "arbitrary"
overtime limit: 3) the serving of notices the previous year to secure the 48
hour week for readers; and 41 the serving of notices in the present dispute
f h 1· f .. 111be ore t e conc us~on 0 negot~at~ons.
On the workers' side, proponents of the 48 hour week had always stressed
the need to relieve unemployment generated by mechanisation, and this theme was
reiterated during the conferences with the employers. As C.W. Bowerman, the
former General Secretary of the LSC, put it:112
It is not surprising that with the introduction of new machines men
should be thrown idle. That may be rectified in time. The linotype
has created trade, but it took time to do that. Meanwhile men are
thrown idle in large numbers, or are only casually employed, and that
is what we are suffering from in London.
109 Quoted in Daily Herald 6.2.1911.
110 Newspaper Owner 11.3.1911.
111 BCPS, 13.4.1911, pp.2-5; cf. also the testimony of Straker and Unwin to Fair
Wages Committee, quoted above, pp.
112 Report of Conference 10.1.1911, p.26.
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Another aspect of the agitation for the shorter working week related to
mechanisation lay in the growing volume of complaints about the increased
scale of production, tighter supervision, and the intensified pace of work.
Already in 1900 the STA Annual Report had referred to new forms of work
113organisation as a
•••Juggernaut car in the hands of the high priests of trade ...the
earth's feeble toilers must become its votaries and submit their
souls to be warped and their bodies crushed in the sacred cause of
this fetish which is dignified with the name of Progress.
Now a compositor identified as "the chief cause of the present unrest in the
, t' d II 114pr1n 1ng tra es :
•••Machinery and the soullessness thereof. By machinery I mean
chiefly the 'modern business methods' and the 'organisation' fads
with which we are confronted, and by which we are harrassed at
every turn, until the burden and restraint have become almost
unbearable .•.• Some ingenious person devised the syndicate, whose
proud boast it is that it is non-moral, impersonal, machine-like,
automatic; and now we are being machined in every possible way,
until we have almost reached the limits of dehumanisation.
Similarly, the Daily Herald featured articles during the strike entitled 'Man
115V. Machine' and 'Speeding up'; the latter spoke of
.•.the tightening up in the factory and workshop.... ~'le have become
part of a huge machine, beginning the day's work by registering our
time in the automatic 'clock'.
113 Quoted in Gray, Labour Aristocracy, p.10S.
114 'From the Wage Earner's Point of View', Newspaper Owner, 22.10.1910.
115 Daily Herald, 14.1.1911, p.3; 13.2. 1911, p.2; cf. ibid., 17.3.1911.
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During the first month. o£ the dispute, the momentum generally ran in
favour of the strikers. Many firms conceding the 50 hour week withdrew from
the MPA, which found itself forced to issue a general appeal for funds by the
1168th of February. There was also a tendency for the strike to be extended
to provincial branches of London firms, such as those of Spottiswoodes at
Colchester and Billings and Sons at Guildford.117 In mid-February the
Lithographers joined the Electrotypers and Stereotypers among the highly
skilled new printing crafts supporting the strike; partially as a result,
11two large anti-union firms, Goodalls and Hazell, Watson, and Viney surrendered.
As the strike wore on, a series of major book and jobbing firms were
forced to concede the 50 hours: Clowes, the largest jobbing firm in the city;
Wyman and Sons; Harrisons; Ballantynes; Eyre and Spottiswoode; and that pioneer
of the cheap novel and penny periodical, George Newnes, all figured among those
firms surrendering between April and November 1911, as did such important
medium-sized houses as Straker Bros., Straker and Sons, Odhams, and Wightmans.
But a number of important firms remained steadfast in their resistance, includin~
Harmsworth, Spottiswoodes, Waterlow Bros. and Layton, Waterlow and Sons, and
Sir Joseph Causton and Sons, and a general stalemate was emerging.119
116 LSC AR 1911, p.41; MPA MC Feb. 1911.
117 Daily Herald 31.1. and 15.2, 1911; Printers' Register, Feb. 1911.
118 Daily Herald, 13.2, 21.2, 14.3.1911; Printers' Register, Jan. 1912,
'Retrospect of 1911'.
119 LSC, Compositors' Guides to Fair Houses, Nov. 1910, Apr. 1911, Nov. 1911;
See also Table 8.
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The large anti-union houses were able to sustain operations, in part through
the use of blacklegs supplied by the National Free Labour Association, while in
April the London MPA reorganised itself into three sections - non-union houses,
union houses, and lithographers - thereby avoiding disintegration.120 Fortified
by contributions fromtheir well-paid comrades still at work in the newspaper
office, the strikers held firm throughout the spring, actively picketing the
holdout houses, but to little effect. Finally, under pressure of mounting
expenses the strike committee withdrew its pickets in July, though there is no
evidence of strikers deserting their unions to return to their former
121employers.
At its height in February, the strike displaced some 1,422 LSC members;
700-900 remained unemployed in July (of whom 600 were still unemployed in
December and 250 the following July, adding to the 800 or so signing the call
122book before the strike began. The total cost of the strike in increased
provident benefits, strike pay, and other expenses amounted to more than £77,000
for the LSC alone, of which E15,000 was contributed by the NPKTF and the General
f d . 123Federation 0 Tra e Un~ons.
Both sides claimed victory. The U1PA noted the high cost of the strike,
to the unions and the loss of 115 houses from the LSC's fair list, together with
124the creation of a reservoir of non-union labour, so that
120 Daily Herald, 13.2, 21.2, 14.3.1911; LSe AR 1911, p.41; MPA MC Apr. 1911;
Printers' Register, Apr., June 1911.
121 LSC AR 1911, p.43; Printers' Register July, Aug., 1911 and Jan. 1912; MPA
MC Aug. 1911.
122 LSC Quarterly Delegate Meeting 28.6.1911 reported in Printers' Register July
1911; LSC AR 1911, p.43; Naylor to Industrial Council, Enquiry into Industria
Agreements, Minutes of Evidence, q. 8487.
123 LSC AR 1911, pp.44-49.
124 MPA MC June 1911; cf. also Printers' Register, July 1911, Jan. 1912.
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•••if unreasonable demands were put forward in the future to a house
that house now had a very large number of non-union houses to which
it could turn for help.
A widely quoted speech at a meeting of the unions' United Pickets' Committee
in June seemed to support this view, though it should be remembered that the
speaker was arguing for the continuation of the strike:125
The immediate result of the strike is that we have 115 fewer houses
on the fair list than formerly, while 1,500 blacklegs now occupy
frames previously held by London society members •••. Some five months
have elapsed since hostilities commenced, but what particular vantage
has the LSC gained? We answer unhesitatingly none.
As Table 8 shows, however, 25 firms had been brought into line between April
and November, including many of the largest houses in the city. The LSC
Executive argued for its part that the majority of London firms were now working
50 hours - including many of the open houses - while the union had demonstrated
its ability to withstand even the most protracted confrontation with the
126employers without significant organisational damage.
An independent assessment is more difficult to formulate. The LSC list
of fair houses contained 582 firms in January 1910 and 488 in November 1911,
127of which 38 were added during the year. The LMPA listed 969 open or non-
society houses in March 1912, but is unclear how many of these were actually
125 Report of Lse Quarterly Delegate Meeting, 28.6.1911 in Printers' Register,
July 1911, pp.7-8.
126 LSC AR 1911. For a subsequent
the exchange between Whittaker
Register May 1914 and LTJ June
debate over the results of the strike, see
of the LUA and Naylor of the LSC in Printers'
1914.
127 LSC AR 1911, p.43.
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members of the organisation or how far this represented a larger number than
before the strl.'ke.128 S' th th 1 200 't' f' ,l.nce ere were no more an, prl.n l.ng l.rms l.n
London (and perhaps closer to 800), however, this latter figure is quite
misleading and must include many of the estimated 3-400 small printers who
employed no labour; the LMPA itself claimed 260 members in July 1912, of whom
55-60% or c. 150 firms were working 52~ hours, which seems a more plausible
129estimate of non-union strength. It should also be noted that the following
year saw a significant reshuffling of the LSC Executive Council - three
members did not stand for reelection, including leading socialists such as
Harry Hobart who had come top of the poll during the strike, while four were
defeated - suggesting that the LSC's membership did not view the outcome of
130the strike as an unqualified success. Nevertheless, it seems that despite
the cost of the strike to the unions, the result was a very significant
diffusion of the 50 hour week in London. According to a survey conducted by
the Board of Trade Labour Department in July 1912 on the effects of the strike,
the results of which it considered representative, 72.9% of all printing
workers were working more than 50 hours per week in January 1911, while only
42.1% were working those hours in July 1912. Among hand compositors employed
on book and jobbing work - the main groups of LSC members involved in the strike
128 MFA MC Mar. 1912.
129 R. Lake (FMP) to Industrial Council, Enquiry into Industrial Agreements,
Minutes of Evidence, qs. 6331, 6410-13; Naylor to ~., qs. 8370-80.
130p , I 't M 1912 MFA MC 1912 D 'I H id 27 2 1911 4rl.nters Regl.s er, ar. ; Mar. ; al.y era •• , p ••
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82% were working more than 50 hours in January 1911, but only 44% in July 1912:31
Meanwhile, despite the involvement of TA members in lockouts at provincial
branches of London firms, negotiations were in progress under the auspices of
the Board of Trade to resolve the tangled issues of the hours question, the
rules revision, and the extension of the apprentice scale. A compromise was
reached in March on the hours question, with the employers accepting a 51 hour
week to be reached in stages depending on the number of hours currently worked
in each district; a ballot of the provincial unions ratified this settlement in
April. The rules and apprentice questions proved somewhat less tractable, but
eventually with the London example looming menacingly for both sides, an
agreement was reached between the TA and the various employers associations on
6 May 1911. A sliding scale was established for apprentices; with a new maximum
of eight in houses with 100 or more journeymen; this agreement would come up for
review in 1913. On the rules question various compromises were formulated: the
TA agreed to indicators on composing machines, but the employers accepted the
prohibition of bonuses, copy marking, and slugging of matter; the overtime limit
was set at 16 hours per fortnight, with numerous exceptions especially for
131 Board of Trade Labour Department, 'Recognised Hours of Printers and Book-
binders in London', Fair Wages Advisory Committee, Minutes of Proceedings
24.10.1912, Department of 7,Employment Library. The representative
character of this sample was challenged by the London MPA, which alleged
that it included only 528 of the c. 1500 London firms (but see p.3l9 above);
it seems likely, however, that most of the larger firms submitted responses.
MPA MC Mar. 1912. The MPA itself claimed that 58% of printing workers
employed by its members worked more than 50 hours. Lake to Industrial
Council, Enquiry into Industrial Agreements, Minutes of Evidence, q. 6410.
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newspaper work. As a central part o£ the agreement, a 'committee of reference'
was established, composed of employer and union representatives, to which all
incipient disputes were to be referred before resort to strikes or lockouts;
the union accepted the indicators, for example, with the proviso that disputes
arising from their use should be arbitrated in this fashion.132
The employers, still in the thick of their contest with the London unions,
celebrated the agreements as marking the end of unilateral regulation:133
It had now been laid down that it mattered not how unanimously they
voted at delegate meetings, no rule could be operative that interfered
with the working of the offices, or attempted to man the machinery,
until those rules had been submitted to the employer and had been
agreed to.
Though the TA membership voted to accept the hours compromise by a large margin
(11,600 to 4,200), substantial discontent persisted among the rank and file,
particularly over the rules and apprentice questions. Resolutions of protest
flowed into the Executive Council from Liverpool, Preston, Blackburn, Oldham,
Hull, Nottingham, Cardiff, Derby, Leeds, Wigan, Stockport, and Hartlepoole. as
well as from the conferences of Yorkshire, Lancashire, and Northern branches;
many complained of the Executive's "autocratic government", and some called for
a special Delegate Meeting to be convened.134 In the months leading up to the
1913 Delegate Meeting, resolutions were submitted by a series of Lancashire
branches demanding that the Executive Council be henceforth prohibited from
without submitting them to the membership for ratification:~signing agreements
132 LSC AR 1911, p.42; Daily Herald 26.4.1911; TA Executive Council Minutes
21.2-,-18.3, 1.4, 8.4, 22.4, 26.4.1911; TC June 1911, p.7; MFA MC Apr. 1911;
Musson, TA, pp.167-69, 192, 197, 216, 248-49; 296-97. --
133 MPA MC Apr. 1911.
134 TA Executive Council Minutes, 18.3, 1.4, and 22.4.1911; Musson, TA, pp.149-
50.
135 TC Apr. 1913.
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This position was adopted by the Delegate Meeting as a whole, which like that
of 1908 saw a major attempt by the delegates to reassert rank and file influence
within the union. The meeting therefore also passed resolutions censuring the
extension of apprenticeship and demanding a lower scale for newspaper offices,
rejected the compromise on indicators, and restored the overtime limit to the
136more rigid eight hours per week. In the face of this upsurge of militant
sentiment, the employers agreed to replace the hated indicators with time sheets
but the other issues remained deadlocked until they were overshadowed by the
. 137outbreak of war 1n 1914.
In London a series of political manoeuvres led to the unlocking of the
stalemate on the 50 hours question resulting from the 1911 strike. To under-
stand how this came about we must briefly review the history·of the LSC's
involvement in the struggle for 'fair wages' clauses in government contracts.
Beginning in the mid-1880s, the Lse initiated a campaign of pressure on political
bodies - from the London County Council and local school boards to the House of
Commons - demanding that a clause be inserted in public printing contracts
obliging master printers to pay the wages called for in the London Scale, if
not actually to abide by trade union work rules. The union organised local
groups to lobby candidates for parliament and local government, with considerable
the Webbs observed in 1897 that138success;
The LSC and the TA have, for the last ten years, used more electoral
pressure with regard to the distribution of local work, than any
other Trade Union.
136 TA, Report of Delegate Meeting 1913, pp.33-34, 109-110, 127-28.
137 Musson, TA, pp.248-49.
138 Industrial Democracy, p.80; see also Alford, Letterpress Printing, p.195.
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These campaigns played an important role in the adoption of Fair Wages
resolutions by the London School Board and the London County Council in 1889,
and by the House of Commons itself in 1891. The 1891 parliamentary resolution,
vaguely formulated and of dubious legal status, remained largely a dead letter,
and was followed by a Select Committee of the House of Commons on Government
Printing Contracts in 1896, convened largely at the request of the LSe, while
printing issues figured prominently in the 1908 inquiry conducted by the Fair
Wages Committee. In 1909 the House of Commons passed a stronger resolution on
fair wages designed to give a larger role to agreements reached through collect-
ive bargaining, and a Fair Wages Advisory Committee was formed to assist in the
f 1 . 139administration 0 the reso ut1on.
In the spring of 1912, the Board of Trade Labour Department carried out a
survey of the hours worked in London printing establishments whose results we
have already discussed. The report was referred to the Fair Wages Advisory
Committee in October, which recommended that "50 hours should be regarded as
the recognised working week for males in the London printing and bookbinding
trades at the present time.,,140 Accordingly, Masterman, the new Chancellor
of the Exchequer, announced in the House of Commons on 29 October that the 50
hour week would henceforth be mandatory for government printing contracts. The
London MPA held an indignant meeting against the government's decision, arguing
that the Board of Trade's returns were incomplete and protesting that the fruits
139 B. Bercusson, Fair Wages Resolutions (1978), chs.l-B. See also the reports
of the 1896 SC on Stationery Contracts, 1897 SC on Government Contracts
(Fair Wages Resolution), and the 1908 Fair Wages Committee.
140 Fair Wages Advisory Committee, Minutes, 24.10.1912.
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of their industrial struggle were being snatched away politically; an angry
resolution was dispatched to Conservative MPs. At a conference with the LMPA
in December, Masterman refused to reconsider the order, arguing that 85% of
the employers holding government contracts (by value £265,000 of £310,000)
141already worked the 50 hour week.
The government's action, which threatened to deprive recalcitrant
employers of the right to tender for public contracts, struck a wounding blow
at the master printers' resistance. In the short-run, however, as Table 8
shows,it mainly affected smaller firms, since the larger book and jobbing firms
which composed the backbone of employer resistance were no longer deeply
involved in government printing, and some 15 of the former had already been
reunionised by 1915. The LSC was maintaining an active missionary campaign for
the reconquest of the major holdouts, which was brought to fruition in the
context of wartime full employment. Firms such as Waterlow Bros. and Layton,
Spottiswoodes, Harmsworth, and even Alabaster, Passmore, and Sons (which had
been non-union since 1908) were reopened to LSC members; Table SB shows the more
general expansion of unionisation. By 1919, as Table 8A shows, only 36% of the
original holdouts remained ununionised, and none of these were major employers;
the rest had either conceded or gone out of business. Not only had the 50 hour
week become generalised throughout London by the end of the war, but also the
original demand of the 1911 strikers, the 48 hours, which was conceded on a
141 MPA MC Mar. and Nov. 1912; Printers' Register Nov.-Dec. 1912; letter from
FMP to Conservative MPs, Webb ColI EB LXXVII, £. 15; London MPA, Printers'
Strike 1911 and the Treasury Intervention 1912, (1912). Bercusson does not
discuss this case in his otherwise excellent work on Fair Wages Resolutions:
interestingly enough this case runs counter to his general argument that
these resolutions played virtually no positive role for the labour movement
during this period.
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national basis by the FMP and the Newspaper Society in 1919.142
While these union victories stemmed in the first instance from the
enhanced bargaining power conferred by tight wartime labour markets, their
roots lay in the superior - though not overwhelming - position won by the
Lse in 1911, which in turn confirmed the growing consolidation of craft
regulation. Without the leverage they had already acquired, the war alone
would not have sufficed to permit the London compositors this final turn of the
screw, nor indeed to maintain their gains in the face of the harsher economic
climate of the 1920s.
142 .eh~ld, Industrial Relations, p.228.
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Scotland
As we saw in Chapter IV, the introduction of composing machines did not
initially give rise to a regional agreement with the employers, nor did it
generate discontent among the rank and file to the same extent as it did in
London and the English provinces. On the whole, the same pattern prevailed
during the decade and a half preceding the First World War: despite the
continuing progress of mechanisation and the growing displacement of hand
compositors, pressures toward confrontation with the employers remained milder
than south of the border. Nonetheless, the introduction of composing machines
indirectly touched off a series of disputes with Scottish employers over the
use of female compositors and unilateral regulation whose resolution profoundly
affected the framework of craft regulation in the region.
In 1904, the Glasgow Typographical Society, the premier branch of the
STA, launched a movement for an advance in its stab rate. This demand was
eventually submitted to arbitration; the arbitrator agreed that the Glasgow men
deserved an advance, but argued that competition from Edinburgh made it impossibl
to grant one unless the Glasgow branch dropped its opposition to female composi-
tors. This report gave rise to a great outcry among Glasgow compositors who
had long opposed the toleration of female labour in Edinburgh and other Scottish
towns; a special Delegate Meeting was therefore called to consider the question
in February 1905. Fearing that the Glasgow delegates would insist on a union-wid
ban on female compositors which would touch off an unsustainable confrontation
with local employers, the Edinburgh branch (838 of whose 1,036 members worked in
offices alongside more than 700 women} proposed that the STA formally abandon
its opposition to female compositors, provided they be treated as apprentices
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and included within the apprentice ratio. This motion was overwhelmingly
rejected by the delegates; a compromise proposed by Aberdeen, another centre
of female workers, carried instead, committing the offending branches to take
the initiative for the "rectification of the female question as opportunity
1 d 1 f 1 ' b h h d h' h ' d ,,143en s itself to a possibi ity 0 so ut~on y t e met 0 s ~t erto recogn~se •
The debate at the 1905 Delegate Meeting reproduced the main tendencies which
had appeared in discussions on the same theme within the union during the
previous decade: representatives of the stronger branches pressed for abolition,
while those branches in which female labour was prevalent argued instead for
the regulation and improvement of its conditions; with the sanction of a previous
Delegate Meeting, the Edinburgh branch had sponsored an unsuccessful attempt to
f 1 ' '1898 144organise ema e compos~tors ~n •
During the next few years, several branches took up the Delegate Meeting's
instructions with considerable success. After a fifteen week strike in Aberdeen
the local branch obtained a pledge that·no further women be introduced either
at case or at machine; Dundee saw the number of female compositors reduced to
two, while the Perth branch reported in 1909 the complete abolition of female
, ft t 'k 145compos~tors a er a s r~ e. Meanwhile, under the stimulus of the unemployment
143 STA AR 1907, p.21.
144 STA AR 1904, pp.28-31, 1905, p.46; report of 1905 Delegate Meeting in STC
Mar.:l905; 'Statement of Edinburgh Branch on the Female Question', STC Sept.
1904; STC Oct. 1904.
145 STA ARs 1907, 1909.
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caused by the 1907-8 slump, sentiment for a forward movement of the female
question was building up in Edinburgh. Compositors there secured the 50 hour
week in 1908 (machinemen in 1909), which had already been won in Glasgow in
1900.146 The threat posed by mechanisation also played a part in the genesis
of this movement - Edinburgh was extremely slow in introducing composing
machines, since most masters considered women as an alternative - but monotypes
began to be introduced in significant numbers from 1907-8, as this statement
147by one employer suggests:
•••While case-room conditions have long been bad for the hand
compositor, they became even doubly so during the past 12 or 18
months. While hand composition was a rapidly diminishing quantity,
its place was being steadily taken by machinery, and by machines
almost solely manipulated by underpaid female labour.
With women occupying the newly introduced monotype keyboards, the problem
acquired a new urgency for the already hard-pressed hand compositors. The
final spur to action on the female question in Edinburgh was furnished by the
growing cohesion of the local unions. The Edinburgh Printing Machine Men's
Society had merged with the local Typographical Society in 1907, and in the
years that followed the local PKTF began to show new signs of vitality, perhaps
inspired by previous Federated campaigns against underpaid female labour in
Barrow, Dublin, and Glasgow, as well as by more recent developments across the
148border. For the first time, the Edinburgh compositors could confront the
employers with the mass of the city's printing workers at their back rather than
146 Ibid. 1900; Gillespie, STA, pp.1SS-S6; for discussions of unemployment, see
STA AR 1908, p.S, 1909,~7.
147 Quoted in STA AR 1909, p.30. On female labour as an alternative to
mechanisation, see Fraser to Fair Wages Committee, q. 4593; statement of
Edinburgh MPA in Printers' Register Jan. 1910.
148 Gillespie, STA, pp.122-2S; Musson, TA, p.290.
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on the basis of their own limited industrial power.
In November 1909, the Edinburgh Typographical Society, under the auspices
of the PKTF, issued a memorial to the employers demanding149
that from 1 January 1910 there shall be no further introduction of
females into our trade in Edinburgh, nor any importation of female
compositors from other centres, and that in future machine composition
be solely undertaken by male union labour.
The initial reaction of the Edinburgh master printers was entirely negative:150
..•They regret that they could not see their way to accede to what
would really be a revolutionary reversal of a state of matters which
has existed for nearly 40 years, and that with regard to the proposition
that machine composition should be performed solely by male union
labour, they are obliged to point out that the operation of keyboards
is specially suited in all respects to women; training as a compositor
is no real qualification. It had been seen how the cognate act of
typewriting (and keyboarding is nothing more than typewriting) has
been practically monopolised by women ••••
As the Edinburgh movement got underway, however, its Federated character
exercised a greater hold over the employers, and desultory negotiations were
149 STJ Nov. 1910; NPKTF AR 1909. The Edinburgh branch had first raised the
matter with the employers in 1906, Gillespie, STA, p.204.
150 STA AR 1909, p.43. Master printers
for the employment of women on both
for example, the remarks at the LUA
TC June 1904:
in England were at this time clamouring
the mono type and the linotype. See
Annual General Meeting 1904, quoted in
What we want in regard to the linotype, I think is embraced in
the phrase 'cherchez la femme' •••• Until we get the opposite
sex working the machines I am inclined to think we won't get
full justice out of them.
Similarly, Straker, who had been defeated in an attempt to introduce female
monotype operators in 1905, told the Fair Wages Committee:
A woman operator on the monotype is very much better than a man.
In my opinion, although the London Society have so far been able
to prevent women operating linotype machines in London, the day
is not so far distant when that is going to break down. (Fair Wages
Committee, q. 4485.1
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conducted during the early spring. Upon the breakdown of talks between the
PKTF and the local MFA, a preliminary trial of strength occurred in one large
book firm where "breaches of trade rules and customs" led the men to tender
notices. At this point a new element entered the equation: the bulk of the
women employed in each department struck alongside the men as demands were
raised for improving their wages and conditions as well. As a result, the firm
in question was forced not only to retract its revisions of work practices, but
also to sign a modified version of the November resolution.1Sl
The existing female compositors appear to have lined up solidly behind
the male unionists in favour of immediate improvements in their own pay rates,
despite efforts attributed to feminist activists to persuade them that their
longer-range interests lay in defending the right of women to enter the trade.
152Thus a memorial addressed to the Master Printers by "We Women" argued that,
•••while recognising that the men have a real grievance in that some
firms have employed an unfair proportion of young girls at subsistence
wages, or nearly so, we women regard it as a great injustice that one
of the main skilled industries open to Edinburgh women should be closed
against them •••• We women feel that the fact that women have been
employed in Edinburgh as compositors for mearly forty years gives women
a claim on the business •••• In Edinburgh the monotype machines have
been largely, if not chiefly, operated by women, and ••.women have proved
themselves entirely competent to work these machines, so that it seems
a great hardship that women should be debarred from working at them ••••
The Edinburgh MPA, impressed by this portent of new solidarity, reopened
negotiations, but a further deadlock was reached in August as employers sought
151 STJ May 1910, pp.353-54, Sept. 1910, p.438i see also the letter on women's
organisation from a female printer, STJ May 1910, p.354.
152 Memorial 10.6.1910, quoted in STJ, June 1910. Emphasis in the original.
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to retain the right to employ women on a proportion of future man atype
keyboards. At this point, the PKTF held a mass meeting - attended by over 2,000
people according to union estimates - at which it was announced that 44 firms
had already accepted the November memorial; the meeting resolved to hand in
notices to the 17 major firms outstanding on September 3. After 10 days of
frantic negotiations, during which the mobilisation of women printers and the
blocking of work from leaving the city bolstered the unions' position, the
employers finally accepted the following terms:
No new female learners should be taken on up to 30th June 1916, and
that all new keyboards during the same period should be operated by
male union labour.
The employers had also pressed for a proviso fixing a three year moratorium on
advance movements in Edinburgh; this was rejected by the STA, which agreed
instead to "recommend their Edinburgh branches to maintain peace on all questionE
of hours and wages for three years." -These terms were accepted by a mass
meeting and signed by representatives of the Federated unions just before strike
, d ,153not1ces were ue to exp1re.
In the aftermath of the victory, the STA Delegate Meeting agreed to set
up a special section for female compositors, though not without a certain amount
of internal dissension. This special section, established in 1911, quickly
enrolled more than 200 women; by 1918 it was reported that all women compositors
, d 154 h h d' b h 1in the city were so organ1se. For t eir part, teE 1n urg emp ayers appear
153 STJ Oct. 1910, pp.433-39; STA AR 1910, pp.S-8; Printers' Register, supplement
June 1910, Oct. 1910; Gillespi~ STA, pp.204-Si for detailed accounts of the
employers' proposals, as well as a list of the firms still holding out in
August, see STJ Oct. 1910, pp.433-38.
154 For the attitude of the STA Executive Council towards the organisation of
women, see STA AR 1910, pp.S-9; for the debate on the result of women's
organisation, see the exchange in STJ June 1911, p.119, and Jul. 1911, p.200.
On the success of women's organisation, see STA AR 1911-12, p.60 and
Gillespie, STA, pp.20S-6.
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to have kept their side of the bargain, as the recognition o£ female compositors
led to a reduction in the gap between their earnings and those of the men.
During the First World War, women called in to replace men secured the full
male rate, while during the interwar period, the female rate was set at 70%
of the male rate in Edinburgh and Aberdeen (compared to less than 50% before the
strike); elsewhere no differential was permitted. By the end of the Second
World War, female compositors were clearly a dying breed: the improvement of
conditions for those working had been won at the price of the long-term closure
155of the trade to women.
The success of the Edinburgh movement, reversing forty years of relative
weakness, can in part be attributed to the novel elements of women's
organisation and Federation - the Warehousemen and NSOPA were particularly
important supporters of the movement - together with the example provided by
English developments. An important role, however, was also played by mechani-
sation itself: by 1910, the advantages reaped by Edinburgh master printers
through the use of cheap hand labour had been eclipsed by the superior speed
and productivity of the machines, and work was flowing back towards London and
h E l' h ' 156t e ng ~s prov~nces.
155 Ibid. pp.206-7.
156 See the statement by the Edinburgh MFA quoted in STA AR 1910, p.43, cf. also
Child, Industrial Relations, p.160:
•••Up to the turn of the century the book trade had tended to
drift from London to Edinburgh where composition costs were lower
owing to the fairly general use of women compositors. After the
introduction of composing machines, however, it became essential
to have high quality labour in order that high output might offset
increased overheads £or capital charges. Edinburgh then ceased to
hold a competitive advantage, and indeed by lagging behind in the
installation of the new machines, tended to lose ground.
It should be noted, however, that there is no evidence that employers switchec
from female to male machine operators voluntarily out of considerations of
the sort adduced by Child rather than as a result of union pressure. In
France, too, the introduction of composing machines led to a reduction in the
number of female compositors1 see S. Reynolds, 'Women and the Printing Trade
in France', (unpublished paper, University of Sussex, 1979), p.9.
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Hence the introduction of composing machines, by subverting the
advantages of cheap hand labour and by relieving a certain amount of pressure
on the employers through higher productivity and lower unit labour costs, made
possible a substantial improvement in the position of male trade union
compositors in the city, given the new industrial support of other groups for
the latter. 157As the STA itself observed:
Since the agreement was signed, the printing trade of the city has
prospered greatly, and with the introduction of labour-saving machinery,
and the consequent reduced cost of production, there cannot be any
necessity for resorting to a system of type-composition which was
threatening the best interests of the trade, and the very existence of
our members.
The Federation's victory on the female question, however, only whetted
the appetite of the long-downtrodden Edinburgh compositors for a thoroughgo~ng
renovation of their position. The agreement signed by the MFA in September
contained an unspecific pledge to improve the position of the linemen (hand
piece compositors, whose position had long been deteriorating) :158
The number of linemen in the Edinburgh case rooms has year by year
been growing beautifully less. There was a time when it was no
hardship to be on 'piece'. But with the machine claiming more and
more of the best work and the army of stab and time hands increasing
steadily, to be on one's lines in these latter days has meant little
money and many hardships. To be a lineman has become an indignity.
When the MFA failed to take any concrete steps to fulfil its promise, the
Edinburgh case branch passed a resolution in February 1911 calling for the
abolition of piecework as a "remedial measure". In the face of persistent
157 STA AR 1911-12, p.6.
158 STJ July 1912; for similar developments in London, see LSe AR 1913, p.72.
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refusal of the employers to yield any ground on this issue, the Edinburgh
compositors unilaterally abolished 'slating' as of 1 January 1912. When
presented with a memorial demanding the abolition of piecework and its
replacement by a 7~d per hour stab wage, the MFA threatened a general lockout
in July. In this instance, however the other printing unions were not willing
to support the compositors, and the latter were thus forced to climb down; an
article in the Scottish Typographical Journal accordingly proclaimed "The day
f. .. " 159o sect~onal str~kes ~s over •
At the 1912 STA Delegate Meeting a rank and file revolt similar to the
one which had occurred at the 1908 TA Delegate Meeting precipitated an
important restructuring of relations between the union and employers. The
delegates passed resolutions demanding the 48 hour week, the reduction of
overtime from 12 to nine hours per week, and new controls on short-time working.
As in the English case, this attempted extension of unilateral regulation
provoked a militant response from employers: the Scottish Alliance of Master
Printers, the first inter-city organisation of employers in the region, was
formed to oppose these measures. The imposition of the new overtime limit in
Glasgow led the Masters' Alliance to threaten a joint lockout in Glasgow and
Edinburgh unless the union agreed to a joint conference on the rules revisions.
When in January 1913 the STA membership rejected the proposal of the joint
conference that the implementation of the new rules be postponed until agreement
could be reached with the employers, the latter posted lockout notices. In the
event, however, the STA Executive reached a compromise on a modified version of
the rules in April, signing a regional agreement for the first time. Though the
1913 Delegate Meeting rejected the terms of the agreement as subversive of local
159 ~ Jan., Jul., Aug. 1912; STA AR 1911-12, p.S8.
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autonomy, and resolved that the Executive henceforth be permitted to negotiate
minimum wages and hours but not working conditions, a new agreement on similar
160lines was concluded in January 1914.
Thus by 1914, in Scotland as in the English provinces, conflicts arising
from the mechanisation of composition had brought about important changes in
relations between organised printers' and their employers, involving on the one
hand an enhancement of the former's bargaining position and on the other an
extension of both the regional scope and substantive content of collective
bargaining. But here as the south of the border tendencies towards more
centralised collective bargaining were checked by the rank and file's staunch
defence of local autonomy and by the persistence on the shop floor of traditiona:
methods of craft regulation.
160 STA AR 1913, p.5; STJ Feb., Jul., Nov. 1913; MPA MC Jan. 1912, Jan.-Feb.
1913~Printers' Regi;ter, Feb. 1913; Gillespie, STA, pp.217-18.
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Conclusions: The Consolidation of Craft Regulation
By the eve of the First World War, the conflicts in Britain over the
introduction of composing machines had clearly been resolved. Despite important
differences in bargaining power and strategy among the three typographical
unions, hand compositors had gained effective control over the machines on a
craft basis. Formal agreements with employers in each region restricted linotypE
work to fully-trained union compositors, while union control of the monotype
was first won de facto and then recognised by the employers de jure, at least
in London and Scotland. This capture of the new machinery by hand compositors,
in the context of the expansion of union organisation, increases in the speed of
production and reductions in labour costs resulting from mechanisation, brought
in its train a marked increase in the effectiveness of craft regulation.
The increasing hold of craft regulation was most evident in the tightening
control exercised by the unions over the labour market. Pockets of non-unionism
were being steadily eliminated, despite temporary setbacks such as the secession
of some London houses after 1911, and in Scotland the advent of mechanisation
made possible the elimination of the historic source of local union weakness,
the employment of women as cheap labour. It was the steady revival of
apprenticeship regulation, already underway from the 18805, which represented
the most important strengthening of the armory of craft regulation. Whereas it
had often been possible for compositors to pick up the trade in small country
printing offices in the mid-Victorian period, chapels were now stricter in
demanding proof of new employees' credentials, and in any case machine operating
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skills could only be acquired in offices large enough to afford the new
hn 1 f"" t "161tec 0 ogy, which was at ~rst qu~ e expenslve. The initial agreements on
the introduction of composing machines made explicit provisions for the
training of apprentices, and the regional collective bargaining agreements
resulting from conflicts over the consequences of mechanisation signed at the
end of the period formally incorporated modified versions of the unions'
apprentice scales; similarly, it was during the struggle over mechanisation
that the LSC first codified its apprentice ratio.
By 1914, there had emerged a fair body of evidence showing that these
ratios were being effectively enforced throughout the country. A survey
conducted by the provincial unions in 1909 showed that there were 3,760
apprentices to 14,472 journeymen in offices recognised by the TA, a ratio of
nearly 1:4; in Scotland the figure was closer to 2:5, and these orders of
magnitude were confirmed by a second sample of 146 firms published by the
Board of Trade Labour Department in 1915.162 Enforcement of apprenticeship
was universally agreed to be most effective in London, where apprentices had
been banned from daily newspaper offices, and the actual proportion was doubtlesf
163rather more favourable than the 1:3 ratio called for in the LSe rulebook.
161 For a first-hand testimony to the changes at work in this period, see Katin,
'A Compositor's Point of View', pp.137-39.
162 Board of Trade, Report of an Enquiry into the Conditions of Apprenticeship
and Industrial Training (1915, copy in the Department of Employment Library) I
pp.242-43.
163 'Report of Special Committee on Unemployment', LSC
N.B. DearIe, Industrial Training (1914), pp.57-58;
Apprenticeship, p.252.
Trade Reports 1908;
Board of Trade,
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The increasing hold of craft regulation made itself felt in other areas
as well. The deterioration in the social position of the hand compositor in
the 1870s and 80s had stemmed from printing employers' need to speed up and
cheapen hand labour in the absence of mechanisation; piece-stab, systematic
overtime, and casualisation were the chief means to this end. The introduction
of composing machines removed the most urgent pressures of this nature and
created a space for concessions on working conditions in the face of intensifyin~
union pressure. As we have seen, both the linotype and the monotype offered
significant savings on labour costs; Hazell, Watson and Viney's Aylesbury works
which introduced monotypes in the early 1900s shows that labour costs declined
from an average of 70.42% of total composing costs in 1904-8 to 54.76% in 1912-1:
Similarly, the vast increase in the speed of composition afforded by the
machines which produced on average 6,000 ens per hour or four to six times the
output of a hand compositor reduced employers' dependence on systematic over-
time and casual labour to meet peak demand: the FMP pamphlets both estimated
S· . t 164a 0% sav~ng on overt~me cos s.
The reduction in the demand for oVertime and casual labour coincided, as
we have seen, with a marked tightening of union rules against these practices
aimed at soaking up the displacement of labour resulting from mechanisation.
With the growth in collective bargaining some version of these rules was
incorporated in collective agreements in each region, and they seem to have been
16by employers.reasonably effective despite union complaints about their evasion
164 Hart, The Linotype; Elias, The Monotype; Alford, Letterpress Printing,
pp.Sl-63, and Table III.
165 Naylor to Industrial Council, Enquiry into Industrial Agreements, Minutes
of Evidence, q. 8329, 8414-15; Skinner (TA) to ibid. q.8667; Child,
Industrial Relations, pp.214-18.
334
The decline in casual labour appears to have been particularly marked: as we
have seen, the introduction of the linotype led to sharp reductions in casuality
in Scottish towns in the 1890s166 while Beveridge estimated in 1908 that the
casual fringe among compositors comprised some 15% of the total compared to
, f 3 l' 167est1mates 0 20- 5% twenty years ear 1er. To be sure the gains won by
compositors as a result of their capture of the new machines - higher wages and
shorter hours for the machine operators, shorter hours and tighter craft
regulation for the hand workers - were to a certain extent offset by the higher
initial rates of unemployment mechanisation brought in its train, especially
pronounced among older workers. But a central component of the revival of
craft regulation was the protection it offered to hand workers: the various
composing machine agreements not only restricted the recruitment of machine
operators to the ranks of hand compositors but also guaranteed that those of
the latter who remained in employment would not be unduly disadvantaged by
competition from the machines through rules providing for equal access to copy
and prohibiting machine operators from working at case. The effectiveness of
these regulations in due course reduced the abuses connected with piece-stab, so
that complaints about slating and the casualisation of piece hands were increas-
ingly confined to districts where mechanisation remained underdeveloped, such
d' b h 168as E 1n urg . The rapid growth of the printing industry during this period
166 See above,p.259.
167 W.H. Beveridge, Unemployment (1908), pp.140-41; Alford, Letterpress Printing,
p.222; for earlier estimates, see above, pp.143-49. For other
evidence that mechanisation led to a decline in the demand for casual labour,
see TC Dec.1899, and a reprint from Systematic Costing in Daily Herald 23.2.-
1911.
168 On the decline of piece-stab in London, see 'Report on Casual Labour and PiecE
Stab', LSC Trade Reports 1909.
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meant that much of the hand labour displaced by composing machines was
reabsorbed in those composing room tasks which remained unmechanised, such as
making up, imposing, and display work; as a result of this trend, coupled with
the survival of many small unmechanised printing offices, the 1911 census
showed 37,883 hand compositors to 3,803 machine operators in England and Wales,
a figure which if anything over-estimates the extent of mechanisation.169
The crucial determinants of these developments, as of the divergent
pattern in engineering, lay in the balance of forces between workers and
employers in the industry and in the broader economic trends which conditioned
the latter's ability to afford concessions on wages, hours, and working
conditions. The extreme vulnerability of printing employers, particularly
daily newspapers, the leading sector in terms of both profitability and
technical development to strikes and short interruptions in production at the
hands of strategic groups of workers left them ill-placed to contest the capture
by hand compositors of the new machines. At the same time, printing unions
showed a far greater capacity for sustained cooperation in industrial action
than did their employers, who found themselves divided by the divergences of
interest between general and newspaper printers and by the intense competition
among the latter. The rapid expansion of printing output, especially pronounced
in newspaper and periodical publishing, coupled with the reduction of labour
costs and production time effected by mechanisation, facilitated concessions
to printing workers along a broad range of issues. The large book and
jobbing firms, which were on the one hand less vulnerable to short
stoppages and on the other less profitable, expanding less rapidly, and had
gained less from mechanisation, tended to resist the demands of the
compositors more effectively than did newspapers as a whole, as
169 Alford, 'Business Enterprise'; Cannon, Skilled Worker, pp.235, 253.
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did provincial newspapers which were significantly less competitive than their
Fleet Street counterparts.
While a more comprehensive justification of these explanations must await
a systematic comparison between developments in printing and engineering, the
centrality of the causal factors we have identified can perhaps be underlined
by a brief consideration of the divergences rather than the similarities in the
experiences of the three typographical unions as they have emerged in this
chapter. While all three unions won effective control over composing machines
during this period, the terms on which such control was won were markedly less
advantageous for skilled compositors in the English provinces compared to London
and Scotland. Only the TA failed to secure the 50 hour week before 1914 or to
obtain formal recognition from employers of its exclusive control over monotype
keyboards~ TA members were likewise obliged to accept an extension of their
apprentice scale, as well as inferior arrangements for overtime and the division
of work between case and machine hands to those prevailing elsewhere.
The TA's concessions to employers were, as we have seen, the result of
the union' Executive's reluctance at crucial moments to risk a major industrial
confrontation, while the most important gains of compositors in London and
Scotland were obtained either through strike action, as in Edinburgh in 1910 and
in London ,in 1911, or by the threat of such action, as in London in 1896 and
1906. Such variations in the willingness of the unions to take industrial
action can in turn be explained on a number of levels. The TA Executive's
conviction of weakness, which underlay its conciliatory strategy, was in
part the product of the union's failure to organise important sections of its
territory, such as the South and Southwest, as well as of its authoritarian and
centralist political style which made the leadership much less willing to mobili:
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the rank and file in support of militant demands than in the more participatory
LSe.
Equally importantly, however, the provincial union faced a qualitatively
different constellation of forces to that prevailing in London or in Edinburgh
and Glasgow, the main centres of the STA. Crucial to the success of the LSC
and the STA in their major confrontations was the combination of division among
the employers with a broad front of unity among the unions organised in the PKTF.
As we have seen, the inability of London newspaper proprietors to combine for
joint resistance to the unions and their defection from the LMPA allowed the LSC
first to win repeated concessions on the operation of composing machines and the)
to finance the 1911 strike from contributions from newsmen still at work.
Similarly, the early collapse of the employers' front in Edinburgh made it
possible for the PKTF to use concessions from some firms to coerce the holdouts.
Conversely, as its various disputes over apprenticeship, monotypes, rules
revisions, and shorter hours converged, the TA found ranged against it a
comprehensive national coalition of newspaper, book, and jobbing printers,
against which its position was indeed precarious. Similarly, when the STA rules
revision movement provoked a threat of a joint lockout by employers in Edinburgh
and Glasgow, that union, too, was obliged to retreat, despite its more open
union structure. The contrast is likewise apparent between the success of the
1910 Edinburgh campaign against underpaid female labour, an issue which affected
all the printing unions, and the failure the following year of the campaign
against piecework which affected compositors alone.
Finally, the variations in the capacity of printing employers for collecti\
action themselves flowed in part from variations in market position and industric
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structure. As we have argued throughout, the divisions among printing employers
resulted above all from the vulnerability of newspaper owners to strikes in
the context of a competitive market and volatile readerships; the book
publishers, with their more standardised and durable product together with the
possibility of decentralising their operations, were far better placed to resist
the demands of the printing unions. This broad, ideal-typical patter, however,
applies more fully to large metropolitan centres like London, Glasgow, or
Manchester than to the smaller provincial towns, where competition between
newspapers was less intense. Consequently, it was more possible for newspaper
proprietors from different towns to cooperate against the unions than it was
for those within a major metropolis, and this helps to explain the less
favourable conditions secured by the TA compared to its counterparts in London
and Scotland. At the same time, the coalition formed against the TA in 1911 of
newspaper, book, and jobbing employers was the product not only of the struct-
ural forces which made such an alliance possible, but also of the convergence
of separate conflicts which made it seem necessary to its constituent sections.
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Chapter VI
Guerilla War In The Workshops: Engineering, 1898-1914
The employers' victory in the 1897-8 engineering lockout began rather than
concluded a major period of struggle over the division of labour, in contrast
to their victory in 1852 or to the London printing strike of 1911. Faced with
mounting competition from American and German producers employing more advanced
divisions of labour, as well as staunch resistance from skilled workers to
initial attempts to introduce non-craftsmen on new machine tools, British
engineering employers had embarked on a major confrontation with the leading
craft union in the industry, the ASE. The employers' aim in this clash had been
to create a new structure of industrial relations which would enable them to
respond to threats to their market position by reorganising the division of
labour in their workshops; the Terms of Settlement which concluded the dispute
represented the key instrument of this design. But as in printing, where skilled
workers had secured strategic initial advantages in the struggle for control of
composing machines through the signing of favourable collective agreements in
the 1890s, the engineering employers' victory did not in itself establish the
shape of the new division of labour, but rather defined the framework within
which the struggle over its development would be conducted. The questions of
whether British engineering employers would be able to use the Terms of
Settlement to meet threats to their market position by transforming the division
of labour - and of what strategies of resistance skilled workers and their unions
would develop in response - remained very much to be answered.
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In the event, a combination of market factors, the internal structure
of the ASE, and the continued capacity of skilled workers for local resistance
conspired to limit the extent of the transformation of the division of labour
in the British engineering industry before 1914. A thoroughgoing transformation
of engineering production depended on an extensive demand for standardised, mass
produced goods - both capital goods and consumer durables - which existed only
to a limited extent in pre-war Britain, in contrast to the USA and even to
Germany. At the same time, the movement of the terms of trade in favour of
primary producers after 1900 generated a boom in demand from the underdeveloped
world for the products of Britain's traditional export industries which drove
their output levels to new heights and eased short-term pressures on engineering
manufacturers to diversify and reorganise production. Even if American and
German firms were cutting into Britain's relative share of world trade in
engineering products, the absolute level of British sales - and with it the
profits of individual firms - were rising rapidly.
The thrust of the engineering employers' strategy after 1898 was to use
the Terms of Settlement - and behind them the threat of a crippling lockout -
to force the ASE Executive to discipline its members into accepting a centralisec
framework for collective bargaining which would neutralise local resistance to
changes in working practices, or indeed to a great extent in questions of wages
and hours. The union Executive's conviction of the employers' real strength,
together with its proclivity for centralising control over trade policy in its
own hands, led it to pursue a conciliatory policy of working within the Terms
of Settlement, ordering its members to accept the new disputes procedures, new
systems of incentive payment associated with the intensification of work, and
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even wage cuts in times of recession. But the employers' determination to
press forward the reorganisation of the division of labour - by promoting
handymen onto machine tools, and by introducing new methods of wage payment and
supervision - along with a militant policy of wage reductions during trade
downturns provoked bitter resistance from skilled workers against this double
threat to their craft status and their standard of living. The ASE had always
ranked among the most democratic of British unions, and the Executive's freedom
of action was strictly limited by union rule through checks and balances
administered by the membership and local officials: trade policy was formally
entrusted to the Delegate Meetings which alone possessed the power to amend
union rules, while an elected Final Appeals Court was the final arbiter in the
interpretation of those rules. In this context, it proved easy for rank and
file craftsmen to win the support of local officials in their struggle against
the Terms of Settlement, and the employers' strategy therefore eventually led,
as we shall see below, to the disintegration of the ASE Executive's own policies
and authority. The boom of 1911-14 then saw a widespread revival of craft
militancy, which enjoyed considerable success, at least in the older sectors.
Despite the substantial changes in the organisation of work in the industry
between 1898 and 1914, it would require a world war, another lockout, and a
prolonged depression to complete the transformation set in train in the l890s.
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Economic Imperatives and Obstacles to the Transformation of the
Division of Labour.
In a capitalist economy - especially a highly competitive one such as
late Victorian Britain - where the basic economic unit is the individual firm,
investment decisions are made on the basis of calculations of possible profits
set against possible risks, with the time-horizon varying with the size and
market power of the firm. In this context, a rational entrepreneur has no
interest in equipping his factory with the most advanced technology available
for its own sake, nor even in directing investment towards the maintenance of
his country's predominance in a particular sector if that does not also involve
sufficient and secure returns for his own firm.l Thus in those sectors where
there was little effective foreign competition before the First World War -
notably textile engineering, but in other areas of the older, heavier sectors
as well - British firms were under little pressure to undertake a wholesale
transformation of production, even if potential competition was developing
overseas. But in the newer, lighter sectors pioneered by American and German
manufacturers - such as sewing machines, motor cars, or electrical goods
British firms would be unable to enter world markets unless they adopted mass
production methods.
But even where effective foreign competition developed in this period,
the real issue was always profitability. British manufacturers could concede
a growing share of European markets to American and German competitors if they
1 For a similar argument, see E.J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, (Harmondsworth,
1969), pp.187-89.
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themselves could maintain a reasonable level of profit by turning to markets
in the Empire and the rest of the underdeveloped world. Locomotive building
furnishes a conspicuous case in point: exports - chiefly to India, South
Africa, and Latin America - became progressively more central to British makers
2after 1870, while Germany dominated European markets. Such tendencies were
greatly accentuated by the marked movement of the terms of trade in favour of
the primary producing countries after 1900, a trend which created a veritable
indian summer for the older export-oriented sectors of British industry, raisin~
3the demand for their products to unprecedented levels.
At this point, it will be useful to distinguish between two strategies
for the changes in the division of labour which differ in terms of their extent
the level of investment involved, and the market conditions favourable to their
adoption. The first strategy, which following much modern usage may be termed
'rationalisation', consists of a systematic transformation of the structure of
the division of ·labour through a programme of capital intensive investment, gen-
erally involving the introduction of automatic and semi-automatic machinery and
bringing in its train major changes in workshop layout, in the composition of
2 Saul, 'Engineering', pp.195-205.
3 Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, especially chs.l-S. The export of capital
from Britain, which in the second half of the 19th century had been closely
associated with export-led growth, likewise experienced a marked revival
after 1900, reaching its highest levels of the entire pre-war period in 1913.
P.L. Cottrell, British Overseas Investment in the Nineteenth Century (1975),
especially, pp.11-15.
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the labour force, and of course in work rhythms and practices.4 The second
strategy, which we have encountered repeatedly in our discussion of conflicts
between skilled workers in both engineering and printing, amounts to a rather
more piecemeal approach to the reorganisation of the division of labour. In
this latter case, new machinery may also be introduced but side by side with
existing plant, and the main thrust of employers' efforts to improve their
competitive position focusses on methods of cutting labour costs and intensi-
fying work without major capital investment, through some combination of
piecework, closer supervision, systematic overtime, the use of apprentices as
cheap labour, and other attacks on craft regulation. These strategies
obviously represent ideal types rather than absolute alternatives, and ration-
alisation entails attacks on craft regulation, similar to those of its humbler
relation, but the level of capital investment required - as 'well as their impact
5on skilled workers - nonetheless serve to set them apart.
4 The term rationalisation first came into common usage during the 1920s, and
its principal meaning referred to the reorganisation of the structure of
ownership of depressed industries to eliminate excess capacity and create
more efficient managerial structures, though in practice it also came to
refer to the reorganisation of work, often involving speed up and changes in
the methods of supervision and wage payment. We have on the whole eschewed
the use of rationalisation as a broad term for the reorganisation of the
division of labour, prefering to restrict its use to a particular strategy
linked to capital investment. For the development of rationalisation as a
concept and as a managerial strategy in Europe, see P. Devinat, Scientific
Management in Europe, International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Serie~
B, 18, (Geneva, 1927); and International Labour Office, The Social Aspects
of Rationalisation, Studies and Reports, Series B, 18, (Geneva, 1931); R.A.
Brady, The Rationalisation Movement in Germany, (Berkeley, 1927); C.S. Maier,
'Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European Ideologies and the Vision of
Industrial Productivity in the 1920s', Journal of Contemporary History 5 (2)
(1970); M. Nolan, 'The Infatuation with Fordism: Social Democracy and
Rationalisation in the Weimar Republic', (unpublished paper, Harvard Universit
1979). On the ideas of rationalisation in Britain, see L. Hannah, The Rise
of the Corporate Economy, (1976), ch.3.
5 For an argument that German industrialists in the pre-war period often
preferred methods of intensifying work and boosting output which did not
involve extensive capital investment, see D. Groh, 'Intensification of Work
and Industrial Conflict in Germany, 1896-1909', Politics and Society 8 (4)
(1978).
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The strongest imperative toward the transformation of the division of
labour is rapidly rising demand. Rationalisation is a risky and expensive
venture, involving investment in new machinery and other elements of physical
plant - including in many cases the remodelling of whole factories - as well
as the possibility of resistance from skilled workers. Hence the most powerful
stimulus to rationalisation is rapidly rising demand which cannot be met using
existing methods - whether qualitatively or quantitatively - which leads
entrepreneurs to believe that the potential returns from such investment will
justify the risks involved. Where demand for a product is not expanding in
this way, entrepreneurs will be unwilling and often unable - to pour in the
capital necessary for the transformation of production even in the face of
effective foreign competition, as the case of British heavy engineering firms
after the First World War would demonstrate.
The period between 1898 and 1914 was one of general expansion for the
British engineering industry as a whole. Total male employment in the metal
trades increased by two-thirds between 1891 and 1911 (see Table lB); Lewis'
index of output for iron and steel products registers an increase from 66.4 to
100 between 1898 and 1914, and exports, which in 1907 amounted to roughly half
total domestic production, rose from an average of £12.1 million in 1889-93 to
£32.3 million in 1909-13.6 The older sectors of the industry shared in the
general growth, but it was in the new sectors that expansion was particularly
rapid, in part because of the low base from which they started. The use of
6 Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, p.250; Jefferys, Engineers, p.118.
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electricity and electrical products grew at a rate of 15% per annum between
1900 and 1914, and by 1907 electrical engineering, which had only begun in
Britain in the l890s encompassed some 14% of the total value of engineering
7output. Similarly, according to the Census of Production, some 78,000 workers
were engaged in the production of motor cars and cycles in 1907, or nearly 40%
as many as in shipbuilding; Professor Saul, using a different source, estimates
8that the industry employed over 100,000 workers by 1914.
But despite the rapid development of these newer sectors in relative
terms, specific features of the British market placed important obstacles to
their levels of growth in absolute terms. In some cases, the problem lay in
prior commitments to older technologies and the absence of necessary infra-
structure, as in electrical engineering where gas lighting and the slow
diffusion of electrification inhibited the demand for electrical products:
similarly, the early and extensive development of telegraph networks appears
9to have restrained the growth of the telephone. In other cases, mainly
consumer durables, the weakness of working class purchasing power limited the
10spread of the new products.
7 Ibid, p.120.
8 Ibid.; Saul, 'The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914', Business History, 5(1)
(1962) •
9 I. Byatt, 'Electrical Products', in Aldcroft, Development of British Industry;
R.E. Catterall, 'Electrical Engineering', in N. Buxton and D.H. Aldcroft
(eds.), British Industry between the Wars (1979); Saul, 'American Impact'.
10 Saul, 'Motor Industry' and 'Mechanical Engineering'; cf. also J. Saville,
'Some Retarding Factors in the British Economy before 1914', Yorkshire
Bulletin of Economic and Social Research, 13 (1961); and P. Thompson, ~
Edwardians (St. Albans, 1975), p.187.
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As a result, it was by no means clear that investments in the new sectors
were the most advantageous course for established producers. Electrical
engineering, for example, yielded average profit rates of only 1.67 per cent
per year according to one estimate, and the most successful part of the sector
was the cable firms which drew on methods of production developed in relation
to the telegraph rather than the producers of lamps and electrical machinery
which in Germany formed the cutting edge of industrial advance.11 Similarly,
several large arms producers, including Vickers and Armstrong-Whitworth,
experimented with investments in motor car manufacture before 1914, but neither
found the game worth the candle: their car subsidiaries made frequent losses
and even in good years barely topped rates of return of 10% on capital, comparee
to the 15-20% earned by Armstrong-Whitworth's arms division in the same period.
With the average level of British military spending increasing from £38.8
million between 1895 and 1898 to £68.4 million between 1910 and 1913, Sir
Andrew Noble of Armstrong's was no doubt right to say that there was more
money to be made from building one river boat than from producing 6,000 cars;
under the circumstances it is hardly surprising that the capital of the heavy
engineering companies flowed towards armaments rather than toward the new
12industries in the decade and a half before the First World War.
The connection between standardisation and rationalisation was quite
evident to contemporary commentators; thus one pre-war writer on scientific
13management observed:
11 I. Byatt, The Electrical Industry in Britain, 1875-1914, (Oxford, 1979),
Ch.Si Catterall, 'Electrical Engineering', p.248.
12 R.J. Irving, 'New Industries for Old? Some Investment Decisions of Sir
W.G. Armstrong, Whitworth, and Company, 1900-1914', Business History 17(2)
(1975).
13 The Engineer, 14.11.1913, p.443.
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A clear distinction must be drawn between those businesses which
manufacture standard articles of fixed design, and those which
have to tackle construction problems which vary from day to day in
every particular, as for instance between firms which make highly
specialised products, such as sewing machines or typewriters, and
others which build ships and machinery for them. In the former
case, standardisation can be carried to an extreme limit, whereas
in the latter, there is abundant room on the part of both designer
and executant for the display of technical skill and ingenuity in
meeting the varying demands of the work.
The sources of variability lay not only in the nature of the product, but also
in the absence of a stable and predictable demand for it. Thus the key obstacl€
to rationalisation in shipbuilding was its propensity to rapid and violent
fluctuations in demand, while firms were called upon to produce a wide range
of ship types, generally on a one-off basis. Hence employers continued to
require workers with a range of general skills who could be laid off and rehirec
with the movement of the trade cycle, so that a far-reachin~ transformatiofl of
the division of labour was not economical, despite the rise of foreign
competition and the consequent fall of Britain's share of world shipbuilding
from 81.7\ of all tonnage launched in 1892 to 58% in 1913.
14
In fact, as
Pollard and Robertson have shown, where this pool of skilled labour did not
exist, as in Germany and the United States, manufacturers sought to fill their
places with a more advanced division of labour based on capital intensive
investment; in the slumps, however, their expensive machinery lay idle,
d. . 1 15pro uC1ng maSS1ve asses.
In the older, heavier sectors, manufacturers also had extensive investment
in pre-existing machinery and plant which often discouraged innovation. It
was in many cases economically more rational for firms to continue making
14 Pollard and Robertson, Shipbuilding, p.45.
15 Ibid., especially ch.6; Reid, Shipbuilding, pt.I.
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adequate - and often after 1900 growing - profits with older plant, despite
the fact that their foreign competitors were using a more productive technology.
rather than writing off the older plant and undertaking the expense of a
massive retooling. Where new automatic and semi-automatic machinery could be
introduced piecemeal, without necessitating a wholesale reorganisation of the
division of labour and plant layout, on the other hand, there is considerable
evidence that British manufacturers actively followed this path, as in textile
engineering. In other cases, peculiarities of the market combined with
features of existing engineering production to discourage change. In locomotiv(
building, for example, British makers specialised in a delicate high-quality
engine which proved to be badly suited to the poorly constructed tracks common
in many parts of the underdeveloped world. This limited the British firms'
abilities to compete in many foreign markets, but it would have been prohibi-
l(tively expensive to reorient themselves toward an entirely new type of product.
Furthermore, it was in the older sectors that craft regulation had
achieved a customary status within the existing structure of industrial
relations, so that any reorganisation of the division of labour would encounter
fierce resistance from skilled workers. In the new sectors, on the other hand,
where the new division of labour had not yet acquired a fixed form, manufacturel
found it far easier to introduce new processes worked by the unskilled, since
this did not displace already entrenched craftsmen. This contrast was height-
ened by the fact that the new sectors developed primarily in the West Midlands
16 Saul, 'Mechanical Engineering', pp.llS-17.
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and around London, outside the older engineering centres of Lancashire, the
Northeast Coast, and the West of Scotland, where craft unionism was most
powerful.
Thus it was not in the lighter sectors where the transformation of the
division of labour had progressed furthest by 1914 that employers encountered
the stiffest resistance from skilled workers, but in those parts of the older
sectors where craftsmen felt most keenly any attack on their established
position in the division of labour. Textile machinery, marine engineering,
machine tools, and to a lesser extent railway engineering offer examples of
this type, but the armaments industry is much the most important case. A long
established sector extensively organised by the craft unions, the arms industry
was in the forefront of technical change, having a radically different market
situation than the other commercial sectors of engineering. The chief customer
for armaments was the British state, which for strategic reasons had little
choice but to fulfill its military needs through British makers or to
manufacture munitions itself. The state's requirements were above all military
rather than economic in this sphere, though it employed complex market
strategies for distributing work between the public and private sector and among
h . . k 17t e var10US pr1vate ma ers. Thus in the face of the acceleration of inter-
national military competition in the years before the First World War, the state
required the most technologically advanced weapons available, produced in
Britain with little attention to market disadvantages. Consequently, unlike the
17 Trebilcock, Vickers Brothers, and 'A "Special Relationship"'.
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other older sectors, the arms firms experienced rapid growth in this period,
as we have already seen: by 1914, certain munitions concerns, such as
Armstrong-Whitworth, Vickers, John Brown, Cammell Laird, Beardmores and the
18Royal Arsenal at Woolwich ranked among the largest firms in the country.
Since many types of munitions - particularly shells, bullets, and some
guns - were technically well suited to standardised repetition production, an
important degree of rationalisation was in principle economical. In the
years before the First World War, therefore, this sector was a prime site of
conflict between skilled workers and their employers over the reorganisation
of the division of labour; during the war itself, it would become the central
focus of such conflict.
18 Trebilcock, Vickers Brothers; Irving, 'New Industries'; A. Marder, 'The
English Armament Industry and Navalism in the Nineties', Pacific Historical
Review, 6, (1937); Hinton, Shop Stewards, pp.26-29.
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Towards aNew System of Industrial Relations? The Terms of Settlement
and the Employers'Offensive 1898-1908
In the immediate aftermath of the 1898 lockout, engineering employers
believed that they had in principle removed the major barrier to the trans-
formation of the division of labour in the industry. As the editor of
Cassier's Magazine, a leading trade journal, declared in 1900:19
The master again became master in fact as well as in name, and
though he respects his men's union, he will not allow that union
to come any more between him and his employees •••• The free
selection of the most suitable labour thus secured has given the
employers the full and productive use of their machines.
Slater Lewis, an influential authority on works management, seconded these
. 20V1ews:
The engineering lockout has put the British engineering trades on a
sounder footing and has enabled manufacturers to begin the process
of measuring swords with their foreign competitors, and further, it
has led to a better understanding between master and man and has
removed much of the deadly friction which hitherto existed.
Trade journalists and industrial engineers waxing enthusiastic over
the technical and organisational achievements of American practice, held out
hopes of a sweeping transformation of British engineering workshop which would
enable employers largely to dispense with expensive and troublesome skilled
labour. As one speaker before the Institution of Mechanical Engineers
fervently proclaimed in 1902:21
19 L. Cassier, 'The British Engineers' Strike of 1897-8: Its Lessons and
Results', Cassier's Magazine, Apr. 1900, p.495. My emphasis.
20 J. Slater Lewis, 'Works Management for Maximum Production', Engineering
Magazine, May 1900, p.213i cf. also B.C. Browne, 'Uses and Abuses of
Organisation among Employers and Employed', ibid., Jan. 1901, especially
p.553.
21 Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 1902, quoted in
Jefferys, Engineers, p.123.
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The main object of these modern methods •••was that of reducing as
far as possible the number of highly skilled workmen, that is fitters.
Similarly, H.F.L. Orcutt, a leading publicist of the new methods, writing in
Engineering Magazine in 1899 with reference to American experience, prophesised
the imminent demise of the skilled production worker with the spread of the
, d' h' 22turret lathe and the precision gr~n ~ng mac ~ne:
This reduces fitting to a minimum and the result is a higher grade
of work than can possibly be produced by the most skillful 'turner'
or lathe hand. By this system it is possible for the lathe attendant
to be a comparatively unskilled lathe operator, and to attend two or
three machines taking heavy cuts and making fast feeds.
And as the same writer argued in 1902:23
Probably in no department of mechanical work are the contrasts between
the old and the new methods so striking than in erecting or assembling.
In the new method, machining is done accurately to dimensions; in the
old, machinery and tools are mainly used for removing metal, and
reliance is placed on the fitter for proper working fits •••• In the
new, the number of fitters is strikingly small compared with the abund-
ance of this class of helpers necessary in works running on old lines.
This movement towards rationalisation was given a further technical
impetus by the development of high speed steel in 1900 by Frederick Winslow
Taylor, better known as the father of 'scientific management'. The new types
of steel made it possible to speed up work substantially: on an older tool
like the centre (slide-rest) lathe, cutting speeds could be increased from
25 to 85 feet per minute, though it was with the newer tools, especially the
milling machine, that the new materials had the most impact, yielding speeds
22 H.F.L. Orcutt, 'Machine Shop Management in Europe and America', Engineering
Magazine, Jan.-Mar. 1899.
23 'Modern Machine Shop Methods', The Engineer, 24-31.1.1902, p.12S.
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of up to 400 feet per minute. The effect of this innovation on the imagination
of engineering manufacturers was vividly expressed by the President of the
Institution of Mechanical Engineers looking back to his first encounter with
it at the International Exhibition in Paris in 1900:24
Those engineers who saw •••a lathe running at high speed with a tool
with its point red hot removing a dark blue chip felt they were
witnessing the beginning of a revolution in tool steel and in machines
fitted for its use.
Another important area of technical progress lay in the rapidly increasing
use of electric power, in which engineering firms played a pioneering role,
especially after 1905 when capital costs dropped sharply. By 1907 40% of
machinery in the industry was electrically driven, and by 1924 90%. The
savings and productivity gains could be considerable: Sir Thomas Richardson
estimated that the introduction of three-phase driving had raised output by
20% in his Hartlepool engine works, and Merz claimed that Tyne shipyards had
25lowered costs by 40% when electricity replaced steam.
The introduction of new tools and materials, however, could only be
profitable if employers could develop ways to use the time saved, to ensure
the optimal use of expensive capital equipment, and to prevent skilled craftsmen
from applying their work rules to the new processes. Hence where extensive
investments in the new techniques were undertaken, employers were forced to
devote much greater attention to the overall planning of production, often
24 Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, July 1910, quoted
in Jefferys, Engineers, p.123. See also, Landes, Unbound Prometheus, p.297.
25 Byatt, Electrical Industry, pp. 78, 89.
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reorganising factory layout to facilitate the smooth and rapid progress of
materials through the various stages of production, now more interdependent
than ever before. A separate tool-room was often established where highly
skilled workers designed the jigs, fixtures, and other special purpose tools
necessary for repetition production, while also grinding tools to the
appropriate edges and angles for the rest of the workforce, tasks which had
formerly been the province of the individual craftsman working at his machine.
At the same time, employers sought to appropriate to themselves and
their supervisory staffs a greater share o£ the planning and direction of work
itself, and to enforce tighter workshop discipline. Timekeeping therefore
became increasingly important, together with new systems of supervision and
incentive payment designed to speed up work and boost output. In many cases,
a new type of supervisor, the 'feed and speed' man was employed to select the
optimal angles and speeds at which machines should be operated, usurping this
traditional prerogative of the skilled worker; where incentive bonus systems
were in force, a rate fixer might also assume the role of setting output norms
and piece prices based on primitive methods of work measurement. These new
grades of supervisor often expanded at the expense of the traditional foremen,
who saw their control over the direction of work, piece price fixing, wage
payment, and hiring and firing diminish with the growth of bureaucratic
administration and modern management techniques in the factory. The real target
of the new methods, however, was the skilled production worker, and where they
were pressed forward most fully the result was a significant reduction of the
autonomy and discretion - and therefore the skill - required from him, while
the fully skilled craftsman found himself pushed into new indirect roles outside
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the immediate production process itself.26
In those large firms in the newer sectors where rapidly rising demand
made possible major capital investments - as in the cycle, car, electrical,
and arms trades - British manufacturers might undertake rationalisations of
factory layout and of the division of labour which pressed toward the limits
of the new technology. In most cases, however, the small and unspecialised
character of the firm, the structure of the market, and the nature of existing
plant discouraged major retooling, so that the extent of innovation consisted
rather in the introduction of new machine tools and work practices within a
workshop organisation that remained structurally unchanged. Indeed, a close
examination of engineering employers' conduct in the aftermath of their victory
in 1898 suggests that their attempts to break out of the conjines of craft '
regulation were more an extension of traditional strategies of work intensi-
fication and cost reduction than any breakthrough into a new rationalising
or 'Taylorist' mode. Material in the archives of the Engineering Employers'
Federation - especially the case files of disputes over machine manning and
piecework - together with the reports of the ASE's Organising District
Delegates (ODDs) in the union's Monthly Reports allow us to form a relatively
clear picture of events on the shop floor during this period, as well as to
evaluate the operation of the new disputes procedure introduced by the Terms
26 On these changes, see Landes, Unbound Prometheus, pp.292-323, especially
pp.3l3-l4i Jefferys, Engineers, pp.124-25i Saul, 'American Impact', pp.28-29i
Weekes, ASE, Ch.Si Rowe, Wages in Practice and Theory (1928), app.IIli Orcutt
'Machine Shop Management', and 'Modern Machine Shop Methods'. C. Littler,
'Deskilling and Changing Structures of Control', in S. Wood (ed.), Labour
and Deskilling, discusses the changing administration of production, with
many examples drawn from engineering.
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27of Settlement.
These sources show that the most direct consequence of the lockout was
to enable employers to pursue more effectively those measures which had been
set in motion before the lockout but which had been impeded by local craft
resistance. The promotion of handymen onto skilled men's work, the extension
of piecework and systematic overtime, the subversion of apprenticeship into
cheap boy labour, - together with questions of small wage advances and
reductions - thus dominated conflicts between skilled workers and their
employers in the years after 1898 as they had before. The main novel element
lay in employers' attempts to introduce new systems of supervision and incentivE
payment designed to increase output and cut labour costs with little capital
expenditure; even these grew out of methods already in force in some engineering
workshops before the lockout, and tended to degenerate in practice into rate-
cutting exercises, similar to those in force on conventional piecework.
Many employers who had promoted handymen onto skilled men's work during
the lockout itself kept them on permanently, and others were added in subsequent
months. Some idea of the extent of changes in machine manning can be drawn
from Table 9 , which gives figures from the EEF archives for two marine and
two inland districts, encompassing a total of 121 firms. The average number of
27 The EEF Archives contain complete files on cases raised through the disputes
procedure concerning various issues - series M deals with machine manning
and series P with payment by results - including the transcripts of local
and central conferences, together with the relevant correspondence between
the firm, the Federation at local and national levels, and local and national
union officials; occasional reports from informers within local union ranks
also appear. The ASE ODDs were full-time officials formally responsible to
the Executive Council but elected by the districts to whom they also owed
allegiance. The ODDs were involved in all important local negotiations,
especially those involving the disputes procedure.
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handymen promoted per firm was 8.8, and only in one inland district dominated
by a small group of large firms did this figure approach 20; elsewhere it
remained below 10. In the absence of information on average size of firms and
on the distribution of promotions among firms, these statistics are difficult
to interpret, but they suggest that while a considerable number of handymen
were promoted onto skilled men's work, the result fell short of a radical
transformation of workshop organisation. It is noteworthy as well that a
significant number of skilled workers regained their position after the close
of the lockout, while the number of handymen promoted during the lockout itself
was much larger than those promoted in the succeeding six to nine months,
suggesting that much of the existing slack in the division of labour had
already been taken up.
The ODD reports and the EEF case files for the years following the
lockout show that the typical machine manning dispute involved the promotion
of a small number of handymen onto an isolated number of new machine tools or
onto a rough part of fitters' work, such as scraping metal surfaces. 28 These
28 Fitters' work was on the whole less directly affected by the new machinery
than was that of turners; it was rather the case that the greater standard-
isation resulting from technical and organisational change indirectly reduce\
the demand for fitters' labour. (See the quotation from Orcutt cited above,
p.353) Nonetheless, there are also indications that employers sought to
substitute handymen on certain portions of fitters' work itself: as J.T.
Brownlie (ASE General Secretary) told the EEF in 1914:
The extension of this principle (the machine manning clause of the Terms
of Settlement - jz) •••is being applied not only to the selection and
training of these people (machinemen - jz) but extended into the fitting
shops •••• Happily it does not so easily apply to fitters so far as the
machines are concerned, but our members view with serious gravity the
extension of the principle of semi-skilled workmen being employed, and
they deeply regret this extension, and view its introduction with great
resentment in certain parts of the country. ('Verbatim Transcript of a
Special Central Conference between the ASE and the EEF, 13.2.1914', EEF
Archives, A(4)6.)
Cf. the transcript of a similar conference on amendments to the Terms of
Settlement, 1.11.1906, pp.158-59, EEF A(2) 5.
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sources are, however, more indices of resistance than of technical and
organisational change as such, since they only record changes which were
contested by the men involved, and therefore highlight developments in the
older sectors where union organisation was powerful rather than in the newer
ones where it was weaker. Despite these limitations, such sources offer
important information on the extent of actual change. Speaking at a local
conference arising from protests over the placement of a handyman on a turret
lathe at a Blackburn textile engineering firm in 1900, the ASE ODD pinpointed
h 1 d· f fl . h . . 2
9t e ea 1ng areas 0 con 1Ct OVer mac 1ne mann1ng:
We have found that in big shipyards and large engineering firms little
or no alteration has been made •••• Unfortunately, in Lancashire and
especially East Lancashire, we have felt these terms more than anywhere
else.
The dispute which erupted in the spring of 1900 at the' large textile
machine firm of Dobson and Barlow in Bolton is instructive as to the types of
changes involved. The firm installed a new shop for handymen working automatic
boring machines, displacing 59 skilled men, of whom 33 were forced to seek
work elsewhere; this was sufficiently unusual for the EEF case file to bear
30the note:
This would appear to be the first case of importance where extensive
changes were made by the introduction of neW machinery, and the
manning of such machinery by unskilled labour.
Only in the newer sectors and the large arms firms - especially at the Vickers'
works at Barrow and Erith - do we find examples of efforts on a comparable
29 'Verbatim Transcript of Local Conference, 20.1.1900', EEF Archives M(4),
1-2, (Livesey case).
30 EEF M(9)3; ASE MJ & R Oct.-Nov. 1900; EEF Executive Report 229, 4.12.1900,
pp.7-9.
360
31scale to shift work away from skilled men.
By its acceptance of the Terms of Settlement, the ASE had formally
abandoned its claim that the District Committees should be permitted to ban
piecework on a local basis, though the union intensified its efforts to secure
a role for itself in piece price fixing. Thus in the aftermath of the lockout
piecework spread rapidly: according to the 1906 wages census 33% of fitters
and turners were paid by the piece, as opposed to 12.9% 14 years before. (See
Table 5) The 'mutuality' in price fixing prescribed by the Terms of Settlement
was in most cases a mere fiction, as employers took advantage of their enhanced
power to fix prices unilaterally; the result was that pieceworkers' earnings
could on occasion fall below the level of the standard day rate. Again
Lancashire was a particular black spot, and the ODD for the region, commenting
on a dispute over piecework in Bolton, complained of the plight of the piece
worker, "left to scramble according to his limited opportunities for the
32crumbs that are left when everybody else has been served." The absence of
mutuality in piece price fixing therefore would figure prominently among the
ASE Executive's grievances when it opened negotiations for a revision of the
Terms of Settlement in 1900.
Employers were likewise quick to take advantage of the relaxation of
craft regulation in the wake of their victory in 1898 to intensify their
pressure on apprenticeship. In some cases, particularly in the cycle industry,
unapprenticed boys were taken on as cheap labour plain and simple, elsewhere
the number of apprentices to journeymen might be expanded to similar effect.33
31 See EEF M (6)4, 1901, and M 19)9, 1905.
32 ASE MJ & R, Jan. 1900.
33 'The Cycle Industry', ASE MJ & R July 1897; reports of ODD 1 (5cotland},ibid.
Apr. 1899 and May 1904; letters to ibid., June 1904, pp.17-18, July 1904:---
p.25, Sept. 1904, pp.24-25.
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Thus a survey of eight Clydeside firms in December 1906 showed that in many
cases the number o£ apprentices approached or even exceeded the number of
journeymen; the Secretary o£ the North West Engineering Employers' Association
estimated that the overall ratio of apprentices to journeymen was 60%, while
Benjamin Browne observed that on the Northeast Coast the ratio oscillated
from 60-80% in bad times to 50% in good times.34
Where specialisation and subdivision of tasks had been most fully
developed, employers were especially prone to exploit their apprentices as
cheap labour, with evident effects on the quality of their technical training
As the General Secretary of the ASE told the employers in 1914:35
34 'Verbatim Transcript of Conferences between the EEF and the ASE, SEMS, and
UMWA, EEF A(2)5-9, pp.114-130. The returns from Glasgow'were distributed
in the following manner:
Firm AEErentices Journe~en
Simon's (Renfrew) 63 54
Barclay, Curle (Finnieston) 80 47
Lobnitz (Renfrew) 101 84
Stephens 72 90
D. & H. Henderson's 82 119
Fairfield's (1 department) 61 76
Rowan's 84 87
Dunsmuir and Jackson's 118 74
Source: ibid., p.114.
35 Brownlie.to 'Special Central Conference, 13.2.14', EEF A(4)6, p.16. Cf.
this letter from an ASE member 14 years earlier:
Repetition work means a remarkable proficiency in a short space of time,
and the lad put to such work can no longer be looked at as an apprentice,
but as cheap boy labour .••• A majority of apprentices in the engineering
trade today •••are not introduced into the workshop to learn the trade,
but to compete unfairly with the journeymen and be used as a safeguard in
the event of dispute. (ASE MJ & R Mar. 1900, pp.2l-24.)
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Here and there there are some old-fashioned firms who pay some
regard to their trade in turning out efficient apprentices ••.
but in a great number of shops - this applies especially to the
textile industry and machine making - where lads are placed on
machines to do a certain piece of work and they have little or no
opportunity of acquiring that extensive knowledge that is to make
good, all-round workmen, and the lads, unless they have the good
fortune to be in the favour of the foreman or someone in the shop,
are turned out into the market as an inefficient product.
J.T. Murphy's well-known account of his struggle to obtain a proper apprentice-
ship at Vickers' Sheffield works at the turn of the century exemplifies this
36tendency:
It quickly became apparent to me. that unless I made a stand for myself
I should become a victim of mass production. After a spell on a
drilling machine I moved onto a miller. In all cases the process was
simple and there was considerable repetition in it. I began agitating
to be transferred to a universal miller where the work was more varied
and skilled. So began the fight for variety of work and training. As
soon as I felt I had mastered a particular machine and its class of
work, I would politely ask Mr Graham the foreman, for.a move on to
another job. Politeness passed into indignant daily protests until
in exasperation he would consent. In the course of a few years I worked
on almost every machine in the place and on all classes of work.
Nor were employers slow to supplement these measures designed to increase
the intensity of work with measures aimed at expanding its duration. The key
issue in the lockout had, after all, been the employers' resistance to the
demand for the 48 hour week; in the wake of their victory they were quick to
press beyond the letter of the Terms of Settlement, especially in matters of
overtime. The Terms of Settlement recognised employers' rights to demand
40 hours overtime per man per month, but the 'emergency clause' in the agreement
was widely used to exceed this limit, as employers sought to reap the advantages
of a small, intensively worked labour force menaced by unemployment outside the
36 J.T. Murphy, New Horizons, p.23.
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workshop, as before 1898.37 Similarly, novel attempts were made by employers
to eliminate breaks in the working day. In an attempt to reach a compromise
over the hours question in December 1897, the ASE Executive had proposed that
the workin~be set at 51 hours in exchange for the elimination of the
38traditional half-hour break for breakfast. While this proposal was rejected
at the same time, some employers later tried to institute the so-called 'one
break system' without any corresponding reduction of hoursj one such attempt
provoked a major strike in Leeds in 1901 and disputes on this issue multiplied
39thereafter.
All these measures represented attempts by employers to use the new
leverage they had gained as a result of their victory in 1898 to push back
the frontier of control by accumulating victories on all the issues which had
formed the battleground of normal conflict in the years preceeding the lockout.
The main point at which the employers threatened to step out of this framework
into a qualitatively new assault on the existing structure of the division of
labour lay in the introduction of new systems of supervision and incentive pay-
37 Barnes to Conference between the EEF and the ASE, SEMS, and UMWA, 1900,
quoted in EEF Executive Report 229, 4.12.1900, p.4.
Allover the country the 40 hours limit per month has been inoperative.
In many towns, not only have firms been working 40 hours per month,
but nearly 40 hours per week, and our men have been told that this
provision was only a recommendation and was not binding on the employers,
and that in cases of emergency they can do as they like, being themselves
the sole judge of what is emergency.
38 Conference, Nov-Dec. 1897.
39 ASE AR 1901; ASE ODD 3 (Yorks.), MJ & R Apr. 1901 and May 1902j for
negotiations between the ASE and the EEF on this subject, see below, p.403.
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mente In many large engineering firms, employers sought to tighten up
supervision by installing time clocks, by introducing non-union foremen, and
by creating a new group of supervisors known as 'feed and speed' men whose
duties encroached on the skilled worker's autonomy at his task; at the same
time, a new method of incentive payment, the premium bonus system, was
launched which aimed to overcome the disadvantages of piecework to the
employer and which involved important elements of work measurement and intensi-
fication.
Engineering employers had always viewed piecework as a key method of
increasing output per man hour and lowering unit labour costs; as we have seen,
the extension of piece payment figured prominently among the weapons of
managerial offensives against craft regulation from the l87Gs forward. But
piecework did not prove quite the royal road to efficient production that
employers had hoped for, as it generated its own dilemmas, especially in
relation to the fixing of piece prices. Workers in engineering, as in printing,
believed that the additional effort involved in piecework should be remunerated
at a higher rate than timework, and accordingly pressed for the initial price
for each job to be fixed loosely enough for them to earn this bonus; often
the strong shop floor organisation and intimate knowledge of the task possessed
by skilled workers enabled them to influence price fixing in this way.
Once a particular task had been priced and worked for a period of time,
however, it might then become possible for the operative to turn out work at
a vastly increased pace, and so earn a huge bonus if the rate were left
unchanged. In this case the employer found his labour costs increasing in
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direct proportion to increased output and was therefore tempted to cut the
rates, while the workers, conscious that there was an implicit or explicit
limit on piece earnings, operated a covert system of restriction of output
among themselves to protect the rates. As we have seen, rate cutting was
accordingly a ubiquitous feature of piecework in engineering workshops, and
had figured among skilled workers' principal objections to its introduction.
By the l890s, conflicts over price fixing had become so acute at a large arms
work like Armstrongs at Elswick that the management had eliminated piecework
entirely in most shops, and had replaced it with time clocks, tight
industrial discipline, and a special group of supervisors known as 'feed and
speed' men, whose "sole duty" according to one pro-management spokesman, was
"to keep moving through the shops in order to see that each machine is being
kept at its proper speed, and is producing the amount of work which it is known
b bl f . ,,40to e capa e 0 turn~ng out.
An alternative strategy which gained many adherents among engineering
employers after 1898 was to replace simple piecework with some form of
progressive or 'premium' bonus system, whereby a maximum time was fixed for
a task when it was assigned; if the worker completed the job in less than the
time allotted, the proceeds were divided proportionally between worker and
employer. Depending on the system, the worker might receive one-half or one-
third of the time saved, though the time wage was often formally guaranteed,
40 B. Taylor, 'The Machine Question and Eight Hours', Cassier's Magazine,
1897, pp.97-ll7; cf. also the previous discussion of supervision and
piecework at Armstrong's, pp.l09-lO.
Nov.
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marking an advance on most piecework arrangements from the worker's point of
view. Slater Lewis, author of the standard manual, The Commercial Organisation
of Factories (1896) anatomised the advantages of premium bonus over piecework
. f . ·t t k ' t· t· f 41~n terms 0 ~ts capac~ y 0 overcome war ers res r~c ~on 0 output:
The defect of this method ~iecework - jZ) is, that once the workman
has begun to derive a profit from the transaction, the employer has
no direct interest in his further exertions, but only has the indirect
advantage of a stationary labour cost coupled with a greater intensity
of output. The general result of this is, of course, well known and
understood. There inevitably comes a time .••when the gains of the
workman appear excessive compared with his former earnings as a mere
supplier of labour by the hour •••• A reduction of rates inevitably
follows.
Of course, where much piecework is in vogue, the trouble does
not necessarily arise with as much frequency as might be expected,
for a very good reason. As soon as the workman finds himself
approaching the point at which his extra earnings tend to rise beyond
the limit at which the traditions of the shop teach him the reduction
may be expected his efforts slacken .•••
The important feature of the newer method~remium bonus, jz)
is not that the saving is divided between employer and workman, but
that no artificial barrier, no 'critical rate' of earnings looms in
front of the latter to dampen his activity and lead him to slacken
his energies.
Slater Lewis was not entirely correct on this last point: in most premium
bonus systems, the division of the time saved between worker and employer
shifted to the advantage of the latter as output increased, thus providing
diminishing incentives for the former beyond a certain point. In theory,
therefore, the premium bonus was intended to remove the need for rate cutting
by building into the system of wage payment an automatic mechanism restraining
42workers' earnings from increasing in linear proportion to output.
41 J. Slater Lewis, 'The Labour Factor in the Intensity of Output', Engineering
Magazine, Nov. 1899, pp.203-4. For a similar analysis, see the letter from
William Denny of the Clyde shipbuilding firm in Webbs, Industrial Democracy,
pp.293-96.
42 I am grateful to Alastair Reid for drawing my attention to this point. For
the differences between the various bonus systems, of which were the Rowan
and the Halsey, see G.D.H. Cole, The Payment of Wages (2nd.ed., 1928), chs.S-
W.F. Watson, The Worker and Wage Incentives (1934); M.L. Yates, Wages and
Labour Conditions in British Engineering (1937), pp.8S-88; and Weekes,ASE,
pp.177-79. For a contemporary account, see the articles reprinted from The
Engineer (1902) as The Premium System of Paying Wages (5th ed., 1917).
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The principle of the 'progressive piece wage' had become relatively
familiar to British employers by the early 1890s through its use in sections
of the tailoring and boot and shoe trades, while its application to engineering
was popularised through discussions of Halsey's American experiments during
43the same decade. The first attempts to introduce versions of the premium
bonus system into British engineering workshops, however, came in Glasgow in
the wake of the 1897-8 lockout, where the firms of Rowan (locomotives), Weir
(marine engineering), and Barr and Stroud (scientific instruments) played a
44pioneering role. By 1901, a number of large firms in various sectors had
introduced some variant of the premium bonus, and with the ASE Executive's
acceptance of the practice under the terms of the 1902 Carlisle agreement, its
diffusion accelerated markedly. As might be expected, the large arms firms
such as Armstrong-Whitworth and Vickers (Barrow and Erith) were most enthus-
iastic in their introduction, though their example was followed by a consider-
able assortment of marine engineers, locomotive builders, and even some general
45engineers and machine tool makers, as well as the Royal Dockyards.
Generally speaking, the introduction of the premium bonus and tighter
supervision and labour discipline went hand in hand. One witness at the TUC
Joint Committee's inquiry in 1909 testified that he had worked at Armstrong's
under the feed and speed system;
43 Schloss, Remuneration, ch.6.
44 Jefferys, Engineers, p.130; Weekes, ASE, p.178.
45 See the evidence to the TUC Joint Committee, Premium Bonus, and the list
of cases in the EEF Archives, Series P.
~8
One feed and speed overseer had five-six shops to overlook, and in
many cases his supervision was only nominal. In 1904, however, the
Premium Bonus system was introduced and they were subjected to close
and continual supervision. He was on small work and had as many as
15-16 separate jobs in one day, each one having its own time allowance.
46Similarly, another witness asserted that
It was a common occurence for an estimator to stand over a man, watch
in hand, which was intolerable to any self-respecting man.
The systematic character of the changes involved emerges from an account by
W.F. Watson, later a founder of the amalgamation movement within the ASE, of
the alterations of workshop practice introduced by a rationalising manager at
the arms and marine engineering works of Thorneycrofts of Chiswick in 1905:47
Hitherto, if a man deposited his check in the timekeeper's box within
five minutes after starting-time, he could walk leisurely to his shop.
Time recorders were installed in each department and we had to 'clock
in' within two minutes or lose half an hour's pay. The plant started
up before time, and we had to be at work as soon as the hooter stopp~d;
discipline men marched round to see that we did.
Charts indicating the feeds and speeds to be employed were fixed
on every machine, and 'feed and speed' bosses, armed with 'feedometers',
endeavoured to keep men and machines working to their fullest capacity.
Emery wheels were taken from the shop, all tools being ground to theoretic
angles by unskilled man. A man was given six standard tools on starting,
which were changed for new ones when worn. Men were forbidden to leave
their job except when Nature demanded; labourers were sent for all tools
and tackle. The lavatories were clean, but without doors and facing
each other, with a perambulating inspector to see that no malingerer
exceeded the seven minutes prescribed in a minatory notice.
Even where the Premium Bonus was not introduced, time clocks alone
might well be, and employers supplemented these more radical innovations with
traditional attempts to win foremen away from the trade unions. In 1896, the
EEF established a 'Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society' aimed at persuading foremen
that they could leave their union without forfeiting their accumulated benefits,
which would be made good by the employers. The FMBA was officially registered
46 TUC Joint Committee, Premium Bonus, pp.34-35.
47 Watson, Wage Incentives, pp.10-ll.
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as a friendly society in 1899, and by 1906 the EEF reported that it had
48enrolled 890 of a possible membership of some 3,500.
It will be evident that these new systems of supervision and incentive
pay introduced by British engineering employers in the first decade of the
century bore some affinity to the schemes for scientific management which
were taking root in the United States in the same period. Certainly, British
managers were acutely interested in American developments, and the technical
press of the period is full of detailed comparisons between British and
American methods of factory organisation, wage payment, cost accounting and
so on, especially in Engineering Magazine which published editions in both
countries from 1897.49 But most of the actual innovations in managerial
practice introduced by British engineering employers had their roots in
indigenous methods pioneered by the large arms firms, and even where some
borrowing took place, as with the premium bonus system, modifications were
made to suit British conditions. British managers were on the whole suspicious
of the systematic character of American theorising, reflecting doubtless on
the bias towards 'rule of thumb' methods in British cultural and entrepreneuria:
traditions, but more strongly the limited possibilities for wholesale reorgan-
isation of factory layout and other expensive innovations. Thus Littler's
study of changing managerial practices concludes that "there was no systematic
time study or method study in Britain before the First World War ...•"50It was
generally impossible to introduce so much standardisation as American theorists
recommended, with attendent consequences for the extent of subdivision
48 EEF Executive Reports 204, 31.1.1899, 207, 24.3.1899; EEF Executive Minutes,
9.10.1905. On questions of timekeeping, see ODD 3 (North east), Mar. 1901
and May 1905; EEF Executive Report for 1902.
49 See for example the special issue of Jan. 19010n 'Works Management'.
50
Littler, 'Structures of Control' I p.16.
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of tasks; similarly, British managers rebelled at the high supervision costs
imposed by American practice, and particularly rejected the high wage strategy
which formed a central component of Taylorist, and later Fordist, thinking.
Finally, British managers were much less sanguine than their American counter-
parts about the possibilities of inducing skilled workers to accept these
innovations, a scepticism which would increase sharply in magnitude with the
resurgence of craft militancy in the run-up to the First World War.51 The
bottom line in these debates lay in the question of overall profitability,
and it was here that British managers were most sceptical. One writer in the
Engineer in 1913, after raising objections about workers' resistance and
supervision costs, went on to conclude that the success of the "American
system of management" in Britain had been rare:52
51 On high supervision costs, see The Engineer, 14.11.1913, p.52l; on fears
of worker resistance, see ibid., and D. Smith and P.L.C.N. Pickworth,
Engineers' Costs and Economical Workshop Production, (Manchester, 1914),
pp.91-94, quoted in M. Barenberg, 'The British Reception of Scientific
Management: A Case Study of Alleged Entrepreneurial Failure' (unpublished
paper, Harvard University, 1976), p.20-21.
52 The Engineer 4.11.1913, p.521. For a critique of the over-systematic
approach of scientific management, see Engineering 1.2.1907, quoted in
Weekes, ASE, p.174; for a general discussion of the reception of scientific
management in Britain, see ibid., ch.5 and Barenberg, 'Scientific Management'
There is considerable evidence that American employers in practice
shared much of the scepticism of their British counterparts about the more
utopian components of Taylorist thinking, though they were able to press
much further the aim of reducing the skilled worker's influence in the
production process. See D. Nelson, Managers and Workers (Madison, 1975);
Palmer, 'Class Conception, and Conflict'; Montgomery, Workers' Control;
Stark, 'Class Structure'.
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The proof of factory management is to be found in the sales
department. Unless scientific management enables us to produce
more cheaply or more quickly than before, it is of little avail.
We have yet to learn that British works managed on American
lines have paid higher dividends than British works managed on
British lines.
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Local Autonomy, and Resistance to the Reorganisation of the Division of Labour
1898 - 1908
While engineering employers were synthesising old and new tactics to
press home the advantages won in the 1897-8 lockout, skilled workers, local
union officials, and the ASE's national Executive were all for their part
compelled to seek a new modus vivendi in the context of the changed balance of
forces and the novel industrial relations procedures inaugurated by the Terms
of Settlement. In this context, it was the national union Executive, by virtue
of its centralising ambitions and the ideological orientation of its leading
members, as well as its position at the fulcrum of pressures from the EEF, .
which was prepared to make the greatest adjustment towards working within the
Terms of Settlement. In particular, the ASE Executive sought to enmesh the
union within the new procedures for the avoidance of disputes, which stipulated
that strikes could only take place after employers and union officials had
failed to reach agreement in a series of local and central conferences, and to
reorient the union away from craft regulation towards a more economistic
conception of collective bargaining. It was these policies which would bring
the Executive into the sharpest conflict with local officials and a rank and
file determined to safeguard local autonomy and to resist encroachments on
craft regulation regardless of the provisions of the Terms of Settlement.
The General Secretary of the ASE from 1896 forward was George Barnes, a
socialist member of the Independent Labour Party who had been a leading supportel
of Tom Mann's candidacy in 1892. In addition to his association with the reform
53 It was alleged at the time of the 1897-8 lockout that Mann had agreed to
support Barnes' candidacy for the ASE post on condition that once elected he
press forward the demand for the eight hour day. Col. Dyer, 'The Engineering
Dispute', Cassier's Magazine, Nov. 1897.
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movement within the ASE and the new unionism, Barnes represented within the
union a growing social democratic or state socialist current within the labour
movement as a whole. Inspired oy the union upsurge of 1889-90 and by general
conceptions of class struggle, men like Barnes and Mann sought to revitalise
British trade unionism by creating a militant all-grades movement to pursue
both industrial and political objectives. Oriented toward the state and away
from the workshop, the representatives of this policy current advocated cross-
sectional demands over wages and hours in the industrial arena, but were most
concerned to secure independent labour representation in parliament, which
they hoped would yield political solutions to the general problems of poverty
54and unemployment.
Before the 1897 lockout, Barnes had believed that trade unions could
pursue militant policies in both the industrial and political arenas. As he
wrote in May 1897:55
And so we find the workers tied by the cords of class politicians to
the stake of their own timidity, jealousy, and prejudice, over and
anon, making ineffective efforts to reach the produce of their own
labour, ever being flaunted before their eyes. Success lies only in
freedom. That is to say that in political and industrial matters we
must recognise the class struggle going on and wage our political, as
we have our industrial battles, off our own bat. Until then we can
only nibble, and in nibbling, get all we deserve.
But after the employers' victory, Barnes concluded that the union had little
choice but to work within the Terms of Settlement and favoured the replacement
of local resistance to the reorganisation of the division of labour by the
development of national collective bargaining that would concentrate on wage
54 For a good general account of Barnes' career and ideas, see the article by
B. Nield in J. Bellamy and J. Saville (eds.) The Dictionary of Labour
Biography, vol. IV (1977), pp. 7-14.
55 ASE MJ & R May 1897.
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issues. Believing that industrial militancy offered slim prospects of
advancement, Barnes.·urged workers to concentrate their energies on parlia-
mentary politics, particularly after his election as an MP in 1906:56
•••Trade Unionism has a difficult time ahead of it, and it behooves
us, as Trade Unionists, to put our own house in order. I am in favour
of orderly and peaceful arrangements being made with the employers
industrially, whenever and wherever it is possible to make them, so
that we can the more effectively cement the Labour forces and focus
them on Parliament •.•• We shall probably find that we need not strike
at all except through the ballot box, which is the cheapest, most
efficient, as well as the most humane way to strike.
By 1898 Barnes had already embarked on the road that was to win him a
place in Lloyd George's war cabinet, while his erstwhile collaborator Tom Mann
would go on to become a syndicalist militant in the pre-war labour unrest and
later a founder of the Communist Party of Great Britain; bo~h drew similar·
lessons concerning the future of the ASE's exclusive membership policies
from the union's defeat in 1898. Immediately after the lockout's conclusion
Mann and other dissident members of the ASE founded the Workers' Union to
combat the enhanced organisational capacities of the employers by organising
the unorganised into a "fighting union", beginning with those excluded from
the ASE.57 Barnes for his part preferred to reform the ASE itself, opening
its doors to the less skilled in hopes of improving their conditions and at
58Thus in 1901 he wrote:the same time strengthening that of the union.
The engineering unions should frankly accept specialisation and adapt
themselves to changing circumstances; they should, I think, grade their
membership from the highly-trained all-round mechanic to the machine
tender who, owing to simplification of processes, cannot rank as an
engineer but who is entitled to a guaranteed living wage.
56 ASE MJ June 1908, p.17.
57 R. Hyman, The Workers' Union (Oxford, 1971), ch.l.
58 'Uses and Abuses of Organisation among Employers and Employed', Engineering
Magazine, Jan. 1901, p.567.
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The employers' victory likewise touched of£ a fierce debate in the
pages of the ASE's Monthly Jourrtal on the consequences of "specialisation"
and the merits of extending ASE membership to handymen and machinists. The
proponents of an alliance with the less skilled argued that technical change
and the attendant specialisation was constantly increasing the ranks of
machinists at the expense of the full-skilled craftsmen; the latter could
only hope to survive if they joined forces with the former to improve the
conditions of both, a position best expressed by a cartoon showing a member
of the ASE standing at the top of some steps and extending his hand to a
machine man, with the caption, "My friend, I'd much rather raise you to my
59level than you should drag me down to yours." The opponents of this policy
feared that the admission of the less skilled would only dilute the ASE's
claim to be a society of fully-skilled men, levelling down their wages to
those of machinists and accelerating the movement of work to the latter; one
spectre bandied about was the image of the ASE as a stream, whose width was
increased by the addition of new tributaries at the expense of its depth and
60force. But while Barnes could ensure that the proponents of an extention
of ASE membership prevailed in the pages of the union journal, and even persuadE
the 1901 Delegate Meeting to create a new section for machinists, he was unable
to convince the bulk of the membership, who remained committed to an exclusive
strategy. Control over admissions to the new section, as with those created in
1892, remained in the hands of the District Committees dominated by the fully-
skilled men, which continued to operate tacit bars against the machinists: by
59 ASE MJ & R Aug. 1901, p.25.
60 See especially the letter from W.H. Lister, Woolwich Branch, ASE MJ & R
Feb. 1900, pp.26-27j on the debate as a whole, .,seethe editorial in ibid.,
Dec. 1899, and the letters in ibid. 1900-2, passim.
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1904 only 4,000 machinists had been recruited into the special section created
for their benefit, while nearly 90% of those joining the ASE were still fitters
61and turners as late as 1914.
Despite the magnitude of the employers' victory in 1898, skilled workers
in the districts were by no means prepared to abandon their struggle for
exclusive control over the new machine tools. In Scotland, for example,
returning ASE men refused to restart work when faced with labourers working
their former machines: similarly, when labourers were placed on machinery at
a Manchester wire works a few months later, the skilled men struck for their
62removal. In many cases, the threat of a strike was sufficient to win a
63favourable settlement, as the reports of the ASE ODDs demonstrate.
But where the employers were prepared to mount a more determined
resistance to skilled workers' demands for the removal of handymen from machines
they could count on the support of the EEF through the new disputes procedures
established by the Terms of Settlement. A number of machine manning cases from
the years immediately following the lockout illustrate employers' efforts to
use the procedure to short-circuit local resistance to the promotion of
handymen onto machines. Thus in one Halifax firm, ASE members struck
spontaneously against the appointment of two labourers on polishing lathes
formerly worked by skilled men: the ASE Executive obtained their return to work
following the disputes procedure, and the resulting central conference ruled
that the men had no right to contest the employers' action under clause six
of the Terms of Settlement, which provided for managerial discretion in the
61 Jefferys, Engineers, pp. 127, 166.
62 ODD 1 (Scot.), ASE MJ & R Feb. 1898; ODD 4 (Lancs.), ibid., Sept.-Oct. 1898.
63 ODD 4 (Lancs.), ASE MJ & R Oct. 1898, Aug. 1899, Jan. 1901: ODD 1 (Scot.),
Dec. 1898; ODD 2 (Lancs), Jan. 1899, Oct. 1901: ODD 3 (Northeast), Jan. 1901:
ODD 5 (Midlands), Dec. 1898, Jan. 1900.
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k' f hi 64war 1ng 0 mac nes. Similarly an Oldham firm had introduced labourers on
turret and capstan lathes during the lockout, and this state of affairs was
tolerated by the skilled men on their return to work. As the craftsmen's
confidence returned, however, they determined to force the removal of the
handymen, and launched a campaign which culminated in a "lengthy stoppage" in
1900; here again, the strikers were induced to return to work under the
disputes procedure and the matter was dropped by the union Executive at a
65Central Conference.
But the most conspicuous case in which the ASE Executive secured a victory
for the employers when a strike would have been likely to have brought
satisfaction to the rank and file came at Vickers' Erith works at the height
of the Boer War in 1901. When ASE men at Erith demanded that handymen on
certain classes of work be removed from capstan lathes, and persisted in
their claim after a local conference, the Secretary of the London Engineering
Employers' Association wrote to the EEF underlining the seriousness of the
situation and noting two main points:
1. If any concession is made it means the beginning of an almost
intolerable state of things at Erith, and the gradual displacement,
as complaints are made one after the other, of all unskilled
machine hands.
2. I do not want our members to be asked •.•if they have a mandate to
lockout, and to be told, if they have not then the point must be
conceded. The attitude that has been taken up has been taken up
because it was felt that the active policy that has been pursued
at Erith by the Trade Unions rendered any concession that made on
this question a mere prelude to the gradual displacement of all
non-union hands. On the other hand, you of course know the position
Messrs. Vickers are in, and what a strike at Erith would mean.
64 EEF M(9)2; EEF, Decisions of Central Conference, 1898-1925, (1925), case
772, p.157.
65 EEF M(9)4 EEF, Central Conference, case 1648, p.355.
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In the event, however, the EEF was able to persuade the ASE Executive Council
to bring its influence to bear and this case too was dropped at central
66conference. As Table lOA shows, between 1898 and 1901 the disputes procedure
operated in a manner completely unfavourable to local resistance to changes in
machine manning. Nearly half of the cases raised in the localities were
dropped before reaching a central conference, and an equal number of appeals
were dropped by the union at such conferences themselves, or referred back to
a local conference; in only one case (the 1900 DODson and Barlow dispute) was
the union able to win even a concessionary formula from the employers, in this
instance that employers should endeavour to avoid the displacement of skilled
h ' d' h' t 1 67men w en ~ntro uc~ng new mac ~ne 00 s.
Nor were employers' efforts to use the disputes procedure to choke off
local militancy confined to changes in working practices such as machine mannin~
or piece payment. As Brian Weekes has shown through an examination of the 1899
advance movement in Mid-Lancashire, the effect of the disputes procedure was
to prevent workers from winning even routine wage advances at a purely local
level. Moreover, the delays involved in the various stages of the procedure
could prevent workers from taking advantage of the conjunctural movements of
the trade cycle which had always given the signal for advance movements; by
the time the procedure had been exhausted, the peak of the upturn might have
passed and the opportunity for a rise 10st.68
66 Letter dated 12.10.1901 in EEF M(6)4, my emphasis; EEF, Central Conference,
case 1106, p.234i ASE MJ & R Dec. 1900 and May 1901.
67 EEF, Central Conference, case 294, p.66.
68 Weekes, ASE, pp.223-26.
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To maintain its.policy of w.orking within the Terms of Settlement in the
face of the mounting discontent in the districts over the workings of the new
disputes procedures, the ASE Executive was obliged to move quickly to consoli-
date its authority, particularly over local officials. Even before the lockout,
Barnes had displayed a disposition to limit local autonomy in important questior.
of trade policy when faced with organised employer pressure, as in the Clyde-
Belfast dispute, when he had compelled the Belfast men to return to work
against their will.69 After 1898, Barnes soon found himself at odds with
several of the union's Organising District Delegates, who, though formally
responsible to the Executive, were elected by the districts and developed
a particular animus against the disputes procedures, not least because of
their exclusion from central conferences.70 After several such squabbles,
the Executive Council began proceedings in November 1898 to 'suspend Rose and
Ratcliffe, the ODDs for Mid-Lancashire and the Northeast Coast respectively.
The Executive's charges make clear the element of localism involved in the
dispute:
Certain Organising District Delegates •••have been spending their
time and energies in undermining the authority of this council, and
inciting the members to refuse to be bound by its decisions.
In this context, the Executive Council was prepared to defend the ODDs'
71exclusion from central conferences with the employers:
During last year they took part in several of the Conferences, and
they could not - or at any rate, did not then - divest themselves
of the character of local officials; but on the contrary, were
constantly talking of 'their division' and 'their constituents' thus
making it perfectly clear that at an Executive Conference the good
of the Society as a whole was of little moment compared to the good
will - and votes - of that section of it upon which they were directly
dependent.
69 See above, pp. 8~81, 189-90.
70 EEF, Central Conference, case 293, p.66.
71 ASE, Suspension of Organising Delegate, Division No.2, 12.11.1898.
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While Ratcliffe apologised to the Executive and was therefore permitted to
retain his position, Rose adopted a less' conciliatory stance and his suspension
was upheld by a membership ballot, though he was allowed to resume office when
reelected by his district the following year.72
It should not be thought, however, that the Executive's willingness to
work within the disputes procedure and to discipline local militants implied
a wholly passive acceptance of the Terms of Settlement as interpreted by the
employers. At each local and central conference, ASE officials fought for a
more liberal interpretation of the Terms of Settlement, particularly in
relation to the interpretation of the machine manning clause and the question
of mutuality in piece price fixing and overtime limits. Speaking at a local
conference in Oldham in 1900, for example, one ODD argued irta fashion typical
of union rhetoric for this period:73
.••Whilst we are well aware that clause 6 of the Agreement gives you
an absolute right to do whatever you like with your machinery, still
we think that most of these clauses are capable of very much broader
interpretation than is given them by the Employers •••• We do not
think the spirit in this clause gives a right to an employer to do
whatever he likes with his machine tools, the spirit of the clause
really is that he is going to guard against any offensive action on
the part of the union men in keeping all the machinery in their hands
and preventing him from making any alteration in the machinery. I say
again that regarding the letter of the law the men have no action, but
we think you ought to make some provision in your workshops to avoid
the bitterness arising by enforcing a clause like this.
Even George Barnes himself displayed a marked ambivalence in relation to the
operation of the disputes procedure and to skilled workers' demands to control
new machine tools, stemming from his dual position as negotiator with the EEF
and representative of a union whose membership remained strongly committed to
craft regulation. In the frequently quoted article in Engineering Magazine
72 Weekes, ~, pp.218-20.
73 'Transcript of Local Conference, 20.1.1900', EEF M(4), 1-2.
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in which he called for the grading of ASE members, for example, Barnes
concluded that
•.•the real solid gain following the dispute has been the freedom
from stoppage, consequent on the facilities afforded for the
discussion of differences ..••
But the bulk of the article was devoted to detailed criticisms of the actual
working of the Terms of Settlement which "run counter to the reason and sense
of justice of the great mass of engineering operatives", especially in their
provision concerning machinery and piecework. And in relation to machine
manning he argued,
•••It is clear to my mind that the probationary servitude of lads in
Great Britain entitles them in after life to take such steps as may
be necessary to protect the trade from microscopic subdivisions which
would reduce mechanics to mere machine-tenders, doomed to a dull round
of narrow and uninteresting drudgery.
As for the disputes procedures,
As at present constituted they but enable each side to ascertain the
strength of the other as indicated by the pertinacity with which it
clings to its argumentative position, and so they lead to avoidance
of disputes as much through the wholesome fear of losing money as by
any other consideration ••.• Such 'courts' can never reconcile con-
flicting interests; they cannot eve~4exhaust the means of amicable
and just settlement of disputes ••••
In 1900, therefore, having recovered from the immediate effects of the
lockout, the ASE Executive opened negotiations for a revision of the Terms of
Settlement in association with the SEMS and the UMWA. The unions' demands
focused on six main issues: 1) the exclusion of local men from Central
Conferences; 2) the interpretation of the term 'current conditions' (the
Terms of Settlement provided that 'current conditions' should prevail until
74 'Uses and Abuses of Organisation among Employers and Employed', Engineering
Magazine Jan. 1901, pp.560-67. See also the passage quoted above, p.374.
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the procedure had been exhausted, and there was a running dispute over
whether this term referred to the conditions prevailing before or after a
managerial innovation; 3) the practical working of the overtime limit;
4)the working of piecework; 5) the machine question; and 6) delays in holding
conferences. Some of these demands, such as those for mutuality in piece
price fixing and a stricter application of the oVertime limit represented
long-standing concerns of the Executive, but the demand for the inclusion of
local representatives at Central Conferences was a clear reversal of past
policy designed to placate opposition in the districts. Similarly, Barnes
was careful to adopt a strong initial position on machine manning in line with
the wishes of the rank and file, demanding that "machines doing a varied class
of work" be reserved for skilled men, and that employers should seek to
minimise the displacement of such men by the introduction of new machine tools.
It is clear from the statements of Executive Council negotiators that their
primary purpose in proposing these changes was to pacify critics among local
officials and the rank and file, and this formed one of the main arguments
for their acceptance by the employers. As one member of the ASE Executive
. 75put ~t:
We have to remind you that the whole of the members of the societies
concerned agreed to the terms of 1898 in principle, but there have
been certain interpretations given to the terms and to the constit-
ution of the conferences, both local and central, since that date,
which have not been assented to by the rank and file of the local men,
and hence the need, in our judgement, for a widely representative
conference at which some of these local men, at all events may be
present. We have not as yet convinced these local men as to the justice
of the interpretations that have been given. It remains to be seen
whether an open conference would so convince them.
75 EEF Executive Report 229, 4.12.1900: 'Request by the ASE, SEMS, and UMWA
for Amendment of the Terms of Settlement'. The Golightly quotation is on
p.3. See also the Verbatim Report of Conferences between the EEF and the
ASE, SEMS, and UMWA, Dec. 1900- May 1902 (1902).
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In return for a more voluntary commitment to the Terms of Settlement,
the employers were prepared to accept certain amendments proposed by union
negotiators: the need for mutuality in piece price fixing was formally
recognised and Federation members were advised that every effort should be
made to avoid the displacement of old hands when changes in workshop organ-
isation were introduced. While these changes were sufficient to win the
approval of the SEMS, the ASE rank and file adopted a more intransigent stance,
rejecting the revised terms by a margin of nearly two to one. This vote
reflected both dissatisfaction with the details of the revised terms - which
failed to offer pieceworkers a guaranteed wage - and the deep-seated hostility
76of ASE members to the Terms of Settlement per se.
Barnes and the ASE Executive had seen their most urgen~ tasks in these
negotiations to bring piecework fully under the aegis of collective bargaining
and so to stem the erosion of the union's role in wage determination. Unlike
many rank and file engineers, who associated piecework with the intensification
of work and the subversion of craft solidarity, the ASE Executive Council
professed no opposition to piece payment in principle, but only to the abuses
associated with its practical operation. As Barnes himself put it,77
76 'Verbatim Report of Conference,
6.3.1912; ASE MJ & R Feb. 1902.
of the Terms of Settlement, see
Nov. 1900, pp.27-28.
20.2.1902' in ibid.; EEF General Letter 146,
For an example of rank and file criticism
the letter signed 1Furnessia' , ASE MJ & R
77 Barnes quoted in EEF Executive Report 229, 4.12.1900, p.3; cf. Verbatim
Report of Conferences 1900-2, especially p.48.
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We are inclined to think that there is a good deal to be said
for piecework under certain conditions •.•. We think that there
may be some arrangement nade oetween us by which the principle
of mutuality may be here introduced, by which the collective agency
of the Society may be brought behind the men, and by which the
principle of the guaranteed day rate of wages may be secured to
the men allover this country •••• Under those conditions I don't
think we have a great objection to piecework, but we do object when
a man is required to make his own bargain, and where the Society
is ignored, as it has been during these last two or three years.
Thus when employers began to experiment more widely with premium bonus
systems after 1900, Barnes saw the conflicts generated by their introduction
as an opportunity to resolve once and for all the union's economic and
organisational grievances concerning piecework. Barnes was by no means
oblivious to the problems raised by the premium bonus. When first confronted
with American writings on the subject, he at once picked out the danger spots.
Without a guaranteed day wage and a commitment from employers to the continuity
of the system once introduced,
The systems of piece and premium are used to gauge full physical and
mental capacity and then to get the additional output for little over
the normal day wage; and in addition, they are used to undermine the
principle of a standard minimum wage by reducing day rates of the
least efficient to a point below the ordinary comforts of life.
At the same time,78
•••There is a new, and to my mind very sinister, element introduced
in the person of the 'router' whose duties, I understand are to
determine the manner and order in which different operations are to
be performed. The effect of this 'routing' would be, of course, to
divest the man of any right of discretion as to how he should do a
job, and reduce him to a mere automation ••.• There will doubtless
be those who will think that the author had 'rout' not 'route' in
his mind when introducing this new form of 'feed and speed man'.
78 Letter to the Engineer, reprinted in ibid., Premium System, pp.40-44.
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But when the union found itself confronted with some half-dozen
disputes over premium bonus schemes to discuss at central conference with the
employers in 1902, Barnes hit upon a novel strategem which most fully
embodied his policy of working within the Terms of Settlement and steering
the union away from craft regulation: believing the introduction of the
premium bonus to be inevitable in any case, he proposed a general agreement
which would embody the union's acceptance of the system in exchange for
safeguards from the employers regarding its operation. Caught by surprise,
the employers accepted, and the resulting agreement signed at Carlisle in
October 1902 included four main provisos: 1) that the time rate of wages be
paid in all cases; 2) that overtime continue to be remunerated at higher rates
in the normal way; 3) that time limits once established should not be altered
"unless the method or means of manufacture are changed"; and that bonus systems
should not be introduced on a temporary basis. In this instance, Barnes
refused to submit the agreement for membership ratification, arguing that the
premium bonus did not constitute a "new condition of labour" and its introductic
therefore fell within the employers' prerogatives according to the Terms of
79Settlement.
Barnes' solution to the dilemma posed by the premium bonus reflected
his more general approach to craft regulation in the light of the employers'
79 For the cases leading to the Carlisle Agreement, see EEF P(2)1-2; for a
transcript of the conference and related documents, ibid., P(2)3, 15.
The text of the agreement was published in ASE MJ & R Sept. 1902 and is
reprinted in Weekes, ASE, app. III.
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victory in 1898 and the new institutional structure which it had brought into
being. Faced with the employers' determination to root out those vestiges
of craft regulation which directly affected the organisation of production,
Barnes sought to convert the demands of his members into a form which could
be made acceptable to the employers by its concentration on questions of
remuneration and collective bargaining. Already in 1897, Barnes had vainly
sought to redefine the machine question as a problem of wage rates, pressing
the employers' to negotiate a list of machines whose operators should receive
the skilled men's rate irrespective of whether they were members of the ASE.
This objective continued to lie behind his bargaining posture in the negotiation
to revise the Terms of Settlement in 1900-1 and again in 1906-7. As Barnes
advised the employers during this latter set of negotiations, "The root of the
question is wages - if you would agree to pay the full rate for certain machines
80there would be no problem."
Barnes' overall strategy was based on a theory of collective bargaining
and the 'legitimate functions of trade unions' which bore significant affinities
to that developed contemporaneously by the Webbs. In the name of efficiency
and economic growth, trade unions should cease to contest the employers'
prerogatives to reorganise production as they saw fit, concentrating instead
on protecting their members against any consequent deterioration in their
earnings and working conditions, and ensuring that no additional effort was
80 'Verbatim Transcript of Conferences between the ASE, SEMS, and UMWA, 1906-7',
EEF A(2)S-9, pp.9S ff.; see the remark of a like-minded candidate for a
seat on the Executive Council in 1907:
In view of the Terms of Settlement, the machine question resolves itself
into the price to be paid for working the various machine.' (Quoted in
Jefferys, Engineers, p.1S7.}
For a characterisation of Barnes' position as a 'rate-for-the-job' approach,
see Weekes, ASE, pp.81-82.
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demanded without increased remuneration.81 Thus Sidney Webb himself commended
82the Carlisle Agreement to the membership of the ASE for its approval:
With the evils o£ competitive piecework in the engineering trade ..•.
the premium bonus .••provisionally agreed to seems to me an admirable
expedient. The ASE may in my humble opinion, sa£ely agree to it.
The standard of time work rates is fully protected. The danger of a
future cutting of rates is well guarded against •••• And, what to my
mind is a great advantage to trade unionism in the engineering trade,
the system makes a distinct advance in rendering more accurate and
scientific the working of the standard rate itself - the securing of
equal pay for equal effort •••.
The ASE Executive's strategy of transforming craft regulation into a
purely economic defence of material interests foundered both on the difficulty
of separating skilled workers' market interests from their craft identity and
on the inadequacies of specific arrangements concluded with employers to
prevent the deterioration of their material position. In their efforts to
repair their competitive position and to reap the fruits of their victory in
1898, engineering employers were determined to reduce their unit labour costs
through a mixture of traditional and novel methods. Where these included the
introduction of new machine tools and methods of workshop organisation,
employers were rarely prepared to pay an ef£ective premium to secure the
consent of the skilled workers, preferring wherever possible to make use of
the cheaper and more docile handymen. The ASE's proposals for rating the
machines were not considered practical by the employers since the same machine
could be used for jobs requiring radically different skill levels, depending
on how it was fitted with jigs and fixtures and whether it was to be used for
81 See Industrial Democracy, especially pt. II, and the discussion of the
Webbs' views on the 'legitimate functions of trade unions' expressed at
the time of the 1897-8 lockout, above, PP.204-6.
82 ASE MR Oct. 1902, quoted in Weekes, ~, pp. 181-82.
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, d ,83small-batch or repetitl0n pro uctlon.
Thus many ASE members found themselves competing for jobs with handymen
a state of affairs whose full consequences might only become apparent in times
of depression, as an ASE negotiator at Vickers' Barrow works noted in 1913:84
•••While it (the placing of handymen on machine tools - jz) will not
hurt us perhaps very much for the time being, when a depression in
trade comes, that is the time we shall feel it. Our experience is
that in times of depression the skilled men are displaced and these
cheap men working tools are kept on ••••
Even in good times, however, the intensity of competition in the labour market
ensured a high level of unemployment among skilled workers: only in one year
B'between 1898 and 1914 did unemployment among ASE members fall below two percent.
Moreover, as in printing, the unemployment caused by changes in the division
of labour was heavily concentrated among older workers unable to keep up with
the pace demanded by the new workshop conditions; as Sir Benjamin Browne,
Managing Director of the Tyneside firm of Leslie, Hawthorne, and Company and
one of the leading lights of the EEF, told the Poor Law Commission in 1908:
"In many trades, particularly engineering, boilermaking, and shipbuilding, men
8(
have little chance of finding a fresh situation after fifty or even forty-five.'
Nor were skilled workers' concerns for the future of their trade confined
to the market value of their own skills; so strong was the identification of
many ASE members with their craft that they expected to pass on a similar statu!
83 See above, p.195.
84 'Verbatim Transcript of Local Conference, 13.2.13', EEF M(9)18.
85 Jeffery, Engineers, p.119.
86 RC on the Poor Laws, qs. 86,210-11.
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to their sons, a prospect which the progress of technical and organisational
change in the industry threatened to foreclose. Thus the bitter reply of
skilled workers at one Blackburn textile machinery plant in 1911 to the
managerial assertion that they should have no objection to handymen being
87placed on machine tools since they were in full employment:
We have children coming who want situations. What are they going
to serve their time for? Labouring? Wheeling a barrow? Some of
the men are throwing it in their teeth: 'what the are you
serving your time for?'
While the reorganisation of the division of labour in the decade after
the great lockout remained patchy and uneven, leaving large spaces within which
skilled workers could continue to entrench themselves, many engineering
craftsmen viewed these developments as a sea change which threatened their.
entire future in the industry. A letter from an ASE member in Erith, where
the example of the Vickers arms works loomed ominously as a signpost for the
future, voiced the fears of the rank and file:88
The tendency of the machine is not merely to place it out of the
power of the workman to become his own employer, but to reduce him
to a machine minder, which needs little skill and brains. Under the
old system the workman may have worked hard and long, but he had
companionship, variety, and the pleasure of seeing things grow under
his hands to the finished form •••• Go now into one of the big shops,
covering acres of ground, where workmen are massed together, and by
the aid of machinery iron is converted to its uses at a fraction of
the old cost. You cannot enter without permission from the office,
and even if you are permitted you must not talk to the men. Here you
find men doing over and over again the same thing, passing all day long
long bars of iron through rollers, turning bits of iron just the same
all day long, week in week out. In the whole establishment there will
perhaps not be a man who can do more than some minute part of what
goes to make a saleable article. The lad learns to attend one machine,
then his progress stops •••• He has no more control over the conditions
under which he works than a passenger in a railroad car over the motion
of a train •••• Causes which he cannot foresee may at any time stop
his machine and put him upon the world an unskilled labourer, not used
to swing a pick or handle a spade.
87 'Report of Interview between H. Livesey and Nine Shop Delegates, 25.9.1911',
EEF M(4)1.
88 Letter from W. Corkey, ASE MJ & R Jan. 1904, p.18. Cf. the description of th
changing conditions of work at the Great Western Railway works at Swindon in
Williams, Railway Factory, pp.302, 394.
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Given the inseparability of skilled workers' market position from their
craft identity, both in their own eyes and those of their employers, together
with the intensity of their commitment to the defence of their autonomy and
control at work, the ASE Executive's efforts to transform craft regulation into
an economistic defence of its members' material interests which could be ac-
commodated within the Terms of Settlement were unlikely to win the latter's
support. Thus despite the decision of the 1901 Delegate Meeting, skilled
workers as we have seen were still unwilling to open the doors of the union
to the less skilled, and the new section remained in practice a dead letter.
Barnes was doubtless correct when he lamented in 1907 that: "The average ASE
member has indicated in the most unmistakable manner that the ASE shall remain
an organisation of the fully skilled and trained men.,,89 At the same time,
skilled workers continued to use all the means at their disposal to retain
control over new machinery; wherever possible, therefore, they refused to
train the unskilled, to set up the tools for their machines, or to finish the
rough work the latter had begun, often lending force to their demands with
. 90implied threats of ca'canny (go slow) or even a str~ke. In 1904, for example
ODDs reported a six month strike outside the disputes procedure at a railway
works in Paisely over the employment of a machinist on turners' work, and a
similar walkout at a Hull firm Where machinists were employed on boring and
turning tools, as well as numerous similar disputes which never reached that
91stage.
89 ASE AR 1907, pp.lv-v
90 The ASE Executive Council felt it necessary to issue a warning in 1904 to
its members about the foolishness of ca'canny. ASE MJ & R July 1904, p.2.
91 ODD 1 ( ) MJ 194 0 4 () 19 4Scat. ,ASE & R Jan., July, ; DD Lancs. ibid., Sept. O.
The Paisley strikers were replaced by machinists, EEF M(9)~
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But while ASE members were determined that the new machine tools not be
worked by handymen, they were o£ten reluctant to work them the~selves,
especially on repetition production, where a prolonged spell could gradually
devalue their skill; to be doing work which demanded their full skill was a
symbol not only of their ability to compete for the top jobs on the open labour
market but also of their self-image as craftsmen. Thus one ODD, having
secured the replacement of a handyman by a turner found it necessary to observe:
"It is to be hoped he will remain for a reasonable length o£ time at least, as
if our turners refuse to work those machines, they have little to complain if
92handymen are put to them." In fact, the dissatisfaction of fully-trained
craftsmen with machine work figured as one of the employers' primary justifi-
cations for prefering handymen. By contrast to the craftsman who pursues more
93challenging work whenever he can find it, the handyman, one employer noted,
•••has got a bit older, and he does not see very much in front of him,
and if he is given a machine he will work it for all he is worth,
because it is something he has secured for himself, and he intends to
stay on.
In the years following the Carlisle Agreement, local militants and
district officials found themselves with greater freedom of manoeuvre on the
question of machine manning than in the immediate aftermath of the employers'
victory. The EEF's willingness to recommend in 1901 that skilled men·.not be
displaced by new machinery a space for ASE negotiators at district level to
92 ODD 2 (Lancs.), ASE MJ & R Feb. 1914.
93 'Verbatim Transcript of a Special Central Conference, 29.2.1912', EEF M(2)1,
pp.72-73. See also the comment by a correspondent to the ASE MJ & R Mar.
1900, p.22: "•••all my experience goes to show that once a man or a lad
puts his hand to mechanism he never turns back unless forced •••• II
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argue for wider concessions, and with the revival of confidence and militancy
at the base these opportunities were taken up forcefully, especially by the
ODDs. By 1904, visits to firms to protest against the employment of handymen
on machines had become a routine part of the ODDs' duties - in an ordinary
month of that year, for example, four of the six District Delegates reported
h" "94their involvement in a dispute over mac ~ne mann~ng. Where the local balance
of forces favoured the men, concessions might be made by the employers; where
the reverse was true, or where the latter preferred to adopt an intransigent
attitude, the question would be referred to the disputes procedure, with little
hope of success. Even here, however, the experience of 1902-7 represents a
marked improvement on that of 1898-1901 from the perspective of craft militancy:
as Table lOA shows, ASE negotiators were no longer willing to drop machine
manning appeals before they reached central conference, and were prepared on
95some occasions to risk the ire of the EEF by refusing to come to an agreement.
But even on machine manning the local militants could find themselves
sharply at odds with the ASE Executive if the EEF brought sufficient pressure
to bear. The most striking case of this kind arose in Manchester in 1906.
Handymen at the works of William Muir and Company were placed on turret lathes
claimed by the skilled men, who in turn instructed the ASE charge hand not to
train them and announced their refusal to touch work turned out on these lathes
by handymen. In the ensuing negotiations, the ASE men argued that while the
Terms of Settlement permitted the employers to place handymen on machines,
94 ASE MJ & R Sept. 1904.
95 For examples of concessions won by.the union outside the disputes procedure,
see ODD 5 (Mids.), ASE MJ & R, Mar. 1904, Nov. 1904; ODD 2 (Lancs.), ibid.,
May 1904; ODD 4 (Lancs.), Aug.-Sept. 1904. --
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these did not require skilled men to follow or finish work begun by handymen.
After a series of escalatory steps on the part of the management, the ASE
men struck in violation of the disputes procedure, backed by the Manchester
District Committee, which demanded:96
•••How long this piece-at-any-price policy is to continue •.•• How
long are the results of the debacle in 1898 to be with us? The time
has arrived when the engineering industry should cease to be the
happy hunting ground for handymen ••••
Under pressure from the EEF, the ASE Executive suspended the district officials;
after a further four months on strike the men conceded, returning to work on
97the employers' terms.
Though skilled men engaged in extensive resistance over machine manning,
their bitterest ire was reserved for the new systems of supervision, labour
discipline, speed up, and incentive payment. W.F. Watson records engineers'
reactions to the reorganisation of work at Thorneycroft's Chiswick works in
1905:98
Passive resistance and sabotage were rife •..Feed and speed men,
harrassed and bullied - sometimes assaulted - by the men, gave it
up in despair. The charts mysteriously disappeared; men deliberately
spoilt work in order to increase the speed.
A number of considerations converged to focus engineering craftsmen's resistance
to the reorganisation of" the division of labour on the premium bonus and the
innovations in workshop management associated with it.
96 ASE MR Nov. 1906, quoted by Clegg, Fox, and Thompson, Trade Unions, p.429.
97 EEF M(5)1; EEF, Central Conference, case 1247, p.259; see ASE MR Sept. 1906
for an explanation of the suspension by the ASE Executive Council.
98 Watson, Wage Incentives, p.12; for a description of the innovations in
question see the passage quoted above, p.368.
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On the most immediate practical level, many workers believed with good
reason that despite the protestations of the employers the premium bonus was
not in fact a wage incentive to higher productivity, but rather a simple
method of work intensification accompanied by frequent and arbitrary rate
cutting, just as on conventional piecework. The Carlisle Agreement, of course,
contained a formal guarantee against rate cutting, but provided no institutional
mechanism for its enforcement on the shop floor. Even where employers were
prepared to observe the letter of the agreement, a minor change in working
practice could serve as the pretext for a sharp reduction in time allowances;
moreover, as a brass finisher at Armstrong's complained, the system of work
measurement meant that each man's individual ability could be ascertained and
those who were not quite up to the maximum standard of efficiency were weeded
out, a fact which figured among the principal reasons for printers' objections
to indicators on composing machines.99 The report of the Joint Committee
convened by the TUC to study the premium bonus system pointed to the core of
the problem: "The interpretation of the terms which governed this system was
entirely in the hands of the employers, and the workman had absolutely no
redress if he considered himself unfairly treated."lOO
Wherever it was introduced, the premium bonus therefore generated a host
of complaints over rate cutting and the mechanics of its operation. At the
Vickers arms and marine engineering works in Barrow-in-Furness, for example,
the District Committee had long been engaged in conflicts with the management
99 Article by C. Coleman of Battersea, ASE MJ & R Nov. 1904, pp.lQ-14; TUC
Joint Committee, Premium Bonus, p.34; cf. also ibid., pp.31, 62.
100 ~., p.73.
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over the operation of piecework agreements, and oppostion to the premium bonus
persisted for several years after the Carlisle Agreement. Once the system
had been introduced, disputes about the details of its operation proved so
frequent that an extensive shop steward system was created to protect workers
101from rate cutting and other abuses.
But even where the premium bonus actually increased wages - the ASE
102claimed that 10-22% above time rates were paid on average - skilled workers
maintained deeper objections to the principles of the system, which they
viewed as a grave threat to both the material and moral foundations of the
craft community. The managerial innovations connected with incentive pay
aimed at sharply reducing skilled workers' autonomy and discretion on the job,
thereby threatening both the market value of their skills and their self-
conception as craftsmen. Thus one writer in the ASE Journal quoted approvingly
an article from one of the technical journals:
The researches into the angles, speeds, and feeds of cutting tools
have had the result in some shops of creating a new occupation, that
of the feed and speed men or the route men. Their control is
frequently resented, and naturally so. Their duties are to determine
the cuts, feeds, and speeds for the work of each machine in the shop,
so removing initiative, and to that extent responsibility from the
machineman. It is, to say the least, a curious and anomalous relation,
and the inevitable result of the general adoption of such a system must
be to degrade the present race of craftsmen into machine minders.
101
Weekes, ~, pp.183-85; for similar disputes, see ASE MJ & R Nov.-Dec. 1902,
Jan., Mar., May, and Sept. 1903. For the difficulties of ensuring that
agreements concluded between management and national unions in fact protected
engineering workers from rate cutting and intensification of work on the
shop floor, see the articles by S. Ortaggi, 'Cottimo e produttivit~ nell'
industria italiana nel primo Novocento' and 'Cottimo e organizzazione
operaia nell' industria del primo Novocento', Rivista de storia contemporanea
(1-2,1978).
102TUC Joint Committee, Premium Bonus, pp.10-ll.
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Tho old d 103~s wr~ter conc u e ;
...The feed and speed man is a useless non-producer, a nuisance who
doesn't pay his way, and the sooner employers realise this fact the
better for their pockets and the better for our tempers. The aggra-
vation also to a man who is told to increase the speed of his machine
tool, when he knows he is getting the best result from the one he is
using, is very great.
Similarly, an ASE turner employed on a milling machine in a Glasgow locomotive
works drew out the connection between the premium bonus and changes in machine
o 104mann~ng:
The premium bonus is a scientific method of squeezing the last drop
of blood from the men •••• This system increased unemployment and
tended to oust the skilled workman. The employers sectionalised and
speeded to a hitherto unknown extent, and the consequences was that
the mechanic was being superseded by the handyman, and most men who
came into contact with it condemned the system throughout.
Tom Mann located the roots of pre-war craftsmen's opposition to systems
of payment by results in their fear that these would undermine the egalitarian
and mutualistic structure of the craft community:105
Judging by lengthy experience, they declare that 'payment by output'
demoralises the man by encouraging the selfish side of his nature, it
feeds his desire to get more at any cost to bodily health, it destroys
good comradeship, encourages the man to become utterly disregardent of
his workmates, and feeds the avaricious and acquisitive side of his
nature so that true manhood is lost.
A turner at Armstrong's Elswick works testifying before the TUC Joint Committee
hearings expanded on this theme and connected the moral decline of the craftsman
with the intensification of supervision:106
103 W.H.C., 'Roughing Tools for Lathe Work', ASE MJ & R Oct. 1910, pp.36-37.
104 TUC Joint Committee, Premium Bonus, p.28.
lOS Tom 'Payment by Results' (1920), p.4.Mann,
106 TUC Joint Committee, Premium Bonus, p.40.
397
The bonus system in my contention, is the worst system that has ever
been introduced into a workshop. It does not benefit the working man
any; it has made him sel£ish, dishonest, and taken his social position
as a trade-unionist from him. His head is never lifted up from going
to work til coming £rom it, except at meal times. He has to contend
with restricted times, also with the foreman interfering with his tools
and feeds and speeds. Factory life is practically unbearable with the
present day system. There will always be unemployed under its existence
and the employer does not intend to pay extra for his labour if he can
get off doing so. It is as bad as the Jewish sweating system. I can
tell by experience what it means is the survival of the fittest, as
youth will outdo old age, and I might mention that we will be old sooner
under present conditions.
The report of the TUC gOint Committee in 1909 summarised skilled workers'
objections to the premium bonus in seven points:107
1. It destroyed the principle of collective bargaining, substituting
individual bargains between workers and employers and lent itself
to rate cutting;
2. The system "to a large extent abolished craftsmanship by training
vast numbers of specialists who are not eligible for membership of
the various engineering trade unions;"
3. It promoted unemployment;
4. It led to 'scamping' of work and the decline of pride in craftsmanshiF
5. It prevented proper training of apprentices;
6. It promoted selfishness in the workshop;
7. It encouraged workshop favouritism and victimisation of resisting
craftsmen.
The intensity of engineering craftsmen's hostility to the premium bonus
quickly brought them into conflict with the ASE Executive. The Carlisle
Agreement provoked a barrage of hostile criticism from the districts, especially
those which had been fighting against the introduction of the premium bonus on
a shop by shop basis and felt betrayed by the Executive's action. Mass meetings
107 Ibid. I p.73.
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against the agreement were held up and down the Northeast Coast, and letters
attacking the premium bonus became a staple feature of the ASE Journal's
correspondence columns; by 1909 opposition to the premium bonus was de rigeur
for successful candidates for the Executive Council. lOB
Rank and file resistance to the premium bonus might actually draw the
union Executive into a dispute on the side of the employers, as at Vickers'
Barrow works in 1905 when the Executive Council upheld the dismissal of
several activists over the objections of the District Committee.109 But the
dispute over the premium bonus, which brought the rank and file and local
officials into the sharpest confrontation with the ASE Executive erupted at
Vickers' Erith works in 1907. This plant run by Maxim-Nordenfeldt until lB97,
was a large gun factory employing 4,500 men at the height of the Boer War and
3,000 when the dispute broke out. When Conradi, an agressive new-style manager
who had reorganised Thorneycrofts Chiswick works in 1905, attempted to have
inspectors price jobs at Vickers, the Erith District Committee threatened a
strike, as it had over machine manning in 1901.110 In the face of intense
pressure from the ASE Executive Council which precipitated the temporary
resignation of the district officials, when Vickers actually introduced the
bonus system, the ASE men struck, to be rapidly joined by the other craft
unions in the plant.
lOB Weekes, ~, pp.207-ll; ODD 3 (Northeast), ASE MJ & R Oct. 1902; for cases
of opposition to the premium bonus, see ibid., Mar., June, Nov., Dec., 1901,
Jan.-June 1902.
109 Weekes, ASE, pp.1B3-B5.
110 See above, pp.377-78.
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Despite its opposition to the movement, the ASE Executive Council was
compelled by a 1904 decision of the union's Final Appeals Court to pay
b f ok 111ene its to the strL ers. Initially, the Erith strike seemed destined
for success: all the skilled men came out, as did the unskilled, and even
the foremen who resented the usurpation of their prerogatives by the feed and
speed men; the strikers were also supported by the press and by the influential
Labour minority on the local council, so that they were able to restrict
blacklegging to a minimum. But without the active support of the ASE
Executive the strikers found it difficult to make much progress with their
demands. Six months later, the strikers were still voting not to return to
work unless the premium bonus were withdrawn, while the firm refused to reopen
on those terms. The ASE Executive Council then persuaded the Vickers
management to suspend the premium bonus and reopen pending further negotiations.
As trade conditions worsened, weakening the shop-floor bargaining
position of the skilled men, Vickers gradually reintroduced the system,
victimising militant unionists in the process. While according to a letter
procured by a company spy, the workers continued to regard the premium bonus
as "•••the Greatest Tyranny that has ever been thrust upon workers since
slavery was abolished", by 1909 it had been reestablished in the Erith works.
The union Executive, considering itself bound by the Carlisle Agreement, stood
idly by, and when the Erith District Committee issued a circular to other
districts condemning the Executive Council's action, its members were suspended.
This Executive action was immediately overruled by the Final Appeals Court,
and the 1909 Delegate Meeting of the same year forbade the Executive Council
111 See below, p.402.
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to take a dispute to a central conference without the local District
Committee's consent. It was not until 1913, however, after a constitutional
crisis had produced a completely new Executive, that the ASE would officially
112disavow the Carlisle Agreement.
The ASE Executive's support for the Terms of Settlement, coupled with
its stance on the premium bonus and machine questions, brought it into
repeated conflict with the District Committees and local militants over control
of trade policy, conflicts which in the context of the union's democratic
structure would lead to the eventual disintegration of its authority. But
the crucial turning points in this growing confrontation between the union's
Executive and its local officials and militants were marked by the disputes
over wage reductions on Clydeside in 1903 and on the Northeast Coast in 1908.
Before 1898, skilled engineers had generally relied on industrial pressure
applied through the District Committees to secure wage advances in boom years
and to resist reductions in slumps. After the lockout, however, employers
sought to use the dispute procedure to avoid granting rises by referring the
matter to Central Conference. As we have seen, this led to conflict between
the Executive Council and the districts, as the men threatened strike action
as a result of lengthy delays, while the Executive Council restrained them in
the face of the implicit threat of a lockout by the EEF.
112 This narrative is based on Weekes, ASE, pp.185-200; see also TUC Joint
Committee, Premium Bonus, pp.50-53. The EEF case file P(2)l2, has been
poorly microfilmed and is illegible, though Weekes summarises its contents.
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In the years between 1898 and 1903, a period of unbroken good trade, the
ASE on Clydeside sought wage rises three times, only to see its demands
frustrated in conference. Hence when with a downturn in trade conditions
in 1903 employers proposed an immediate wage reduction, the local unionists,
along with those on the Northeast Coast, voted by heavy margins to resist any
113such cuts. The Executive Council ordered ASE members to continue working
under the reduced rates pending a Central Conference, but the Glasgow men
struck anyway in May 1903. George Barnes ordered the men back to work and
personally visited the area to press this position, where at a mass meeting
114of strikers he was howled down and generally abused.
Barnes, believing that the Clydeside strike represented "rebellion •••
the first serious revolt against the terms of agreement made at the close of
1897-8" and taking his stand on the absolute supremacy of the Executive in
financial matters, suspended strike pay and forced the District Committee to
115support a call for the men to return to work. At this point, direction of
of the strike passed largely into the hands of unofficial workshop-based vigi-
lance committees, which had played a significant role in the conduct of the
1897-8 lockout on Clydeside. These unofficial bodies, defending their actions
on the basis of ASE rules guaranteeing local autonomy, were able to spread the
strike to the neighboring districts of Greenock and Paisley; by the middle
of May, however, the exhaustion of their funds had forced the strikers back
113 Croucher, Local Autonomy, pp.20-22; Weekes, ASE, pp.227-28.
114 Barnes, Workshop to War Cabinet, p.62; Croucher, Local Autonomy, pp.24-26;
Weekes, ASE, pp.228-30.
115 Engineering 6.5.1903, quoted in Weekes, ASE, pp.229. See also the
quotations from Barnes' statements to the Glasgow press in Croucher,
Local Autonomy, pp.26-27.
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116to work.
Rather than pursue a conciliatory policy toward the strikers after their
return to work, the Executive demanded the return of all strike benefits paid
out during the strike, an act certain to alienate the strikers as a body. At
the same time, opinion in the other districts ran sharply against the Executive
Council; the Newcastle District Committee expressed these sentiments most
h h d h do b 0 117acidly in a circular w ic connecte t e wage cut an prem~um onus ~ssues:
•••We are of the opinion that there are no heaven-born leaders in the
vicinity of 110 Peckham Road, London, and we also believe that a course
of workshop practice under the 'premium bonus' system, accompanied by
'feed and speed' methods, would actually stimulate them to such an
extent that it is possible they might become useful members of the
Society. We hope they may have the opportunity of obtaining the
necessary stimulus at the earliest possible date.
In the elections that followed, the three sitting members of the Executive
Council up for reelection were defeated by comparatively unknown candidates,
largely on the strength of massive opposition votes from Clydeside and the
Northeast Coast. This debacle for the Executive Council was capped by the
Final Appeal Court's ruling in 1904 that the Executive, whatever the wisdom
f 0 0 h d h f Ok 118o ~ts polic~es, a no aut ority to withdraw dispute pay rom str~ ers.
By the eve of the 1908 Northeast Coast strike, the hold of Barnes and
the ASE Executive over the union had already become tenuous. Barnes had
116 Ibid., pp.2S-33. Shop Steward organisation appears to have been unusually
well developed on the Clyde at this time: in July 1902, for example, the
ASE ODD reported three city-wide meetings of stewards in a single month.
ASE MJ & R July 1902.
117 Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 7.2.1903, quoted in Croucher, Local Autonomy,
p.35.
118 Weekes, ASE, pp.236-43; Croucher, Local
the FAC, which met every two years with
Meeting, see Weekes, ASE, pp.2l0-lS.
Autonomy, p.34. On the role of
half as many members as a Delegate
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become overtly committed to a conciliatory strategy which brought few evident
returns either on the shop floor or in the pay packet and had become identified
in eyes of the membership with the premium bonus and the hated Terms of
Settlement. In 1907 Barnes had negotiated a revision of the Terms of
Settlement along the lines projected in 1901, transforming them into 'Terms
of Agreement'; though he was prepared to argue that they had been "on the
whole, productive of some good" and "as now amended have secured to the
members solid material advantages •••I do not say they are perfect, but they
are, at all events, moderately fair •••", he did not dare to submit them to
h mb h' f 'f' t' 119t e me ers 1p or rat1 1ca 1on. An indication of the extent to which
Barnes had moved out of touch with the feelings and aspirations of not only
the rank and file, but also of most union officials, was his willingness to
defend the employers' interpretation of the 'current conditions' clause which
allowed managerial innovations to stand pending the results of the disputes
120procedures:
I believe that the initiatory discretion of the employers in regard
to minor matters is a necessary condition of any terms of agreement.
Pending settlement, somebody must say what, under certain circumstances,
must be done, and it seems to me that that somebody must necessarily
be the employer.
In the same year, ASE members rejected a compromise negotiated by the Executive
Council with the EEF which would have secured the 51 hour week in exchange
121for acceptance of the one break system.
119 ASE AR 1907, pp.iv-v; the text of the revised agreement appears in A.I.
Marsh, Industrial Relations in Engineering (Oxford, 1965), app. C2.
120 ASE AR 1907, p.v.
121 See EEF Executive Minutes 1905-7, passim; Weekes, ASE, pp.246-50.
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Barnes had characterised the dispute on the Clyde as the "violent
clashing of two antagonistic principles; centralised authority and local
autonomy", and the 1908 Northeast Coast strike involved a similar contest on
122a larger scale. As we have seen, the Appeals Court ruling had prevented
the Executive from suspending dispute pay to unauthorised strikers in 1904.
Hence when the ASE men of the Northeast voted to strike against a proposed
wage reduction in 1908, the Executive had limited powers at its disposal to
restrain them, despite its vehement opposition. Infuriated by ten years of
frustrated wage advances and the erosion of craft regulation, as well as by
unemployment figures reaching 40% in the marine sector, the ASE rank and file
struck solidly under the aegis of the District Committees in February 1908.
By the end of March, Barnes found himself unable to compel the men to
return to work, and in desperation demanded the convocation of a special
Delegate Meeting in hopes of amending the union's rules to enhance Executive
control over strike policy. When the rest of the Executive Council, aware
that any such meeting would be irreconciliably hostile to further infringements
of local autonomy, refused his request, Barnes resigned. Because the Northeast
Coast District Committees continued to support the strikers, in contrast to
the pattern on the Clyde, no unofficial organisation developed. But though
the strike remined solid through September, the combination of poor trade
conditions, lack of national union support, and the employers threats to
h d . 123unleash a general lockout eventually forced the men to accept t e re uct~on.
122 ASE AR 1903, pp.iv-v.
123 Weekes, ASE, pp.250-66; Croucher, Local Autonomy, ch.2. For the EEF's
role in the dispute, see its Minutes 1908, especially 18.8.1908, and 8.9.-
1908. Barnes was not actually permitted to resign but was dismissed by the
rest of the Executive Council on the pretext of election irregularities.
Weekes, ASE, p.264. For Barnes' subsequent parliamentary career, which saw
him become first a dilution commissioner and then a member of Lloyd George's
war cabinet when Henderson and the other Labour ministers resigned over the
abortive Stockholm peace conference, see his Workshop to War Cabinet, and
the article in the Dictionary of Labour Biography.
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Barnes' resignation marked the effective end of attempts by the ASE
Executive before the First World War to create a framework of centralised
collective bargaining which would eclipse local autonomy. Barnes refused to
govern the society any longer in its present form: the conflict between the
democratic structure of the union, in which final authority rested with
bodies directly elected by the rank and file, and the requirements of a
powerful Executive seeking to bargain for its members within the Terms of
Settlement must be resolved in favour of the latter. As he wrote in his
.. 124res~gnat~on message:
The Northeast Coast men .••had become possessed of a notion that they
had to 'work out their own destiny', to use a foolish notion much
mouthed by them; their minds had been warped by statements that I
•••had been induced to take the employers' side of the case, and they
therefore voted in the main on a feeling of resentment that had been
fostered among them ....If trade union officials are to be flouted with-
out due rhyme or reason - and this will apply to local as to central
officials - then the effectiveness of trade unionism as an agent for
labour will be weakened and collective bargaining undermined ...•
Employers may well decline to treat with them or regard them as
representative.
In the context of the employers' determination to use the Terms of
Settlement to press forward a militant assault on craft regulation at the
same time as a hard line on wages, and to evade the spirit of the Carlisle
Agreement, the strategy of Barnes and his Executive was doomed to failure.
Given the entrenchment of local autonomy in the institutional structure of
the union and skilled engineers' determined defence of their craft status,
the joint pressures from the EEF and the union Executive to centralise
authority over policy making in the hands of the Executive Council resulted
124 ASE MR Apr. 1908, quoted in Croucher, Local Autonomy, p.51.
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in the disintegration of the latter's authority while rank and file
resistance to the reorganisation of the division of labour continued to
the local level.
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The Resurgence of Craft Militancy 1909-1914
After George Barnes' resignation as General Secretary, the disintegration
of Executive authority in the ASE accelerated. For several years thereafter,
his former colleagues on the Executive Council attempted to carryon with his
policies, but the movement against them of opinion among the rank and file
and local officials - spurred on by the greatest boom in the British economy
since mid-century - ultimately proved irresistible. In the end, this revolt
from below precipitated the wholesale removal of the old Executive and its
replacement with a new one whose members were far more in tune with the
feelings of the rank and file and committed to the revival of craft regulation
in defiance of the Terms of Settlement.
Despite the evident hostility of ASE members to the strategy of working
within the Terms of Settlement envinced by the 1903 and 1908 revolts on Clyde
and Tyne, the ASE Executive continued its attempt to channel rank and file
grievances into forms which did not challenge the new structures of industrial
relations created in 1898. On the machine question, for example, the Executive
urged ASE members to accept the inevitability of technical change and to seek
redress of their grievances in the political rather then the industrial sphere.
125As an editorial in the union's Monthly Journal in February 1909 argued:
It is well-known that some industries have been entirely crushed out,
whilst others have been revolutionised by the introduction of machinery,
and although the making of machinery is not likely to lessen, the
125 ASE MJ Feb. 1909, pp.5-6, my emphasis.
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engineer is now realising that he, too, is being 'hoist with his
own petard'. He is being largely evolved into a mere attendant or
looker-on, tending or watching the machine which now - as if possessed
of intelligence - automatically takes the place of skill, and produces
the parts and mechanism of other machinery with mathematical accuracy.
The great benefit which machinery was heralded as bringing to the
workers has not been realised. The labour 'saving' up till now has
not been the easing of the worker's burden, but too often the saving
of his labour altogether, so that he has to stand, or be cast aside
as a superfluity ...•
Labour-saving machinery must be used to lessen not lengthen the
hours and stress of labour, and the State will need to more and more
interfere in the usage and control of machinery, and incidentally to
preserve the arts and crafts, and to ensure that the inventive genius
of mankind shall not be to the undoing, but to the building-up of the
race.
Similarly, when the Erith District Committee issued a circular denouncing
the premium bonus in 1909, the Executive suspended its members, a decision
126which, as we have already seen, was reversed by the Final Appeals Court.
Opposition to Executive policies on machine manning and the premium
bonus was given a great fillip by a crucial tactical error on the part of the
Executive Council. Realising that local disputes over small advances and
reductions in wages represented a major threat to its authority, the Executive
Council in 1909 signed a series of long-term agreements with regional
employers' associations, freezing wages for five years in areas like Hull,
127Barrow, Sheffield, and London, and for three years in Manchester and Newton.
Unfortunately from the Executive's point of view, the years between 1911 and
1914 witnessed one of the greatest booms and explosions of labour unrest in
126 See above, p.399.
127 Weekes, ASE, p.266.
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British history. The ASE, which had possessed some 83,500 members in 1898
and 107,000 in 1907, jumped to over 174,000 in 1914; the trade union movement
as a whole doubled in size from 2,022,000 in 1900 to 4,145,000 in 1914.128
Thus in precisely that period when the tightness of the labour market
was dramatically enhancing skilled workers' bargaining power, they were
prohibited by union agreement from seeking to increase their wages, which had
been falling relative to prices in the general inflation since 1896.129 The
frustration engendered by these agreements naturally intensified rank and file
hostility to the Executive, and directed their energies more strongly into
efforts to revive craft regulation rather than into more economistic channels.
By 1913 all candidates for General Secretary of the union actively opposed
. 130both long-term agreements and the prem1um bonus.
The final collapse of the Executive Council's authority and of its
centralised collective bargaining strategy came as the result of a conflict
in 1912-13 over revisions of the society's rules that would have further limite(
the power of the Executive and made it more responsive to the wishes of the
membership. The history of this dispute is a baroque web of petty intrigue
131with little relation to policy issues, and its details need not detain us her~.
The upshot of the conflict - after a series of humiliating litigations and
counter litigations accompanied by the physical eviction of the former Executiv!
Council from its London offices - was the installation of a new Executive in
1913, committed to repudiating the policies of the old.
128 Ibid., p.317.
129 Yates, British Engineering, p.106.
130 Weekes, ASE, apps. 7-8.
131 See Jefferys, Engineers, pp.169-71 and Weekes, ASE, ch.8, for full
narrative.
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In the context of the erosion of Executive authority after 1908, and
the tightening of labour markets after 1911, craft militancy among ASE
members enjoyed a dramatic revival. Its effects could be seen first of all
in the intensification of militancy in machine manning disputes, which both
mushroomed in number and proved vastly more successful from skilled workers'
point of view than at any time since 1898. As table lOA shows, more machine
questions were raised by the ASE through the disputes procedure between 1911
and 1914 than in the previous 12 years taken together, and for the first time
ASE members began to win compromise settlements and even victories through
the procedure in significant numbers; at the same time, union negotiators
were rarely prepared to drop a machine manning case at any stage before the
final failure to agree. The outcome of strikes on machine manning shows a
similar pattern, as Table 11 indicates. Before 1912, no strikes over machine
manning whose details appear in the records of the employers or the union were
ever successful, even to the point of winning a compromise settlement; in
1912-13 only two often such strikes were failures and four were outright
victories. Moreover, all previous strikes had been 'unconstitutional',
(i.e., they had taken place before the disputes procedures had been exhausted
and therefore without the consent of the ASE Executive); now the Executive
Council sponsored three such strikes after the exhaustion of the procedure,
all of which were quite successful.
In several cases, rank and file militants were able to win major
concessions from large firms which had been leaders in the reorganisation of
the division of labour, where previous efforts had been complete failures.
411
Vickers, Barrow was a large arms and marine engineering works, where, as we
have already noted, opposition to the premium bonus was rife after 1898.
There is considerable evidence that the management was reorganising the
division of labour at the expense of skilled workers to an alarming extent
during the same period. In 1905, the local ASE officials raised a complaint
through the disputes procedure that Vickers was employing handymen on repeti-
tion production of parts whose prototypes were built by skilled men, and in
1911 a further complaint was lodged against the movement of turners' work
from the (skilled) gunshop to the (unskilled) shell shop, and the promotion
of handymen from shell to gun work; both complaints were then dropped at
132Central Conference. By 1913, however, feeling had grown so intense among
the skilled men that such resolutions were no longer possible; as one of
133their representatives told the employers:
We have always conceded to the Employers the privilege to man the
machines with handymen, but the time is coming for a stand to be
made. The turner knows that the machine question means taking away
the work from him, and a stand has to be made, because of the
introduction of the handymen in Vickers' firm, which at the present
moment is in excess of the worst firms in the country.
Thus in February 1913, the ASE claimed all "turners' work" at Barrow for its
members, excepting only fully automatic machines; the firm pressed by the
134tightening labour market, conceded without a struggle. Similarly, at
Dobson and Barlow, a large textile machinery firm which had been able to
displace significant numbers of skilled men in 1900, ASE members struck in
132 EEF M(9)5, 18; EEF, Central Conference, cases 20 and 27, pp.lO-ll.
133 'Verbatim Transcript of Local Conference, 13.2.1913', EEF M(6)8.
134 Ibid.
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1913 to secure the reinstatement of skilled men on the construction of ring
frames; in the settlement of the dispute the following year, the firm agreed
135to extend the use of handymen no further.
This revival of craft militancy was by no means confined to the machine
question, but extended to the reorganisation of the division of labour as a
whole, singling out the premium bonus for special opprobrium. In 1909, the
TUC had convened a joint committee to investigate the premium bonus, whose
evidence and conclusions we have already had occasion to cite. But while the
ASE Executive accepted the committee's negative judgment on the premium bonus,
the joint movement for abolition proposed by its report never got off the
d b f th E t" C "1' d bt b"t "b"l"t 136groun ecause 0 e xecu 1ve OunC1 s au s a out 1 s pract1ca 1 1 y.
Meanwhile, in the changed climate of 1911-14, the rank and file and local
officials began to take matters into their own hands:37ThUS at the Vickers'
works in Sheffield, a threatened strike against the premium bonus caused the
firm to abandon plans for its introduction and in January 1913, the one ODD
reported a major flare up of successful resistance to a 'Taylorist' experiment
at Port Sunlight:138
A series of conferences have been held here respecting the introduction
of an American organiser at Messrs. Lever Brothers. The system to be
inaugurated was on the Taylor plan, which is one of the last stages of
lunacy. A mass meeting of the men engaged in the engineering department
was held, and they refused to have the man, card, or system. The firm
have agreed to adjourn matters until their principal returns. In the
meantime, the old conditions are being worked to, and the organiser has
gone. Wherever this system is attempted, action should be taken at once
to put it out of existence. A mass meeting of the men, after hearing
the report, were very jubilant at the result.
135 EEF Executive Report for 1913; Central Conference, case 306, p.68.
136 TUC Joint Committee, Premium Bonus; ASE MJ Aug. 1911, pp.5-6.
137 S. Pollard, History of Labour in Sheffield, (Liverpool, 1959), p.232.
138 ODD 2 (Lancs.), ASE MJ & R Jan. 1913.
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Similarly, ASE officials in the East of Scotland were only dissuaded with
difficulty in 1914 from immediately implementing their resolution to prohibit
their members from working under the premium bonus, while members at Armstrong-
Whitworth's Elswick were eventually able to win a Is per hour advance
as a result of their demand for the replacement of the premium bonus with
the payment of time and a quarter to all irrespective of the amount of work
139done.
As Table lOB shows, the incidence of complaints raised by the ASE over
machine manning and the premium bonus during this period was overwhelmingly
concentrated in the older areas of union strength - Lancashire, Yorkshire,
Scotland, the Northeast Coast, Barrow, and Belfast - and especially in the
textile and general engineering districts of Lancashire. This does not, of
course, imply that greater changes in the division of labour were taking place
there than in the centres of the new industries in the West Midlands and
London, but rather that craftsmen in the older areas were better placed to
resist encroachments on their position. How much further the development of
rationalisation had gone in some of the new industries than in the old can
be seen from a dispute that arose in 1914 at the electrical engineering works
of Siemens in Charlton, near London. Whereas in Lancashire skilled workers
were generally seeking to keep small numbers of handymen off new machine tools
at the Siemens works, the ASE was alarmed by the wholesale replacement of
boys by women in the newly developing department of telephone work. Replying
to the union's complaints', the firm characterised the work in terms that
clearly set it off from that done in the older sectors, excepting perhaps some
140departments of the large arms works:
139 EEF, Central Conference, case 681, p.136; and cases 1436 and 1439, pp.298-
300.
140 'Verbatim Transcript of Local Conference, 30.7.1914', EEF M(8)3, p.ll.
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It is not engineer's work: it is telephone manufacture, which is
quite another story. You cannot really train an engineer or a good
mechanic on that class of work because the whole of the assembling
even is all done by such foolproof jigs and dies in which everything
must drop together that there is no fitting left or required, and
no tooling.
The only response available to the ASE was a categorical opposition to
. . k 141women on eng~neer~ng wor :
•.•We do feel that there is labour for women to perform in the world
but we do not think that an engineering shop is a place where women
ought to be.
The revival of craft militancy was not the only response of ASE members to
the opportunities opened by the 1911-14 boom. The 'new unionist' current
within the union, particularly those reformers associated with Tom Mann, had
always been sympathetic to the principle of wider organisation based on class
. .
struggle, and the diffusion of syndicalist ideology in the context of the
labour unrest gave it renewed vitality in the form of the amalgamation
committees which sprang up among ASE members in 1913-14, particularly in
London and Sheffield. Their leader, W.F. Watson, a Londoner who himself had
not served an apprenticeship, expressed these ideas most clearly in his 1913
pamphlet 'One Union for Metal, Engineering, and Shipbuilding Workers' which
argued that "just as the development of the industry tends to eliminate craft
distinction, so we must eliminate craft distinction from our organisation.,,142
Such views were given an added fillip by the contemporaneous explosion of
organisation among unskilled and semi-skilled engineering workers, particularly
in the West Midlands where the development of the new industries was most
extensive. The Workers' Union, founded after 1898 by ASE dissidents, to
organise all workers excluded by the craft unions, reaped the main benefit
141 'Verbatim Transcript of Central Conference, 11.9.1914', ibid. But cf. the
successful claim by skilled workers for control of milling machines on motor
car work at the Coventry Ordnance Works in 1913, EEF M(8)2; EEF, Central
Conference, case 518, p.10S.
Quoted in G.D.H. Cole, Trade Unionism and Munitions (Oxford, 1922), P9~:·
the amalgamation movement, see B. Holton, British Syndicalism, 1900-1
(1976), ch.ll: Hinton, Shop Stewards, pp.~?2-3, 1~8Me~83~h~~ f~·~~~i~~SlY
w~tson hims~lf, s~e.his autobiOg~~~~yghM~~t~~~:d~O hiS' industrials11ent on h~s polltlcal career" ..
experience. '
o142
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growing from 5,000 members in 1911 to 143,000 in July 1914; in its strongholds
this union was beginning to challenge from below the ASE's claim to work all
, h' t 1 143non-automat~c mac ~ne 00 s.
But while some advanced militants in the ASE drew comfort from the
progress of organisation among the unskilled, most rank and file engineers
were rather alarmed at the threat of being swamped. A representative response
was that of one writer to the ASE Journal: "When the membership of a semi-
skilled union rises from 5,000 to 65,000 in less than four years, and nearly
t bl ' 1 h 1 h d' h' 144re es ~n ess t an twe ve mont s, we get ~ctators ~p. Similarly, the
amalgamation movement made little real headway outside London, while the
debate in the ASE Journal before the war revolved primarily around an
amalgamation of craft societies rather than any alliance with the unskilled.
The new section for the less skilled opened up by the 1912 Delegate Meeting
remained as empty as its predecessors, and the ASE continued to be over-
whelmingly a society of apprenticed fitters and turners, as every sign suggest~
the vast majority of its members desired. The achievement of the proponents
of a class strategy within the union thus was to have laid the groundwork for
the fragile and momentary alliance with the unskilled that James Hinton has
discerned in the wartime shop stewards' movement rather than to have converted
their fellow members away from craft exclusiveness.145
The resurgence of craft militancy can be traced quite clearly through
the growing assertiveness of the Organising District Delegates, who became ever
143 Hyman, Workers' Union, chs.2-3.
144 ASE MJ & R Jan. 1914, p.85.
145 Jefferys, Engineers, p.127; Hinton, Shop Stewards.
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more closely identified with rank and file resistance to the reorganisation
of the division of labour. Whereas in the immediate aftermath of the 1898
lockout their participation in machine manning disputes had been somewhat
sporadic and tentative, the ODDs' language now betrayed a new confidence and
spirit of aggression. Thus in August 1912, one ODD who had secured the
146dismissal of a handyman placed on fitters' work in a Preston factory wrote:
I sometimes wonder what the engineering industry would be like if
we did not take this question up. The duty of a trade union should
be to protect the trade and not conserve its bank balance.
Similarly, another ODD described his actions in defence of skilled workers'
position in the division of labour with a peculiar mixture of the rhetoric
f 1 t 1 d ft . 147o c ass s rugg e an cra conservat1sm:
I find that in every attempt at an improvement of our conditions that
employers oppose us by all the means in their power and never appear'
to willingly grant any concessions to the workmen. All the talk about
our interests being identical is just so much piffle, and they prove
it on every hand by their irritating actions in every workshop in the
way of reductions in prices, manning of machines, etc., and which all
goes to show that it is only by a strong combination that we can hope
to in any way improve our conditions.
Thus by February 1914, one ODD could tell the EEF leaders assembled at a
Special Central Conference that,148
Our own practical experience (as ODDs) has made us sympathise with
the desire or demand of our members for the abolition of these present
Terms of Agreement, because they have come to be regarded by your side
as a charter of immunity, and as far as we are concerned they are
regarded as a bond of servitude.
146 ODD 2 (Lancs.), ASE MJ & R Aug. 1912.
147 ODD 7 (London), ASE MJ & R Jan. 1914.
148 Ryder (ODD 5, Mids.) to 'Special Central Conference, 13.2.1914', p.37,
EEF A(4)6.
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Even in the case of the District Committees, which had always maintained
close ties with rank and file resistance, there was an erosion of past differ-
ences into a joint front of craft militancy: thus in June 1914 it was reported
that a coalition of the Glasgow DC with the Vigilance Committees which had
recently received official recognition from the ASE in the shipyards had
driven large numbers of non-unionists into the ASE.149
This growing participation of union officials in the resurgence of
craft militancy was by no means confined to the District Committees and ODDs.
With the election of a new Executive in 1912-13, the highest levels of the
union hierarchy began to assume an active role in the defence of craft
regulation. The new Executive Council was elected more on the basis of
opposition to the old Executive and of general slogans about 'militancy' and
'democracy' than on the basis of any coherent policy. J.T. Brownlie, who
became the new Independent Chairman (roughly equivalent to the old post of
General Secretary) in his election address presented himself as "an experienced
worker for social and economic emancipation", and attacked the "pernicious
method of premium bonus and long-term agreements". Though a majority of the
new Executive Council were members of the Labour Party, and several, including
Brownlie were socialists, none proposed alterations in the craft basis of the
ASE; their industrial orientation was to the defence of skilled workers' craft
b . 150status rather than any alliance with the unskilled on a class aS1S. As
151Brownlie outlined his vision of the industry's future in AUQust 1913:
149 ODD 2 (Lancs.) ASE MJ & R June 1914; ASE Executive Council Minutes, 13.12.-
1914, cited in Hinton, Shop Stewards, p.l04.
150 Weekes, ASE, pp.244-47, app.7.
151 ASE MJ & R, Aug. 1913.
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I am one of those that hunger for the time when we will no longer
be mere cogs in the wheels of industry, but when there will be
master workmen taking a pride in their craft, and when the work
left their hand it could stand on the table of the museum in the
mechanics' institute .•.• Today they were not making craftsmen but
were destroying all the artistic spirit in their nature, and
sacrificing their inner feelings on the altar of capitalism.
With the multiplication of machine manning cases in 1911-12, the old
Executive Council had been forced to convene a Special Central Conference in
February 1912 to discuss revisions in Clause 7 of the Terms of Agreement
(Clause 6 in the original Terms of Settlement). As the ASE negotiators told
152the employers:
It has become so serious that the members in our Society by resolutions
of their branches and strong protests against the movement of this
clause to the detriment of the skilled artisan, and •••we had some
difficulty in keeping down what we considered was eventually to develop
into a revolt of the members against these Terms of Agreement.
Accordingly, the Executive Council proposed new safeguards for the skilled
men including the rating of machines and a special apprenticeship for
machinists; these were rejected by the employers and the conferences broke up
153without achieving any results.
A few months later, when the rank and file revolt they had feared swept
the old Executive from power, the first act of the new Executive Council was
to ballot the membership on the abolition of the Terms of Agreement and the
Carlisle Agreement, proposals which obtained huge majorities from the rank
d f'l 154an ~ e. At the.conference with the employers which followed, Brownlie
152 Transcript of Special Central Conference, 29.2.1912', p.6, EEF M(2)1.
153 ~.; for details of proposals by each side, see EEF General Letter 146,
6.3.1912.
154 Weekes, ~, p.354.
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set out clearly his identification with the concerns of the skilled men,
155arguing for a revival of apprenticeship in the most forceful terms;
I recognise the trend of modern industry and I recognise ••.that there
is a considerable amount in the argument that •••machines have become
so simplified today that a man with very little training is able to
turn out work of a class very efficient indeed. I recognise also
that that has a tendency to bring down the wages of the better skilled
women in many particulars. With a desire to get back as far as modern
industrial conditions will permit to the old medieval system where a
boy was trained to be an efficient craftsman and get back to some system
of apprenticeship •••we feel that something might be done in the future,
whether we have Terms of Agreement or not, to put an end to this source
of irritation and annoyance whereby young men can be trained from a
particular age, although it may be a later age at which the boy is sent
into the workshop to serve his apprenticeship, whereby they could be
trained, and that we would have some control over the manning of these
machines, having regard to the welfare of all those concerned, and that
in the course of time we would, as far as possible eliminate what is
known as the handyman by some workmen.
While in the heyday of George Barnes' reign, the union had been inclined to
accept the argument that the long-term effect of mechanisation would beta
increase the volume of employment for skilled workers, the new Executive took
its stand with the rank and file;156
The long view has been pointed out to us with regard to the manning
of machine tools, and we have been told time and time again that in
the long run it will be all right, that while these machine tools are
being utilised by semi-skilled labour at the present moment, ultimat-
ly the result would be that there would be more and more machines and
more and more engineers required ••.• I want specially to submit to the
employers of labour that while you may take a long view of this case
in an abstract way, it is useless going to your fellow workman and
telling him that this will work out in the long run to the advantage
of the working classes in the engineering trade. They are up against
the fact and they believe that it means to them in the near future the
displacement of their labour, and as workers they are anxious to serve
their interests as skilled men. It is all very well for them to tell
us at the present time it is not bearing very severely on a skilled
artisan in the workshop, but immediately a depression of trade comes
round, it is the skilled and highly paid man that is going to go by the
board.
155 'Special Central Conference, 13.2.1914', pp.7-8.
156 Young to ibid.,
'The Effects of
pp.836-45.
pp.19-20; for the opposing view, see F. Rose (ODD 2, Lancs.'
Labour-Saving Machinery', Engineering Magazine, Mar.1904,
420
At the end of 1913, therefore, the ASE Executive issued three months'
notice of the unilateral termination of the Terms of Agreement and the Carlisle
Agreement, while demanding that negotiations be opened for the 48 hour week.
But the new Executive Council like its predecessor found itself constrained
by the need to establish some modus vivendi with the powerful EEF, and as a
result while the revocation of past agreements was carried out, the Executive
concluded a new agreement with the employers covering only the procedure for
avoiding disputes. Some of the union's grievances about the procedure were
eliminated in the new agreement - notably the delays in holding conferences
were reduced - and this was presented to the rank and file as an interim,
157rather than a binding agreement.
The dramatic resurgence of craft militancy in the ASE from 1908 onwards
posed a major challenge to the strategy developed by the EEF in the years
following the 1898 lockout. Conscious of their overwhelming strength and of
the determination of the ASE Executive under Barnes to work within the Terms
of Settlement, the Federation had generally refrained from open threats of a
national lockout, preferring to isolate local resistance by bringing informal
pressure to bear on the union leadership and by offering financial support to
the firm concerned. Rule 48 of the EEF Constitution stipulated that "any
member of a Federated Association who suffers a loss by the adoption of any
measure necessitated by the Board shall be assisted by the Federation in such
157 EEF Executive Minutes 7.2.1913, 16-17.4.1914; Weekes, ASE, pp.3SS-s9;
the text of the new agreement, see Marsh, Industrial Relations in
Engineering, app. C3.
for
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manner, and to such extent as the Board may decide," and the normal practice
was for the Special Finance Committee to make grants to the affected firm
from funds contributed by outside sympathisers in 1897-8 up to 45% of the
wages of the men on strike, though larger payments might be made in special
158cases. The rationale of this strategy was clearly set out in a memorandum
distributed to the members of the EEF Executive Board in 1913, just as its
159efficacy was being called into question by the movement of events:
It has been found of great value in certain cases to restrict the
dispute to the shop in which the question has arisen, with a view
to maintaining the employers' position by making the Union lose the
shop or at least be compelled to return on less favourable conditions
than those on which they went out. So far, these tactics have been
satisfactory and a general lockout has been avoided, but as you can
appreciate, it is necessary in such cases for the Federation to
undertake considerable financial obligations.
The success of the employers' strategy in the short-run can be gauged
from the results of unconstitutional strikes shown in Table 11: as we have
noted, prior to 1912, ASE members had never been successful in any strikes
over the machine question, nor had they been able to win greater satisfaction
through the disputes procedures. But in the context of the enhanced
opportunities for craft militancy at the base afforded by the 1911-14 boom,
coupled with the installation of new Executive committed to the defence of
craft regulation, major cracks began to appear in the employers' strategy.
The changed balance of forces can be read quite clearly in the outcomes
of strikes and questions raised through the disputes procedures for the period,
but the transformation of the situation on the ground can perhaps best be
158 EEF General Letter 171, 30.4.1913; Emergency Committee Report, 75, 30.4.1913
159 'Memorandum to Members of the EEF Executive Board', 29.11.1913, EEF M(2)1.
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appreciated through a brief glance at one of the more important disputes over
machine manning in these years, which occurred at the Blackburn textile
machinery works of Henry Livesey and Sons between 1911 and 1913. Already in
1899 Livesey appears to have been a relatively aggressive employer for the
district, and the local ASE men brought a case against him under the disputes
procedure for placing labourers on turret lathes, which was dismissed at
160central conference. In March 1911, ASE members in the plant began to
complain that Livesey was placing handymen on centre lathes, still the heart-
land of the turner's territory; equally ominous, in their eyes, was the
creation of a separate 'automatic shop' in a building set apart from the main
works into which the turners were refused entry. As the men declared at a
local conference the following month: "We think the whole policy of the firm
is to do away with skilled workmen altogether, and train up.these handymen
as a special and favoured class of workmen at our expense.1I16l The ASE later
introduced figures showing that the firm had progressed from producing 90
looms per year with 40 turners in 1901 to 290 with 95 in 1911, a remarkable
jump in productivity in ten years and, in the eyes of the skilled men, a
162displacement of 150 turners despite the increase in their absolute numbers.
A series of local and central conferences in 1911 and early 1912
produced no result, as neither side was willing to offer any concessions;
where previously the ASE Executive Council would have caved in at this point,
the changed climate of opinion within the union made this course impossible,
160 EEF M(4)1; EEF, Central Conference, case 225, p.49.
161, b . . t f La 1 C f 12 4 1911' EEF M(4)1Ver at1m Transcr1p 0 ca on erence, .., •
162 'Verbatim Transcript of Central Conference, 3.15.1911'; 'Verbatim Trans-
cript of Joint Local-Central Conference, 13.9.1911', both in ibid.
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and the Livesey case figured among those referred to the abortive 1912
conferences on the renegotiation of Clause 7 of the Terms of Agreement.
Finally, with all procedures exhausted, the men struck in August 1912.
Livesey had all along insisted that a strike would prove disastrous to his
firm, which was behind orders at the apogee of the boom, and stood to lose
a crucial contract with the Northrup Loom Company, on which it depended for
its main business. Consequently, Livesey was extremely reluctant to risk
a strike, which he was convinced he could not win even with EEF financial
support, and it required the full force of the Federation's influence to avert
an immediate capitulation on his part. While the total amount paid to the
firm remains obscure, the Federation's Emergency Committee voted to consider
Livesey's a "special case", enabling it to be subsidised beyond 45% of its
b'll 163wage ~ . As the strike wore on, the firm became increasingly desperate
under pressure from its contractors; when a compromise settlement negotiateed
by the EEF and ASE Executives was rejected by a ballot of the men in November,
Livesey wrote to the Federation: "We can see nothing but call for a general
lockout of the trade, for if we have to be closed down any longer we might
, 11 1 th b ' '1 ,,164Just as we case up e us~ness ent~re y.
The ASE Executive favoured a compromise settlement which removed the
handymen from most of the machines, but the local men, supported by the
district officials and the ODD, were holding out for control of all the machineE
in the automatic shop other than four purely automatic ones. When a second
163 Letters from Livesey to A. Smith (Secretary, EEF), 13.5, 2.8, 7.8,27.8,
9.10,23.10.1912; Smith to Livesey, 14.5,23.7,17.10,24.10.1912;
'Memorandum of EEF Emergency Committee', 30.8.1912, Emergency Committee
Report 75, 8.8.1912, EEF M(4)1-2.
164 Livesey to Smith, 1.11.1912; for pressure from customers, see ibid.,
23.8, 26.8, 23.10.1912, in EEF M(4)1-2.
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meeting rejected the settlement, the Executive was then powerless, as union
rules established as a result of the earlier struggles over local autonomy
stipulated that once a district had been given power to strike, only the men
concerned could call it off; as one Executive Council member told the EEF
on the telephone, "the Council think the best thing that they can do is to
165leave the men severely alone."
At this point, the EEF felt that a dramatic escalation of the dispute
had become unavoidable. The compromise settlement offered to the ASE Executive
Council was withdrawn, and the firm announced its intention to sell all the
semi-automatic lathes and replace them with fully automatic ones uncontested
by the skilled men; meanwhile the places of the strikers were filled with.
blacklegs recruited through the Shipping Federation.166 The employment of
non-union strikebreakers, however, merely widened the strike: in the context
of the labour unrest of the period, none of the labourers or handymen already
employed by the firm would touch work performed by blacklegs, and efforts were
made to enrol the latter immediately in the UMWA and the Gasworkers.
Meanwhile, the EEF reported incidents of mass picketing, threats to the
families of foremen and blacklegs, as well as the menace of 'peaceful persuasior
against the men in the automatic shop unless they joined a union. In this
context, not only was it "found necessary to employ special men to protect
the works and the men, the latter being housed and fed in the works," but
"the workmanship of the fitters and turners taken on was not on the whole very
satisfactory." By late November, the employment of blacklegs had so inflamed
trade union tempers that the firm was threatened with a strike by the remaining
165
166
'Verbatim Transcript of Joint Conference between the ASE and EEF Executives
and Local Committees, 30.10.1912'; Livesey to Smith, 1.11.1912; 'Memorandum
of EEF Emergency Committee' 4.11.1912, ibid.
Smith to Livesey,19.11.1912; EEF Emergency Report 89, 7.11.1912: lilt appears
that the Shipping Federation keep a large stock of beds and bedding ready
for instantaneous use. They also keep a staff of alterers and cooks who
are sent to the districts as required." ~.
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trades still at work, from the moulders down to the labourers, unless the
" di 1 d 167strikebreakers were 1mme 1ate y remove .
With the failure of the employers' tactics to unblock the situation,
a new conference was convened under the auspices of the Mayor of Blackburn
in December, and the firm was persuaded to offer a guarantee that Clause 7
would be interpreted generously in the future, in addition to the following
compromise: 1) that a fitter be placed in charge of the disputed machines;
2) that apprentices be placed on some of the lathes; 3) that the centres be
removed from all capstan lathes except those reserved for turners' use,
thus ensuring that these could no longer be used for skilled work. According
to the report of a spy who attended the strikers' meeting, the district
officials returned from this meeting claiming victory, and advised the men
that "at last they had obtained not all but as much as they possibly could
do under the circumstances •.•", as the conditions agreed "had given them
greater privilege than they had ever had in manning these machines •.••" While
the men accepted these terms, continuing disputes over their implementation,
victimisation, and the removal of blacklegs kept them out until the beginning
168of February 1913. EVen when they returned, the status quo ante by no means
returned with them: in the months that followed, Livesey repeatedly complained
to the EEF that ASE members were restricting output, were refusing to allow
time-cost cards to be used, and were generally interfering in the management of
167 Livesey to Smith, 19.11., 20.11.,21.11.,27.11,29.11.1912; EEF Emergency
Committee Report 92, 18.11.1912; precis of Livesey case, ibid.
168 'Verbatim Report of Conference at Town Hall, Blackburn, 2.12.1919';
Livesey to Smith, 2.12.1912, 29.1, 30.1.1913; MS. 'True Copy of a Letter
Received from One of the Men on Strike Present at Mass Meeting of the Men
Held on Monday Night Last', 2.12.1912; 'Report by Blackburn ASE DC to
EEF', 20.12.1912, ibid; Central Conference, case 233, pp.50-5l.
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169the enterprise; by this point, he was ready to close up shop. While the
ASE men had not won their full demands, the balance of the settlement was
clearly in their favour, and even a massive commitment of resources on the
part of the EEF had been unable to prevent this outcome.
Despite setbacks of this kind, however, the EEF was not yet prepared
to abandon the strategy which had brought such handsome results during the
previous decade, particularly in the context of a boom which tipped the
balance of power in favour of rank and file militancy. Long experience under
the disputes procedures had bred a habit of negotiation among employers which
was not easily broken, and the EEF was therefore prepared to discuss with
successive ASE Executives amendments to the Terms of Agreement, while refusing
any binding concessions on questions of principle. At the same time, the
Federation cautioned its members to follow procedures strictly and avoid
unnecessary provocation of the union; for example, firms were urged to place
handymen on machines from the outset rather than experiment with craftsmen
170and replace them with handymen. Even when the new ASE Executive unilaterall:
revoked the Terms of Agreement and the Carlisle Agreement, the Federation's
initial response was to reopen negotiations rather than threaten a general
171lockout.
But while the EEF was attempting to preserve its traditional strategy
through negotiations with the ASE on the one hand, it was preparing to
strengthen its hand for a possible confrontation by drawing up plans for a
169 Livesey to Smith, 19.7.,29.7.,31.7.,28.8.,15.9.,3.12.1913,13.2.1914,
EEF M(4)1-2.
170 On clause 7, see EEF General Letter 176, 13.11.1913; EEF Minutes 13.10.1913.
171 EEF General Letter 181, 14.4.1914.
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172mutual strike insurance scheme on the other. A scheme of this kind had
been adopted by members of the ITEA on the Northeast Coast during the early
90s, but had dropped out of sight with the success of the more centralised
d . 173an extens~ve EEF. The inability of George Barnes to force the Northeast
Coast strikers back to work in 1908 provoked the first efforts on the part
of employers in the district to revive the concept of a strike insurance
or 'indemnity' fund on a national scale, but it was not until the revival
of craft militancy and the replacement of the ASE Executive in 1912 had begun
to threaten the foundations of the 1898 settlement that the Federation became
prepared to put it into practice. Many employers were wary of the expense
involved in such proposals and feared lest they be forced to finance strikes
arising, as John Lang, the Glasgow machine tool maker put it, "from employers'
want of tact". Ultimately, however, the growing inability of existing tactics
to contain the resurgence of craft militancy in the districts combined with
the ASE Executive's determination to revoke the Terms of Agreement to override
such reservations. The scheme finally approved by 92% of Federation members
in 1913 called for the formation of a fund of £250,000, based on contributions
of ~% of each firm's average wage bill for the previous three years, with an
172 Even before the ASE Executive Council had become converted to a militant
defence of craft regulation, the EEF was prepared to urge the Industrial
Council to introduce measures for the legal enforceability of collective
agreements, which would allow civil measures to be taken in cases of local
breaches of agreements. A. Smith to Industrial Council, Enquiry into
Collective Agreements, Minutes of Evidence, especially qs, 11,660 ff.;
and the submission of A. Siemens, (President of the EEF) in ibid., Report,
~d. 6952), P.P. 1913, XXVIII, pp.20~22. Smith nonetheless testified that
the unions generally followed their agreements, though 'the men are
becoming restiVe to the existence of the agreements •••', and explained
that the EEF viewed local breaches "•••more as the safety valve of human
nature than anything else", Ibid., Minutes of Evidence, qs. 11,622, 11,697-
98.
173 B.C. Browne to Smith, 15.5.1912, including printed rules of 'Employers'
Subsidy Association', 1895; see above,p.188.
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additional levy of ~% permitted by consent of the members if expenses
exceeded £50,000 in any single year; to qualify for benefits, at 5s per stri-
king man and 2s per apprentice or woman per day, firms were obliged to have
followed the Federation Executive's instructions both before and during the
dispute; no subsidies would be granted in case of national lockouts, strikes
arising out of general wage claims, or the first fortnight of any dispute.174
In 1914, the first year of the indemnity scheme's operation, six firms received
a total of E3,791, the largest payment of £3,076 going to the Northeast Coast
firm of Doxford and Sons for a strike involving 226 men and lasting for 57
days. From its inception until the qualifications for subsidies were tightened
up in 1922, the Federation paid out £93,156 to firms in dispute, of which
£53,079 was spent in 1919 alone.175
Thus despite its initial cautious and moderate response to the changing
industrial climate and the ASE Executive's renewed support for craft regulation,
the EEF was not prepared to see all that had been won in 1898 slip away.
Sentiment was mounting among the rank and file of engineering employers in
these years for a renewed confrontation with the ASE, and the Managing Director
174 Extract from minutes of Executive Board meeting, 7.7.1908; 'Draft for a
Federation Subsidy Scheme', 17.10.1908 (prepared by Marjoribanks of
Armstrong-Whitworth and Browne of Leslie, Hawthorn, both of Newcastle);
EEF General Letter, 10.5.1912; letter from J. Lang to Smith, 14.5.1912;
letter from Browne to Smith, 15.5.1912; minutes of Executive Board Meeting,
16.5.1912; Browne to Smith, 17.5.1912; amended drafts of scheme, 1912-13;
General Letter 171, 30.4.1913, 'Suggested Institution of Subsidy Scheme';
General Letter 175, 1.10.1913, includes rules of approved scheme. EEF 1(4)2
175 Figures in EEF 1(4)12.
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o£ Weir's, Cathcart, one of the more aggressive firms in the country on
labour questions, was doubtless correct when he observed in 1917 that:176
The position just before the outbreak of. war was that, by consistent
disregard of the Terms of Agreement, many of these provisions, though
officially effective, had become inoperative, and these inroads on the
powers of management in the shops had become so serious that, had war
not intervened, the autumn of 1914 would probably have seen an industrial
disturbance of the first magnitude.
The intensification of militancy on both sides during the war as a result of
the Munitions Act, dilution, and inflation, coupled with the demands for
workers' control raised by vocal sections of the shop stewards' movement
would, of course, heighten engineering employers' determination for another
definitive showdown with the unions on the question of managerial prerogatives,
as the 1922 lockout would demonstrate.
176 J.R. Richmond, Some Aspects of Labour
Industry, Presidential Address to the
Society, 1916-17 (Glasgow, 1917).
and Its Claims in the Engineering
Glasgow University Engineering
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A Transformation of the Division of Labour l898-l9l4?
In 1898 skilled engineers and their employers alike believed that if
the industry's pattern of development continued indefinitely, the skilled
craftsman would be replaced by the unskilled machine minder. While this
belief had not been forgotton by 1914, neither had it become a general
social reality. Where mass demand for a specialised product justified the
construction of a jig or fixture to make the work completely automatic and
foolproof, it might indeed be technically possible for unskilled labourers,
boys, or in some cases women, to operate the machines, as a speaker before
the Institution of Mechanical Engineers declared in 1914:177
•••Once a jig or fixture has been properly designed and set up, it
is possible in at least 60 percent of the cases to employ very much
cheaper and occasionally unskilled labour to perform the same work
with as much accuracy as any highly paid mechanic.
Generally speaking, however, it was not economical to specialise operations
so narrowly. As the Ministry of Munitions discovered when it introduced women
into munitions work during the war, optimal rates of production might only be
achievable through several complete reorganisations of both machinery and
workshop layout, an expensive procedure often impractical under the market
. f i 1 d . 178constra1nts 0 commerc a pro uct10n.
177 Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers 1914, quoted in
Jefferys, Engineers, p.125. On jigs and fixtures, see A.L. Levine,
Industrial Change and Its Effects upon Labour, 1900-14, (Ph.D. Thesis,
London, 1954), pp.299-300, quoted in Weekes, ~, p.160:
Without resort to a jig or fixture the placing into correct
position of a piece to be machine - for example a casting or a
forging - necessitates extremely careful setting by means of a
chuck, clamps, and so forth. Now where it is desired to produce
in quantity, if a "jig or fixture is used this setting up operation,
and 'locating' may be considerably simplified, and the time necessary
for this setting and locating greatly reduced. Moreover, not only
is the locating o£ the piece done with dispatch but it is done with
accuracy.
178 See the quotation from the History of the Ministry of Munitions, below,
p.457.
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Thus it was only where opportunities for mass production were most
developed that the new technology could be pressed to its limits. But even
in such cases, the result was neither the elimination of the skilled engineer
nor simply the multiplication of semi-skilled machine minders, but rather a
new polarisation of the labour force between a larger group whose skills were
being downgraded and a smaller one whose skills were being enhanced. Where
standardised and repetitive processes were introduced, craftsmen were still
required to design jigs and fixtures, to make and set tools for the less
skilled, and to repair and maintain the new machinery. While fewer craftsmen
were required and the older and less competent workers most likely to fall
by the wayside, these new tasks generally required greater skill than that
of the ordinary fitter or turner, since the principles of the new techniques
had to be assimilated to those of the old. Both employers and union leaders
testified to the heightened abilities of the remaining full-skilled craftsmen:
thus Sir Benjamin Browne informed the Poor Law Commission in 1908 that "a
skilled mechanic now is a far higher class of man than he was 20 years ago",
and George Barnes echoed this judgment: "I should say the skilled men require
even more skill now than they did, because of the finer work and more intricate
h" ,,179mac ~nery. Where it proved impractical or uneconomical to introduce mass
production methods, on the other hand, skilled workers with a general training
would still be required on direct production, even where new machine tools
had been installed, and improvements to the older lathes had actually increased
, "I" 180turners versat~ ~ty. It was therefore only where craftsmen found themselve~
179 RC on the Poor Laws, qs. 82,943 and 86,244.
180 Jefferys, Engineers, pp.122-25.
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working automatic or semi-automatic machines in the context of repetition
production that a clear devaluation of their skills could be said to be
underway; here lay the danger in 'following the work to the machine'.
Conversely, the non-apprenticed handyman might progress up a job ladder
from the simpler to the more complex machine tools - as had been true since
the 1870s - thereby accumulating a body of particular or plant-specific skills
which if less versatile than those of the craftsman might nevertheless give
him far greater bargaining power than that of a general labourer. At the
apex was work on complex machines like the radial dr~ll or the universal
miller; by 1914 these had become recognised skills in some districts and their
bearers received the district rate or slightly below.18l From this point work
became decreasingly skilled as machines became more automatic, until one
reached the juvenile or female operative minding a 'fool-proof' machine.
But as Richard Hyman correctly reminds us, "the gap between such semi-skilled
workers as the automatic stamper and the universal driller was far greater in
terms of skill than that between the driller and the fully-skilled turner.,,182
It was of course the tendency for the handymen on the way up and craftsmen on
the way down to meet as competitors in the same section of the labour market
which lay behind the latters' militancy on the question of machine manning.
There were thus two central aspects to the problem of transformation
of the division of labour in engineering in this period: the extent to which
new machines and new processes had been introduced, and the extent to which
181 Cole, Workshop Organisation, p.34.
182 Hyman, Workers' Union, p.41.
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skilled craftsmen had been able to control the conditions of their introduction.
We must bear these questions in mind when we try to assess the extent of
employers' success in transforming the division of labour in engineering
between the great lockout and the great war.
Any precise assessment of the progress of the division of labour in the
industry between 1898 and 1914 must necessarily remain problematic: there
is no single index which provides a suitable guide; even the movement of
productivity measured in terms of output per man hour reflects a range of
factors (levels of investment, capacity utilisation) in addition to the
utilisation of labour itself. Hence we shall instead consider a number of
different indicators to form a general impression of the position of skilled
workers in the division of labour in 1914.
Perhaps the most crucial index is the proportion of men classified as
skilled in the industry as a whole. According to the EEF, the labour force in
Federated firms in 1914 was 60% skilled, 20% semi-skilled, and 20% unskilled.18
Barnes estimated in 1908 that 30-40% of engineering workers earned less than
the standard rate; 10% of the total were labourers.184 The weight of the
semi-skilled was far higher, of course, in the newer, lighter sectors:
according to the 1911 occupational census, 45% of the labour force in general
183 Yates, British Engineering, p.31.
184 RC on the Poor Laws, q.82,845
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engineering was semi-skilled in Coventry, compared to 16% in Sheffield,
8 . 11 18519% in Glasgow, and 1 % nat10na y. The EEF figures provide only an
approximate guide, but their bias if anything overstates the extent of
change in the industry as a whole, since Federated firms tended to be larger
and more specialised than those which remained outside. Taken as a social
rather than a technical index, then, these figures suggest that the ASE had
been generally successful in defending the craft status of its members by
winning control of new machine tools.
A similar picture emerges if we examine the extent to which engineering
jobs had become 'women's work', in social terms the opposite pole to 'skilled
men's work', in pre-war Britain. To be sure, the number of women in the
engineering trades grew more rapidly than did total employment in the industry
between 1891 and 1914 - increasing from 58,000 in 1891 to 128,000 in 1911 and
170,000 in June 1914 while the total labour force in engineering and ship-
building grew from roughly 11 million in 1911 to 18 million in 1914.186 But
while the number of women in general engineering shops had reached 17,000 in
1914, women before the First World War remained largely confined to simple
repetition work in the newer sectors of the industry concentrated in London
and the West Midlands - especially cycles and electrical goods - and so
187presented little immediate threat to skilled men's craft status.
185 Hinton, Shop Stewards, p.2l8.
186 B. Drake, Women in the Engineering Trades (1917), p.8; Jefferys, Engineers,
p.ll8.
187 Drake, Women, pp.8-13.
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On the other hand, if the composition of the labour force suggested
that the ASE was protecting skilled men's position in the division of labour
in the short-run, the decline of apprenticeship pointed to a bleaker future
in the long-run. We have seen that after 1898 engineering employers intensifiec
their traditional strategies of eroding the ratio of apprentices to journeymen
and of using the former as cheap labour, with an attendent dilution of
technical training.
In contrast to their success on machine manning, skilled workers were
rarely able to win significant concessions from their employers on the question
of training, and the more ambitious schemes for an apprenticeship system for
machinists mooted by the engineering unions towards the end of the period
188proved non-starters.
Similarly, .despite, the success of engineering craftsmen in capturing
the new machine tools, the employers continued to introduce them at a pace
only slightly below that achieved in the 1890s. According to an index
constructed by Professor Saul, the total output of nine of the best-practice
British machine tool firms (of which roughly one-third was exported) increased
by two and a half times between 1900 and 1914, where it had tripled in the
previous decade. Similarly, although imports of American machine tools to
Britain declined after 1902, they rose sharply again to reach a higher
absolute level in the 1911-14 boom.189 Thus an increasing proportion of ASE
188 Board of Trade, Apprenticeship, pp.56-72. On employers' erosion of
apprenticeship after 1898, see above, pp.360-62.
189 Saul, 'Machine-Tool Industry', p.30; Floud, 'Engineering Competition', p.61.
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members were operating machines which often demanded less than their full
range of skills.
The spread of systems of payment by results provides another important
measure of changes in the division of labour. (See Table 4) With the
expansion of repetition production and the abandonment of official union
opposition after 1898, piecework, as we have seen, expanded rapidly.190
Whereas in 1892, the ASE had reported some 12.9% of its members on piecework,
with higher figures in the West Midlands and other areas, the 1906 wages
census found 27.5% of all engineering workers to be paid by results, while
the figures for fitters and turners alone had risen to 33%; by 1919 these
proportions were surely higher still. Again the figures ran higher in certain
sectors: 67.6% in railway carriage building and 52.8% in cycles.191
Piecework in engineering was generally associated with the expansion of
standardisation and the weakening of craft regulation, so that the increasing
proportion of skilled engineers working under it offers some guide to the
changing division of labour. But it was the premium bonus which emerged in
this period as the cutting edge of the managerial assault on skilled workers'
position in the division of labour and which therefore became the target of
the bitterest attacks on the shop floor. The 1906 wages census showed 4.6%
of all engineering workers on some form of premium bonus, while an ASE survey
190 See above, p.360.
191 See Table 5 and 1906 Wages Census, Engineering, Shipbuilding, and Metal
Trades; Jefferys, Engineers, p.129, cites an EEF Survey as evidence that
in 1914 46% of fitters and 37% of turners in Federated shops were paid
by results; he gives a reference to Rowe, Wages in Theory and Practice,
app.ll, which does not, however, discuss this survey.
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three years later reported 9.2% of members working under this system. The
TUC Joint Committee concluded that the premium bonus was generally confined
to repetition work in the armament, motor, locomotive, and electrical sectors,
d' 'd l' , 192though it was sprea lng to marlne an genera englneerlng. Although there
are no comparable figures for 1914, it seems clear that the premium bonus and
other more radical innovations in managerial practice affected only a limited
proportion of ASE members concentrated in the more advanced sectors, but these
became the focus of resistance among the rank and file precisely because they
were seen even by those unaffected as the most extreme of the threats to
skilled workers' autonomy and control at the point of production.
Were there accurate statistics available on the movement of real earnings
these might provide another indication of skilled fitters' and turners'
ability to contain the social consequences of technical change. Given the
changes in the skills required from fitters and turners, if wage rates reflecte,
skill levels directly we would expect a number of related developments: 1) an
internal differentiation of rates within these categories of skilled workers;
2) an erosion of the differentials between skilled and unskilled workers;
and 3) the emergence of new differentials between fitters and turners on the
one hand and those skilled trades whose skills were under less pressure, such
as the smiths or patternmakers. Judging by the movement of the standard rates,
however, none of these developments occurred, at least at a national level;
as J.W.F.Rowe has sought to demonstrate, between 1886 and 1914, the ASE was
able to maintain its standard rates for fitters and turners at levels parallel
192 Ibid.; TUC Joint Committee, Premium Bonus, pp. 11, 73-4.
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to those of other engineering crafts, nor were differentials narrowed in
k'll d ' 193relation to the semi-s 1 e 1n most cases. But union officials alleged
that many engineering workers were in practice unable to earn the district
rate where piecework systems were operated unfavourably, and it is therefore
doubtful whether we can take the movement of the standard rate as an accurate
guide to the movement of real earnings, even when supplemented by the 1906
194Wages Census. In some areas, moreover, the semi-skilled were indeed able
to narrow the differential between their rate and that of the skilled: in
the new industries of the West Midlands, the Workers' Union organising drive
was able to raise labourers' wages from 59% to 71% of the district rate, while
many of the semi-skilled were already earning the full rate or just below.195
193 Rowe, Wages in Practice and Theory, pp.104-11.
194 The Board of Trade Enquiry of 1906 shows piece workers in engineering as
earning 18.5% more than time workers. A number of considerations shed
doubt on this figure as an accurate assessment of differentials between
the two groups. First, the Board of Trade survey reflects only earnings
in a single week at a high point of the trade cycle when wage drift might
have been expected to be most evident, and pieceworkers would have been
unlikely to sustain this rate of earnings over the whole year or throughout
the trade cycle. Second, these figures relate only to those workers
employed on a full working week, while piecework would often have been
accompanied by periods of short time due to lower demand or delays in the
supply of raw materials. Third, the EEF's own figures for 1914, also a
prosperous year, show no gap between time and piece earnings in Federated
workshops, a conclusion which tallies with the frequent union complaints
about rate cutting and the tendency for piece earnings occasionally to
fall below the district rate. For the EEF figures, see R.A. Hart and
0.1. Mackay, 'Engineering Earnings in Britain, 1914-68', Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, Sere A, 138, Pt. I; for similar observations
about pieceworkers in shipbuilding, and the 1906 Wages Census, see Reid,
Shipbuilding, pp.50-61.
195 Hinton, Shop Stewards, p.219.
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And though the differentials between skilled engineers and other groups of
skilled workers did not change dramatically on the national level, neither
did their real wages continue to rise as they had between 1850 and 1890.196
Finally, such evidence on the movement of productivity as exists
suggests that the persistance of craft militancy after 1898 contributed to
restrict the rate of growth of output per man hour in engineering before 1914.
An index of the throughput of metal processed per worker in engineering
between 1880 and 1914 compiled by Phelps Brown and Browne shows a rapid rise
in the 1890s followed by a levelling-off thereafter; similarly, between 1900
and 1914, the growth of productivity measured in these terms tended to lag
behind that of output in the upswing of the trade cycle, an effect which is
particularly marked in the boom of 1911-14. These results support the view
that the intensification of craft resistance to the reorganisation of the
division of labour after 1900 and particularly after 1911 played a significant
role in the deceleration of productivity growth, a view which Phelps Brown and
Browne share. This evidence must be handled carefully, however,both because
of the intrinsic difficulties of constructing an index of productivity in so
heterogeneous an industry as engineering, and because of the large contribution
of capital investment to productivity growth. The movement of the terms of
trade in favour of primary producers after 1900, which brought in its train a
revival in demand for Britain's traditional exports, undoubtedly encouraged
manufacturers in the older sectors to pursue a strategy of extensive expansion
196 Yates, British Engineering, pp.99-106.
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in their existing specialities rather than run the risks involved in product
diversification or in expensive retooling of plant; certainly, the lag of
productivity growth behind the growth of output is consistent with the view
that British engineering firms tended to avoid large capital investments,
prefering to meet expanded demand with a fuller use of eXisting capacity or
. 197by sub-contract1ng.
Two general points can be made about the extent of the transformation
of the division of labour in the industry as a whole. First, despite the
increasing polarisation between large and small firms in the years after 1890,
the bulk of British engineering concerns remained small and unspecialised in
relation to their American and German competitors. As the Board of Trade
Committee on the Engineering Trades noted in 1918: the industry was distin-
guished by "the smallness of the individual firms and of the capital they
198employ." Second, however much progress individual British manufacturers
had made by 1914, the overall position of British engineering in world markets
was clearly declining. Where British engineering products had generally
reigned supreme in 1880 and even 1890, American and German makers now
presented a serious challenge: in 1913 the UK exported £34.8 million of
mechanical engineering products (motor cars excluded), to Germany's £37.2
million and America's £26.9 million. (See Table 12)
197 Phelps Brown and Browne, Century of Pay, pp.174-95, especially pp.177,
180-81.
198 Board of Trade Departmental Committee, Report on the Position of the
=E~n~g~i~n~e~e~r~i~n~g~T~r~a~d~e~s~A__f~t~e~r~t~h~e~W~a~r,Cd. 9073, P.P. 1918, XII; Saul,
'Engineering'.
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But in assessing the extent of transformation in this period, it is
again crucial to distinguish between the newer, lighter sectors of the industry
and the older heavier ones. The newer sectors were the growth centres of the
industry, and in certain cases, British manufacturers were able to create
plants whose advanced division of labour allowed them to compete with the
emerging American and German industries. In bicycles, for example, where
American competition had provided the initial stimulus to British entrepre-
neurs, by 1913 Britain exported 150,000 to Germany's 89,000, while the rest
of the world exported almost none. In sewing machines, too, British products
were competitive, though not predominant as in cycles: in 1913 the UK
exported £2.4 million worth of sewing machines, to 2.8 million for Germany
199and £2.4 for the US. In other new products, however, British manufacturers
did less well: electrical engineering, agricultural machinery, gas and oil
200engines and motor cars are good examples. In explaining economic retard-
ation, it is always difficult to separate external factors such as the
structure and extent of demand from those internal to the firm, and to assess
the role of labour in relation to the latter. In motor cars, for example,
where the British output of 34,000 cars per year on the eve of the war was
dwarfed by America's 485,000, the difficulties of reorganising production seem
to have been critical. No British manufacturer was able to introduce an
assembly line before 1914; in fact only two makers were moving towards truly
interchangeable production methods. The consequences for productivity were
staggering: while in 1903-4 Ford employed 300 men to make 1,700 cars in 1914
201no British maker exceeded one car per man per year. While the predominance
199 Saul, ~Engineering', pp.2l4-l5, 227; Harrison, 'Cycle Industry'; Balfour
Committee, Survey of the Metal Industries, p.193.
200 Saul, 'Motor Industry', 'Mechanical Engineering', 'Engineering'; Byatt,
'Electrical Products'; McLean, 'Engineering Competition'.
201 Saul, 'Motor Industry'.
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of skilled workers in the British firms undoubtedly acted as a constraint on
the employers, - ASE members on motor work struck successfully over machine
manning in Coventry in 1913 - the artisinal structure of production owed
more to the restriction of British firms to a luxury market, and though other
European producers employed more advanced methods, none had introduced an
202assembly line before the war. Similarly in electrical engineering it was
above all the limits of the domestic market which inhibited the development
f "i h f" 203o Br~t s ~rms.
In the older heavier sectors where both the existing division of labour
and trade union organisation were more deeply entrenched, the balance between
market and social obstacles to innovations was more mixed. In some sectors,
such as textile engineering, continued British dominance in world markets
discouraged wholesale reorganisation of production in favour of steady returns
from existing plant, while in marine engineering, the variability of demand
made capital-intensive investment strategies impractical even in the face of
competition. In both cases, however, it is also clear that the persistence
of shop floor resistance by skilled workers placed a major restraint on such
technological and managerial innovation as employers undertook, ensuring that
new machine tools would be worked both more expensively and less productively
than would otherwise have been the case. In the crucial machine tool sector
British firms specialising in automatic machinery grew rapidly from the l890s,
but American and German makers dominated most European and Third World markets
by 1914. As the Board of Trade Committee on the Engineering Trades reported
in 1918:204
202 P. Fridenson, 'The Coming of the Assembly Line to Europe', in Layton et
al., (eds.), The Dynamics of Science and Technology (Dordrecht, 1978).
203 Byatt, 'Electrical Products', Electrical Industry.
204 Engineering Trades After the War, p.12.
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There are makers who specialise to some extent in this country,
and with notable success, but speaking generally specialisation
is not carried nearly so far as in the USA, where makers manufacture
milling and grinding machines and automatic lathes in great numbers
and have secured a very large proportion of the trade.
While the late and limited development of demand for automatic machine tools
from other sectors of the industry, together with the proliferation of small
firms were central to the international weakness of British makers, here, too
the resistance of skilled workers to changes in the division of labour
undoubtedly inhibited conversion to the production of lighter machine tools
205which could be mass produced.
It was in the arms industry, poised between light and heavy production
and between the public and private sectors, that the most extensive trans-
formation of the division of labour in existing shops occurred, hence also
the most militant resistance on the part of engineering craftsmen. The years
between 1898 and 1914 were rife with expansion and amalgamation in this
sector: companies like Armstrong-Whitworth and Vickers grew rapidly, as did
the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich, all stimulated by military competition among
the European powers. The transformation of the division of labour had perhaps
gone furthest in armaments than in any other long established sector of
the industry. But, even here, the onset of war and the resulting munitions
shortage would rapidly demonstrate just how limited the effective displacement
of the skilled craftsman had been.
The decade and a half between the 1898 lockout and the coming of war
was a period of continuous technical and organisational change in British
205 S 1au , 'Machine-Tool Industry'; Floud, Machine Tool Industry, chs. 1, 3,4.
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engineering. Employers introduced new American-model machine tools in
significant numbers, and this change in technique was not without its
ramifications for the division of labour - though these of course were
greater in the newer than in the older sectors - as the increasing proportions
of semi-skilled workers and payment by results in the industry suggest. But
skilled workers' resistance on the shop floor had placed severe limits on
employers' ability to reorganise the division of labour, so that we can only
speak of a thoroughgoing transformation in a few large and specialised plants
in certain sectors.
The efforts of the EEF and the ASE Executive to enforce the Terms of
Settlement to facilitate such transformation had merely resulted in the
disintegration of central authority rather than in the diminution of rank and
file resistance, a process speeded along by the democratic structure of the
union and the favourable economic climate for the older sectors after 1900.
In 1914, with a new Executive Council committed to the defence of craft
regulation, the ASE's self-image as a craft society seemed as entrenched, if
not as secure, as it had been in 1890. But craft regulation itself was in
decay in many important areas - apprenticeship and piecework for example -
while the policy of 'following the machine' implied the dilution of the
technical skills needed for engineering production. Many ASE members were
employed at tasks which no longer required the full craft training of a skilled
fitter or turner, but only the particular and plant-specific skills which they
often shared with handymen who had served no apprenticeship. In an increasing
proportion of cases, therefore, the ASE's claim to be a society of craftsmen
possessing skills indispensible to production rested on a fiction enforced by
its members through their local organisational capacity. This fiction was
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becoming more evident as the position of British engineering in the world
economy deteriorated. The outbreak of war, with its demands for enormous
quantities of munitions and other engineering products would highlight the
weakness of the ASE members' exclusive claims, and the less favourable
economic climate of the 1920s would see employers launch another, more
decisive effort to root out those surviving elements of craft regulation
which obstructed their freedom of action in the workplace.
PART III
OUTCOMES AND EXPLANATIONS
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Chapter VII
Epilogue and Outcomes:
Engineers and Compositors on Divergent Paths
By the outbreak of the First World War, marked divergences had already
become apparent in the respective abilities of skilled engineers and compositors
to defend their positions within the division of labour in the face of
pressures toward technical and organisational change. Compositors had
conclusively captured composing maChinery and had used the enhanced bargaining
power thus acquired to improve significantly the effectiveness of craft
regulation in their trade, reversing the tendency for their position to
deteriorate evident before mechanisation. Skilled engineers, by contrast,
saw the hold of their framework of regulation ebbing away, despite the
remarkable success of their guerilla campaign to retain control over new
machine tools, especially during the final pre-war boom. By the mid-1920s,
the differences in the trajectories of skilled workers in the two industries
had become vastly more pronounced.
Without denying the importance of the specific experiences of each
trade during the First World War and in the changed economic and political
climate of the post-war period, it is our contention that these divergences
largely reflect the working out of the basic tendencies of development whose
roots in struggles over the reorganisation of the division of labour we have
anatomised in the pre-war period. To substantiate this line of argument, we
will begin by comparing the positions of skilled engineers and compositors in
1914; a brief account will follow of the experiences of the two trades during
the war and post-war recession, based largely on secondary sources; finally,
we will review our comparison of the two trades from the vantage point of
the inter-war years.
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Engineers and Compositors in 1914
As we have already suggested, skilled engineers and compositors had by
the eve of the First World War embarked on markedly different paths as a result
of variations in their ability to contain the effects of technical and
organisational change on their position in the division of labour and on the
framework of craft regulation which served to sustain it. Indications of
these differences can be found in the respective abilities of the two trades
to control the working of new machinery; to control the labour market; to
regulate working conditions and methods of wage payment; and finally, to
impose their will on employers in full-scale confrontations.
Throughout our analysis we have placed a central emphasis on the
struggles of skilled workers to win control over new machinery, and in the
preceding chapter we drew attention to the relative success of skilled
engineers in winning concessions from their employers over machine manning
despite the prOVisions of the 1897 Terms of Settlement, a trend which became
particularly pronounced with the changes in the ASE Executive and the tight-
ening of the labour market after 1911. Nevertheless, it was still the case
that semi-skilled labour was expanding more rapidly than total engineering
employment during the period, though the inadequacies of the census data make
it impossible to say by how mUCh, and many of these handymen were clearly
operating machines similar to those worked by a growing proportion of ASE
members. The most rapidly growing sectors of the industry, moreover, were
those which disproportionately employed the less skilled, such as cycles,
motor cars, and electrical engineering; in those regions where the new trades
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predominated, in London and especially in the West Midlands, the Workers'
Union, which represented the semi-skilled, was beginning to challenge the
ASE's hegemony during the labour unrest of 1911-14.
In printing, by contrast, the control of composing machines established
by the typographical unions was very nearly total; in fact, the machines were
on the whole controlled more effectively than was hand work. The printing
unions, moreover, were able to secure from employers a set of protective
regulations which maximised the employment of the surviving hand compositors
and insulated them from the worst effects of competition from the machines:
all machine operators had to have been trained as hand compositors, and in
London machine operators could not be returned to case work without two weeks
notice; apprentices were forbidden to work the machines unt{l the last few
years of their training; and case hands were guaranteed equal access to copy,
enforced in London by the principle of simultaneous 'lift' or starting times
for both groups. The advent of the machines also enabled male compositors in
Edinburgh and elsewhere to eliminate those pockets of female labour which had
weakened their organisation, despite the early employment of women as monotype
operators, a task for which many employers believed them to be ideally suited.
While control over the machines and the elimination of pockets of female
labour were important components of the tightening control of the typographical
unions over the labour market, equally crucial in the long-run was the revival
of apprenticeship regulation. As we have seen in earlier chapters, the
diminishing effectiveness of apprenticeship restriction was a central aspect of
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the deterioration of skilled compositors' position between the 1850s and the
1880s, and its revival from the mid-80s was both a contributory cause and a
consequence of their successful struggle for control over composing machines.
The composing machine agreements signed in the 1890s proved the cutting edge
of a growing formal acceptance on the part of employers of the unions'
apprenticeship ratios, even if the latter were forced to grant a limited
extension of the scale in the Provinces and in Scotland towards the end of
the pre-war period. Other signs of growing control over the labour market
included the reduction of systematic overtime and casuality, the latter practicE
having been an especially important force depressing the compositor's earnings
and intensifying his labour before mechanisation; here the productivity gains
attendant on mechanisation perhaps played the determining role, though the
unions were active in imposing tighter rules to discourage these practices
in the decade before the war.
In engineering, on the other hand, apprenticeship was clearly in decay,
as many employers recognised no restrictions and apprentices approached - or
even exceeded - journeymen in number in some firms; in most cases apprentices
were seen as a source of cheap labour and were often employed on repetitive
processes to the detriment of their technical training. While the engineering
unions sought in conferences with the employers immediately before the war to
press their case for a revived form of apprenticeship which would extend to
machinists as well as the older trades, the latter refused any concessions
despite the upsurge of shop floor militancy. Similarly, systematic overtime
seems to have been widespread in engineering through most of the pre-war period
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despite a limit of 40 hours per man per month provided in the Terms of
Settlement (reduced to 32 in 1907), though some more effective regulation
revived towards the end of the post-war boom.
Another significant sign of the erosion of craft regulation in the
work place was the growing extension of piecework, together with new systems
of supervision and incentive payment: by the outbreak of war more than one-
third of all fitters and turners were paid by the piece, while nearly 10% of
ASE members were working under the hated premium bonus system. Here again the
revival of craft militancy after 1911 helped to curb the extension of the
premium bonus and the encroachment by feed and speed men on skilled engineers'
control over their work, while District Committees and shop stewards gradually
acquired a greater voice in the setting of piece prices, but the premium bonus
once installed was rarely dislodged, even during the height of rank and file
bargaining power on the eve of the war •. In printing, by contrast, skilled
workers enjoyed considerable success in prohibiting the use of indicators
which employers had hoped to use to force a faster pace on stab hands, and
complaints about piece-stab and slating largely disappeared with the advent
of mechanisation under effective union control. On London daily newspapers,
moreover, the particularly well-organised compositors succeeded in defending
their ancient piece scale which gave them a disproportionate share of the
returns from mechanisation despite the proprietors' efforts to impose a stab
wage, which would have tightened managerial control over labour costs and indeed
over working practices.
These marked divergences in the effectiveness of craft regulation
stemmed in large measure from variations in the balance of forces between
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workers and employers in the two industries (though also and relatedly
from differences in their market position and profitability). Employers
in engineering emerged victorious from the 1897 lockout, as well as from
subsequent local confrontations in 1903 and 1908; they retained the upper
hand in relations with the unions until the resurgence of craft militancy
during the pre-war boom, despite their inability to capitalise fully on their
advantage to transform the division of labour. In printing, on the other hand,
it was the unions who played the more aggressive role, especially in London:
The 1911 50 hours strike, which was initiated by the unions rather than the
employers and offers the closest parallel to 1897-8,ended in a partial if
incomplete victory for the men, which they were able to consolidate in the
decade that followed. In the Provinces and Scotland, to be sure, employers in
several instances took the initiative in imposing regional frameworks of
collective bargaining on the unions which they hoped would contain the forward
surges of craft regulation. These moves were, however, largely counter-
offensives which resulted in formal acceptance by the employers of the most
important extensions of craft regulation, even if their terms were less
favourable than those won by the better-organised Lse.
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Engineering from War Economy to Depression
Wartime developments in engineering have attracted a great deal of
attention from historians as they did from contemporary observers. With the
urgent demand for shells on the Western Front, the engineering industry,
especially its munitions sector, assumed a central role in the war economy,
and novel bureaucratic instruments were created to administer it. Employers
and trade union leaders were drawn into protracted negotiations over the
formulation and implementation of state policies for war production, as sharp
legal controls were imposed on labour mobility and strike action. The inabilit~
of the arms firms to deliver sufficient quantities of munitions using existing
production methods led the state to seek, and ultimately to obtain (albeit to
a limited extent), the suspension of trade union work rules and the dilution
of skilled labour - i.e., the replacement of skilled craftsmen by less skilled
male and female labour on certain operations - subject to guarantees of the
restoration of pre-war practices, and large numbers of women entered engineerin~
workshops for the first time. The extension of state control over the labour
force, the progress of dilution, and the threat to living standards posed by
rampant wartime inflation provoked successive waves of industrial discontent.
As a result of the limited cooperation of trade union leaders with the war
effort and the legal bans on strike activity, rank and file protest was
organised in some areas by unofficial shop stewards' groups, though in many
instances local union officials took a leading role.l
1 The literature on the engineering industry during the First World War is
vast and growing rapidly. Of the contemporary accounts, the official History
of the Ministry of Munitions (8 vols., 1920-24), the two volumes by G.D.H.
Cole in the series produced by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
(Workshop Organisation and Trade Unionism and Munitions), and Drake, Women in
the Engineering Trades are of particular interest. Among the secondary
literature, Hinton, Shop Stewards, is the most influential study but needs to
be read in conjunction with Reid, Shipbuilding, pt. III, and I.S. McLean, The
Labour Movement and Clydeside Politics, 1914-22, (Oxford D.Phil., 1971). On
the Ministry of Munitions, see also C.J. Wrigley, Lloyd George and the British
Labour Movement, (Brighton, 1976), and R.J.Q. Adams, Arms and the Wizard:
Lloyd George and the ~inistry of Munitions U978)_.
<. , . <
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The entry of the engineering industry onto the national political stage
during the war raises a wide range of important questions, of which perhaps
the most interesting concern the character of state intervention in the
economy and in industrial relations, together with its relation to the
pressures and interests of employers and trade unions. Such issues, however,
lie well beyond the scope of this thesis.2 Rather than attempt a full-scale
account of wartime conflicts in engineering, we will instead confine ourselves
to a brief assessment of the significance of wartime developments for the
struggles over the reorganisation of the division of labour whose course we
have traced to 1914.
The dramatic character of the conflicts over dilution in the munitions
factories, together with the role ascribed to them in the genesis of unofficial
shop steward organisation, has placed them at the centre of historical
analyses of the wartime unrest, particularly in the influential work of James
H. 31nton. This emphasis on dilution has, as Alastair Reid has shown through
a careful analysis of events in shipbuilding, led to an undue neglect of
other sectors equally important to the war economy and to wartime industrial
conflict, as well as to the projection onto them of a model drawn from
munitions. At the same time, other sources of workers' discontent with state
intervention in industrial relations have received insufficient attention,
though they figure in Hinton's and others' accounts, particularly grievances
over restrictions on labour mobility, the working of munitions tribunals, the
2 For a stimulating discussion of these issues, see Reid, Shipbuilding, ch.10,
'Skilled Workers and the State during the First World War'.
3 Hinton, Shop Stewards, although most of the works cited in note 1 above
share a similar emphasis.
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extension of payments by results, the suspension of demarcation rules, and
the lag of wages behind prices. Such objections can also be applied to
engineering itself, where generalisations have arguably been drawn from the
most advanced sectors, especially the shell factories, to the experience
4of the industry as a whole.
But the aspect of this focus on wartime dilution which most centrally
concerns us here is the tendency to overstate its significance for the long-
term transformation of the division of labour in the industry. Implicit in
Hinton's argument that the programme of the Clyde Workers' Committee and other
shop stewards' organisations offered a superior response to that of the ASE
Executive to the threat posed by dilution is the assumption that wartime
. . . 5measures opened an irreversible breach in the framework of craft regulation:
•.•The ASE Executive never faced up to the problems posed for the
traditional craft strategy by wartime dilution •••• The guarantees
...of the restoration of pre-war practices after the war were of
highly questionable value •••• No amount of legislative activity
of this kind could have protected the engineering craftsmen against
the fundamental threat to their economic security implicit in the
adaptation of the industry to the needs of war production.
It was the shop stewards' movement that produced the most realistic
response to dilution. Although based in the anxiety of craft workers
faced with immiseration, the movement rejected not only the patriotic
collaboration of the Executive, but also its craft exclusiveness.
Dilution was accepted as inevitable and progressive: 'a step in the
line of industrial evolution'. From the outset the pursuit of restor-
ation was seen to be futile, and in contrast with the Executive, whose
whole position implied a ruthless purge of dilutees from the industry
after the war, the shop stewards attempted to meet dilution in a way
which would reconcile the interests of craftsmen and dilutee.
4 Reid, Shipbuilding, pt. III; for an account of the diffusion of simplified
versions of Hinton's conclusions into the secondary literature, see ibid.,
pp.242-43.
5 Hinton, Shop Stewards, pp. 65, 35, 73-74.
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This vision of dilution as a major step in the elimination of the
skilled craftsman from engineering production figured prominently in the hopes
of employers, and in the fears of trade unionists (not least the ASE Executive,
whose whole strategy was aimed at delaying dilution and minimising its effects),
h "'f' di , , h d 6though as t e war wore on 1tS S1gn1 1cance 1m1n1S e • In the event,
however, these cataclysmic predictions proved unfounded: the Restoration
of Pre-War Practices Act was duly passed into law in 1919 and the vast
majority of the dilutees in due course flooded out of the engineering workshops.
Of the 819,000 women working in the industry in 1918, only 221,000 remained
7by 1921, as compared to 172,000 in July 1914.
To understand why the long-term impact of the introduction of women
during the war on the composition of the labour force was so limited, it is
necessary to bear in mind the fundamental differences between wartime dilution
and the initiatives toward the reorganisation of the division of labour
underway before the war. Dilution, in contrast to pre-war changes in the
division of labour, was undertaken by the state in order to meet its immediate
wartime needs for munitions rather than by employers responding to the pressureE
and opportunities of the market. As we have seen, the limited demand for mass
produced goods coupled with the expense involved in retooling existing plant
inhibited the extent of the transformation of the division of labour in pre-war
Britain. The freedom of dilution from market constraints permitted the
temporary development in munitions works of a division of labour more advanced
than anything which had existed before the war, even in the newer sectors of
6 For employers' hopes, see the quotations in Hinton, p.2l and History of the
Ministry of Munitions, IV/2, p.48. For the skilled men's fears and those of
the ASE leaders, see the quotations from the negotiations leading to the 1915
Treasury Agreement in Wrigley, Lloyd George, pp.165, 262; History of the
Ministry of Munitions, IV/2, pp.47-48i and H.E.R. Highton, 'Report on the
Engineering Industry, Clyde District', in Drake, Women, especially, pp.l3l-32.
7 Yates, British Engineering, pp.146-47.
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engineering. As the official History of the Ministry of Munitions remarked:8
.•.Finance was at no time a limiting factor in the production of
munitions. The division of labour, therefore, was not checked by
the expense of installing new machinery, making special arrangements
for women •••• New factories were laid out for the mass production
of specific munitions and equipped with machines each designed for a
specific purpose .••• The War resulted not only in the re-equipment
of many old workshops with machinery, much of which was designed
for a single limited purpose •••• Every mechanical device was intro-
duced that could facilitate the handling of weights or render the
operation of a machine tool by an unskilled operator foolproof.
Even where such expenditure ultimately resulted in economic production,
it could rarely have been undertaken subject to ordinary commercial
risks.
At the same time, the fact that dilution was not undertaken with commercial
considerations in mind meant that the reorganisation of the division of labour
was not designed to meet the long-term needs of British engineering manufac-
turers, as would become all too apparent after the war.
The peculiar aims and conditions of wartime dilution ensured that its
impact on the skill structure of engineering production was markedly different
than that of pre-war managerial initiatives. Whereas pre-war changes in the
division of labour had brought about a downgrading of the skills of many
engineering craftsmen, leaving them open to competition from the lower-paid
handymen, the vast expansion of engineering production coupled with the influx
of large numbers of women unfamiliar with metal work created an unprecedented
demand for skilled engineers to make and set tools, repair and install
machinery, and to train and supervise the unskilled. Thus the war brought
about a temporary upgrading of engineers' skills which, coupled with the
shortage of skilled labou~ enhanced their bargaining power and helped to ensure
8 History of the Ministry of Munitions, IV/2, pp.74-75, 79.
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that dilution was implemented on relatively favourable terms.9
The specialised character of war production likewise meant that women
munition workers were concentrated on work which had little direct connection
with pre-war output. The bulk of the women were employed on shell and gun
work - at first confined to light work and moving on to heavier tasks as the
war went on - and much of it in special purpose-built National Shell Factories:
225,000 of the 819,000 women were employed in government establishments, most
. 10of wh~ch would be closed down after the war. While a large proportion of
direct substitutions of women for men occurred in general engineering, motor
and cycle, and electrical work (39%, 20%, and 4% of the totals, respectively),
direct returns published by the Board of Trade show that the absolute numbers
involved were small relative to the total number of dilutees: 84,000 in
general engineering, 42,000 in motor and cycle work, and 15,400 in electrical
11work. And even in these sectors, the women were engaged in production
closely geared to the specific needs of the war effort, constructing and
assembling specialised machine tools and other components needed for the shell
and gun factories. Where women were substituted directly for men, moreover,
they rarely did the same job; as many observers commented, the basic pre-
condition for the employment of women was the introduction of specialised
automatic machines and the minute subdivision of tasks; supervision was also
far heavier than was customary in pre-war practice, and women rarely set their
own tools, in contrast to semi-skilled men.12
9 ~., p.80; Hinton, Shop Stewards, pp.63-64.
10 Yates, British Engineering, p.147.
11 Reid, Shipbuilding, Table 6, p.446: Hinton, Shop Stewards, p.63.
12 Drake, Women, pp.8-9, 14-40; Highton, 'Clyde District' in ibid., pp.115-19.
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The fact that dilution largely involved the reorganisation of work to
permit the employment of women without previous experience in engineering,
rather than the upgrading of semi-skilled men which had been the principal
feature of pre-war changes in the division of labour, proved an important force
for the smooth restoration of pre-war practices. Had dilution instead brought
about a massive promotion of semi-skilled men onto skilled men's work, the
lines of demarcation would have been extremely difficult to redraw at the end
of the war. But the military's need for manpower, together with the ASE's
success in protecting skilled men from conscription, led to the enlistment of
most semi-skilled men into the armed forces, compelling the government to
concentrate on the introduction of women on munitions production. The bulk
of the women employed on war work were engaged in simple repetition operat~ons
on specialised machines, so that the skills they acquired could not easily
be converted to other tasks. Thus the transformation of engineering production
during the war, precisely because it was so much more radical than the pre-war
reorganisation of the division of labour, proved to be too narrowly directed
towards munitions work to serve engineering manufacturers' needs in producing
for post-war commercial markets. As a further confirmation that wartime
dilution did not represent a step continuous with the development of the
division of labour after the war, the number of women employed in engineering
increased relatively slowly during the 1920s and 30s: from 221,000 in 1921
they had reached only 276,000 in 1931, and were heavily concentrated in
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13electrical engineering, motors and cycles.
To some extent the rapid purge of dilutees after the war was the
result of the legal obligations incurred by the state and of the ability of
skilled workers to force compliance from employers anxious to avoid disruptions
in the conversion to peacetime production. But as G.D.H. Cole pointed out
. 14at the t1me:
More important •.•was the fact that those who foresaw a determined
attempt by employers to keep dilution after the war had, to a large
extent, misunderstood the nature of the war-time changes and greatly
over-estimated their probable influence on post-war methods of
production. In fact, most of the forms of dilution introduced during
the war, while they afforded important lessons for further application
to the technique of production, were not suited for direct and immediate
application to the forms of normal production to which employers
reverted when their contracts for munitions came to an end.
If the war, then, marked no major watershed in the distribution of
engineering skills, it had, nonetheless, a number of less direct repercussions
on the struggle between skilled workers and their employers. First, as Cole
13 Yates, British Engineering, pp.157-59; Balfour Committee, Survey of the
Metal Industries, p.320; Caterall, 'Electrical Engineering'. This is not
to say that the war had ~ impact on t.hedistribution of engineering skills.
As Table 13 shows, EEF estimated that the proportion of skilled men in
Federated workshops fell from 60% to 50% of the total between 1914 and 1921.
These figures, however, pose special problems of interpretation. The
proportion for 1914 is probably only a rough estimate, while that for 1921
conflates the effects of the war with those of the post-war boom and
subsequent recession. Thus the proportion of semi-skilled for 1918 would
undoubtedly have been higher if dilutees were included, but those for 1921
reflect the return of semi-skilled men from the army, the widespread
unemployment among the skilled beginning in 1920, and the disproportionate
growth of the new sectors with lower skill levels between 1918 and 1921.
Extreme caution must therefore be exercised in treating these figures as
an index of wartime changes in the industry.
14 Trade Unionism and Munitions, p.196.
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pointed out, wartime experiences offered employers a potentially fruitful
model for the future developments in the division of labour; this model was,
however, taken up largely by the newer sectors, especially motor cars, where
f 1 1 . 15the American example was 0 at east equa ~mportance. The wartime model
had a parallel effect on trade unionists, as the experience of the tentative
and ultimately unsuccessful alliance with the unskilled glimpsed at certain
moments during the war contributed first to the amalgamation of the ASE and
other craft societies into the Amalgamated Engineering Union in 1920 and then
to the opening of the latter to large numbers of the less skilled after 1926.
Second, the war aggravated the difficulties of the olde~ heavier sectors of
the industry which were already becoming apparent before 1914, both by
encouraging the development of overcapacities in Britain and abroad in products
like armaments, marine engineering, and especially machine tools, and by its
disruption of international trade, which struck hardest at the export-oriented
16sectors. Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the short-run, the painful
and expensive experiences of engineering employers with the intensified shop
floor militancy of the war and immediate post-war years - coupled with their
frustration at government-enforced settlements which they believed to have
favoured the unions - reinforced the determination that had been building up
in the EEF before the war to seek another confrontation with the unions in
15 Fridenson, 'Assembly Line'.
16 T.R. Gourvish, 'Mechanical Engineering', in Buxton and Aldcroft, British
Industry between the Wars, especially pp.131-42; D.H. Aldcroft, 'The
Performance of the British Machine-Tool Industry in the Inter-war Years' ,
Business History Review, 40 (1966); Jefferys, Engineers, pp.200-201. S.
Pollard, The Development of the British Economy, 1914-67 (2nd ed., 1969)
pp.SS-56; is rather too optimistic about the use of expanded wartime
capacity after the war.
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order to reestablish the hegemony of managerial prerogative in the workplace
which had been eroded since 1898.17
Wartime full employment had promoted a massive expansion of union
organisation, and the ASE grew from 170,000 in 1914 to nearly 300,000 in 1918;
the newly created AEU had 450,000 members at its formation in 1920.18 The
first two years after the war saw a reconversion boom which kept the demand
for skilled labour at close to wartime levels, and allowed the engineering
unions to secure the long-desired 47 hour week. But by the beginning of 1921,
the post-war boom had drawn to a close, and a severe depression struck the
engineering industry; by July of that year 114,684 of 425,714 AEU members
19were unemployed. In this changed economic climate, the employers launched
their counter-offensive. The EEF had expanded rapidly in power and numerical
strength during the war, growing from 714 member firms in 1914 to 1,469 in
1918 and 2,600 in 1921. One central component of this managerial offensive
was a drastic attack on wages in the industry, including a 6% cut in the basic
rate, the revocation of war bonuses, and a 15% cut in piece rates, demands
accepted by the AEU under threat of a lockout in mid-1921. At the same time,
the EEF became increasingly militant on questions it considered to involve
managerial prerogative, including machine manning, the payment of apprentices,
and the regulation of overtime, all of which were the subject of local strikes
in 1921. Early that year, the Employers' Federation threatened a lockout
over those issues, and it seemed only a matter of time before it would precipit-
ate a major trial of strength with the unions.20
17 Wigham, Power to Manage, pp.86-l35; for the frustration of the EEF with
government labour policy during the war, see J. Turner, 'The Politics of
the Business Community during the First World War', (unpublished paper,
Bedford College, 1979).
lS Jefferys, Engineers, pp.19l, 194.
19 Ibid., pp.21S-19.
20 .Ib~d., pp.2l8-22; wigham, Power to Manage, pp.121-24.
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In the event, it was the rejection by a ballot of AEU members of the
Federation's claim that employers had the right to decide unilaterally when
overtime should be worked, as well as to introduce changes in working
conditions before the disputes procedure had been exhausted (the old disputed
'current conditions' clause), that led the EEF to lock out all AEU members in
March 1922. In contrast to 1897-8, when employers had been anxious to isolate
the ASE from other unions, the EEF felt so sure of itself that it threatened
to lock out 46 other engineering unions unless they signed the memorandum
defining managerial functions rejected by the AEU. In any case, the AEU was
in no position to command solidarity from other quarters, since it had
seceded from the Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades in 1918
(having only joined in 1905) and had thoroughly alienated the semi-skilled
unions through its stand on dilution. The employers had other good reasons
to feel confident: in 1921 the AEU had been forced to dispense over £2
million in unemployment benefits, and were completely unable to meet the
threat of a major lockout, as the Executive, which had recommended that the
members accept the EEF's demands, clearly recognised. By May 1922, the AEU's
funds, which had amounted to some £3,250,000 at its formation, had dropped
to £32,572, forcing the union to suspend all benefits except those to super-
annuated and disabled members. In June, the membership, recognising that
further resistance was futile, voted to accept the EEF's revised definition
21of managerial functions, known as the York Memorandum.
21 Jefferys, Engineers, pp.2l8, 223-27; Wigham, Power to Manage, pp.121-24.
For a contemporary account from a managerial perspective, see A. Shadwell,
The Engineering Industry and the Crisis of 1922 (1922); for the text of
the managerial functions agreement, see Wigham, Power to Manage, pp.293-99.
For an account of the lockout and its consequences in Coventry, see Carr,
Engineering Workers, ch.4.
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The immediate consequences of the employers' victory were two-fold:
another drastic reduction in basic wage rates, together with a rapid decline
in union membership, especially sharp in the new sectors. The reductions in
wages extracted by the EEF in 1921-22 totaled some 32s: the average skilled
fitter or turner's weekly basic rate fell from somewhere around 86s to 54s
between June 1921 and September 1922. Insofar as basic rates remained close
to total earnings (as they did in the early 1920s), these reductions meant
a substantial decline in real income relative to the pre-war period: the cost
of living had increased by 79% between 1914 and 1922, while skilled engineers'
22rates had increased by only 45%.
By the end of 1922, the AEU had lost over 120,000 members from the time
23of its foundation, a decline of over 25%. In the centres of the new
industries such as motor car production, the union was virtually driven off
the shop floor. In Coventry AEU membership had fallen by 57% in 1923 and
by 80% in 1925, a decline which continued until the onset of rearmament in
the late 1930s. By 1925, the union presence in the factories was so limited
that it was obliged to send round a questionaire to the few surviving shop
stewards in hopes of obtaining basic information about prevailing wage rates
and working conditions; this state of affairs was typical of other centres of
24mass production such as Oxford as well.
22 Yates, British Engineering, pp.112-17, 133-34. Earnings data collected
by the EEF show that the gap between basic rates and total earnings was
still relatively small in this period. In 1926 average fitters' earnings
totaled 60s 3d per week-compared to basic rates of 56s. R.A. Hart and
D.I. Mackay, 'Engineering Earnings in Britain, 1914-68', Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, Sere A, 138, pt. 1, (1975), p.39. See also
Table 14.
23 Jefferys, Engineers, p.227 ••
24 Carr, Engineering Workers, ch.5, especially pp.246-47; R.C. Whiting, The
Working Class in the 'New Industry' Towns: The Case of Oxford CD.Phil,
Oxford, 1977), chs.2-4.
465
The EEP's victory did.not in itself solve the problems faced by
engineering manufacturers. In the short term, employers had once again been
able to reduce their wage bill drastically and to force the AEU to recognise
their authority to reorganise production. But as they had discovered after 189£
the formal powers conferred by victory did not automatically lead to an
effective transformation of the division of labour in the industry, though
the employers' victory in 1922 was even more complete than it had been in
1898. The ability of skilled engineers to contain the extent of change on
the shop floor in the pre-war period, coupled with their employers' preference
for the pursuit of secure profits in the short-run rather than more ambitious
and risky investments in rationalisation and the development of new products,
had ensured that adjustment to the emerging shifts in world demand would be
exceptionally painful.
After the war, the depressed demand for engineering products, together
with the intensification of foreign competition and the disruption of world
trade, presented an especially unfavourable context for far-reaching ration-
alisation plans in the older sectors of the industry. In contrast to the
period following 1897-8, the greater completeness of the employers' victory
in 1922 and the persistence of mass unemployment in the older sectors ruled
out any speedy revival of craft regulation on the shop floor which would inhibit
managers' ability to impose radical changes in the division of labour. By
that point, however, the barriers to rationalisation in the older heavier
sectors imposed by the character of demand and the adaptability of the product
to mass production methods loomed even larger than before 1914, resulting in
a sharper divergence in the experiences of old and new sectors. In the section
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which follows, we will consider first some general indices of the transformatiol
of the division of labour in the industry as a whole and then attempt to
specify further the experiences of the old and new sectors.
It is of course, quite difficult to formulate an overall judgement as
to the extent of the transformation of the division of labour in this period,
especially as regards the older sectors. Contemporary students of labour
economics, such as J.W.F. Rowe and M.L. Yates saw the twenties and thirties
as a period of rapid industrial change, in which the skills of the average
fitter and turner were devalued, while the increasing sophistication of
machinery required enhanced skills on the part of a smaller proportion of the
workforce. As Yates wrote in 1937:25
The post-war years have been marked by an increase in mass production
methods generally, encouraged by and in turn giving further impetus to
improvements in machine tools and workshop equipment. New techniques
have vastly altered the way in which certain engineering products are
made. In addition, greater attention has been paid to planning and
production control, and to the question of subdivision of operations.
Generalisations of this kind, however, tend to exaggerate the extent of
change by focussing on the most advanced firms and sectors. To specify the
picture somewhat, we will need to examine some particular indices of change.
One important index of this kind is the overall proportion of skilled and
semi-skilled workers in the industry. Estimates of these for Federated shops
are given in Table I}. These figures clearly show the rapid growth of semi-
25 Yates, British Engineering, p.16. See ibid., ch.2 and Rowe, Wages in
Practice and Theory, pp.93-111, 263-71 for descriptive accounts of general
changes in the division of labour and in the skills of particular groups
of workers in this period.
467
skilled machine operators during the 1920s at the expense of the older skill
structure based on fitters and turners assisted by labourers. Large numbers
of the surviving skilled workers would now be serving as toolmakers and other
workers on indirect production in the newer sectors; the number of toolsetters,
for example, jumped from 8,000 in 1921 to 12,000 in 1931.26
Another sign of the transformation of the division of labour in the
industry was the accelerated decline of apprenticeship. An inquiry conducted
by the Ministry of Labour in 1925-26 discovered that only 32% of the youths
under 21 in the industry were apprentices, with a further 11% classified as
learners. By 1938 an AEU survey of 1,332 "fair-sized" firms showed that only
16% took indentured apprentices.27 This decline was, however, highly
concentrated in the newer sectors. In motor cars and electrical engineering
fewer than 50% of the firms took apprentices, a condition which extended to
the Midlands and the Southern counties taken as a wholej aircraft alone of
the new sectors relied heavily on apprenticeship. In the older sectors
centred in the North, such as textile engineering, marine engineering, and
locomotive building, 75 to 85% of the firms still employed apprentices and
28learners, though in 'general engineering' the proportion stood at 60%. While
apprenticeship was on the wane, the use of boy labour in the industry was not:
the number of boys per 1000 workers in engineering itself increased between
29
1911 and 1921 from 239 to 258 among fitters, and from 166 to 246 among turners.
26 Yates, British Engineering, p.31.
27 Ministry of Labour, Report on Apprenticeship and Training, 1925-26 (1928),
vol. VI, pp. 6-7; Jefferys, Engineers, p.205.
28 9Ministry of Labour, Apprenticeship, vol. VI, p..
29 Ibid., vol. VII, p.51.
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But even where apprenticeship persisted, the quality of the training
continued to decline, as piecework and repetition production rendered it
increasingly a system of cheap labour rather than a royal road to craft
training; Love on the Dole is the classic, if fictionalised, account of this
30process. An additional indication of the demise of apprenticeship
regulation can be discerned in the fact that 90.3% of all apprentices now
were forced to serve an additional term of one to two years as 'improvers'
before they received the district rate.31
A further index of the erosion of craft regulation in the industry as
a whole was the general extension of payment by results. There had been a
significant expansion of payment by results under the auspices of the Ministry
of Munitions during the war, a change that proved more difficult than dilution
to roll back with the armistice. After the employers' victory in 1922, the
unions found themselves unable to resist a managerial offensive in this area.
According to the EEF, the proportion of workers on payment by results jumped
between 1923 and 1927 from 41% of turners and 51.7% of fitters to 51.7% and
63.4% respectively.32 It is difficult to tell how far this extension of
payment by results was accompanied by other changes in the division of labour
rather than reflecting those which had already occurred. Moreover, these
figures conflate ordinary piecework with the introduction of premium bonus
systems associated with more radical changes in the division of labour,
particularly in the lighter sectors where mass production was advancing most
'dl 33rap1 y.
30 W. Greenwood, Love on the Dole (1933, reprinted, Harmondsworth, 1965);
Jefferys, Engineers, p.206.
31 Ministry of Labour, Apprenticeship, vol. VI, pp. 34-35.
32 EEF, Thirty Years of Industrial Conciliation (1927), p. 35.
33 Yates, British Engineering, pp. 80-95.
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Even more than during the pre-war period, the distinction between the
older, heavier sectors and the newer, lighter sectors is absolutely fundamental
to an understanding of the transformation of the division of labour in the
industry. The 1920s were a bad period for the British engineering industry
as a whole. In 1913, the UK was responsible for 30.4% of total world exports
of machinery, to 25.9% for the US and 32.5% for Germany; by 1926, the
proportions had shifted to 25.63% for the UK, to 37.64% for the US and 23.35%
34for Germany. The percentage of the total product exported dropped from
approximately one-half in 1907 to between one-quarter and one-third from
1924-35, and an increasing proportion of the surviving exports went to
35protected Empire markets.
This decline was concentrated in the heavier sectors that had formed
the mainstay of British engineering in the second half of the 19th century,
especially textile machinery, marine engineering, and prime movers and boilers.
These three sectors, which in 1907 had comprised half of gross mechanical
engineering output, by 1935 had fallen to just one-quarter.36 In textile-
machine making, one of the most seriously affected sectors, output declined
from 121,054 tons in 1913 to a nadir of 65,486 in 1925, and demand showed little
signs of revival in this period.37 In most other heavy sectors, the situation
was analogous, if somewhat less extreme, though a few relatively small trades
- printing and book binding machinery, mining machinery, tobacco processing
3machinery, and dairy machinery - continued to hold their own in export markets.
34 Balfour Committee, Survey of the Metal Industries, p.205.
35 3Jefferys, Engineers, p.198; Gourvish, 'Mechanical Engineering', pp.131- 2.
36 Ibid., p.l33.
37 Balfour Committee, Survey of the Metal Industries, p.l93.
38 ~., pp.168-69, 198-2.4; Gourvish, 'Mechanical Engineering' pp.133, 142-43.
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The lighter sectors~ on the other hand, presented a much less gloomy
picture. The value of output in the wotor car industry, for example, more
than doubled oetween 1922 and 1927 while the industry's share of the home
market increased from 49% in 1922 to 82% in 1927. The motorcycle sector also
boomed in this period, as the value of output jumped from £1.6 million in 1912
to £5.9 million in 1924. Similarly, the British electrical engineering industr~
was becoming more competitive in world markets, as its share of world exports
increased from 23.53% in 1913 to 29.02% in 1926.39
Consequently, the 1920s saw a radical shift in the internal occupational
structure of the British engineering industry. The proportion of workers
employed in the older sectors declined dramaticailly: shipbuilding and marine
engineering, which had accounted for 25% of all metal worke~s in 1907, dropped
to 14% in 1925 and 7.4% in 1935, while textile engineering employed just
3.5% of the total in 1935. The newer sections, by contrast, expanded rapidly:
electrical engineering, which had employed some 5% of metal workers in 1907,
comprised 15.4% in 1924 and 22.5% in 1935, while vehicle construction expanded
40from 7.4% of the total in 1907 to 20.4% in 1924 and 28.5% in 1935.
The result of this shift was that while employment in engineering and
shipbuilding increased slightly from 985,000 in 1924 to 1,073,400 in 1930, a
huge number of workers in the older sectors became permanently unemployed.
Between 1922 and 1935, unemployment among AEU members never fell below 8%,
39 Balfour Committee, Survey of the Metal Industries, pp.2l7-18, 225, 337;
M. Miller and R.A. Church, 'Motor Manufacturing', in Buxton and Aldcroft,
British Industry Between the Wars; Catterall, 'Electrical Engineering' in
ibid.
40 Jefferys, Engineers, pp.198-99.
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reaching 30% in the w.orst years, but the picture in particular trades was
41even bleaker than even these figures suggest. According to the .Ministry
of Labour, more than 100,000 workers permanently left the general engineering
sector between 1923 and 1928, while 15,000, Ca much higher proportion), left
marine engineering during the same period. Added to these numbers must be
the 9.7% of general engineers and 13.4% of marine engineers registered as
unemployed as well as the substantial numbers working short-time. In textile
engineering, perhaps the worst hit sector, 37% of those employed were working
42an average of 16.5 fewer hours than the normal 47 hour week.
These figures show clearly that the changes in the skill structure of the
industry as a whole came about largely through a simultaneous expansion of
the newer sectors using mass production techniques and a contraction of the
older sectors in which skilled workers were concentrated. These changes in
the occupational structure were directly reflected in a continuous decline in
AEU membership, which fell from 333,123 in 1923 to 218,339 in 1927.43 What
appears to have occurred, quite simply, is that the decline of the older
sectors resulted in the permanent unemployment of perhaps one-quarter of the
skilled workforce in engineering and shipbuilding. Those most likely to suffer
unemployment were the older and less adaptable skilled workers, for whom findin£
new employment would by most difficult. Furthermore, such workers could not
41 Ibid., pp.197-98
42 Yates, British Engineering, pp.9-11, 128.
43 Jefferys, Engineers, p.296.
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easily transfer to the newer branches of the industrYi not only were their
skills in reduced demand in the mass production sectors, but these were
concentrated in the South and the Midlands, while the bulk of the unemployed
in the heavier sectors lived in the older manufacturing districts of the
44North.
In this bleak economic context, it does not appear likely that employers
in the older sectors implemented a broad transformation of the division of
labour, since such measures required capital investments unwarranted by
declining demand. Hence employers probably confined themselves to such
measures as wage cuts, short-time work, extensions of piecework, and the
promotion of the semi-skilled onto existing or replacement machines. According
to the survey of the depressed areas conducted by the Board of Trade in 1932,
the rationalisation schemes implemented by manufacturers in these sectors
were largely confined to the merger or amalgamation of companies with an eye
to the reduction of total capacity. Mechanisation in these sectors seems to
45have been quite limited, especially on the Northeast Coast. The limited
progress of rationalisation in these sectors is reflected in the slow growth
of productivity: thus despite difficulties in calculation it seems safe to
say that output per man hour in mechanical engineering (which excluded vehicles
and electrical goods) grew more slowly than in manufacturing industry as a whole
between 1924 and 1935, though the record appears to have been better in the
first half of the period, when demand was higher and when employers' strategies
46of work intensification and cost-cutting had begun to be effective.
44 Ibid., p.l99.
45 Board of Trade, Industrial Survey of the North-East Coast (19321, pp.183~84~
Southwest Scotland C19J2l_, pp. 67, 137-,.39;Lancashire, UgoJ21, pp.l57-61.
46 Gourvish, 'Mechanical Engineering', pp.l43~44.
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In the lighter sectors, on the other hand, where demand was increasing
rapidly, manufacturers found it worthwhile radically to transform the structure
of the division of lanour, so that it is appropriate to speak of rational-
isation. In the motor car industry, employers were able to introduce a wide
range of new techniques, of which the most famous is the assembly line, while
output was speeded up by the widespread use of piecework, bonus schemes, and
aggressive supervision.47 As a result, output per man hour in the motor
industry roughly doubled between 1924 and 1935 while rising by only a quarter
48in manufacturing industry as a whole. Similarly, in electrical engineering
manufacturers introduced fully automatic special-purpose machinery on a large
scale, especially in mass production sectors such as lamp making; by 1929
women comprised 20% of engineering workers in London, the centre of electr~cal
engineering.49 Productivity seems, however, to have risen only slightly
faster in this sector than in manufacturing industry as a whole, apparently
because of the labour-intensive methods used by many of the infant consumer
d bl f" 50ura e ~rms.
47 On conditions in the car factories, see Carr, Engineering Workers, chs.4-Si
Whiting, 'New Industry' Towns, chs.2-4; A. Exell, 'Morris Motors in the 1930s
History Workshop Journal, 6-7 (1978-79). On technical change, see R.A.
Church, Herbert Austin (1979), pp.98-101; Fridenson, 'Assembly Line'.
48 Miller and Church, 'Motor Manufacturing', p.184.
49 Yates, British Engineering, p.158. For a detailed examination of production
methods in London engineering firms in 1930, see E.M. Hugh-Jones and F.F.
Turnbull, in H. Llewelyn Smith, (ed.), The New Survey of London Life and
Labour, (1931), vol. II.
50 Caterall, 'Electrical Engineering', pp.254-55.
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The small but strategic machine tool sector seems to have charted a
course in between those of the old and new trades. Depressed by over-
capacity generated during the war and by the decline of demand from the
older sectors in the mid-1920s, British machine tool makers cut back their
investments and moved only slowly into the specialised and automatic tools
which dominated international trade and demand from the newer sectors at
home. Consequently, the British share of world exports of machine tools
dropped by one-half between 1923 and 1937 despite a large increase in world
demand, while the inability of British makers to supply certain 'gap' machines
and to meet peaks in demand ensured that imports represented 56% of exports
in the 1920s and actually exceeded the latter in the 1930s, largely as the
result of large quantities of imports after trade revived in 1936. Yet the
period saw the growth of a small number of large firms using standardised and
specialised methods who controlled roughly one-third of total output in the
1930s (more in the most advanced products), and output per man rose by 40% in
the industry a whole between 1924 and 1935, much faster than in other older
51sectors.
The completeness of the AEU defeat in 1922 coupled with the persistance
of mass unemployment in the older sectors meant that these variations in the
pace of technical change in different sectors owed rather more to the pattern
of demand and the suitability of the product for mass production than to the
retardative role of workers' resistance. In the newer sectors such as motor
cars, craft unionism hung on only in isolated occupations such as sheet metal
work, copper smithing , and to a lesser extent in the toolrooms. As a result,
employers enjoyed more or less untrammelled freedom of action in the car fac-
tories, which were marked by arbitrary discipline, poor working conditions
51 Aldcroft, 'Machine-Tool Industry'; Gourvish, 'Mechanical Engineering',
pp.140-42.
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seasonal and cyclical layoffs, and unilateral managerial control over piecework
. d 52prices during this per~o • In the older sectors, where skilled workers had
more to lose, it seems likely, as Yates suggests, that they became "•.•more
accomodating and less rigid in the interpretation of union rules concerning
what work may be done", though as we have seen, the extent of change was in
1 ., d 53any case relative y l~m~te •
The AEU itself, seeing the collapse of its position in the industry,
officially converted itself into an industrial union recruiting all grades of
male workers, though organising the non-craftsmen into separate sections with
lower benefits. Though the semi-skilled entered the union in large numbers
after 1926 - the proportion of skilled men dropped from three-quarters in 1920-
25 to just over half in 1936-39, and the semi-skilled were of course more
prominent among new admissions - this widening of recruitment can in large
measure be viewed as a strategy of containment through incorporation whereby
craftsmen hoped to minimise the threat posed to their position by the semi-
skilled by bringing the latter into the union where they could be more easily
controlled. At the same time, many AEU branches resisted the new strategy,
refusing well into the 1930s to enroll members in the non-craft sections, a
.. 54position that received some support from national off1c1als. The AEU
continued, moreover, to oppose the upgrading of the semi-skilled onto skilled
men's work throughout the 1930s, and when rearmament began to generate shortages
of skilled labour it resisted dilution despite its conversion to industrial
52 See the sources cited in note 47 above
53 Yates, British Engineering, pp.5l-52.
54 Jefferys, Engineers, pp.22B, 235-36; See the quotation from a private
exchange between AEU and TGWU officials in 1931 in Whiting, 'New Industry'
Towns, p.13l.
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unionism; similarly, when the union reluctantly accepted dilution under
pressure of military defeat in 1940, it nonetheless obtained guarantees of
the restoration of pre-war practices, and remained closed to women until 1943.55
Against this should be set the considerable evidence of a transformation of
attitudes among rank and file militants, many of them Communists whose ideology
in principle inclined them to a broader class outlook; recent interpretations
of the shop steward movement in the late 30s and 40s have emphasised the role
of Communist skilled aircraft workers in the unionisation of the shadow car
factories established after 1936, and in imparting techniques of piecework
bargaining and shop steward organisation to the less skilled.56
Despite the inroads of foreign competition and the depression, the
older sectors of the industry did not entirely disappear, and some like marine
engineering and, of course, machine tools, experienced a certain revival
after 1936; nor did the sectionalism of the skilled engineers vanish entirely,
even in the newer sectors. But when trade union militancy revived in engineer-
ing after 1936, its focus had shifted to the mass production sectors; insofar
as craftsmen participated in this upsurge it was more as toolmakers or aircraft
workers than as fitters and turners.57
55 On the 1930s, see J. Hilton, et al. Are Trade Unions Obstructive? (1934),
pp.143-50; EEF, Industrial Conciliation, pp.20-26; Jefferys, Engineers,
pp.245-47, 259-60; Whiting, 'New Industry' Towns, pp.127-32, 245-59; R.
Croucher, Communists and Shop Stewards in British Engineering, 1936-45,
(Warwick Ph.D. 1978), p.40; Exell, 'Morris Motors', pt. II, p.58. On the
war, see P. Inman, Labour in the Munitions Industries, (1957) and J.T.
Murphy, Victory Production (1942), pp.12-23.
56 Croucher, Shop Stewards; N. Fishman, 'Craftsmen, Communists, and Shop
Stewards in the Aircraft Industry' (unpublished paper, Birbeck College, 1979)
57 See Whiting, 'New Industry' Towns; Croucher, Shop Stewards; Fishman, 'Shop
Stewards'; and my own essay, 'The Emergence of Shop Steward Organisation
and Job Control in the British Car Industry', forthcoming in History Workshor
Journal 10 (Autumn 1980).
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Printing between the Wars
Printing, by comparison with engineering, was much more peripheral to
the war economy, and wartime developments have remained,with good reason, the
province of specialist historians of the industry.S8 The main thrust of the
war experience was to intensify the tendencies of development which we have
argued were already evident before 1914: the wartime shortage of skilled
labour strengthened the prewar trend towards the consolidation of craft regul-
ation. The initial effect of the war on printing, as on other industries,
was to depress commercial activity and thereby to put men out of work: at
the beginning of 1915, unemployment had reached some 10% among compositors.
But as the conflict wore on, the revival of commercial activity coupled wi~h
the army's need for manpower began to create severe shortages of skilled
labour. As in engineering, pressures were set under way for the relaxation
of trade union work rules and the acceptance of dilution. The TA and the
STA agreed to relax some of its work rules in return for a strict guarantee
from the employers of the restoration of pre-war practices, but both adamantly
rejected any moves toward female dilution; the LSC refused even to relax its
work rules. This temporary flexibility on the part of the provincial unions
meant that overtime restrictions were lifted; that compositors, readers, and
machinemen could be interchanged; that apprentices could be advanced sooner
onto machine work; and that printers were no longer prohibited from holding
two jobs at the same time. In every case, however, the TA insisted that the
higher rate be paid, while the final decision as to whether the relaxation of
60rules was left in the hands of local branches and chapels.
58 This section is largely based on the following secondary accounts; Musson,
TA, ch.lS; Gillespie, STA, chs. 12-13; Howe and Waite, LSC, chs. 15, 18;
and Child, Industrial Relations, ch.14.
59 Ibid., pp.219-20; Musson, TA, p.366.
60 Child, Industrial Relations, pp.220-22; Musson, TA, pp.366-6B.
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These concessions were not, in practice, sufficient to alleviate the
labour shortage caused by the war: by the beginning of 1917 manpower in the
printing industry as a whole had been reduced by 50% and some 30-40% of
61monotype keyboards were standing idle, with parallel shortages elsewhere.
Employers, particularly in the provinces, accordingly attempted to introduce
women as monotype operators and in other skilled positions, giving rise to
many disputes, which as Musson informs us were largely successful in blocking
such initiatives.62 When the war ended, therefore, the unions were in a good
position to insist on a speedy reversion to pre-war practices.
The tightened control of the typographical unions during the war had a
number of consequences, some with implications for the longer term. First,
skilled printers were able to keep their earnings rising at close to the rapid
pace set by inflation through a flurry of advances granted between 1916 and
1920. In 1919, the general pressure of inflation on the industry's wage
structure led to the negotiation of a single national agreement between the
PKTF and the FMP, which created a uniform (though afterwards hotly contested)
set of differentials between the various printing trades, and between London
and the various grades of provincial towns. At the same time, printing
workers secured the long sought-after 48 hour week, with 42 hours for night
63work. Second, the war years saw a pronounced growth in unionisation. As we
saw in chapter V, it was during the war that the LSC obtained the re-unionisatior
of the large book firms that had rejected the 50 hours in 1911, and the total
membership of the union grew from 12,384 in 1914 to 15,500 in 1920, much faster
61 Musson, ~, p.366.
62 Ibid., pp.367-68.
63 Child, Industrial Relations, pp.222-29; Musson, TA, pp.369-70, 376-83,
387-94; Gillespie,_~ , pp.157-58, 173; Howe and Waite, LSe, pp.244-53,
287-91, 302-6.
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64than before the war. The TA, for its part grew more modestly during the
war itself, from 23,783 to 24,762 (though it reached 31,234 in 1920), but
65began to unionise new areas more effectively, especially in the Southeast.
Finally, despite the temporary relaxation of trade union work rules in
some areas during the war, the long-run effectiveness of craft regulation was
enhanced; this tendency was more evident in the English provinces where craft
regulation had been weaker before the war than in London where it had been
quite securely entrenched. The 1919 National Agreement contained a reneg-
otiation of the 1911 agreement on the TA rules revision, which was on the
whole quite supportive of craft regulation: composing machine indicators,
bonuses, and task work were definitively abolished; the apprentice scale was
maintained despite calls from employers for its extension; while the overtime
limit was restored to 16 hours per fortnight as opposed to the more rigid
eight hours per week demanded by the 1913 TA Delegate Meeting, most of the
'tt d' th l' 66exceptions perm~ e ~n e ear ~er agreement were abolished.
It was not merely the content of the 1919 National Agreement, but also
the formal procedures for industrial relations it established which signalled
the favourable balance of forces between printing workers and their employers.
In contrast to the disputes procedures in engineering, which were imposed on
the defeated unions by the employers, the Joint Industrial Council was
established as a result of a voluntary agreement between the NPKTF and the FMP,
64 Ibid., p.340.
65 Musson, ~, pp. 371, 540.
66 Ibid., pp. 383-87.
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th . d 67along lines proposed in e pre-war per10 . While its constitution
recommended that no strikes or lockouts take place before consultations had
been held at national level, there was no enforcement mechanism, and the
Joint Labour Court, charged with arbitrating disputes still unresolved after
such national negotiations, was likewise a voluntary body whose decisions were
not binding on the unions. While the TA and other printing unions had been
prepared to accept such a scheme before the war, the more militant LSC had
held aloof; now, presumably, the greater security of craft regulation combined
with the success of Federated action in 1911 and the advantages of national
bargaining in a period of rapid inflation convinced this union to renounce
provisionally the leverage afforded by sudden and sectional strike action.
The favourable character of the new procedure by contrast to that in engineer-
ing can likewise be seen in the fact that the printing unions were able to
secure the employers' agreement that the status quo before any changes had
been initiated by either side should prevail while points were under
conciliation, whereas it had been the engineering employers' insistence that
'current conditions' meant those in force after a managerial initiative which
68touched off the 1922 lockout.
With the relaxation of labour shortages attendent on demobilisation, the
collapse of the post-war boom and the sharp drop in the cost of living
after 1920, printing employers began to agitate for a reduction of inflated
wartime wage rates. The position of the NPKTF was undermined by the TA's
decision to negotiate separately with the FMP in the fall of 1921, which
67 See above, pp.393~4!
68 Child, Industrial Relations, ch.l6; Musson, TA, ch.lB.
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paradoxically resulted in larger reductions being accepted by the provincial
unions than by the LSC and the Stereotypers, another highly skilled craft
society (7s 6d v. 5s). The employers' demand for a new round of wage cuts
the following spring met a similarly divided response from the unions. The
Scottish unions accepted a flat l5s reduction, while the TA once again
insisted on separate negotiations. The employers' claim was then submitted
by mutual agreement to the newly formed Joint Industrial Council for
arbitration, which recommended a staged reduction of l2s 6d. The TA Executive
then ballotted its members, whose refusal of these terms precipitated a four
week strike. Isolated from the other printing unions by its sectionalist
policies, the TA was eventually forced to accept the original reduction, while
the LSC and others escaped with a 6s cut. Some particularly well-organised
groups, such as the London newsmen, were able to prevent any reduction at all
in the new piece scale negotiated in 1920 at the height of the post-war boom.
Yet even the STA and TA members who had suffered the most severe
reductions remained significantly better off in real terms than in 1914. And
it is likewise a noteworthy testament to the entrenchment of craft regulation
in the industry that the TA's defeat in 1922 did not, as in engineering, result
in a major reassertion of managerial prerogative, or even a demand for the
renegotiation of the unions' work rules accepted by the employers in 1919.
Only a small number of employers converted to a non-union basis, and the
. d by 1925.69largest of these, the Newcastle Chronicle, had been reunion~se
69 Child, Industrial Relations, pp.27l-75i Musson, TA, pp.387-402; Howe and
Waite, LSC, pp.244-47.
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The inter-war years were a period of general prosperity for the
printing industry, whose insulation from foreign competition and concentration
on the home market saved it from the fate of the staple export industries.
Employment in printing, publishing, and bookbinding therefore rose signifi-
cantly faster than in industry as a whole between 1925 and 1936, though its
rate of growth slackened off somewhat in the 1930s.70 The fastest growing
sector was the London-based national newspaper press: as newspapers enjoyed
their greatest prominence as a form of mass communication, the total
circulation of the national dailies grew from 3.1 million in 1918 to 4.7
million in 1926 and 10.6 million in 1939. Much of this expansion came at
the expense of the provincial press whose circulations grew more slowly,
whose numbers declined, and whose ownership became progressively more
d· h . d 71concentrate ~n t e same per~o • While the pre-war trend for large-scale
specialised printing of books and monthly periodicals to move out of London
continued into the 1920s and 30s, the expansion of the national newspapers
and particularly the vast growth in printed advertising meant that the overall
decline of printing employment in London relative to the provinces was
72reversed.
The general buoyancy of the industry kept unemployment at roughly half
the level of all industries between 1921 and 1936; at its worst in 1932,
when a quarter of all ensured men were unemployed, the figure stood at 12%
70 Child, Industrial Relations, p.234; Musson, TA, pp.403-4.
71 G. Murdock and P. Golding, 'The Structure, Ownership and Control of the
Press, 1914-76', in Boyce, Curran, and Wingate, Newspaper History, pp.130~38i
and the estimates for circulations in W.A. Belson, The British Press:
Part III. An Historical Outline of Developments and Trends Affecting the
British Press (duplicated, n.d., 1958?} I am indebted to Keith McClelland
for supplying this last reference.
72 A.D. Denning, S.K. Ruck, and S.C. Sutton, 'Printing and Bookbinding' in
Llewelyn smith, New Survey of London Life and Labour, vol. V, p.226; Hall
Industries of London, ch.6.
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in printing.73 Compositors, whose numbers were not keeping pace with overall
output, were less affected than other trades, especially in London, though
no statistics are available. Such technical change as was introduced during
this period mainly affected the pressroom and other departments of printing
such as lithographic and intaglio work. In the composing room, the main
trend was the increasing replacement of case hands by the better paid machine
operators: according to the incomplete returns of the censuses, the number
of machine operators in England and Wales grew from 3,156 in 1911 to 11,954 in
1931.74
In this context, the inter-war years saw a reinforcement of the pre-war
tendency for the consolidation of craft regulation in the wake of the capture
of composing machines by skilled workers, and a reversal of the declining
social and material position of the compositor which had not yet made itself
fully felt before 1914. These trends can be discerned in the increasing
strength and extent of trade union organisation, in the increasing effect-
iveness of craft regulation as such, and in the sharp rise in compositors'
earnings relative to the cost of living and to those of other skilled trades.
Unionisation levels rose markedly during this period, as unorganised
pockets began to disappear. In London union density reached 90%, while
in the provinces major steps were taken to organise the black spots of the
Home Counties. The TA's membership grew from 24,762 in 1918 to 38,277 in 1939,
despite falloffs in the post-war slump and the depression of the early 1930s;
73 Child, Industrial Relations, pp.234-35.
74 Musson, TA, p.405. These figures probably underestimate the number of case
hands: I.C. Cannon suggests that the proportion of machine operators in
London did not exceed 25% of the total in this period. Cannon, Skilled
Worker, pp.235, 253.
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Musson estimates that the union had organised 80% of its potential membership
in 1930, though the proportion was doubtless higher among compositors and
75increased overall in the 1930s. These gains did not occur without setbacks,
of which the most serious were associated with the aftermath of the general
strike. A number of provincial firms organised house unions in hopes of
binding their workers to themselves more closely, and the TA's unsuccessful
attempt to oppose the formation of such a union at the Manchester Guardian
led to the expulsion of 200 of its members. More serious was the decision of
Scottish newspaper proprietors in Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, and Glasgow
to establish house unions, which unlike their English counterparts did not
permit employees to retain trade union membership as well. The reunionis-
ation of large sections of the Scottish newspaper industry thereafter occupied
the STA without success until the Second World War.76
We have already noted the growing effectiveness before and during the
First World War of trade union work rules concerning the regulation of labour
supply, overtime, casuality, and the operation of composing machines, and
this tendency continued uninterrupted during the interwar years. In the
provinces, the FMP accepted a favourable version of the TA's rules as part
of the 1919 National Agreement, and this was never challenged thereafterj
in London, the various Scales accepted by all union houses contained detailed
prescriptions concerning working methods as well as rates of pay, and these
too were not relaxed during this period. The improved effectiveness of craft
regulation was most evident in the restriction in the number of apprentices.
75 Ibid., p.235; Musson, TA, pp.407-9.
76 Child, Industrial Relations, pp.25l-53j Gillespie, STA, pp.2l9-23.
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A survey conducted by the Ministry of Labour in 1925-6 in cooperation with
the FMP and the Newspaper Society covering some 4,000 firms showed the
vitality of apprenticeship regulation: the overall average for Britain was
one apprentice to 5.3 journeymen~ in London the ratio was 1:7.5, and in
the provinces 1:4.5. Apprentices were banned from daily papers in London,
and the ratio in the provinces was 1:5.2 on weekly papers, 1:9.5 on evening
papers, and 1:16.5 on morning papers. 82.6% of all apprentices were bound
77under verbal or written agreements, depending on the custom of the district.
In 1909, a more restricted survey had put the number of journeymen per
trainee (including learners) at 1:3.7 nationally; by 1925, the ratio had
improved to 1:4.1. Not only was regulation improving in relation to the
apprentice: journeymen ratio, but the proportion of boy labour in composing
rooms was falling as well: among compositors employed in ail industries,
the number of boys under 21 per 1,000 workers dropped from 143 in 1911 to
92 in 1921~ in printing alone the figure declined from 153 to 93. (1911
itself already appears to show a considerable improvement on 1901: in all
industries, a composite figure for compositors, stereotypers and electrotypers,
and letterpress machine minders stood at 247 boys per 1,000 workers; by 1911
the figures stood at 143, 152 and 152 respectively.) By way of comparison,
we should recall that the analogous figures for fitters and turners in 1921
78were 258 and 246 per 1,000 respectively.
The fall in compositors' wage rates in the early 1920s by no means
equalled that of the cost of living, so that as a result they were markedly
77 Ministry of Labour, Apprenticeship, vol. I, pp. 9-16.
78 Ibid., Vol. VII, pp.46, 54.
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better off in real terms than before the war. The cost of living fell by
35% between 1921 and 1925, while London case rates fell by only 10%, and
those of the TA by 18-25%; since the reductions were flat rates they affected
the better paid machine operators proportionately less, while in London the
79news piece scales were not reduced at all. We have noted as well the
declining incidence of piece-stab and casuality, so that the average
compositor's position had probably improved more since 1900 than these
figures suggest, since the major forces depressing earnings below stab rates
had been removed. Wage rates remained stable throughout the 1930s, so that
compositors suffered no further cuts in the slump, but in turn fell behind
relative to the cost of living and national earning trends in the economic
revival after 1936.80
Before 1914, and particularly before 1900, compositors had complained
that their earnings were falling behind those of other skilled trades,
especially in London. As a result of their success in defending their
wartime gains, as well as of the increases won for machine operators before
the war, compositors appear to have drawn ahead of other categories of
skilled workers between the wars. Table 14 attempts to set out some
comparisons with other skilled trades, including engineering.
As we have argued earlier, information on workers' earnings as opposed
to their wage rates is notoriously scarce, and this undermines generalisations
about real wages, both absolutely and between trades. The figures given in
Table 14 avoid some of the main dangers usually involved in such comparisons,
79 Child, Industrial Relations, p.282; Musson, TA, pp. 394-401.
80 Child, Industrial Relations, pp. 282-83.
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though they are not without problems of interpretation. The compositors
rates given are minimum rates for jobbing case work, and actual earnings of
large sections were much higher. All machine operators in the TA earned at
least 6s - 8s 6d above case rates, and morning news machine rates were pegged
from 1923 at 83s 6d - 103s; the LSC's minimum machine rate was 96s and 160s
for morning machine hands, though most of the latter were paid by the piece
and earned even more. Case hands on daily papers and night jobbing hands
also were paid above ordinary rates. From 1937, moreover, the hours of
printing workers were reduced to 45 per week. Unfortunately, there is no
way of weighting the respective numbers of each group to produce a more
effective index of earnings, though if the census figures are to be believed
the better-paid machine hands were rapidly displacing the case hands in this
. d 81per10 •
While the figures for compositors are minimum rates, we fortunately
possess a new series for engineers' earnings, drawn from surveys conducted
by the Employers' Federation. These suggest that there was little divergence
between wage rates and earnings before 1914, but that the spread of piece
rates gave rise to wage drift in period of rapid expansion of output such
as the late 1920s and late 1930s: thus fitters' earnings exceeded district
rates by only 4s 3d in 1926 and 4s 2d in 1932, but by 8s Id in 1929 and ISs 6d
in 1938.82 But even comparing minimum rates of compositors to fitters' earnings
it is evident that the former stood well ahead of the latter until the
rearmament boom of the late 1930s, by which time high wage sectors like motor
81 Musson, TA, chs. 16, 19, passim; Ministry of Labour Apprenticeship, vol. I,
p.36.
82 Hart and Mackay, 'Engineering Earnings', pp.38-39.
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cars had become dominant in engineering while compositors' rates were no
longer keeping pace with inflation though their hours were shorter; an index
of real earnings would magnify the compositors' advantage through most of
the period and most likely preserve it even at its end.
As a result of these global changes in the social position of the
skilled compositor, there is some evidence that the inter-war years saw an
upgrading of the social basis of recruitment to the trade, particularly in
London. While commentators before 1914 had remarked that compositors' sons
were less likely to follow their fathers' trade than those of other more
secure groups such as machine minders, and managers complained of the low
quality of apprentices, an interview-based survey conducted by I.C. Cannon
in London in the 1950s suggests that the proportion of apprentices drawn from
compositors' sons and from middle class backgrounds increased during the
inter-war years. While Cannon's sample procedures are unreliable,
impressionistic evidence confirms that he has correctly identified the
83prevailing trends.
Conclusions
The divergences in the trajectories of skilled engineers and compositors
which had already become apparent before the war widened markedly during the
interwar period. As we have seen, the skill structure of the engineering
83 Cannon, Skilled Worker, pp.122-l3. On the decline o£ generational
succession and social quality among printing apprentices before the
war, see above, pp.l65-66.
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labour force changed rapidly during these years, while the ability of skilled
craftsmen and their unions to regulate working conditions on the shop floor
became increasingly frayed after 1922. In printing, by contrast, compositors'
control over labour supply and working conditions became progressively more
effective after 1914, despite some setbacks in the provinces and on Scottish
newspapers. These divergences can be seen across the whole range of possible
indicators which have been examined in this chapter, including the movement
of real wages, but perhaps the most important single difference lay in the
decline of apprenticeship in engineering and its marked reinforcement in
printing.
The divergent economic positions of the two industries undoubtedly
contributed to the respective fates of their skilled workers, especially in
the contraction of the older engineering sectors in the 1920s. But the
seeds of the long-term decline in the effectiveness of craft regulation in
engineering had already been sown before 1914, when the situation of the
older sectors was much less critical, and its short-run survival likewise
contributed to their stagnation during the immediate pre-war period; both
the decline of the older sectors and of craft regulation would most likely
have continued even without the disruption of international trade after the
war. Conversely, the prosperity of the printing industry between the wars
by no means explains the improved position of the compositors, since this
economic trajectory had continued unchanged since the 18705; compositors'
gains depended on the prior improvement of their framework of craft regulation
resulting from their successful capture of composing machines before the war.
It was likewise the failure of the engineers to entrench themselves in the
newer growth sectors of the industry before 1914, together with their inability
to forge a durable alliance with the less skilled, that exacerbated their
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decline after 1922. Thus in each case, the impact of economic change on
skilled workers' position in the division of labour was mediated by the
balance of forces between workers and employers whose importance we have
underlined throughout our account. In the concluding chapter, we will
attempt to draw together the various threads of our argument to explain the
differential abilities of skilled compositors and engineers to defend their
position in the division of labour in the face of pressures for technical
and organisational change.
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Chapter VIII
The Sources of Bargaining Power
On the eve of a major wave of technical and organisational innovation
in l890~ skilled workers occupied a central place in the division of labour
in both printing and engineering. In each industry they defended this position
inside and outside the workshop with an elaborate framework of craft
regulation, though by the 1880s its effectiveness was being increasingly
challenged by diverse pressures from the employers in engineering and
printing alike. Compositors in printing, fitters and turners in engineering,
each found their position deteriorating in the face of their employers'
efforts to cheapen and intensify hand labour by manipulating systems of
payment and supervision, by multiplying the number of apprentices, by
resorting to systematic overtime and casual labour, and by experimenting with
old and new forms of mechanisation. To be sure, subtle but significant
differences were discernable in such matters as the effectiveness of
apprenticeship regulation in the two trades, as were more basic variations
in the history and dynamism of the division of labour. But few contemporaries
would have suggested that the compositors in their three regional typographical
unions were better organised or more secure than the fitters and turners of
the ASE, which having spawned a range of imitators in the 1860s remained
among the largest and most influential forces in the labour movement.
By 1914, and even more clearly by 1930, the two trades had embarked
on markedly divergent paths. Despite the relative success of skilled
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engineers' ·guerilla campaign against the Terms of Settlement and against
the employment of handymen on machines after 1898, the long-term prospects
for craft regulation in the industry were being subverted by the decline
of apprenticeship and the extension of new systems of supervision and payment
by results. By the time of the General Strike, the ASE (now the AEU) had
been defeated in its second major confrontation with the EEF in 25 years,
had suffered spectacular wage cuts, and had seen a quarter of its inflated
wartime membership slip away. In its heavy engineering strongholds -
Clydeside, Lancashire, and the Northeast coast - mass unemployment prevailed,
though depressed market conditions prevented employers from taking advantage
of the collapse of craft regulation radically to restructure the division of
labour. In the prosperous new mass production centres of London and the
west Midlands, the union had been effectively driven off the shop floor
after the 1922 lockout, while craftsmen were increasingly confined to new
roles in indirect production. As employers throughout the industry enjoyed
unprecedented freedom of action on the shop floor, the proportion of skilled
men in Federated workshops dropped to little over one-third, apprenticeship
virtually disappeared outside certain of the old sectors, and a large
majority of AEU members found themselves working under systems of payment
by results.
The compositors by contrast emerged from the war in a position of
unparalleled strength. Despite post-war wage cuts in the provinces,
printers had become the best paid manual workers of the period. The
typographical unions throughout the country had secured virtually complete
control over composing machines at substantial advances over hand rates.
At the same time, they had obtained official recognition from the employers
for restrictions on the number of apprentices and other work rules which
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gave them an effective stranglehold over labour supply, particularly in
Fleet Street.
Why were compositors so much more successful than engineers in defending
(and even enhancing) their position in the division of labour and in enforcing
craft regulation in the face of pressures towards technical and organisational
change? Certain historians of printing have sought to explain the compositors'
capture of mechanical typesetting primarily by reference to the judicious
strategy adopted by their leaders in relation to the new machines.l While
the typographical unions did on occasion display a shrewd tactical sense of
when discretion formed the better part of valour, as for example over the issue
of payment for tuition on the machines, this argument cannot withstand a
comparative test. In rejecting such arguments we are not asserting that
union policies in general do not affect control of new processes; a good
example of such an impact can be drawn from the transition from wood to iron
shipbuilding. The shipwrights, who had formed the principal group of
woodworking craftsmen initially refused to work with metal in private shipyards
and so lost control of the principal hull construction operations in iron
shipbuilding to the boilermakers; in government dockycrrd~ by contrast, where
the shipwrights were prepared to work with iron, they retained control over
a much larger section of the production process.2
1 See ab Lvove, p.x •
2 See pollard and Robertson, Shipbuilding, pp.1S3-SS; Reid, Shipbuilding,
pp.82-87, 150-51; K. McClelland, 'Shipbuilding Workers on Tyneside, 1850-
1880' (unpublished paper, University of Birmingham, 1977), pp.11-12;
J. Field, 'Labour Sectionalism and the Skilled Trades of Portsmouth
Dockyard', Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History 40 (1980).
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An argument based on union policy, however, cannot account even for
the variations in the terms for operating composing machines won by the
TA and the LSC. While the TA Executive repeatedly conceded important points
to the employers rather than risk a national lockout - ranging from the
principles governing the relation between hand and machine work to shorter
hours - the LSC Trade Committee, under the impetus of a militant and participatory
membership, was prepared to face major strikes to impose tighter regulation of
the machines. More significantly, the demands accepted by all organized
printing employers in relation to union control over new machinery and the
shorter working week were markedly more restrictive than those which precipitated
the 1897-8 lockout; the ASE after all had requested only that certain machine
tools be reserved for its members, or failing thiS, that whoever worked them
receive the skilled men's rate.
In any case, such an argument begs the central question of how union
policies are determined, ignoring both the role of the rank and file in
policy formation and the wider contextual and organisational factors that
explain why some union executives can impose a strategy from above while
others cannot. As we have seen, executive policies considered insufficiently
protective of craftsmen's interests in the face of mechanisation provoked
rank and file revolts in each of the typographical unions, as well as in the
ASE. Yet in the printing unions these revolts did not produce any substantial
shift in union policy, while in the ASE the conciliatory strategy of working
within the Terms of Settlement pursued by the Executive was overturned by
opposition from the membership. Rank and file compositors eventually accepted
the policies of their leaders because they did not prove subversive of craft
regulation and because they themselves possessed no real alternative strategy.
Engineers overturned their Executive's policies because these had failed
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to prevent the deterioration of skilled craftsmen's position in the industry,
and because the democratic structure of the union made it possible for them
to do so. Thus it seems to have been the divergent abilities of the printing
and engineering unions to enforce their demands rather than any intrinsic
features of their policies or the attitudes of their members towards machinery
which account for the different outcomes.
A second line of argument to be found in certain contemporary sources
and in the historiography stresses the skills technically required for the
optimal operation of composing machines. Thus it has been suggested by
various authors that printing employers preferred to employ compositors on the
new machines because their skills (other than familiarity with the location
of types in their cases) remained essential for high output, and because
the high capital costs involved required reliable operators rather than
3cheap labour. It is certainly true that the operation of a linotype or
mono type is by no means an unskilled activity since the machine operator
must still be able to decipher his copy and hyphenate and justify the lines
in accordance with the rules of spelling, punctuation, and printing convention.
But while machine composition was a faster-paced and physically more demanding
activity than hand work it was also on balance less skilled: the case jobbing
hand, generally the most versatile but worst-paid of compositors, was often
called upon to design the layout of a simple advertisement or broadsheet,
3 Elias, The Monotype, pp.lO-ll:
There is no machine in the world which calls for greater care in
the selection of the operator than the mono type • Therefore, whether
for keyboard or for caster your men must be the best obtainable. A
careless operator will run up your bill for correcting and reading, and
upon urgent work will jeopardise your production, for it will be remembered,
you will be relying on the work of the machines being ready on time.
See also G.E. Barnet, 'The Introduction of the Linotype', in his Chapters
on Machinery and Labour (Cambridge, Mass., 1926), pp.26-29; and Child,
Industrial Relations, p.160, quoted above, Ch.V, note 156.
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while even the ordinary case hand setting streight copy had also to master
the intricate rules governing the internal spacing between moveable types,
a task eliminated by composing machines. The bulk of the skills still
required of the composing machine operator - literacy and speed - were
increasingly shared with the ordinary female typist, as printing employers
were fond of observing, who after all underwent a not inconsiderable training
period herself in most cases.
By the first decade of the 20th century, women were employed as
rnonotype operators in Scotland and London, and voices were raised among
printing employers clamoring for their use to be extended to the linotype
as well. Even if mechanisation removed some of the need for printing
employers to rely on cheap labour, all the evidence suggests that it was
only under intense union pressure - in most cases an actual strike - that
they were prepared to replace women with men as mono type operators. It seems
clear that from a technical point of view the introduction of compos.3rg machines
would have been compatible with a radically different division of labour,
modelled perhaps on that prevailing in Edinburgh book houses before
mechanisation, in which a small number of fully-trained compositors were
retained for such tasks as making up, imposing, table work, and supervision,
while the bulk of the actual typesetting was performed by women or non-
apprenticed men after a relatively short training period.
Nor should it be thought that the introduction of automatic machine
tools eliminated at a single stroke the need for skilled craftsmen in
engineering, as for example, the introduction of machinery in the French
glass bottle trade appears to have suddenly displaced artisans in the l890s.4
4 Scott, Glassworkers of Carmaux.
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Highly skilled engineers were still required (albeit in smaller numbers)
to make and set tools, install and repair machines, and even to perform
production work in most of the less specialized workshops that comprised
the bulk of the British engineering industry. As in printing, therefore,
new technology in engineering raised the question of where the line should
be drawn between skilled and less skilled work rather than eliminating the
demand for craftsmen to perform the former altogether.
If the intrinsic character of technology contributes little to an
explanation of the divergent fates of compositors and engineers, market
forces appear at first glance more powerful. The basic variations in the
experience of these two trades with mechanization, it might be argued by
neo-orthodox defenders of the deskilling thesis, can be explai~ed by the
contrast between the exposure of engineering to international competition
and the sheltered position of printing in the domestic market particularly
the newspaper sector. Insofar as technical advances in printing and
communication free employers from their dependence on a single local market,
the trends towards deskilling prevailing elsewhere in the economy should come
5to affect printing as well.
Leaving aside the question of whether the changes in the division of
labour in engineering can be accurately described as 'deskilling', such
arguments carry undoubted force. Where demand was expanding rapidly and
profit margins remained buoyant, as in newspaper printing, employers could
afford to cede skilled workers higher wages and greater control over working
5 This is broadly the argument of Zimbalist, 'Technology and the Labour Process
in Printing', in his Case Studies on the Labour Process, though the emphasis
there is on the autonomous deskilling impact of technology rather than on
shifts in market structure.
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conditions than where the reverse was true, as in book and jobbing printing,
and in much of engineering. More strongly, the intensification of international
competition among engineering producers and shifts in demand for their products
clearly constrained British employers' ability to tolerate the persistence
of craft regulation in the industry to a far greater extent than was the
case for their counterparts in printing. The impact of the world market
would be felt most sharply between the wars: those British firms whose
costs of production remained significantly above those of their American and
German competitors, or equally importantly, who failed to follow the shifts
in demand towards new products, tended to be driven out of international
markets to a greater or lesser extent.
But before we embrace such determinist arguments, certain major
qualifications are in order. The first concerns the slow, uneven, and
often perverse impact of market forces on the division of labour in engineering.
Between 1898 and 1914 buoyant demand for traditional export products allowed
British firms in the older sectors to earn acceptable, if not spectacular,
levels of profit without undertaking major investments in new plant and the
transformation of the division of labour. At the same time, the low initial
rates of return in the newer sectors consequent on the relatively weak market
in Britain for mass produced goods, together with rigidities in the structure
of existing enterprises, made such investments appear both risky and expensive
to established manufacturers. Thus before the war, market forces left a wide
space within which British engineering firms could select their investment
strategies, and the extent of the actual changes in the division of labour in their
workshops was determined by the clash between these strategic choices and
the shopfloor resistance of skilled workers. In this period, the consequence
of British engineering employers' incomplete transformation of the division
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of labour was slower growth of output and productivity than that of their
competitors rather than any immediate crisis of profitability. When
intensified international competition assumed a more critical aspect after
the war, it was by then too late for British firms in the older sectors to
mobilize the resources for ambitious rationalisation programs, as the depressed
climate of demand for heavy engineering products discouraged major new
investments. Even so, many firms in certain older sectors such as marine
engineering and machine tools survived the depression through wage cuts,
short-time working, and selective layoffs, only to reemerge with the traditional
division of labour relatively intact after the onset of rearmament.
Nor does printing present a less ambiguous case for the determinism
of market forces. If book printers in Britain were relatively. sheltered
from foreign competition, they remained extremely vulnerable to domestic
competition from provincial plants enjoying non-union wage rates and working
conditions. Yet in this sector as in newspaper printing, compositors won
control over mechanical typesetting, albeit on somewhat less advantageous
terms. Even in the newspaper sector itself, there was no shortage of local
competition, especially in London. It was the particular forms of competition
in this sector and their impact on the newspaper proprietors' capacity
for collective action rather than their insulation from market forces as
such which underlay their repeated concessions to trade unions.
Finally, even where an industry is not subject to foreign competition,
skilled workers may still fail effectively to enforce craft regulation. Thus
in building, where the nature of the work ensured that it be performed
locally as in printing, and where its varied character and the impact of
seasonal and cyclical fluctuations served to sustain a demand for skilled
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labour as in shipbuilding, craftsmen experienced increasing difficulty in
the years before the First World War in regulating apprenticeship and
working conditions, and often found themselves facing progressive casualisation,
particularly in London.6 Furthermore, a similar sheltered market position
was compatible with different results in other countries: in America the
building trades have always been one of the best organised sections of the
labour movement, a bastion of the closed shop and the mainstay of the
7American Federation of Labour. Thus in printing as in engineering, the
central role of market forces in explaining the divergent outcomes of
technical change is to be found less in an autonomous tendency to eliminate
inefficient and unprofitable forms of the division of labour than in their
impact on the balance of forces between skilled workers and their employers,
to which we now turn.
As we have argued throughout this thesis, the divergent abilities of
skilled engineers and compositors to control the impact of technical and
organisational change on their position in the division of labour flowed in
large measure from variations in the patterrs and outcomes of industrial
conflict. At issue here were both the outcomes of full-scale confrontations
between unions and employers, and the less dramatic evolution of the balance
of industrial power through local skirmishes and collective bargaining.
6 Burgess, Industrial Relations, Ch.2, especially pp.130-33; Price,
Masters, Unions, and Men; N.B. Dearle, Problems of Unemployment in the
London Building Trades (1908), especially Chs.3-4. For the role of market
conditions in sustaining a demand for skilled labour in the industry, see
Stinchcombe, 'Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production'.
7 For more recent contrasts between the effectiveness of craft organisation
in construction in the US and the UK, see L. Ulman, 'Collective
Bargaining and Industrial Efficiency', in R. Caves (ed.>, Britain's
Economic Prospects (1968), p.345 and Piore, Birds of Passage, Ch.2.
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The most striking contrast, of course, lay between the ASE's defeats
in the national confrontations with the EEF in 1897-8 and 1922 and the
relative success of the printing unions in the 1911 London 50 hours strike.
The differences in the timing of the two disputes are as important as
those in their outcomes as a guide to the varying balance of forces between
skilled workers and their employers in the two industries. The engineering
lockout developed at the onset of a period of major technical and organisational
change, as employers sought to free themselves once and for all from the
restrictions placed by craft regulation on their freedom of action in the
workplace. In printing, by contrast, employers in most firms conceded
initial control over the linotype to skilled compositors without a struggle;
subsequent disputes with the typographical unions focused more on how the
machines should be worked than on who should work them, though'certain
book firms did seek to employ women as monotype operators. Thus the 1911
Hours movement represented a forward movement launched by the compositors to
consolidate the advantages won by their initial capture of mechanised
typesetting, in contrast to the engineering lockouts in which the employers
took the initiative.
Employers in engineering were not only more aggressive than their
counterparts in printing, but also significantly more unified. The major
firms in most sections of engineering strongly supported the EEF at the
outset of the lockout, and theFederation's influence expanded considerably
during the dispute itself. In the years following the lockout, the EEF
developed into a powerful organisation enjoying remarkable hegemony over
the industry, able to formulate policy effectively on a centralised basis,
and from 1913 armed with an independent strike fund of considerable proportions.
In printing, on the other hand, the newspaper proprietors, having granted the
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48 hour week during the 1890s, withdrew from the London MFA in the face of
a threatened city-wide printing strike in 1906. It was thus mainly the
large London book and jobbing firms which mounted a determined resistance
to the unions in 1911, and a large proportion even of these defected during
the dispute itself.
These variations in employers' bargaining postures and capacities for
collective action stemmed in the first instance from differences in market
position and industrial structure. The sharpest contrast is that between
engineering as a whole and newspaper printing. We have often had occasion
to note the special vulnerability of newspaper proprietors to strike action
rooted in the combination of a highly perishable product with a volatile
readership and intense competition for advertising and circulation. A
related contrast lay in the differential exposure of the two industries to
foreign competition, with the newspaper and jobbing printers sheltered
from external competition by the nature of their product and engineering
firms feeling the threat from German and American manufacturers using a
more advanced division of labour.
While their vulnerability to strikes inhibited newspaper publishers
from uniting in opposition to their workers, the underlying buoyancy of
their economic position also enabled them to concede the unions' demands
more easily than could their counterparts in engineering. Given their
rapidly expanding market and the productive power of the linotype, newspaper
owners could afford to concede control over the machines to union craftsmen,
and even to pay operators substantial premiums, without cutting too far into
rising profits. In engineering, by contrast, slowly rising demand in the
older sectors, the limited market in Britain for mass produced goods, and
employers' anxieties about foreign competition all deterred them from offering
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financial premiums to win craftsmen's consent to the new techniques. On
the contrary, they believed the use of less skilled and lower paid labour
essential to the profitable operation of the new machines, as well as new
systems of incentive payment and supervision antithetical to craft
regulation. Thus conflicts over mechanization proved more bitter and less
amenable to compromise in engineering than in printing.
The importance of these variations in market structure is underlined
by the contrast we have repeatedly drawn between the daily newspapers and the
rest of the printing industry. As we have seen, it was the large book and
jobbing firms, able to stockpile their more standardised and durable product
but vulnerable to competition from provincial plants enjoying non-union
wage rates and work rules, which formed the backbone of
employers' militancy throughout Britain. With demand for their products
rising more slowly than that for newspapers, and profits squeezed by rising
capital costs and intensified competition, it is hardly surprising that
these firms initially (though unsuccessfully) experimented with female
operators on the monotype - which though better-suited to book production
offered lower cost-reductions than the linotype - and in general maintained
a harder line on wages, hours and working conditions than did the newspaper
proprietors. In a parallel vein, the lower level of local competition
faced by provincial newspapers compared to their London counterparts enabled
their proprietors to collaborate more successfully both with one another
and with other master printers, despite their similar vulnerability to time
pressures. But though their greater militancy and solidarity won them more
advantageous terms for the operation of composing machines, these were
never put to the test of strike action before 1914.
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If variations in market structure conditioned the relative cohesion
and aggressiveness displayed by printing and engineering employers, these
do not provide a complete explanation. While market structures defined the
lines of force which facilitated certain alliances and discouraged others,
the actual coalitions forged by employers depended in large measure on those
combinations of historical conjuncture, prior experience of industrial
conflict, and strategic choices which made them appear necessary and
desirable to the participants.
Thus structural forces can be discerned which acted to obstruct as
well as encourage the formation of a cohesive national employers' association
in engineering. The heterogeneity of the industry, which posed similar
problems of coordination for the unions, made it difficult to convince
firms in diverse sectors that their interests would be served by a single
national organisation; it was on this rock that the ITEA ran aground in the
1870s, as the marine firms preferred to hold aloof from an organisation which
they fuared would be dominated by the inland producers. Even after 1898,
the railway companies refused to join the EEF despite the fact that they
figured among the country's largest engineering employers. As we saw in
Chapter lV, it was the convergence of a number of factors in the 1890s
which overcame the sectional barriers among engineering employers.
Beginning in the late 1880s, a period of intensified normal conflict with the
ASE drove engineering employers, particularly in the marine centres, to
experiment with wider forms of cooperation. The combination of an upsurge
of foreign competition with new opportunities for mechanisation in the mid-
90s helped to convince leading firms in a number of sectors that a major
confrontation with the unions over craft regulation had become both
necessary and potentially profitable. Even so, it required the spectre of
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an immediate sharp increase in labour costs in the shape of the demand for
the 48 hour week to win over most regional employers' associations, and
many smaller firms less able to sustain the costs of a shutdown were
only brought into line through a rigorous trade boycott.
Similar factors contributed to the pattern of employer organisation
in printing. Despite the latent structural possibilities for collaboration
among the larger book and jobbing firms, it was the growing strength and
aggressiveness of the printing unions, manifested in demands for increases
in wages and reductions in hours, which led to the reestablishment of the
London MPA in 1890 and the formation of the FMP in 1901. Similarly, the
emergence of the first efforts at regional collective bargaining by
provincial master printers were the product of the conflicts over the
introduction of the linotype, while it was the convergence of a set of
related but separate disputes which gave rise to the grand coalition of
provincial newspaper, book, and jobbing firms in 1911. Even in the London
newspaper press, the proprietors' structural weakness was not the sole cause
of their initial concessions to the compositors over the linotype; their
previous experience with experiments at mechanical composition had made
them doubt that the new machines would enable them to reduce their dependence
on highly skilled operators.
In engineering, by contrast, the prior success of mechanisation disposed
employers if anything to overestimate the immediate impact of the new machine
tools on the industry's skill requirements, and so made them more prepared
to risk a full-scale confrontation with the unions. Moreover, had the Lse
remained completely intransigent on the questions of tuition, piece rates,
and restricton of output, rendering the linotypes completely unprofitable,
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it is conceivable that the London newspaper proprietors might have found
themselves forced to overcome their historic disunity. Had the breakthrough
to mechanical composition first affected the large book and jobbing firms
rather than the most vulnerable yet most profitable sector of the industry,
it seems unlikely that the compositors would so easily have secured control
of the machines. Given the actual sequence of historical developments,
on the other hand, the concessions made by the newspaper proprietors over
the linotype in turn weakened the bargaining position of the book and jobbing
firms over the monotype.
Whereas engineering employers were more united than those in printing,
the reverse was true of the workers in the two industries. The ASE did not
receive the support in 1897 of several of the most important unions of
skilled workers in the industry, the Boilermakers, the Patternmakers,
the Plumbers, and the various unions of blacksmiths. At the same time,
the engineers had earned the active hostility of the less skilled, who
remained largely unorganised. The 50 hour movement in London, by contrast,
was strongly supported not only by the various unions of printing craftsmen,
but also by the new unions of the less skilled, whose cooperation was by all
accounts crucial to the successful prosecution of the strike. Similarly,
the ability of the Edinburgh compositors in 1910 to impose restrictions on
the use of low paid female labour on local master printers depended on a
similar Federated movement, in which the women themselves cooperated to
secure higher pay. The centrality of inter-union collaboration in these
victories by printing workers is underlined by the defeat in 1912 of the
Edinburgh compositors' movement for the abolition of piecework which was not
supported by the local PKTF, and by the failure of the TA's national strike
against wage reductions in 1923.
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These variations in the solidarity of engineering and printing workers
stemmed in large measure from the sharply different social rela~ions prevailing
between sections of the labour force in the two industries, which were in
turn closely related to structural differences in the divisions of labour
prevailing before mechanisation. Paradoxically, the more amicable relations
between craftsmen and the less skilled in printing resulted from the compositors'
more successful policy of exclusiveness. Because there had been no
significant changes in typesetting methods since the days of Caxton and
Gutenberg, there were no non-craftsmen with a foothold in the organisation
of production who could be upgraded by the introduction of composing
machines. The only labourers passing through the composing room were
unambiguously relegated to carrying type-filled formes and to similar menial
tasks. At the same time, there was little overlap between compositors' work and
that claimed by other printing trades, and so limited scope for demarcation
disputes with other groups of craftsmen.
In engineering, on the other hand, a previous wave of mechanisation
in the l830s and 40s had called into being a host of handymen and machinemen
working simpler machines such as planers or drills who could now expect
to move onto semi-automatic lathes or milling machines at higher wages
unless restrained by the ASE. At the same time, the heteroge~5 structure
of the engineering industry, with its network of overlapping product and
labour markets, and the greater complexity of its division of labour, meant
that engineering craftsmen faced fierce competition for control over tasks
from members of other skilled trades, particularly in the shipyards with
their exceptionally sharp exposure to the business cycle. Skilled engineers'
demarcation lines were therefore far more tangled and ambiguous than those
of the compositors, and therefore more vulnerable to encroachments not only
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from employers, but also from other groups of workers 'beside' and 'below'
them in the occupational hierarchy.
These conflicts of interest made solidarity between skilled engineers
and other groups of workers difficult to achieve, even over a demand beneficial
to all such as the eight hour day_ As we have seen, the antagonism between
craftsmen and the less skilled in engineering, amply attested to by
contemporary observers and often reinforced by the formers' social aloofness,
reinforced the disposition of handymen and labourers, whether organised or
not, to blackleg during strikes by ASE members. Similarly, the defection of
the Boilermakers, Patternmakers, and other skilled trades from the movement
for the 48 hour week in 1897 was in large measure the result of the bitterness
created by a series of intense demarcation disputes during the preceding decade.
In printing, by contrast, the insulation of the compositors from such
conflicts with other groups of workers made warm relations possible not only
among the various crafts, but also between the compositors and the new unions
of the less skilled. The main threat to compositors' control of the labour
market came from unorganised and partly trained men and women, whose
exclusion all groups of unionised workers were prepared to support. The new
unions took the lead in the formation of a cohesive and dynamic Printing
Trades Federation, first in London and then nationally, and were the
first to propose joint action within its framework to secure the eight
hour day. In this context, the demand for a shorter working week appeared
as an egalitarian goal advantageous to all grades, even though this struggle
aided the compositors to consolidate their privileged status.
The importance of the structure of the division of labour for the pattern
of relations between craftsmen and the less skilled is confirmed by the
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endemic conflicts between printing machine managers and specialised labourers
in the machine room. The development of larger and more complex presses
during the second half of the 19th century had created an intricate division
of labour in the machine room which made it possible for an unskilled press
hand to ascend a ladder of progressively more demanding tasks until he could
challenge an apprenticed craftsman for the management of the largest presses.
As a result, not only did the machine managers respond more coaly to the
organisation of the lower grades of press hands than did the compositors, but
by the eve of the First World War conflicts over the promotion of underhands
to positions claimed by craftsmen had become so acute that NATSOPA had
transformed itself into a union aiming to organise all grades of workers,
while the threatened craft unions had formed a defensive alliance against
this threat of "usurpation".
But as in the case of the employers, the variations in the capacities
of engineering and printing unions for concerted action were not determined
solely by structural factors. As we have seen, the construction of durable
and effective Printing Trades Federations at the local national level was
the product of a lengthy and eminently political process of bargaining
cuoong the various unions in the industry. From the mi.d-Bos to the late 90s,
a series of attempts to form national and metropolitan Federations failed
because of disagreements over the basis of representation on its executive,
the reluctance of more powerful unions to surrender any of their autonomy to
a larger body, fears that federation would lead to undesirable entanglement
in other trades' disputes, and historic antagonisms between the various
regional typographical unions whose initial experiment at amalgamation had
collapsed in 1848. Despite the sympathy of the Lse for the
organising efforts of the new unions of the less skilled
compositors were initially reluctant to link their fortunes with them in a
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metropolitan Federation proposed by the Warehousemen and Cutters in 1894;
it was only the example of the engineering lockout and the worsening climate
of relations with printing employers over composing machines that convinced
them to affiliate in 1897.
Similarly, the enthusiastic support of the new unions for federated
action in pursuit of the eight hour day flowed not only from the lack of
antagonism between compositors and the less skilled in the workplace, but
also from the supportive role played by individual socialist compositors
and the LSC as a whole in their formation and subsequent growth, from the
socialist ideology of their leaders, and from their organisational dependence
on concessions from organised employers to achieve gains which they were too
weak to secure at plant level. These relationships were further solidified
by the experience of victories won through joint struggle during the decade
prior to 1911: the London PKTF played a central role in the recognition of
NSOPA by the MPA in 1900, and in the LSC's successes in the disputes at
Straker's and Hampton's in 1905-6.
Conversely, the defection of the TA from the Federated front in 1911
was a consequence both of its Executive's cautious and autocratic political
style and of the heritage of bitterness and distrust left by the jurisdictional
disputes with the LSC and the breakdown of amalgamation negotiations in 1907.
Compositors were fortunate that the local solidarity which they forged with
other printing trades proved a more important determinant of the outcomes of
industrial conflict in this period than the antagonisms between their own
regional unions which they failed to overcome.
In engineering, too, the structural sources of conflict with other unions
were exacerbated by the ASE's political style. If the ASE leaders' policies
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towards new machinery contributed little in themselves to the declining hold
of craft regulation over the trade, their aggressive and imperialistic conduct
towards other unions and groups of workers reinforced the engineers'
isolation and vulnerability to an employers' offensive. The ASE became
notorious in the 80s and 90s for its efforts to shore up its declining
organisational poaitdonqr attacking the smaller sectional societies and
appropriating the work claimed by their members; even when their strikes
were wholly directed against employers, they were rarely prepared to
consult other trades whose members were often laid off as a result of the
ASE's unilateral actions. Such attitudes led the union to hold aloof from
all proposed forms of inter-union cooperation before 1897, whether at a
regional or a national level, particularly those organised by its arch-rival
the Boilermakers, such as the Federation of Engineering and shipbuilding
Trades. In this context, it was hardly surprising that the other unions
left the ASE to face the employers' front alone in 1897, despite their own
commitment to the goal of the 48 hour week.
The failure of the various efforts between 1890 and 1914 to forge
an alliance between craftsmen and the less skilled within the framework of
the ASE was likewise linked to the internal politics of the union as well
as to the structural antagonism between handymen and apprenticed engineers
in the division of labour. In 1892, 1901, and again in 1912, ASE Delegate
Meetings under prompting from the Executive voted to create new sections
for less skilled engineering workers in hopes of broadening the union's hold
over the industry. Each time, however, these initiatives were frustrated
by the fact that responsibility for recruiting workers into these sections
remained in the hands of skilled workers in the District Committees who
were largely opposed to any dilution of the principles of craft regulation.
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More broadly, the notion of opening the ranks of the union to the less skilled
tended to become discredited in the eyes of militant ASE members and local
officials because of its association with George Barnes' broader strategy of
working within the Terms of Settlement and converting the union's goals from
the defence of craft regulation to the pursuit of economic demands through
national collective bargaining. This strategy foundered in turn on the
continuing commitment of rank and file engineers to craft regulation,
on its failure to secure tangible gains in the face of the employers'
simultaneous aggressiveness on wages and work organisation, and on the
democratic structure of the union which ultimately prevented the Executive
from imposing policies which were opposed by the majority of its members.
The alternative conception of a revolutionary alliance between
craftsmen and the less skilled associated with Tom Mann and later with the
syndicalist militants of the amalgamation movement held little appeal for
skilled engineers, not least because it was unable to propose any concrete
measures to overcome the practical conflict of interests between the two
groups within the existing division of labour. It was only during the
First World War, when it seemed conceivable at times that political upheaval
might give rise to an entirely new division of labour, that such ideas
acquired a wider following among engineering craftsmen. Even then, the
local alliances forged between skilled and semi-smilled workers tended to
collapse as soon as the issues that had brought them together gave way to
ones which divided them; with the stabilisation of the political situation
after the war and the collapse of the post-war boom, such conceptions once
again gave way to the older sectional and exclusive attitudes among the
majority of skilled engineers.
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The project undertaken in this thesis was inspired by a general
dissatisfaction both with the dominant theoretical approaches to the division
of labour and with the many historical case studies which described the
experience of individual trades against a backdrop of unexamined theoretical
assumptions. By embarking on a detailed historical comparison between two
groups of skilled craftsmen whose experiences with technical and organisational
change ran in certain respects against the grain of these theoretical
assumptions, and by attempting a systematic explanation of the divergences
between them, it was hoped to provide an account of the transformation of
the division of labour which would be more convincing from both a theoretical
and an empirical point of view.
Our account has highlighted the role of conflict between skilled
workers and their employers in determining the consequences of technical
and organisational change for the position of craftsmen in the division of
labour within the limits set by market forces. The outcomes of industrial
conflict have in turn been traced back to variations in the balance of
forces between skilled workers and employers, emphasizing the impact of
market structure and the preexisting division of labour on the bargaining
power of each group and their relative capacities for collective action.
At the same time, it has been argued that structural factors conditioned but
did not determine the actual pattern of alliances formed by workers and
employers, which depended in large measure on an essentially political
process influenced by specific historical conjunctures, past experiences of
conflict and cooperation, and the strategic choices of each group of actors.
A comparison of this type provides a solid basis neither for the
construction of a new theory of the division of labour nor for detailed
generalisations about the pattern of its development in other empirical
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cases. A number of wider methodological implications for the analysis of
the division of labour can nonetheless be drawn from the present study.
The account presented in this thesis strongly supports the view that the
development of the division of labour cannot be deduced from a unilinear
model of capitalist development but is rather the outcome of a complex
process of struggle and negotiation which must always be the subject of
empirical investigation. At the same time, such empirical studies cannot
proceed without certain theoretical guidelines. While the specific outcomes
and the relative importance of causal factors will differ in each case,
it seems reasonable to argue that the balance of forces between workers and
employers will always be of central importance for the transformation of the
division of labour. In similar fashion, the alliances and cleavages within
the ranks of each group crucial to the outcome of industrial conflict can
only be understood as the product of a dialectic between such structural
factors as market position and the shape of the existing division of labour,
and the creative responses of each group of actors to the dangers and
opportunities presented by any historical situation.
APPENDIX:
TABLES
Table 1
Employment in the Engineering Industry, 1851-1911
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A. Metal manufacture, machines, implements, vehicles, precious metals, etc.
(Great Britain, 1911 census categories)
Year Number (OOOs)
1851 536
1861 747
1871 869
1881 977
1891 1151
1901 1485
1911 1795
Source: Abstract of British Labour Statistics, 1886-1968 (1968), Table 102
B. Estimated Number of Operatives (Male and Female) in the Manufacture of
Machinery and Shipbuilding, 1881-1911 (Great Britain)
Year Machinery (OOOs)
457.3
533.7
695.7
733.1
Shipbuilding (OOOs)
72.5
94.3
122.7
158.0
1881
1891
1901
1911
Source: E.H. Phelps Brown and M. Browne, A Century of Pay (1968), p.4l6
C. Employment in Selected Sectors of Engineering and Shipbuilding, 1907
(Great Britain)
Sector
Engineering (mechanical and electrical)
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (private firms)
Cycles and Motor Vehicles
Railway Carriages and Wagons
Railway Firms (construction, repair, and maintenance of
rolling stock and plant)
Royal and Naval Ordinance Factories
Government Shipyards
Source: Analysis of 1907 Census of Production in A.E. Musson,
The Growth of British Industry (1978), p.181
Number (0005)
461. 7
188.3
54.3
28.0
241. 8
15.6
25.6
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Table 2
Male Employment in Printing, 1851-1911
A. Printing, Paper, Books, and Stationery (Great Britain, 1911 Census
categories)
Year Number
1851 62
1861 79
1871 94
1881 134
1891 178
1901 212
1911 253
Source: Abstract of British Labour Statistics, Table 102
B. Growth of Male Employment in Printing by Sector, 1851-1891
(England and Wales)
Sector 1851 1871 1891 % increase 1851-91
Bookbinding 5.5 7.9 11.5 110
Printing 23.6 44.1 82.0 250
Lithography 2.0 3.8 B.6 330
Papermaking 6.1 10.1 12.0 100
Total 37.2 65.9 114.1 207
Source: Censuses of Population as analyzed in J. Child, Industrial
Relations in the British Printing Industry (1967), p.l07
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Table 3
Sectoral Structure of the Engineering and Printing Industries, 1907
A. Gross Output of Selected Sectors of the Engineering Industry
Sector Value (Ern.)
13.0Textile Machinery
Railway Locomotives: Private Builders
Railway Companies
Railway Carriages and Wagons: Private Builders
Railway Companies
4.5
7.9
8.2
7.6
12.4
15.8
Marine Engineering
Steam Engines (excluding locomotives and agricultural
steam engines)
Cycles, Motor Cycles, and Parts
Motor Vehicles and Parts
Boilers
Machine Tools
Agricultural Machinery and Steam Engines
Internal Combustion Engines (except motor vehicles)
Hydraulic Machinery
Mining Machinery
Other Machinery
Electrical Engineering
9.8
6.9
5.7
5.2
4.1
2.9
2.4
2.1
1.4
1.3
11.7
14.1
Source: Analyses of 1907 Census of Production in Saul, 'Engineering',
p.192; Musson, British Industry, p.183; T.R. Gourvish,
'Mechanical Engineering' in N. Buxton and D.H. Aldcroft (eds.),
British Industry between the Wars, p.l33
B. Gross Output of Selected Sectors of the Printing Industry
Sector
Jobbing and General Printing
Newspapers
Magazines
Lithographic and Photographic Process
Books
Value (£OOOs)
11
10
2
3
2
Source: Analysis of 1907 Census of Production in J.C. Smail, Training
and Employment in the Printing Trades (1917), p.9
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Table 4
Piecework in Engineering, 1861-1906
A. National Figures
Year % on piecework
1861 (a) 10.5
1876 (a) 17.0 (England and Wales)
3.0 (Scotland)
1886 (b) 7.5
1891 (a) 16.8
1906 (c) 27.5 (all engineering workers)
33.0 (fitters and turners)
(a) ASE members only
(b) 1886 Wages Census*
(c) 1906 Wages Census**
* Sample of 54,141 engineering workers, including 7,547 fitters and
turners;
**Sample of 368,552 engineering workers, including 61,238 fitters and
turners.
Source: 1861: ASE, Returns on Trade Customs, etc. in M. and J.B. Jefferys,
'The Wages, Hours, and Trade Customs of the Skilled Engineer in
1861', Economic History Review, 1st ser., 17 (1947);
1876: ASE General Information Schedule, cited in K. Burgess,
The Origins of British Industrial Relations (1975), p.26;
1886: Wages Census, PP. 1893-4, LXXXIII, pt.II, cited by Jefferys
and Jefferys, 'Skilled Engineer';
1891: submission of the ASE to the Royal Commission on Labour,
Group A, Minutes of Evidence, pP. 1893-4, XXII, App.XLVI;
1906: Board of Trade, Report of an Enquiry into the Hours and
Earnings of Workpeople in the U.K., PP.1911, LXXXVIII, pt. I
B. Increase of Piecework in Selected Districts, 1861-91
District % 1861
Lancashire 16
Yorkshire 11
Southwest 16
East Midlands 14
west Midlands 14
Eastern Counties 19
% 1891
26
17
22
25
44
57
Source: Jefferys and Jefferys, 'Skilled Engineer', p.43
Table 5
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Trade Union Standard Rates and Average Time Earnings of Fitters and Turners,
1886
District
Northumberland,
Durham, North
Yorkshire
Manchester
South Lancashire
(except Manchester)
West Yorkshire
(except Sheffield)
Cumberland, West-
moreland, North
Lancashire
London
Notts., Derbys.,
Lincoln
Cheshire, Staffs.,
Warks., Worcesters.
Standard Rate
26/6 (Hull) , 30
(Newcastle) , 33
(Sunderland)
34
(Oldham) 33
(Blackburn) 32
(Leeds) 36
(Barrow)
(Nottingham) 34
(Birmingham) 30
Bristol, Monmouths., (Bristol) 32
South Wales
Glasgow (1889) 33/9
Belfast 26/6
31
Average % whose earnings ranged
Earnings more than 10% above or
below average earnings
29/6 24
29/0 30
31/6 12
31/11 14
29/0 25
29/5 18
26/11 22
27/2 18
29/4 17
29/3 7
38/0 5
37/6 9
26/1 28
27/8 32
30/1 18
30/5 30
26/4 28
28/3 32
28/6 18
27/5 12
27/1 27
27/1 25
38
Total Number in Sample: 2601 Turners, 4946 Fitters
Note: In columns three and four, the figures for turners are given above
those for fitters.
Sources: A.H. Bowley and G. Wood, 'The Statistics of Wages in the U.K.
during the last Hundred Years, pt.X, Engineering and Shipbuilding:
Trade Union Standard Rates', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,
68(1), 1905; General Report on the Wages of the Manual Labour Classes
in the U.K., 1866 and 1891 (1886 Wages Census), (C.6889), PP.1893-4,
LXXIII
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Table 6
Casual Labour in the Typographical Association 1892: Branches with OVer
200 Members
Branch No. of Members No. of Casuals % of Casuals
Belfast 468 118 25.6
Birmingham 645 86 13.3
Bristol 305 70 22.9
Cardiff 330 23 6.9
Derby 220 27 12.3
Hull 260 54 20.7
Liverpool 830 149 18.0
Manchester 1611 499 31.0
Newcastle 489 79 16.1
Nottingham 266 56 21.0
Oxford 260 10 3.8
Sheffield 365 54 1\4.7
Total 6049 1225 20.3
Source: Report for Half Year to 25/6/92, Typographical Circular, Jan. 1893,
p.4
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Table 7
Apprenticeship in Printing, 1850-1890
A. Regulation of Apprentices in the United Kingdom 1850
Region Journeymen Apprentices
London 3000 1500
England and Wales 2500 (1937) 2000 (1443)
Scotland 1500 (954) 1200 (550)
Ireland 1500 (548) 1300 (475)
Total 8500 (6439) 6000 (3968)
Figures in parentheses are actual trade union figures
Source: E. Edwards, 'The Disease and the Remedy', LSC Prize Essay 1850,
in E. Howe (ed.), The London Compositor (1947), p.307
B. Regulation of Apprenticeship in London 1837-1890
Year Houses Journeymen Apprentices Turnovers Ratio
1837 94 1110 425 2:5
1840 95 1343 534 2:5
1847 124 1901 495 140 2:6
1867 99 2344 547 103 2:7~
1877 180 3601 961 112 2 :6'~~
1880 169 3901 874 94 1:4
1890 306 6679 1412 83 1:4~
Source: Report of LSC Special Committee on the Apprenticeship Question,
1887, in Howe, London Compositor, Doc.XCIII; LSe Annual Report
1890
Cont.-
Table 7 Cont.-
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C. Apprentices, Boys, Women, and Journeymen: Selected Provincial Printing
Centres 1885
Town
TA:
Aylesbury
Bristol
Burnley
Cardiff
Derby
Gloucester
Guildford
Halifax
Huddersfield
Lancaster
Liverpool
Middlesborough
Newry
Penrith
Preston
Rugby
Scarborough
Sligo
Southport
Stafford
Sunderland
Wigan
York
STA:
Ardrossan
Ayr
Dundee
Edinburgh
Glasgow
Hamilton
Journeymen Apprentices and Boys
100 25 girls, 100 boys
200 57
30 28
200 100
200 30 girls, 30 boys
55 50
90
72
25 2 girls, 30 boys
1260 120 boys, 160 apprentices
50 40
100 80
12 16
110 90
35 8
50 18
16 11
71 17
75 75
70 56
52 15
120 80
11 8 boys, 3 girls
30 28
150 100
1000
1401 1000
18 10
Independent Local Societies:
Dublin 600 100 girls, 30 boys
Leeds 1000
Women Apprentice Ratio
15 1:3
max. 3 per office
60 max. 3 per office *
1 max. 3 per office *
union offices: 1:3-4
all offices: 1:1
60
3 in all union offices
max. 3 per office
1:2
3 per office
2-3 per office
3 per office
3 per office
1:6 up to 3 per office
3 per office
1:3 *
7
3 per office *
2 3:9
3:9
3 per office *
300 1:3 *
1:3 max. 4 per office
1:3
officially 1:9; in
practice 1:3
sliding scale: 2:4-
7:31-40; evaded in
some cases
* Ratio not effectively enforced
Note: These figures include pressmen and other printing trades as well as
compositors, though the latter are overwhelmingly predominant.
Source: Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade and Industry, Second
Report, PP.1886, XXII, Appendix II
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Table 8
Outcome of 1911 London printing Strike
A. Reunionisation of London Printing Houses 1911-1919
Firms on LSC Fair List 11/10 not conceding 50 hours by April 1911 144
Concessions by November 1911 25
Concessions between November 1911 and January 1915 16
Concessions between January 1915 and March 1919 13
Total of concessions by March 1919 55
Non-conceding firms absent from Post Office Directory 1919 37
Remaining firms still resisting in 1919 52
Percentage of original pool resisting in 1919 36
B. Additions to LSC Fair List 1912-19
1912 na
1913 52
1914 na
1915 na
1916 na
1917 51
1918 59
1919 86
C. Date of Concession of Major Firms
April-November 1911:
Clowes
Wyman and Sons
Harrisons
George Newnes
Hazell, Watson, and Viney
Eyre and Spottiswoodes
Bal1antynes
1915-1918:
Harrnsworth
Alabaster Passmore and Sons*
Water10w Bros. and Layton
Water10w and Sons
Spottiswoode and Co.
Sir Joseph Causton and Sons
* not on LSC Fair List 11/10
Sources: LSC Fair Lists, 1910-15; LSC Annual Reports, 1910-20; Kelley's
Post Office Directory of Stationers, Booksellers and Papermakers,
1919
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Table 9
Promotion of Handymen onto Skilled Men's Work 1897-8
I. Working of Machines Marine Dist. Marine Dist. Inland Dist. Inland Dist.
(46 firms) (23 firms) (13 firms) (39 firms)
l. unskilled men
started during 263 135 104 198
dispute
2. number still 197 104 80 139employed 3/98
3. unskilled men
started since 171 57 60 70
close of dispute
Total Retained (2 & 3) 368 161 140 209
II. Other Skilled
operations
l. unskilled men
started during 49 3 102 26
dispute
2. number still 36 3 98employed 3/98 14
3. unski lled men
started since 13 5 11 7
close of dispute
Total Retained (2 & 3) 49 8 109 21
Total Unskilled
Men Promoted (I & II) 417 169 249 230
Average per firm 9.07 7.68 19.15 5.80
Source: Engineering Employers' Federation Archives, Emergency Reports 1/6/1898;
13/9/1898
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Table 10
Conferences Between EEF and ASE on Machine Manning 1898-1914
A. Results of Conferences on a Scale from 1-6 (See Below for Key)
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6
1898-1901 5 5 1
1902-1907 6 2
1908-1910 3
1911-1914 3 5 10 3 2
Key: 1. Appeal dropped by union before central conference;
2. Appeal dropped at CC, referred back to local conference, or CC adjourned;
3. Failure to agree, or no recommendation;
4. Conciliatory formula proposed by employers - e.g. employers should
avoid displacement of old hands in introducing new machine tools;
5. Union success;
6. Union success without CC.
B. Geographical Distribution of Cases by Area 1898-1914
Region 1898-1901 1902-1907 1908-1910 1911-1914 Premium Bonus1902-1907
Lancs & Yorks 5 (7) 3 2 17 3 (4)
Northeast Coast (3) 3 2 (4) 6 (7)& Barrow
Northwest,
Scotland & 1 2
Belfast
W. Midlands 1 2
London 1 1 1 1
Other 1 2 3
Figures in parentheses include cases in EEF archives which did not reach
a central conference.
Source: EEF Archives, Series M(3) - M(9); Series P(2)
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Table 11
Strikes over Machine Manning in Engineering and their Outcomes 1898-1914
Year District Firm Outcome
1898 Manchester Johnson & Co. Defeat-strikers replaced
1898 Halifax J. Sagar & Co. Defeat-return on old terms
1900 Oldham Wm. Bodden & Sons Defeat-return on old terms
1901 North East Richardson, Westgarth Defeat-return on old terms
1904 Paisley M & 0 Car Co. Defeat-strikers replaced
1904 Hull Amos and Smith Defeat-return on old terms
1906 Manchester Muirs Defeat-return on old terms
1907 Burnley Pembertons Defeat-return on old terms
1907 Burnley Butterworth & Dickinson Defeat-return on old terms
1908 Belfast Davidson & Co. Defeat-strikers replaced
1911 Bradford Parkinson & Co. Defeat-strikers replaced
1912 E. Scotland Brown Bros. Defeat-men return on old terms
1912 Burnley? Compromise recommendation
1912 Bradford? Compromise recommendation
*1912 Blackburn H. Livesey & Co. Victory
*1912 North East John Lynn & Co. Victory
1913
1913
1913
*1913
1913
Bolton Vulcan Motor & Engine Go. Compromise
Coventry
London
Coventry Ordnance Wks. Compromise
? Defeat-return on old terms
Bolton
Birmingham
Dobson and Barlow Victory
VictoryTangyes
* strike was 'constitutional': i.e. occurred after EEF disputes procedure
had been exhausted.
Note: where information given was not sufficient to determine the outcome
of strikes, these were omitted.
Sources: EEF Archives, Minutes, Emergency Committee Reports, Case Files,
Series M; ASE ODD Reports in ASE MJ&R 1898-1904, 1911-14
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Table 12
International Competition in Mechanical Engineering Exports, 1913 (Em.)
Product UK USA Germany
Agricultural Machinery 3.0 6.7 2.5
Boilers 1.8 0.8
Prime Movers 5.2 1.9 4.7
Machine Tools 1.0 2.9 4.0
Locomotives (rail and road) 3.4 1.2 3.9
Sewing Machines 2.4 2.4 2.8
Textile Machinery 8.3 0.3 2.8
Miscellaneous 9.7 14.2 15.7
34.8 29.6 37.2
Note: Table excludes cars, cycles, firearms, and railway carriages and
wagons. Miscellaneous section largely consists of cranes, pumps,
mining, hydraulic, sugar grain milling, paper making, and woodworking
machinery.
Source: Balfour Committee on Industry and Trade, Survey of the Metal
Industries, (1928), pp.138-206, analysed by S.B. Saul, 'Engineering',
in D.H. Aldcroft (ed.), The Development of British Industry and
Foreign Competition, 1875-1914 (Glasgow, 1968), p.229
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Table 13
Distribution of Engineering Skills, 1914-33 (Federated Shops)
Year
1914
1921
1926
1933
Skilled
60
50
40
32
Semi-Skilled Unskilled
20
30
45
57
20
20
15
11
Source: M.L. Yates, Wages and Working Conditions in British Engineering
(1937), p.32
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Table 14
Relative Wage Rates of Compositors and Selected Skilled Trades 1914-1938
Year TA Stab LSC Stab Engineers Ship- Brick- Engine-wrights layers drivers
1914 28-36/6 39 38.9 41.3 40.6 40.5
1923 62/6-77 /6 89 55 (4/3) 48.9 69.0 59.4
1938 62/6-77/6 89 69 (15/6) 68.0 73.1 72.0
Note: The figures in parentheses represent the amount by which fitters'
earnings exceeded basic rates according to surveys conducted by the EEF;
the figure for 1923 actually refers to 1926. Figures for all other
trades than compositors are weighted averages of district rates.
Sources: A.E. Musson, The Typographical Association (Oxford, 1954), p.190;
Ministry of Labour, Report of an Enquiry into Apprenticeship and
Training in U.K., 1925-6 (1928), Vol.I, p.36; K.G.J.C. Knowles and
D.J. Robertson, 'Differences in the Wages of Skilled and Unskilled
Workers, 1880-1950', Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Statistics,
13(4) (1951), p.126; R.A. Hart and D.r. Mackay, 'Engineering Earnings
in Britain, 1914-68', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,
Ser. A, Vol. 138, (1975), pt.I, p.39
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ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations are used to indicate the location of rare sources:
BM Briotish Museum/British Library
EEF EEF Archives, Broadway House, Tothill St., London SWl
LSE London School of Economics and Political Science (including
Webb Collection)
MRC Modern Records Centre, Warwick University
St. Bride's st. Bride's Printing Library
Note: Place of publication is London unless otherwise indicated.
Where serials or periodicals exist for the entire period 1890-1914,
no dates have been given.
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